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THURSDAY MORNING SESSION
August 17, 1978
The Public Oversight Board Public Hearing on Scope 
of Services by CPA Firms, SEC Practice Section, American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants convened at 9:00 
o’clock in the United-B Room of the Hyatt Regency Hotel, 
Chicago, Illinois, with Mr. John J. McCloy, Chairman, 
presiding. .........
MR. JOHN J. McCLOY: Ladies and Gentlemen: We 
have a rather long schedule this morning, and I am terribly 
anxious to keep up with it so we don’t get behind and we 
can give an opportunity to everybody that wants to be heard, 
to be heard.    
Sitting before you here are the Public Oversight 
Board of the AICPA SEC Practice Section. I think that is 
the dignified title, and this Board has the imposing task 
of overseeing the operations of the self-regulatory 
program of the AICPA to help insure its thoroughness and 
its fairness and its efficient operation when it is in 
place and functioning.
As I see our role, it was not one having line 
authority to make decisions or act in any sort of way as a 
reviewing body in regard to the action of the profession 
in the course of its self-regulatory functions, but we are 
charged and very pointedly charged, I think, with the 
duty of observing the operation of the system and reporting 
to appropriate bodies as to our thoughts and recommendations 
arising from that observation. We have been asked to render 
our judgments on proposals now being put forward to limit, 
at least to some degree, the scope of the management 
advisory services which the accounting firms should engage 
in at the same time they are called upon to attest the 
fairness of the financial information of the client.
The proposals arise out of the very strong desire 
that those responsible for the conduct of audits of 
companies should maintain a fully objective and independent 
attitude, in regard to their relationships with those 
companies who employ them so that all who rely on those 
statements may have the confidence that the auditors’ 
findings and attitudes embody that independence and that 
objectivity.
We are aware that this subject of the so-called 
"MAS” (management advisory services) is not a new one. 
Much already has been written about it and said about it, 
and having been given the duty of taking a look at the 
background, I am practically blind from having tried to 
read and keep up with what has appeared. We felt that 
before we were in a position where we could render a 
judgment in regard to this, we might make provision for 
a hearing as there were a number of interested groups 
who did indicate that they would like to have their 
thoughts brought at least up-to-date. It became apparent 
that this was a desirable thing to do even though so much 
ink had been spilt heretofore on this subject. We are 
aware that there are many varied views.
I have asked Mr. Ray Garrett, Jr., Vice Chairman 
of our Board, a former Chairman of the SEC, and a partner 
in the law firm of Gardner, Carton and Douglas, to take 
the laboring oar in preparing for these hearings and 
preparing us for the position that we now occupy in 
sitting in judgment as to some of the recommendations 
in respect to this subject.
I think I ought to say that we are quite aware 
of the fact that this subject is one in which very 
significant and substantial interests are involved.
I don’t contemplate that we will be in a 
position to render any opinions, so to speak, from the 
bench today on it. I think I ought to also warn you that 
our decisions aren’t decisive, though I dare say they 
may be influential. It is quite possible, as I see it 
at least, that some of the judgments of the Board we may 
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want to defer until the Board observing the self-regulatory 
procedures has gained more experience before we conclude 
what our final judgments are on the whole subject.
I am now going to turn the conduct of this hearing 
over to Mr. Garrett as he and his firm, as I say, have 
pulled the laboring oar in the preparatory work for it, 
and in many other respects he is better qualified and 
equipped than I am to assume this task.
But before I do that, I would like to introduce 
to you the members of the Board. I will start with 
Professor William L. Cary who is on my left. He is 
Professor at the Columbia Law School, and a former Chairman 
of the SEC.
I might say that Mr. John Harper, another Board 
member, couldn't be with us today because he recently 
came on the Board, and his appointments had jelled, as had 
ours. He is a former Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, 
as you may know, of ALCOA.
Mr. Arthur Wood, on my right, is former Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer of Sears Roebuck & Co.
I have mentioned Mr. Garrett. Mr. Charles Manzoni 
is from Mr. Garrett's firm.
He and Mr. Richard Stark is on the right of Mr. 
Wood. He is a member of my firm, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley 
& McCloy, and he has been looking over and supervising 
the legal work which we have had to assume in large part 
in connection with the organization of the POB.
Mr. Matusiak is a former partner of Alexander 
Grant & Company, and he is the Executive Director of the 
POB.
I think I have introduced everybody. I have 
referred to Mr. Garrett. I am going to turn the proceedings 
over to him and let him conduct this hearing throughout.
I hope we will have a chance to really get your 
views. In the first place we shall be glad to have your 
statements and then we can perhaps have some questions 
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afterwards, all for the purpose and all for the objective 
of trying to educate us, as well as you perhaps, as to 
some of the problems that we face in trying to make 
our recommendations on this subject.
Mr. Garrett, will you take over.
MR. RAY GARRETT, JR.: Thank you very much, Mr. 
McCloy.
I imagine that most of you have participated 
in sessions similar to this, but in case you have not, 
I should emphasize it is not a trial. Nobody is here by 
compulsion or under oath, so we hope you tell us the 
truth.
We are grateful to you rather than being in 
any accusatory or judgment sense. We very much want 
education, and the benefit of as many views from as many 
directions as we can get because we know that to the 
extent that our conclusions and recommendations are 
influential, this particular issue, or set of issues, 
probably has a more immediate and deeper effect on the 
financial welfare of more accountants than any of the 
other issues that we are dealing with in the self- 
regulatory program.
This sort of thing can put people out of 
business. We know that, and we don’t want to participate 
in recommending anything that has that kind of effect 
upon people without understanding as best we possibly 
can what we are recommending and why.
So we are grateful to you, both for the written 
comments that you and your associate firms have supplied, 
and also for the willingness to take the trouble to come 
here and actually talk to us.
We do have a court reporter present making a 
record, a transcript, for our own benefit. We also have 
before us, each of us on the panel, the written materials 
that have been submitted, but in giving your statements, 
I think probably the wise thing is not to assume that we 
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have all read them all.
I dare say at this point there are varying 
degrees of diligence and time available and some of 
the written statements just, in fact, arrived this 
morning.
As to your own presentations, we have allowed 
a half hour apiece. We will have, incidentally, a coffee 
break from 10:15 to 10:30. The half hour is yours, but 
if it is all consumed in reading a prepared paper, it 
will suffer from our point of view from lack of any 
opportunity to ask any clarifying questions, but that 
is up to the individual persons who are making statements 
as to the extent to which they want to read a prepared 
paper or summarize or present their views in any fashion 
that is suitable to them.
As I say once more, the setting is somewhat 
more formidable than I think we had anticipated, but 
this is a friendly educational session and not a court, 
and not a place in which anybody is intended to get hurt 
in any fashion.
We will begin—I don’t know whether copies of 
this schedule have been made available, Lou, to anybody 
else. Have they?
MR. LOUIS W. MATUSIAK: Yes, they have.
MR. GARRETT: Good. That will make it easier.
The first persons to make statements are George 
Catlett and Bill Mueller from Arthur Andersen & Co.
I would appreciate it very much if we could get 
started, George and Bill.
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MR. GEORGE R. CATLETT: I am George R. Catlett, 
a senior partner of Arthur Andersen & Co., and I am 
accompanied by William J. Mueller, Vice Chairman of our 
firm with responsibility of our administrative services 
practice.
My written statement has been submitted to you 
in advance of this hearing, and I will summarize a few 
of the matters covered by that statement.
When society grants to accounting firms the 
authority to give reports on financial statements for use 
by the public, certain responsibilities go with that 
authority. These responsibilities include engaging only 
in those activities that do not detract in any significant 
way from the attest function.
There have been controversy and confusion about 
the need for restrictions on the services of accounting 
firms. Unless the underlying reasons are analyzed and 
applied in a sensible and logical manner, no useful 
purpose will have been served for investors, for the 
business community, for the accounting profession, or 
for anyone else.
In considering the limitations on the scope of 
services of accounting firms, I believe that two basic 
criteria are involved: independence and compatibility. 
All other criteria represent guidelines for the 
implementation of these basic criteria.
Independence is a cornerstone of the attest 
function. General agreement exists on the general 
proposition that accounting firms should not engage in 
activities that compromise or adversely reflect on the 
attest function in a manner that would impair or appear 
to impair the independence of the auditors in giving 
reports on financial statements.
The divergence of views with respect to 
independence does not result from the general concept 
involved but from questions concerning how the concept
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should be applied.
Some agreement exists on the general proposition 
that accounting firms should perform only those services 
that are compatible with their responsibilities to the 
public. The credibility of independent auditors which 
is so necessary in carrying out their function in our 
American system depends upon a clear demonstration that 
CPAs, independent of clients and government alike, serve 
the public interest and perform a vital role in our 
system better than any other arrangement.
If an accounting firm were to appear to be like 
a department store, constantly adding diverse and unrelated 
lines, an adverse image of such a firm could be created. 
The attest function could appear to be downgraded, at 
least in the eyes of persons outside the accounting 
profession, whether or not independence is really affected. 
This is illustrated by the fact that certain services, 
such as plant layout and design which are currently under 
some criticism, are only remotely related, if at all, 
to independence.
The divergence of views with respect to how a 
compatibility criterion should be applied is greater 
than with respect to independence, because the accounting 
profession has recognized the independence issue for a 
much longer time and has had more experience in dealing 
with it.
The principal guideline in the proposed 
amendment relating to the compatibility criterion is the 
restriction of "accounting and auditing related skills" 
which replaces the existing guideline of "accounting and 
financial related areas." This is a substantive change. 
While "skills" may have some merit as a guideline, "areas" 
would give more understandable, and probably more desirable, 
guidance in the long run. The "skills" presumably could 
be used in any area even though such area is not related 
to accounting, financial or auditing.
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The application of the criteria only to 
services performed for SEC reporting companies was added 
to the original membership requirements of the SEC 
Practice Section by specific vote of the AICPA's Council 
because of the emphasis on publicly owned companies and 
because of the concerns of smaller accounting firms about 
possible limitations on their services for privately 
owned companies. Smaller firms have had a continuing 
question about whether rules adopted in this context 
eventually would adversely affect their practice. Undue 
restrictions should not be placed on these firms in 
serving privately owned companies. The fact that there 
are two sections in the AICPA Division for Firms 
represents recognition of the different characteristics 
of the nature of public accounting as it related to 
companies under the jurisdiction of the SEC and to 
privately owned companies.
Auditors who elect to audit publicly owned 
companies should be affected more by "public interest" 
and "investor interest." Such auditors assume a 
relatively greater burden in maintaining credibility 
in the eyes of investors and other interested parties, 
particularly insofar as the compatibility criterion 
is concerned. The same general rules with respect to 
independence should apply to all auditors. However, 
a greater burden in this regard may fall on the auditors 
of publicly owned companies.
A question exists, particularly for the larger 
accounting firms with many publicly owned clients, 
concerning the desirability of offering certain services 
to privately owned audit clients and to nonaudit 
clients but not to publicly owned audit clients. 
Such a distinction between audit and nonaudit clients 
can be made under the independence criterion, but it 
is more difficult to do so under the compatibility 
criterion.
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I see no impelling reason to change the 
traditional work of either large or small accounting firms 
for independence or compatibility reasons in the areas 
of (1) taxes and (2) the design and installation of 
accounting systems and the performance of studies related 
to accounting, general record keeping and control. Other 
services in accounting and financial related areas may 
also be acceptable. However, there will be some services 
such as those discussed in the proposed appendix that 
should be reviewed and considered periodically.
The Executive Committee of the SEC Practice 
Section plans to review the entire record of this public 
hearing and consider the views of the Public Oversight 
Board. I am confident that the Executive Committee can 
and will make improvements in the proposed amendments so 
that the objectives we are all seeking can be achieved 
and the public interest can be served.
Thank you for the opportunity of appearing at 
this hearing.
MR. CATLETT: Bill and I will be glad to answer 
any questions you may have.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you, George.
We will start with the Board members first. 
Have any of you questions that you would like to put?
PROFESSOR WILLIAM L. CARY: I would like to ask 
a number of questions. One, of course, is not related 
to your firm, George, and therefore perhaps not quite 
proper to ask you, and yet one of the issues that is 
before us is this matter of the actuarial services.
Obviously, your firm does not perform them. 
Is this a matter of principle, or do you have a view as 
to how that should be handled by other firms?
MR. CATLETT: I think the actuarial area is 
one that should be given careful consideration by your 
Board and by the Executive Committee. It is an area that 
has had much discussion in Washington, as you know, along 
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with a few other areas.
I would like to answer your question by making 
a few comments about it. I will try to relate it to 
some of the statements that I have just made.
I think actuarial work is in an accounting 
and financial area, as we think of the various criteria. 
I don’t think there is much argument about that.
It is a skill that could be used on audits 
of certain companies, but I do not believe that it is 
a skill that is necessary for accounting firms to have. 
One evidence of this is that most accounting firms do 
not have actuarial skill.
You certainly can’t say that it is necessary 
to have such skills to make adequate audits, although 
it is a skill that could be used if you did have it.
One of the questions that is raised in this 
area is whether, when there is actuarial work and audit 
work in the same firm, the actuarial arm of the firm 
is playing a major role in determining amounts that are 
in financial statements which the auditors, on the other 
hand, end up auditing as part of the financial statements.
One of the questions that is raised in this 
regard is whether the auditors would be as likely to 
question the methods and assumptions and various things 
going into the actuarial computations as they might if 
it was done by another firm.
I am not commenting on that. I am just saying 
these are the kinds of questions that come up.
There is also the question of how much 
participation there is by the client in the actuarial 
determinations. Of course, this leads into the 
independence question. Actuarial work is the work of 
a separate and distinct profession.
The point that arises sometimes when this is 
discussed is that some people argue that it is desirable 
and necessary to have the actuarial skill for the audit 
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function. The same thing could be said, I think, of 
geologists, appraisers, lawyers and a lot of other 
matters that relate to audits. In making audits, 
auditors rely to some extent on geologists in oil 
company audits, appraisers with respect to mergers, 
and of course, lawyers in various ways.
This is a subject that has been under 
discussion and needs careful consideration, and our 
firm does not do it. Some firms do do it. These 
are the things that need to be considered in deciding 
this question, and it is one that has to have careful 
consideration if for no other reason than it has been 
under question in Washington and other circles.
PROFESSOR CARY: May I ask one more question? 
It relates only peripherally to the preceding question. 
Bill Mueller can probably help us.
The MAS concept is so broad that each person 
has a different, I suppose, definition of it.
I take it that in your firm it is a fairly 
narrowly defined role. Does that correctly differentiate 
it, say, in your firm from other firms—some of the 
other firms?
MR. WILLIAM J. MUELLER: I am at a little 
disadvantage because I am really not that conversant 
with all of the nuances and the scopes of practice of 
the other firms. I can only speak for ourselves.
We internally do not really feel that our 
scope of practice is narrow. It involves primarily the 
design, development, implementation of control systems 
for management, and the accounting and operations areas 
of various enterprises, private and governmental. It 
also involves the studies related to these methods.
It keeps us all very, very busy hiring enough 
people to do the work that comes to us in these areas, 
and we have never really seriously considered going into 
some of the peripheral areas that other firms have gone
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into.
There are some that we have looked at, and 
on a policy basis, decided that we didn’t want to get 
into them. There are others we have looked at and 
decided we just didn’t have the requisite expertise 
and because of this chose as a matter of business 
strategy not to get into them.
MR. GARRETT: When you say "on a policy basis," 
do you mean that they would not meet one of the two 
criteria that you have set forth; either they would not 
be compatible with the audit function or they would 
jeopardize your independence?
MR. MUELLER: That is correct.
MR. GARRETT: Could you name an example of 
one that you decided not to go into and on which of 
those grounds?
MR. MUELLER: Yes, I think I could. You know, 
it is an interesting question because I think we could 
say that executive recruiting does not meet our criteria. 
On the other hand, even if it had been acceptable, I 
think we would probably not have chosen to go into it 
for other reasons, but nevertheless, that is one area 
that does not meet our criteria.
MR. McCLOY: Are there any other ones that you 
can think of besides the "head hunting?"
MR. MUELLER: Nothing that we have seriously 
considered going into.
MR. GARRETT: I presume by executive recruiting 
the emphasis is on the executive.
MR. MUELLER. That is right.
MR. GARRETT: You don’t decline the help people 
find employees at a lower level than executives.
MR. MUELLER: As you know, we do attempt to 
help our own employees become placed when it is decided 
that they no longer have a future career with our firm 
or unilaterally decide that they do not want to be in 
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public accounting. We do advise them of openings that 
we are aware of in our client organizations.
We don't do this on what might be considered 
a professional basis. It is merely a clerical clearing­
house type of operation. We make these names known to 
the clients, and also make it known to our people that 
there are openings with clients.
We certainly attempt not to imply firm 
endorsement, however, to the qualities or merits of 
these people when we make these types of referrals.
MR. CATLETT: I might make a couple of comments. 
One of the distinctions in, say, the recruiting area 
is that we have never done executive search in the sense 
of going out and searching out people and screening 
them and that sort of thing.
MR. McCLOY: You will respond to inquiries, 
though?
MR. CATLETT: That is right. Our extent of 
that has either been referring our own people or casual 
referrals. Somebody would say, "Do you know anybody?" 
We would say, "We know Tom Jones. You might talk to him." 
But we have never gone out and written letters, 
placed ads and tried to find people and screen them.
MR. GARRETT: Organizationally, you do not have 
a department or branch for such services.
MR. CATLETT: No. One other area that we 
considered, I think it is fair to say, was when some 
of the firms acquired actuarial firms. When that came 
up, we considered whether or not we should go into that 
area, and we decided not to for various reasons.
MR. McCLOY: May I ask you one question. Do 
you do plant layouts?
MR. MUELLER: No, sir, we do not.
MR. ARTHUR M. WOOD: I would like to ask what 
percentage of your clients are privately owned?
MR. CATLETT: I presently don’t have that 
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statistic in mind. I can tell how many are public.
MR. WOOD: It doesn’t have to be accurate.
MR. CATLETT: We have between one thousand 
and eleven hundred companies under SEC jurisdiction, 
which would be in the publicly owned area. Of course, 
we have many thousands, many more small clients. In 
numbers, we have a lot more privately owned clients 
than we have publicly owned. We have many thousands 
of privately owned clients, whereas we have a thousand 
or eleven hundred companies under the SEC.
Of course, in volume of work, the proportions 
are different because the publicly owned companies 
tend to be much bigger engagements, but they are both 
important part of our practice; We don’t in any way 
deemphasize or consider our privately owned clients 
to be second rate. We consider them just as important 
clients, and try to give them the same quality of 
service.
MR. MUELLER: I might be able to add something 
there, George. A look we did at this a little while 
ago would indicate that the number, from order of 
general magnitude, might be about ten thousand or 
eleven thousand in that area, in the privately owned.
MR. WOOD: Do you see any difference in the 
requirements of privately owned or small publicly owned 
clients for a broader range of advisory services?
MR. CATLETT: I might comment and Bill may 
add some, too.
I think the type of service you give is a 
little different because if it is a smaller company, you 
tend to give more of a continuing service and your 
relationships tend to be a little more personal, month 
to month, than large companies, and perhaps at times 
you tend to give more business advice and help them in 
various ways.
As far as our administrative services practice 
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is concerned, I don’t think it is a whole lot different. 
Bill, you might comment on that.
MR. MUELLER: No, there really isn't in 
principle a great deal of difference. I think perhaps 
some of the techniques that one uses in performing the 
services are somewhat different. Perhaps you are more 
of an educator working with a small business than you 
would be with a larger one. Perhaps you have to explain 
why you are doing what you are doing a little more 
clearly in some respects in a more basic manner than you 
would in a larger organization, but the results, the 
outputs of your services, tend to be the same.
MR. WOOD: We have had comments from a number 
of smaller auditing firms, and from a number of small 
businesses, clients of those firms, which indicate that 
a rather broad advisory service is vital to their success 
and those seem to me to be rather compelling.
MR. MUELLER: If I could make a comment on that 
I think that maybe you are talking, when you talk about 
the privately owned company, about a different kind of 
a client than when you are talking about a very small 
accounting firm serving the small privately owned 
company.
There are different degrees of smallness 
involved, so that maybe we are not talking about the 
same type of organization when we talk small as the 
smaller accounting firm is in all cases. Maybe we 
should characterize it as large, medium and small. 
When we refer to small, we are sometimes talking about 
the medium-sized company. When they are talking small, 
they are talking about a smaller entity that perhaps 
does need more day-to-day attention and different types 
of advice.
Also, this is a matter of firm organization 
to some extent, and this is why I would like George 
to also respond to this. It may well be in the very
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small company that the accountant, the auditor, is the
person who is rendering this type of, let's call it, 
informal MAS advice. In our organization, our group, 
we call it administrative services, is performing 
project type work with these clients, whereas the 
audit division is performing the day-to-day consulting 
type advice that the smaller practitioner refers to as 
MAS.
MR. CATLETT: I agree. I think it would be 
unfortunate if undue restrictions are put on accounting 
firms in working with small companies, particularly 
so long as it doesn't affect their independence in 
giving opinions on financial statements.
Another important point, too, is that when 
an accounting firm elects to go into the area of auditing 
publicly owned companies with public investors and the 
related public interest—and accounting firms don't 
have to do this and some firms, of course, don't have 
that type of auditing—such election to go into that 
practice, whether you have one or a thousand publicly 
owned clients, means that you are assuming an additional 
responsibility to the public. There is a larger public 
interest in such work than for a privately owned company. 
I think firms should be expected to have a higher level 
of public responsibility and consider the public interest 
more, and the effect on the public, which involves 
independence and compatibility and those kinds of things 
to a greater degree than in the case of the smaller, 
privately owned companies.
You can argue: What is the difference? To 
me there is a big difference. There is a big public 
interest difference in the case of a large publicly 
owned company, and I think the managements of those 
companies feel it as well.
MR. WOOD: You have stressed or have identified 
independence and compatibility of services as the two 
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principal criteria that you consider as affecting your 
attest function.
You then referred to the Executive Committee's 
proposed test that services use accounting and auditing- 
related skills. Who is going to decide whether a 
particular service requires the use of accounting-or 
auditing-related skills? Who is going to be the judge 
of that relationship?
MR. CATLETT: I suppose that insofar as the SEC 
Practice Section is concerned, the accounting firm 
itself would make the first judgment. Then if there 
was any question, it could come up in the peer review 
program and go through the Peer Review Committee up to 
the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee would 
then decide whether or not it agreed with the firm on 
that point. In your monitoring function you could also 
look at it, if there was a question and controversy, 
so in the end it would have to be a judgment matter by 
whoever is making it. Thus, it would be first the 
firm, secondly the Executive Committee, and thirdly 
your views from a monitoring standpoint. But, of 
course, any of these judgments would have to be a 
matter of opinion.
The test that is in the plan now is accounting 
and financial related areas. That is what was in the 
initial plan and that is being changed, at least by the 
proposed amendment. In either event, it is a judgmental 
matter, but as I pointed out, there is a difference, 
a significant difference, between accounting and 
financial related areas and accounting and auditing 
related skills. They are different kinds of tests, 
but both would require judgment.
MR. WOOD: That is all I have.
MR. GARRETT: You would prefer to areas termed 
as more closely meeting the concept of compatibility, 
I presume.
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MR. CATLETT: I have thought about that a lot, 
and the Executive Committee debated this at great 
length before the plan was originally adopted. What 
is in the plan now, in the original document, is the 
accounting and financial related areas which I 
thought was the right way to go about it in the first 
place. I personally would prefer to stay there rather 
than to shift to the other one. I wouldn’t say that 
skills is not a possible way to go about it and is 
not one that you could live with, but you understand 
I have a preference in the other direction.
The questions that arise in this area, such 
as in Washington, cause people to think in terms of 
areas.
The plant layout and all of those types of 
things relate to areas basically, and people tend to 
think in terms of areas. When you get into compatibility, 
they think about whether a particular area is compatible 
with the audit area. People think that way, and it is 
easier to understand, and easier to apply. In the 
long run, a test based on areas will be better for 
the accounting profession and everybody else.
The skills test is another approach. This 
test is the other way around. You need the skill on 
the audit. Therefore, it is all right to use it in 
other areas.
One problem, though, long-range, is that 
accounting and auditing related skills can be used 
in areas that have nothing to do with accounting and 
financial related areas. Then when you meet the test, 
but are clear out in left field, you will be subject 
to severe criticism.
MR. GARRETT: I understand your argument 
to be that if accounting and auditing related skills 
include anything that an auditor ought to be able to 
understand or would have some use for in conducting 
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an audit, that could go just about everywhere depending 
upon your clients.
MR. CATLETT: Including law.
MR. GARRETT: Yes, sure. We won’t get into 
that, George. (Laughter) That war is a temporary 
truce. You could go into geology and engineering and 
all sorts of things.
MR. CATLETT: Not only that, but also even 
a skill about which there is not much argument, such 
as an accounting computer skill or something, such as 
that, there isn’t much argument about, you could go 
outside the accounting and financial areas and use 
the skill for engineering or something like that which 
has nothing to do with accounting or financial at all.
MR. GARRETT: But why should there be a 
compatibility criterion, however we phrase it, if you 
have satisfied the independence need? I suppose we 
are going to find universal conceptual agreement, at 
least, on the independence question.
MR. CATLETT: You will find conceptual 
agreement; but you will find great disagreement about 
what constitutes it.
MR. GARRETT: I am certain we will.
MR. CATLETT: It has been my job in our firm 
to worry about our own policies in this area, and for 
the last ten or fifteen years I have struggled with it 
in our firm. We have been debating it for a year in 
the Institute, and of course, we have debated it even 
before that.
With all the commotion that there has been in 
Washington and in articles that have been written about 
this subject and questions that have been raised in the 
academic area, it has become obvious to me that there 
are two basic tests. Independence obviously is one 
test, but the perceptions of this problem, whether 
right or wrong, have caused questions to be raised 
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in a lot of places, including Washington. Outside 
the accounting profession, there is a concern, and 
I think I can say there is a serious concern, which 
is not frivolous, about the practice in some areas 
that has nothing to do with independence. This is a 
legitimate concern, and therefore it has to be in the 
area of image or compatibility or something like that. 
I like "compatibility" better than "image" as a word, 
but there has to be something there. Otherwise, you 
could be a veterinarian and a thousand other things. 
You could do almost anything that you could legally 
do. After all, if we were veterinarians, that wouldn’t 
affect our independence on audits, but I am not so 
sure it would be a good idea from the viewpoint of the 
public.
MR. GARRETT: But you might come to that 
conclusion from a business point of view, mightn’t 
you?
MR. CATLETT: Sure, but all I am saying is 
that the independence test alone would permit you to 
do thousands of things that are way out, that have 
absolutely nothing to do with independence on audits. 
It just seems to me, on the face of it, that this is 
not desirable. Therefore, there has to be some test 
on that side, and I use the word "compatibility" in 
searching for a word in that area. The conceptual 
aspect of this is that if society gives us the authority 
and right and responsibility to certify financial 
statements, on which the public is going to rely, 
they expect us to operate efficiently in that area 
and do things that are compatible with that, and 
they don't expect us to do a thousand other things 
at the same time. We would either downgrade what we 
are doing or, at least, downgrade what it looks like 
we are doing, and this could impair the attest 
function on which our whole business community relies.
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One of the important things in our system is the 
reporting on financial statements by auditors and the 
reliance of the millions and millions of people on 
that.
In fact, the whole free enterprise system 
is somewhat dependent on it because it involves the 
credibility of financial reporting of business 
enterprises. It is such an important crucial function 
that you don't want to water it down with too many 
other unrelated things that are not accounting and 
financial related, even though they might not affect 
independence.
MR. McCLOY: Are you saying, in the case of 
public owned companies, the conduct of the accounting 
firm has to take into account appearances to a greater 
degree than privately owned companies?
MR. CATLETT: There is no question about 
that.  
MR. McCLOY: Even though there is no causal 
connection between them.
MR. CATLETT: Some people say that if you 
are really independent, what difference does it make. 
But it makes a lot of difference, because if the 
public in this country on a broad basis ever decided 
and perceived that they no longer could rely on the 
certification of auditors, then not only would the 
accounting firms suffer but the whole business system 
would suffer. This is such as important link in our 
system that we have to zealously guard it and not let 
it be ruined by a bunch of irrelevant things.
Of course, I realize that when I say 
"compatibility,” there is a lot of argument about 
what that means, too, but what I am trying to explain 
is the general idea. There are a lot of services 
that can be performed that are a great service to 
clients and are compatible and help society and help 
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the business community. But, not only would the 
accounting firms suffer, but every one would suffer, 
business in particular, if the financial statements 
issued by publicly owned companies in this country 
were such that the people getting them were not 
sure whether they could trust them or not. Business 
is going to be the first to suffer. That really 
brings on government regulation.
PROFESSOR CARY: I would just like to revert 
back to one other area to which you made reference, 
George, about large firms. I mean, that you have a 
higher public responsibility vis-a-vis the large 
firms than vis-a-vis the small ones.
Now, trying to analyze it, does that mean 
that criteria should differ between large and small 
firms? I am asking myself, try to think it through 
this way. It seems to be that small firms are still 
public firms in one sense or another because most of 
the companies that you would audit or anybody would 
audit would have a few outside shareholders.
MR. CATLETT: Or you might have bank loans. 
PROFESSOR CARY: Right. I was going to say 
you have bank loans, creditors and then you have 
probably some outsiders, although you may not call 
them the public because it is not that broad.
With that in mind, it seems to me that as 
far as applying the criterion of independence is 
concerned, it is probably a policy matter. Looking 
at it from our standpoint, it may not be wise to have 
a different policy vis-a-vis the small than vis-a-vis 
the large firm for independence.
The appearance which you just referred to, 
maybe there is a difference because that is a public, 
but am I right in analyzing it that way?
MR. CATLETT: I think in general I would 
agree with that. I would have the same two criteria 
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as far as basic criteria are concerned. What I am 
talking about is the application of them.
I agree that in the independence area there 
would be less difference than in the compatibility 
area. Basically, there shouldn’t be a difference in 
the independence area, if you are certifying financial 
statements. But even there, there is a zone in the 
application where maybe you lean over backwards to be 
more pure in auditing a big publicly owned company 
than you might in the case of a privately owned 
company just because there is a big public interest. 
There is more concern in Washington at the SEC and 
everywhere else about publicly owned companies.
It’s a small zone of differences. I think 
there is a wider zone in the compatibility area. I 
would have those two criteria, but I would apply the 
compatibility one somewhat differently. I wouldn’t 
have any significant difference on independence.
I think the basic matters of independence, 
like owning stock in the company or having your 
brother as president and such as that, are no 
different in a big company than, a little one. But, 
what I am trying to say is that there may be marginal 
areas in the public arena where you ought to lean 
over backwards to be sure there is no question of 
appearance of independence.
MR. GARRETT: We are about out of time, 
but I don’t want to totally frustrate Lou and Dick 
and Charlie. Do any of you have a question there 
that you would like to put?
MR. CHARLES R. MANZONI: I just have one.
If the compatibility criteria is an important 
matter, doesn’t it relate to the firm providing it 
rather than the client to whom the particular service 
is provided?
For example, the standards now or the criteria 
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discussed providing certain services to SEC clients, 
it would seem to me that if you are concerned with 
an image problem, that image problem would arise 
by providing it to any one.
MR. CATLETT: I think that is right in 
general, except to the extent I was commenting 
previously that it may be even more apparent in the 
audit of publicly owned companies. The restriction 
that is in the plan at the moment was put in there by 
Council which is a higher body than the SEC Practice 
Section, with the idea that it was an SEC Practice 
Section, and therefore, its jurisdiction was only 
for SEC clients. Also, with a lot of Council members 
being from smaller firms, they were concerned about 
the effect on smaller firms, so the Council put that 
restriction in the plan after the interim committee 
had originally designed it.
When it went to the Council for final 
approval, it did not have that restriction in it. 
The Council put it in on the floor of the Council 
meeting that this would only relate to SEC companies. 
This is jurisdictional, which is a different point 
than yours, because you are talking philosophically, 
but there is a jurisdictional question within the 
Institute.
How much authority does the SEC Practice 
Section have to restrict beyond the services to 
companies that are SEC clients? Philosophically you 
are right but with some of the variations I have been 
talking about.
MR. GARRETT: One last question and then 
I think we are going to have to turn to the next 
person.
The SEC’s release, the recent accounting 
series release, requiring the disclosure of the 
percentage that MAS or nonauditing service fees bear 
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to the auditing fees, I presume is based, well, it 
must be based on the thought that there is some 
significance to the relationship. I presume it 
would be that the higher the percentage of nonauditing 
fees to auditing fees, the more likely it is that 
independence has been jeopardized. Is that true? 
Does that make sense to you?
MR. CATLETT: I assume that is their logic. 
I personally think they are off on a tangent trying 
to do something. They haven’t done it.
MR. GARRETT: You wouldn't recommend that 
approach?
MR. CATLETT: I would not. I don't think 
it accomplishes what they set out to do.
MR. GARRETT: Rather than worry about 
compatibility, would you say MAS fees can't exceed 
25% of audit fees or any number?
MR. CATLETT: I think it is kind of irrelevant 
to the major issues. I think the SEC felt it had to 
do something, and it first proposed some other things. 
It received a lost of flak and cutback and ended up 
with this. I think it believed that it had to put 
something out.
MR. GARRETT: They should have waited until 
we had completed this hearing.
MR. CATLETT: They should have. (Laughter) 
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much, gentlemen. 
Mr. Vanatta and Mr. Krisher.
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MR. CHESTER B. VANATTA: I am Chester B. Vanatta, 
the Firm Managing Partner of Arthur Young & Company. 
It is a pleasure for me to appear on behalf of my 
firm before this hearing the the Public Oversight Board.
In my position as Firm Managing Partner, 
I have day-to-day line management responsibility for 
the operations of our firm in the United States. In 
addition, I am a member of our firm's Management Committee, 
which is our senior policy committee and equivalent to 
what some call a board of directors. I am a CPA.
One aspect of my experience might be particularly 
worth mentioning. That is the fact that eight years of 
my professional career was in the management consulting 
activities of our firm—as a staff consultant, a manager, 
and a partner. This experience is particularly relevant 
because of the subject matter of these hearings. I have 
been there—and I know on a first-hand basis the 
professionalism with which that aspect of the practice 
of accountancy is conducted.
As Mr. Garrett and Mr. McCloy stated, this 
hearing is to assist you in commenting on and making 
recommendations as to the scope of services appropriate 
for CPA firms, and specifically as to the proposal of 
the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section. 
Our firm's chairman, Bill Kanaga, participated actively 
in the formation of the SEC Practice Section and is a 
member of its Executive Committee. To that extent then, 
our firm has participated in the scope of service 
deliberations, although the draft being considered is 
not consistent with the views of our firm. As a firm, 
we have consistently maintained that there is no logical 
basis for restricting a CPA firm's scope of service. 
We urge the Board to avoid endorsing conclusions arrived 
at in response to perceived pressures to "do something" 
unless those conclusions have substance and are based 
on the facts.
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The remainder of my remarks will address 
fundamental convictions which our firm and I hold 
regarding scope of service, amplify the reasoning 
supporting those beliefs, and, finally, make three 
specific recommendations for consideration by this 
Board.
OUR BELIEFS
With regard to scope of service considerations, 
the cornerstone of our firm’s conviction is that CPA 
firms must first and foremost be protective of their 
public audit responsibility and its impact on the 
business capital market. In other words, CPAs should 
conduct their professional practice in such a way that 
it enhances, rather than detracts from, the credibility 
of audit opinions. Thus, we believe that:
If non-audit services provided by CPA 
firms in any manner compromise the 
independence of the auditor in fact, 
such services should be curtailed. 
(In other words, not provided to audit 
clients.) 
If non-audit services provided by CPA 
firms impair audit independence in 
appearance to a knowledgeable person 
aware of all the facts, such services 
should be curtailed.
If non-audit services provided by CPA 
firms negatively impact the effectiveness 
of audit performance, such services 
should be curtailed.
There is no question in our minds that maintaining the 
credibility of the audit function is and must continue 
to be of paramount importance to the independent auditor. 
OUR REASONING
As pointed out in our paper submitted earlier, 
there has been no documented evidence of independence
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compromise in fact resulting from CPA firms providing 
non-audit services. This is true even though there 
have been extensive research efforts by critics and 
others. The statistics are truly remarkable—in the 
45 years since security laws were first written 
requiring independent audits, and with the tens of 
thousands of corporate audits performed in each of 
those years, not one single case of compromised 
independence relating to providing tax and management 
services has been found. In our opinion, this is a 
substantial hurdle that those who would impose arbitrary 
restrictions on the scope of auditors’ practice must 
cross. They have not crossed it.
Rather, the criticism of CPA firms providing 
non-audit services principally rests on a theoretical 
concern relating to the "appearance" of independence. 
This point of view conveniently ignores the concept 
of independence being based on the views of a 
knowledgeable person aware of all of the facts of 
an individual situation. The critics seem to maintain 
that the CPA must appear independent to an uninformed 
person possessing no facts. Such a point of view is 
so unreasonable that those criticizing on this basis 
must have other, unstated objectives in mind.
As to audit effectiveness, in our paper we 
speak at some length to the point that non-audit services 
can and frequently do improve the effectiveness of 
audits and that they do not impair such effectiveness. 
The knowledge gained from management advisory service 
involvement with clients enables the auditor to have 
a greater understanding and appreciation of the client's 
systems and operating environment and thus can favorably, 
at times materially, impact audit effectiveness. This 
is in addition to the fact that having available in the 
firm the skills used in providing non-audit services 
is often of invaluable assistance in executing an audit.
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In considering the scope of service question, 
it is important that we remind ourselves of the overall 
objective the practitioner must serve—contributing 
to the integrity and the effectiveness of the 
business capital market of this nation. To our way 
of thinking, it is preposterous to conceive that the 
market’s ability to function has been negatively 
affected by CPA firms providing corporate tax advice; 
suggesting work simplification techniques and assisting 
in the development of productivity measurement and 
improvement programs; counseling management as they 
define the experience and qualifications for a top or 
middle management position; recommending three candidates 
as qualified for a division controller’s job; designing 
a cost accounting system; reviewing the effectiveness 
of the EDP and systems activities of the company and 
reporting in laymens terms; or the many other types 
of management advisory services historically provided 
by our and other CPA firms. Providing non-audit 
services has not hurt the capital market. To the 
contrary, we submit that the capital market and, 
therefore, the public has directly benefitted. And, 
such services have been of benefit to private companies 
served by our firm and others. 
OUR RECOMMENDATIONS
We offer for the Board’s consideration three 
specific recommendations which we believe, taken 
together, are an appropriate basis for scope of 
service determination, and provide a means for 
continuing control and monitoring of that scope of 
service. They are as follows:
1. The Board should forcefully recommend 
that there be no general proscription of 
services. In that regard, we suggest 
you not endorse the accounting and auditing 
related skills concept of the proposed 
29
amendment being considered at these 
hearings. Rather, we believe the Board 
should embrace a concept of prohibiting 
service to an audit client only when 
specific services to be provided a 
specific audit client would impair the 
audit firm's independence. We believe 
this is the only service limitation 
securely founded on logic, and it can 
only be applied on an individual case- 
by-case basis.
2. The Board should recommend that individual 
CPA firms have the responsibility to review 
the specific services provided with the 
Audit Committee or the Board of Directors 
of all public audit clients. While the 
CPA firm should have primary responsibility 
for maintaining their independence, the 
Audit Committee should review on a regular 
basis the services provided and independently 
consider audit independence in light of 
the facts.
3. The Board should recommend that the SEC 
Practice Section explicitly require that 
the peer review process include 
consideration of any potential impact on 
audit independence from acceptance of non- 
audit engagements. This analysis should 
include a review of the firm's policies, 
procedures and documentation standards, 
and verification that such acceptance 
criteria are being followed. These 
policies and procedures should be such 
that thorough and thoughtful consideration 
is given to any potential impact on audit 
independence. The acceptance criteria we
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use and believe appropriate include the 
considerations that:
a. We are not acting for, or in the 
capacity of management.
b. The client can arrive at an informed 
opinion on the propriety of our work 
and recommendations.
c. Our relationship with other clients 
or third parties does not pose a 
conflict of interest.
d. Personnel assigned to the engagement 
have no material financial interest 
in the client or its affiliates.
In addition, we evaluate with great care 
consulting engagements where decisions 
made in reliance on our work will be 
irreversible and are of such importance 
that the outcome may have a significant 
adverse impact on the future operating 
results and/or financial viability of the 
client.
If needed, the SEC Practice Section could 
prescribe the acceptance criteria, including 
specific matters to be considered.
This requirement to include a review of 
the acceptance of non-audit services in 
the peer review process would, we believe, 
complete the loop of positive and 
continuing control over the auditor 
maintaining his independence.
These three recommendations would not place 
artificial limits on the scope of services to be offered 
by CPAs. Nor do they involve just saying "trust us— 
we'll consider the circumstances and conclude what 
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reasonable men, having knowledge of all the facts would 
conclude." Rather, the recommendations provide a basis 
for objective and informed individuals outside of the 
CPA firm, both outside the profession and within, to 
have access to all the facts and judge whether audit 
independence would be or was impaired.
The accounting profession has been preoccupied 
for the past 18 to 24 months with issues relating to 
its internal operations, its structure, and its scope 
of services. We sincerely hope that the Board will 
take a forceful stance along the lines of our 
recommendations and by so doing contribute materially 
to clearing the air on this subject. Such action would 
serve the profession well—allowing us to turn our full 
efforts to serving clients and fulfilling our 
responsibilities to the users of financial statements. 
Such a refocus would without doubt be in the public 
interest.
Thank you.
MR. VANATTA: I appreciate the opportunity to 
be here, and I will be happy to respond to any questions 
that you might have. I assume you will have some.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Vanatta. Mr. 
McCloy, have you any questions?
MR. McCLOY: I may have some questions as we 
go along, but I am thinking of a comment. I don’t 
place as much value, as you seem to do, on this lack 
of record. I am not so sure that the lack of record is 
all that significant. I am not so sure how that record 
would appear.
There may not be any cases on it, but in 
fact, if there was a lack of independence there, I don't 
know that it would come up in the courts. It is a more 
subtle thing.
MR. VANATTA: I think that we are reasonably 
close together, Mr. McCloy, I believe that it is a 
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consideration and an important consideration, particularly 
if logic will not support prohibiting certain services.
I give it, I guess, more weight than you do, 
because of the tremendous efforts that have been made 
by various people in attempting to identify situations 
where independence might have been compromised.
My recommendation, and specifically the last 
of the three recommendations, addresses the substance 
of your point. I am recommending providing a positive 
mechanism for informed people who can reach a knowledgeable 
conclusion, having access to the facts, which possibly 
critics or others didn’t have.
MR. McCLOY: I recognize that. I keep coming 
back to this classical analogy of Ceasar’s wife. She 
has got to be above suspicion no matter who the 
gossiper is in the street in Rome. And there is 
suspicion perhaps since the Cohen Commission said there 
was a significant minority that expressed some doubts. 
When they used "significant," I guess they were meeting 
your point, or at least, they are subconsciously 
meeting your point. This was not an ill-informed 
group.
MR. VANATTA: On that point, Mr. McCloy, 
and I always kind of chuckle when I see those two words 
together—significant minority, though I do not disagree 
with the Cohen Commission on any of their research or 
their findings and conclusions in that area, I think 
it important to also point out that their research, 
their studies, and their findings were that as 
individuals better understood, became more informed 
and were closer to the scene of what was actually 
happening, in other words became more knowledgeable, 
the concern significantly decreased. I think that is 
a very, very important point for this Board to consider.
MR. McCLOY: I may want to come back. 
MR. WOOD. You offered three criteria. The 
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second one I noted was that services should be prohibited 
when it is clear that they would impair the independence 
of the audit firm, and suggesting it be applied on a 
case-by-case basis.
MR. VANATTA: Yes, sir.
MR. WOOD: Can you give us an example of a 
service which would clearly impair independence?
MR. VANATTA: Can I give you an example of a 
service?
MR. WOOD: Of a service performed by a CPA 
firm.
MR. VANATTA: Yes, a service that would not 
meet the criteria that I mentioned in my prepared remarks, 
that would involve doing work that we believe management 
does not have the capability to review, to reach informed 
conclusions concerning. In other words, acting in place 
of management.
There are disagreements within the profession, 
and I think honest disagreements in the main, but I would 
include in that particular category what is called turnkey 
computer services.
By definition turnkey, as we explain in our 
paper, involves doing all of the work involved in the 
design and programming of a system or installing a 
prepackaged system, testing it, getting it operational, 
and turning it over to the client.
I think by definition that implies that there 
is not the adequate amount of client participation in 
reviewing the work, in reaching informed judgments 
concerning the propriety of the work and in assuring 
themselves that everything has been considered in their 
individual situation.
That is an example of where I believe one 
could get into at least the fringe of acting in place 
of management. If it is a semantics problem, then 
let’s not call it turnkey. Let's call it full
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implementation work.
That would be a form of, and there are all 
kinds of others, original, specialized services but 
it does not have the necessary management participation 
involved.
MR. WOOD. In many of the papers submitted, 
we see the principle of many accounting firms that 
their service should be advisory, and of course, should 
not be managerial.
I think you are saying the same thing. You 
would not provide a turnkey computer system. You would 
advise management.
You didn’t mention advisory services as opposed 
to management, but you are saying the same thing.
MR. VANATTA: If I understand your comments, 
I would agree with you. You are paraphrasing what I am 
saying accurately, yes.
MR. WOOD: What you have just suggested brings 
to mind a service which I think could be important to 
management.
Suppose your firm in looking at the computer 
system and the controls that are built into the system, 
let’s say on accounts payable, you found that the 
computer staff of the client was, in your judgment, 
inadequate, you would have to go to management and 
say: "We don’t want to tell you what this system has 
to be and oppose it, but your staff, in our judgment, 
must have competent people," then management asks you, 
"Can you find us one?" What would your response be 
then? Would you engage in helping management to find a 
competent person?
MR. VANATTA: We would assist management, 
and this gets into, the area that you are asking about, 
I assume, is that of executive recruitment services.
MR. WOOD: Right.
MR. VANATTA: And Mr. McCloy, I don’t like to 
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call it head hunting, as you kiddingly referred to it 
earlier.
MR. McCLOY: An unfortunate connotation.
MR. VANATTA: I am talking about professional 
executive recruitment services. Yes, our firm does have 
that included in our scope of services. In the 
particular situation you describe, according to the 
level of the position, if it would meet both our 
professional and business criteria, we would participate 
and accept an engagement to assist the client in finding 
suitable and qualified personnel to meet their needs.
I don’t mean to be picking on words, but I 
think it is important from a concept standpoint that 
I elaborate on the question, "Would we locate a 
person?" We would first assure that we understood 
the needs of the position. We would discuss this with 
management, possibly assist them in their thought 
process of defining the requirements, experience 
needed, et cetera, for the position.
Then we would seek out qualified candidates, 
individuals that we thought would qualify for the 
position. Do appropriate reference checking, do 
appropriate interviewing with them, and would 
recommend an individual to that client as in our 
opinion being qualified and worthy of consideration 
for the position.
We have as a policy to recommend never just 
one, but three people as qualified, and the client 
management themselves are the ones that make the 
selection, make the decision, and we do not get into 
negotiating with the client on behalf of compensation, 
fringe benefits, that kind of thing. We believe this 
is a service that our clients need. We believe that 
we can provide it and do provide it on a professional 
basis, that we consider all of the independence aspects 
related thereto, that it does not compromise independence, 
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or if it would for any reason, we wouldn’t accept 
the engagement.
We believe that when there is a client 
need that in some way there is going to be assistance 
from the CPA firm. I don’t care whether you want 
to call it casual referrals or what. We believe that 
the need can best be provided on a professional 
consulting basis subject to all of the disciplines 
of the practice.
MR. WOOD: Thank you.
MR. VANATTA: I didn’t mean for that to be 
such a long answer, Mr. Wood.
PROFESSOR CARY: I have only one question, 
but it stems from what Mr. Wood has raised.
What if you found that one of the Big 
Eight announced they were going to merge Booz, Allen, 
Hamilton or McKinsey & Company. What would your 
reaction be?
MR. VANATTA: Surprise—great surprise. 
(Laughter)
PROFESSOR CARY: I assume. That is why I 
asked it, but not let’s see what is wrong with it in 
terms of no restrictions. You said there would be no 
restrictions.
MR. VANATTA: In my opinion, Mr. Cary, there 
would be nothing wrong with it. The previous person 
appearing discussed what was termed compatibility. 
We use the term image in our paper. I think you 
have to be very careful to not get image mixed up 
with independence. That is very, very important.
In the previous discussion, and I think I 
am addressing the question, you talked about getting 
into geology and so forth.
Mr. answer to that is that I would not 
prohibit that. Our firm is not going to go into the 
geology and so forth.
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My answer to that is that I would not 
prohibit that. Our firm is not going to go into 
the geological engineering business, but logically, 
I see no reason why those services should be 
proscribed. I would, rather than attempting to 
react to all kinds of different perceptions or 
desires for image, I would let the marketplace make 
that decision. I believe if a CPA firm starts 
diffusing its focus too much, and if there truly 
are questions among business as to compatibility, 
image and the kind of firm that they want to 
associate with, the audit committee of the board 
of directors that are going to be reviewing your 
firm’s scope of services would forcibly speak 
through their decisions. I believe, even if one 
were to assume that just major firms would do it, 
that the marketplace should make the decision 
rather than an arbitrary decision being made by 
any particular body.
PROFESSOR CARY: That is quite an adequate 
answer. I mean, that is an answer all right.
MR. VANATTA: If it is not adequate, I 
would be happy to enlarge on it. (Laughter) 
PROFESSOR CARY: You haven’t limited 
yourself, put it that way.
MR. VANATTA: Because we believe as a 
firm, and I personally believe, that it would be 
inappropriate to artificially limit scope of services. 
MR. WOOD: I have one more question, Ray. 
You suggested that the audit committee of 
the board should review the services that the CPA 
firm engaged provides.
MR. VANATTA: Yes, sir.
MR. WOOD: And the audit committee should 
make the determination whether these services would 
affect, or impair independence. I believe that was it.
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MR. VANATTA: I indicated that the CPA 
firm has the primary responsibility for being 
independent, that the audit committee in their role, 
or the board of directors if there is not an audit 
committee, I believe should have the responsibility 
as an audit committee for reviewing the facts and 
reaching their own independent conclusion as to  whether they agree or not with the CPA firm.
MR. WOOD: Audit committees, as we know, 
have had a lot of attention. All listed firms now 
must have an audit committee of the board.
I am just wondering whether they are going 
to be competent to make this judgment. They haven’t 
had the benefit of these hearings, and study of all 
these fine position papers from the profession.
I am sure that Mr. McCloy’s Audit Committee, 
and he is chairman of two or three, is pretty 
sophisticated, but I am just wondering whether in 
the great cross-section of American business, you 
have got on boards of directors, people who are going 
to be able to do this especially if we get too much 
complication, and the AICPA in its wisdom finally 
decides on very particular parameters and definitions.
MR. VANATTA: I believe I understand your 
question, Mr. Wood, and I think that the generic 
problem of enough qualified members for audit 
committees and so forth, which you are suggesting 
is a related issue, some people do think is a problem.
I would not agree with the conclusion that 
your reasoning would seem to lead one to, and I 
personally believe that if we were to take that tack, 
we would be underestimating the capability of members 
of the board and audit committees. If one does not 
have the background, if one cannot get the background, 
if one can’t go to some educational sessions that 
CPA firms and other for-profit organizations are 
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holding, to be able to perform effectively as an 
audit committee member, then I think we have some 
other larger problems, but I would not artificially 
restrict the scope of a CPA’s services because of 
that. Why penalize CPA firms in their services 
because audit committees are perceived not to be 
able to do their job?
I do have the other additional restriction 
or control, of course, built in from the standpoint 
of professionals themselves reviewing through the 
peer review program the independence question as 
related to non-audit services.
MR. WOOD: I think this has been constructive 
in the sense that we, the AICPA, when this issue is 
resolved, would, and it’s your suggestion that audit 
committees should always question CPAs in their twice- 
a-year or at least once-a-year review with them on 
the services they are performing, I think the 
profession can do a real service for American business 
and boards in providing the same kind of material that 
you have already provided the audit committees, and 
I have read them, the pamphlets of several of the Big 
Eight firms, at least—what the audit committees ought 
to get into.
MR. McCLOY: I come back, if I may. I was 
thinking about this thing. Particularly if you are 
talking about audit committees. I have had that 
experience on audit committees.
MR. VANATTA: Extensive experience, I 
understand.
MR. McCLOY: I find in some cases that they 
have had difficulty in finding outside directors. I 
am not sure the ruling was a good one that the SEC 
put out.
I am inclined to think maybe if you had 
one member of the management that knew something 
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about the business, it might be a better audit 
committee than if you had just X, so many black, 
so many white, so many feminists, so many people, 
whatever you have to do.
MR. VANATTA: I was with you for a while. 
(Laughter)
MR. McCLOY: So that I think there is 
something in the thought that maybe it may be too 
easy to get the expert outside group of directors, 
knowledgeable outside directors. That will come 
about in time, but for the moment, I think they are 
having some difficulty with it because almost by 
hypothesis they want to put on the audit committee 
somebody that has nothing to do with the business.
The other thing is about this recruitment 
of executives.
I may be one of the uninformed in the 
streets that you were referring to whose judgment 
you shouldn’t be given much attention.
I have a gut reaction to this thing— 
that it is unwise to have this all out service of 
obtaining executives or the chief accounting officer 
and to sort of commission an accounting firm that 
is doing your auditing to find that man for you. 
I just think it might encroach upon this concept 
of independence.
Maybe it isn't complete. Maybe you haven't 
got any record of abuses, but as I say, I have a 
gut reaction against it. I have a feeling that with 
the accountancy profession, as with my profession, 
there is some opprobrium at the moment. You have 
to duck when you say you are a lawyer, and you have 
to duck when you say you are an accountant in view 
of some of the records we have had and some audit 
failures.
Maybe there is a pressure, as I say, to be 
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above suspicion, as Caesar's wife, and maybe you 
ought to eliminate it, just for the sake of the 
repute and the importance of the credibility of the 
accountants.
MR. VANATTA: I understand the point of 
view you are expressing, Mr. McCloy. I respectfully 
disagree with that line of thinking, though I do 
agree that there is some suspicion—you mention 
your gut reaction. But I don't think that important 
decisions affecting certified public accountants, 
their clients and others, should be made just on 
feelings, on emotion. The problem is I don't know 
where it stops then. Whose feelings, whose emotions 
whose reaction? I think that it is important to 
consider that aspect of it.
I understand and respect your viewpoint.
MR. McCLOY: I feel that there are some 
things the accountants can do in the MAS field that 
are helpful to the audit. However, this on I 
react to, and I think that informed people do.
Now a query: Is this something that you 
should take into account or that you would take 
into account if you were in our place?
MR. VANATTA: I think you should take it 
into account. I would not get into quantifying 
the impact that it should have on you. I think this 
is indicative of the need, because executive 
recruitment is a focal point of an area that is 
easily discussed and one can have strong feelings 
on it one way of the other, for the whole thought 
process to really be thought through clearly and 
that you take into account the future implications 
for other areas of decisions that are made in this 
particular area.
Also, I would suggest that you take into 
account the feelings, the reactions, that people
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have in this kind of a thing, providing executive 
recruitment on a professional discipline basis, 
and compare that to what the feelings, what the 
appearance might be, of the CPA partner referring 
one of his close friends, a person he has worked 
with, to that organization, or of placing one of 
their partners with that organization.
I think that the whole area must be 
reviewed before any conclusion is reached.
MR. McCLOY: This is one of these 
situations where you have to face the dilemma. 
As Mr. Churchill used to say to me frequently: 
These are some of the goddam bloody dilemmas of 
life. You have to make the judgment. (Laughter) 
MR. VANATTA: Mr. McCloy, I know it 
doesn’t apply to you, and I mean that sincerely, 
but when you are referring to attorneys and others 
who feel like they have to duck, and this is going 
to sound like waving a flag, I must say I think 
that is one of the problems. Too many people 
in business and the professions and others have 
ducked too often, and we need to stand up and be 
counted on these matters that I think are very 
important.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Vanatta.
MR. VANATTA: Thank you.
MR. GARRETT: Before we break for coffee 
I think I ought to observe that the legal profession 
somewhat excels the accounting profession in getting 
into trouble. After all, we got raked over by the 
President himself and all you have been able to 
attract is a retiring Congressman and a deceased 
Senator. (Laughter)
But with a little effort. (Laughter) I 
would like when we resume, our next person will be 
Mr. Arnstein. Is he here? Good. How about Mr. Green 
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who follows him? And Mr. Auerbach. Thank you very much. 
We will take 15 minutes.
(A short recess was taken.)
MR. GARRETT: Let’s reassemble. Lou Matusiak 
has had several questions with respect to the availability 
of written comments or prepared statements, that have 
been presented to the Board. They are all publicly 
available documents. They are physically available 
at Lou’s office in New York City or he will send you 
a copy for the cost of copying if you will write him 
or give him a note to that effect.
With respect to copies of the transcript, it 
is also public as a matter of policy and can be examined 
at the office of Lou Matusiak or I am sure you can order 
copies from the reporter if you wish to do so before 
you leave.
We will proceed with Mr. Peter Arnstein of 
John F. Forbes & Company. Mr. Arnstein, please.
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MR. PETER ARNSTEIN: You have my written 
statement, and I will try to summarize it and maybe 
make some observations which are not in the statement.
Our firm is a regional firm. We have 
approximately 200 professionals. We are regarded 
as a small firm by the large firms and a large firm 
by the small firm. (Laughter)
We have 9 offices. We practice entirely on 
the West Coast. We figure that approximately 12% of 
our revenue is derived from clients who are registered 
with the SEC.
As with smaller firms, a much higher proportion 
or our revenue is derived from tax services and 
approximately 6% from a formally organized MAS service.
I am Chairman of the Executive Committee 
of our firm, and I am responsible for its accounting 
and auditing practice.
Since 1961, I have served on various Institute 
committees, including the MAS Committee. I was for 
six years on the Institute’s Ethics Committee and 
Chairman of its Independence Committee for three years, 
and during that time I conferred with Andy Barr, the 
former Chief Accountant of the SEC, on many occasions. 
In my position with the firm, I am often called upon 
to settle or resolve potential or actual independence 
problems and I was a partner in charge of MAS services 
when we were starting it, going into that field, in 
the early Sixties, and I am primarily an auditor.
During all of this period, for at least 15 
years, I have been dealing with the management advisory 
independence question in these various capacities, 
and I am interested in seeing it resolved in a way 
that is beneficial to the public, business, the 
profession and won't hurt our firm.
I think that the two previous gentlemen who 
were before this Board, and it is quite apparent to me 
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that you gentlemen recognize the problems, are well 
aware of the problems, and I would just like to say 
this, that I am persuaded with these years of 
experience with it that the only practically sound 
and theoretically sound criteria for restricting 
MAS services is on the basis of independence; and 
that with respect to the performance of non-audit 
services, role is the only theoretically sound and 
practice manner to do it.
We have had a lot of experience with role, 
and it is a practical approach, and for example, 
the question of executive recruiting and particularly 
head-hunting for senior executives is concerned, 
there is a question, I think, whether the role of 
the auditor is compromised by hiring a chief 
executive because inevitably no matter what the 
auditor does in separating himself and being an 
independent consultant, there is a possibility that 
he has a vested interest in the success of the 
executive whom he has been instrumental in placing.
When it comes to skills and the breadth 
of services that are performed, there has never been 
a case where some audit failure was dependent on 
the performance or lack of independence resulting 
from the performance of non-audit services. As an 
audit partner over a number of years and as the 
top authority in our firm for settling these 
problems that come up in connection with audit 
independence, and even in our size firm they come 
up often, and when we feel that our objectivity 
is threatened, I would say 99.9% of the time the 
problems come up in the context or our suggesting 
adjustments to the client's financial statements 
to which the management objects. There is, I would 
say, the fundamental nexus of independence, that is, 
if we don't come to a satisfactory agreement, we may
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be fired.
That is overwhelmingly the situation that 
prevails, and really nothing else determines real 
independence except how the auditor performs under 
those circumstances.
Even in our practice, and quite frequently 
with non-SEC clients, contractors who have to show a 
certain net worth in order to get adequate bonding, 
private companies who have to show liquidity in order 
to get credit, family-owned companies where some of 
the family owns part of the company but is not in 
management, and another section of the family operates 
it and the non-managers are often very critical of 
how the operating part does, so that the question of 
what the financial statements are going to show and 
what the auditors are going to say about it comes up 
quite frequently. Overwhelmingly the objectivity and 
integrity of the auditor is tested under those 
circumstances. MAS never comes into the picture.
I think we realize, and I think Mr. McCloy 
particularly has focused on the problem that when it 
comes to publicly held companies, we have to be like 
Caesar’s wife. There is this gut feeling that certain 
services dilute the auditor’s image as an expert or 
somehow they don’t seem right.
When we were trying in the MAS Committee in 
the early Sixties, and this was my first exposure to 
this problem, to describe an appropriate scope of 
services for CPAs, immediately those firms who don’t 
perform psychological testing, and we don’t perform 
psychological testing in our firm, said, "Well, 
obviously, you shouldn't do psychological testing," 
and those firms who did psychological testing had 
all kinds of very good reasons why they should do 
psychological testing. I think they were probably 
right. I think, for example, you can make a pretty 
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good case that if we as auditors had the results of 
psychological tests of some of the chief executives 
and financial officers of the firms we audit we would 
be a lot more knowledgeable than going out and 
counting inventory (Laughter) because when we do get 
into some of these audit problems and we discuss 
among ourselves, that it, within the firm: What are 
the motivations of this particular executive? Is 
he really telling the truth? I think that if you 
examine audit failures, and I have been involved 
fortunately not as a defendant but as an expert 
in assisting lawyers in some of these massive audit 
failures, perhaps if the auditor could have knowledge 
that the chief executive really was a liar, or as 
in the renowned case of McKesson Robbins really 
wasn’t the person he purported to be at all, 
(Laughter) it would have been very helpful.
So that you can make a strong case for 
psychological testing, but there is this gut feeling 
that maybe auditors shouldn’t do it. In order to 
satisfy this substantial minority of people who are 
less acquainted with what actually goes on than 
anybody else, I think that we can acknowledge that 
some restriction should be made so that these 
questions don’t arise.
The important thing, and it is particularly 
important to our firm, is that if such restrictions 
are made, that they are completely separated from 
independence considerations. They are acknowledged 
as image problems that have no logical basis and 
are simply being made to satisfy the critics, and 
I may be putting it in an unnecessarily negative 
aspect, but that is the way it ought to be done, 
so that there is no spill-over to the very valuable 
non-audit services that firms of our size perform 
for our non-SEC clients.
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As you acknowledge, and I think you realize, 
most of our size clients do not have CPAs on their 
staff. They rely on us. They do not have computer 
specialists. They rely on us for all kinds of things. 
We are in an excellent position to serve them.
As an auditor, we probably are, as other 
auditors are, the outside person who goes around and 
is more intimately acquainted with our clients’ 
operations and how other businesses operate than 
others, and I think over a period of years we get 
a very good idea why some businesses are successful 
and some are not, and you might say our function as 
a bee spreading the pollen of success is an important 
one, in the economy of this country. So that if some 
way our services are to be restricted, then it is for 
public image, and it is not based on independence 
because there is no theoretical reasoning or experience 
that says that independence is affected as long as 
role is maintained.
I would like to also comment on the account­
ing and auditing skills criterion. I think that we 
have certain criticisms with the restrictions and 
the reasons for the restrictions presently contained 
in Section 4. I have read it and read it and read it, 
and I still don't make too much sense out of it.
I am presently a member of the National Review Board 
and have been a member of the Trial Board panel, 
but particularly as a former Ethics Committee member, 
I would not want to underestimate the ability of the 
Ethics Committee or any other technical committee 
in the Institute to sit around and, maybe in this 
room I have spent days, certainly one of these rooms 
down on this floor, trying to dissect similar problems, 
and we don't get to a resolution. I would say in the 
examples of what are accounting and auditing skills 
and what are not, there is probably in each one of 
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these categories food for weeks and months of argument 
and discussion. I agree entirely with my friend, 
George Catlett, on role as a criterion. I think also 
I would like to say that the thing that is implied 
in here is that perhaps our tax services are affected 
because in one of these documents, tax advisory 
services is defined as a non-audit service. As is 
entirely logical, most of our clients ask us to 
prepare their tax returns. They have nobody in the 
firm that can do that. Generally in our firm our 
auditors prepare the initial draft which is a logical 
outgrowth of their auditing.
They assemble the information. When you 
get down to a client’s bottom line, half of it may 
go to taxes, and so we get a very good idea of what 
the tax problems of the client are. We get some 
ideas as to maybe how they can be improved or where 
the trouble areas are. It is very logical. 
Accountants have always been involved in taxes, and 
we feel that there is an implied threat and a spill­
over that possibly because taxes in some sense are 
an adversary procedure, that down the line it will 
be prohibited even though the jurisdiction has been 
limited to services for SEC clients. As has been 
previously pointed out, it is impossible to 
distinguish independence questions vis-a-vis 
public and private companies. It is possible to 
distinguish image problems, and if image is a basis 
for proscription, as it may very well be, then it 
can be acknowledged that it will not affect services 
for privately held companies.
I think I have covered most of the material 
in my prepared remarks. I appreciate the opportunity 
to be able to present them to you.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Arnstein. 
Mr. McCloy, do you have any questions?
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MR. McCLOY: You constantly referred to role 
as distinguished from skills. Would you just elaborate 
on it. I have read your written statement. You talked 
as if you only looked at this from the point of view 
of role the problems would be resolved. Will you 
elaborate on that. What do you mean by "role” and what 
should be our approach to this dilemma that we refer to? 
Tell me how that term helps us.
MR. ARNSTEIN: I think role is an acknowledged 
part. It has been embodied in the independence 
literature. It is embodied in the rule that an 
accountant or an auditor should not perform any 
management functions, and there is a long history, as 
a matter of fact, at the present time. Take a simple 
matter like auditing our own work, and at the present 
time the profession’s position is somewhat different 
from the SEC’s position as to what part an auditor 
can play, let’s say, in keeping the books.
I was the Chairman of the Independence 
Committee when the current interpretations were issued, 
and you might say we agreed to disagree. We came 
pretty close but did not entirely agree, and role is 
a difficult thing to judge as to where you cross 
the line because we have had publicly held clients 
where the client really didn't know how much money 
they had made until we got through with our audit. 
We may make 150 journal entries. Let's say all the 
important ones. Have we kept the books, and 
accountants sometimes add things up by the number 
of journal entries although some may be for 25 dollars. 
We hope not, and some for half the profit, but for 
example, how do you measure it? When you get over 
100, have you kept the books or not?
MR. McCLOY: Do you mean in management?
MR. ARNSTEIN: So it is a difficult thing. 
Yet, I think it has always been acknowledged that role 
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in the performance of non-audit services or in the 
performance of accounting services is an important 
consideration in determining whether you are independent 
or not. We have addressed it, and we can distinguish.
In my written statement, if it is independence, 
it ought to be decided on role. If it is not 
independence, and role is a part of independence, 
then it ought to be image. We can't separate 
independence between private and publicly owned 
companies, but we can separate image. Image is a public 
thing, but independence is pervasive throughout public 
and private practice.
MR. McCLOY: You talked about taxes. It seems 
to me as long as I can recall, accountants have been 
preparing corporation returns.
I am thinking of what we are probably going 
to hear this afternoon from the actuaries. They make 
a big point about the vice that is involved in reviewing 
your own work.
Aren't accountants reviewing their own work 
when they do the tax returns? They can come to the 
audit, and they must make a decision that the tax work 
has been well done before they make the attest. Isn't 
that reviewing your own work?
MR. ARNSTEIN: That is right, and to a certain 
extent it is. I think you could say that taxes, the 
income taxes, are a result of the operations of the 
company so that no matter who does the work, you are 
going to come up with a figure.
MR. McCLOY: It is an interpretation of the 
law.
MR. ARNSTEIN: It is an interpretation of 
rules, but then we as auditors are in the position of 
interpreting accounting rules which go right to the 
heart of the subject.
When the chief executive officer and the 
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chief financial officer as they presently do sign 
representation letters that they are responsible for 
the fair presentation of financial statements in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles, often they know very little about 
generally accepted accounting principles, and we 
know a lot more and we tell them what they are, so it 
is a difficult thing to separate.
MR. McCLOY: You have had a lot of experience, 
as you point out in your qualification statement. 
Suppose you should put yourself in our position. What 
MAS would you proscribe and what would you permit.
MR. ARNSTEIN: Since the objections are not 
based on logic, I think, and some of the services 
that are already proscribed as part of the SEC 
Section rules, are services which are mentioned as 
kind of offending the propriety of "the public" if 
you put quotes around "the public," and are services 
which seem far removed from independence considerations, 
although they may not necessarily be removed from 
independence considerations, although they may not 
necessarily be removed, I can't say except that it 
be based on what is the image? And the determination 
of image is a nonlogical process. I think that somehow 
or other the Board has to get a feeling for what will 
satisfy this public out there and say that the image 
of the profession is unfavorably regarded because 
certain firms perform these for public clients and 
considering the pluses and minuses, just proscribe 
them. To a certain extent it is just like dealing 
with unidentified flying objects. It is not a logical 
process.
MR. McCLOY: Thank you very much for that. 
That is great help. (Laughter)
PROFESSOR CARY: It is realistic.
MR. RICHARD A STARK: I am not sure that
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I understand the distinction you are making on the 
image point. You say image is a public matter and 
that proscriptions should apply only those performing 
SEC work or work done for SEC clients.
I would have thought that the public that 
you are referring to would be the persons relying on 
the financial statements. Whether it is a broad 
public such as shareholders of a publicly held company 
receiving financial statements or a narrow constituency 
such as the nonmanaging owners of a company that you 
spoke of or the creditors, there would still be a 
public perception and I would think it would be 
important to preserve whatever image qualities are 
desirable in either case.
MR. ARNSTEIN: I think that the term "image" 
is unfortunate and perhaps George Catlett's term, 
compatibility, is a little better because it is hard 
to distinguish image from appearance because in 
judging independence questions we use the fact and 
appearance of independence. But image doesn't have 
anything to do with independence because in practice 
we know it doesn't affect independence as long as 
role is maintained, and that other things are very 
much more important.
We should acknowledge it is image, and I 
think that if you look at the polls and so forth, 
that the people who seem to have the idea about non- 
audit services affecting independence are generally 
people who are removed from the scene. I think 
Mr. Vanatta referred to that.
One of the significant findings is that 
the more people know about it, the less they are 
worried about MAS service. So when you get the 
smaller companies and everybody knows everybody 
else, I don't really think that they are concerned 
with that subject at all. Really, it is all those 
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people out there who are the public, and have very 
little contact with it.
MR. GARRETT: We are running a little late. 
Do you have any further questions?
MR. MATUSIAK: I have one. If I understood 
Mr. Catlett’s position correctly, he would proscribe 
the rendering of any services by a firm that had an 
SEC client. You seem to say that you can render some 
services to non-SEC audit clients that would be 
proscribed to an SEC audit client. Is that correct?
MR. ARNSTEIN: That is correct.
MR. MATUSIAK: You are not afraid that there 
would be some spillover over time or that if you were 
an auditor for a non-SEC client and you rendered to 
them a service that you would not render to an SEC 
client, that you would have no problem with that?
MR. ARNSTEIN: Well, I am worried about 
spillover and very much worried, and therefore, I 
think the essence of my statement is that if the 
proscription is based on image and image is a concept 
of the public and if non-public companies don’t have 
a public, so to speak, that the spillover won’t occur 
as long as it is adequately contained.
PROFESSOR CARY: Mr. Arnstein, I just wanted 
to relate myself to one point in connection with your 
type of firm.
You indicate yours is a 200-man firm, 
professional firm, and obviously, as you say, you 
can't speak for the small firms, and yet perhaps you 
have a better impression of firms below that than 
the big firms do. I am not sure, but I will accept 
that for a premise for a moment.
If that is the case of the firms with the 
number of professionals of your size and less, when 
you speak of their performing MAS services, is it the 
same kind of MAS services that we are talking about 
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vis-a-vis big firms? For instance, how many firms 
below your size have computer specialists, for example? 
They wouldn’t have anybody who was doing formal 
executive recruiting, plant layout, actuaries, would 
they?
I am just wondering what are we dealing with 
in terms of organizations of the 200 professional or 
less?
MR. ARNSTEIN: I can’t speak exactly. All 
I can say is that the practice of firms our size and 
smaller vary a great deal.
I do know of smaller firms than ours who are 
in psychological testing.
PROFESSOR CARY: And never had any logical 
testing in these firms? (Laughter)
MR. ARNSTEIN: I do know of firms, for example, 
that specialize in marketing and so forth so that I 
don't know what the impact is, but I don’t think it 
would be wise to make an assumption. In fact, I 
know it wouldn't be because I do know that there are 
relatively small firms who specialize in what can be 
regarded as non-audit practice.
PROFESSOR CARY: I am amazed that a firm of 
under 200 could be engaged in psychological testing 
and anything that is somewhat, shall we say, way out 
relatively, and still perform the auditing function 
which is its primary function.
MR. ARNSTEIN: In this particular firm, I 
think the managing partner is a graduate psychologist 
as well as a CPA.
I am a graduate engineer, although I wouldn’t 
want to build anything for anybody. (Laughter) I 
would say also that you referred to computer 
specialists. In this day and age almost any firm has 
to have one.
PROFESSOR CARY: That is probably one area 
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plus the taxes, you said.
MR. GARRETT: Mr. Arnstein, in your experience 
or observation, do you gain or lose clients because 
of the variety or the quality of this MAS service?
MR. ARNSTEIN: There is no question about it. 
If we don’t provide a full range of services of what 
accountants are expected to provide, then they will go 
to competitive firms which can provide all of those 
services. For example, this I have got to say, comes 
up in executive recruiting a good deal. When a client 
is looking for a chief financial officer, they ask us, 
and we very much want to supply one because they will 
go and ask a competitor, and then maybe this gets into 
independence to a certain extent.
A competitor will place their own man, who 
will feel loyal to this other firm and all kinds of 
things like that.
MR. GARRETT: And change auditors.
MR. ARNSTEIN: Sure.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much, Mr. 
Arnstein.
Mr. Green. Eric Green of Harris, Kerr, 
Forster. Is this Mr. Noonan coming with him?
MR. ERIC F. GREEN: That is right. 
MR. GARRETT: Proceed, gentlemen.
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MR. ERIC F. GREEN: I am Eric Green. This 
is Donal Noonan. We are both very much pleased to 
have the opportunity of being here.
Perhaps by way of introduction, I should 
just say a few words about our firm. We are one of 
the smaller of the national firms.
We also happen to be rather a strong 
international firm in public accounting and in 
management advisory services.
Both of us CPAs. Both of us have spent 
many years of our lives as audit partners, and both 
of us now dedicate, I would say, 95% of our time to 
our MAS practice.
In our written brief we have pointed out 
some of the areas in which we are rather specialized, 
and in some respects we are rather unique in providing 
certain types of MAS services to our clients, both 
audit clients and non-audit clients.
Very briefly, the position of our firm in 
respect to scope of services, is that no restrictions 
are warranted such as those that are proposed. We 
believe that they would be harmful, unjust and 
completely uncalled for by any past events. These 
points have been already mentioned by other speakers.
We are confident of our own ability to 
decide, guided by our own internal rules of conduct 
and those of the MAS Practice Standards of the AICPA 
that we can decide for ourselves the scope of 
services that we should provide.
We do not doubt our independence in 
rendering them, and we also know from experience 
that our clients will decide whether we are the best 
suppliers of their needs.
A free market exists particularly with 
respect to the provision of management advisory 
services, and we believe it should continue to
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exist without harmful regulation.
However, rather than dwell on the negative 
side, we should like to draw the Board’s attention to 
the positive values of MAS services to audit clients 
and others. For example, we see demands from 
governments for better, more comprehensive audits 
of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and they 
are certainly needed.
We have SEC requirements for disclosure 
of replacement values of assets. The private sector 
is constantly seeking new insights into its operating 
methods and businesses turn to their public 
accountants for study and advice. They also turn 
to other business consultants frequently on a highly 
competitive basis.
That is to say that CPA’s management 
advisory services have grown because there is demand 
for them. It is not that we went out and invited 
them, as it were, but people came to us to provide 
the services, and in fact, we believe that CPAs in 
general are often the most efficient, economic and 
effective suppliers of those services.
We believe that the benefits that accrue 
to stockholders and to the economy as a whole, when 
services are rendered, greatly overtakes any possible 
dangers that some allege exist.
It is asserted in the summary of notice 
78-1 that the practice of public accounting has its 
origins in the attest function. In the case of our 
firm, at least, the MAS function preceded the attest 
function to some extent, certainly in the United 
States.
When our firm came here in 1911 at the 
request of an English client, it was to provide 
essentially what are now referred to as management 
advisory services because of a perceived competency
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that we had in the kind of services that that client 
was looking for.
Our management advisory services are still 
provided internationally, and it is important to us 
and to our firm that they continue.
As the private sector seeks to expand 
overseas, it seeks the advice of its business 
consultants. Many of our MAS services involve our 
overseas offices. Our British associates who are 
already, as I am sure you are aware, living in highly 
regulated society, have expressed amazement at the 
proposed scope restrictions that would affect them 
also because we must practice as one firm in our 
international work.
They ask us: How can we willingly abridge 
our rights to practice professionally when no public 
good is promised except in the minds of our detractors? 
Unfortunately, the issue has become political rather 
than professional, and as we say in our written 
brief, we have serious concern that the proposed 
proscriptions will be unconstitutional restraints 
on our rights to practice our profession.
I am going to ask my partner, Donal Noonan 
just to say a few words on this other political 
question since so many other speakers are covering 
most eloquently some of the more professional aspects 
of this discussion. If you would, Don.
MR. DONAL C. NOONAN: Gentlemen, I am a CPA 
by examination in New York and by reciprocity in 
California. I practice in California now, although 
originally I was in our New York office.
I am also an attorney admitted to practice 
in the State of New York, and Mr. McCloy, I hope I 
don’t have to duck twice when I say that.
The certificate granted me by New York and 
by California, and to my fellow CPAs around the country 
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in the various states, permit me to hold myself out 
to the public as a certified public accountant, but 
I do not find in any place that this grant of status 
restricts me in the pursuit of an honest livelihood 
in the business world.
You have in the record the position of my 
firm and have heard the comments of my partner and 
colleague, but I would like to approach the issue from 
a different perspective.
First off, I would like to add my whole 
hearted personal endorsement to Chester Vanatta’s 
comments. They were most eloquently presented.
The professional public accountant is 
highly regarded and respected for his integrity, his 
independence, his objectivity, his competence, his 
knowledge of the client’s affairs, his knowledge 
of the client’s business, and by education, which 
does not stop upon attaining an undergraduate or 
graduate degree but is a life-long process, he has 
frequently many other attainments. You heard Mr. 
Arnstein state that he has an engineering degree, 
and there are many CPAs who have degrees in other 
than auditing and accounting.
By experience gained in the marketplace 
and in the field and in industry, he attains a 
knowledge and a capability far beyond that which 
we would normally associate with the attest function 
alone.
By application of his knowledge and testing 
of that knowledge and his experience to problems of 
his clients, he has demonstrated to the community, 
to his clients, his ability to undertake and solve 
complex business problems.
The accountant as professional adviser, as 
a diagnostician of business ills, as a dispenser 
of curative advice, has established a standing in 
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the business, financial and industrial community 
that is the envy of those less qualified or worse, 
those whose motivation to criticize is politically 
based and on a "popular" concept, if you will.
I submit that our reaction to the so-called 
Senate staff study, the Metcalf report, if you will, 
is indeed an overreaction to a witch hunt.
The very title of the report, The Accounting 
Establishment, reveals the underlying bias and lack 
of objectivity of its authors.
The pronouncement of other politically 
motivated individuals including one from my present 
home state are replete with innuendoes and charges 
and false assumptions and peculiarly lacking in 
facts or case studies. Broad generalities based 
on pure assumptions can confuse the uninformed 
segment of the public perhaps, but should not confuse 
us.
Witch hunters will always find witches. 
UFO hunters will always find UFOs. And leprechaun 
seekers, my parent’s native land, will always find 
leprechauns, but we should direct our efforts toward 
seeking the truth and toward educating the public 
in the truth and not waste our time tilting at 
windmills set in motion by misinformed, biased, 
politically motivated, would be critics of our 
professional activities. There is not a scintilla 
of evidence that the independence, integrity or 
objectivity of any CPAs have been compromised or 
impaired by management services performed for audit 
clients or any other clients.
The charge itself is an insult which 
demands proof from those making the charge and not 
proof of a negative which is an impossible feat.
We should avoid even the appearance of 
seeking isolated instances or claimed instances of
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lack of independence, but rather seek out the truth, 
the real benefit to our clients, to the community 
and to society as a whole of the advisory and consulting 
services performed by the accounting profession.
I believe that an analysis and perhaps a 
scrutiny of the motives of our detractors will 
disclose a conflict of interest there, that is to 
say the least, unbecoming their status in the community 
and demeaning to the integrity of the profession of 
which I am proud to be a member.
I recommend that the proposed Amendment 
be rejected. I thank you.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you, gentlemen. Are 
there questions?
MR. McCLOY: Is there any area that you 
proscribe or any types of business advice that you 
refuse to give?
MR. GREEN: We are very careful only to 
accept engagements that we feel we can complete with 
full competence and due care and all the standards 
that are applicable, I think in general, to CPAs’ 
work, but specifically are documented in the MAS 
Practice Standards. So yes, if someone comes to us 
to undertake a study for coal mining, for example, 
we would say: No, that is not our expertise, and 
we would perhaps try to find the right firm and 
recommend them, but no, we would not accept 
engagements that we didn’t feel we could complete.
Does that answer your question?
MR. McCLOY: I guess it does.
MR. NOONAN: Might I just piggy-back on that. 
In the past where that situation has occurred, and it 
has occurred frequently, we have joint ventured, if 
you will, assignments with other professionals in the 
performance of assignments which included our 
expertise applied to the project at hand coupled 
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with the expertise of others.
So that if we have any question as to our 
own competence, which we would have as a natural 
outcome of, for example, studying a coal mine, we 
would.
MR. McCLOY: You would go out and get a 
coal expert to help you. Is that the idea?
MR. NOONAN: That is the idea. Dig out 
the facts.
MR. McCLOY: There is no limit.
MR. NOONAN: There is no limit we can see 
to place on the profession. I think if we individually 
place a limit on ourselves, because of our own 
evaluation of our own competence, that is one thing., 
but to place that limitation on the entire profession 
is, in my opinion, an error because there are others 
within the profession who would have that competence 
and to whom we would direct such a client or potential 
client.
MR. WOOD: Would you have different members 
of the firm performing management advisory services 
and a check on the accounts and internal controls 
in the final certification of the attest function?
MR. NOONON: Yes, as a matter of fact, in 
our firm, and I say this only because of the fact that 
we do have a firm of sufficient size to permit, and 
I would not want to impose the same restrictions on 
smaller firms. We have three separate divisions in 
the firm: the audit, or attest division, audit and 
accounting, the tax department which is involved 
primarily in taxes, and we have our management 
advisory services department of which I am the 
Western Regional Coordinator and of which Mr. Green 
is the National Director, and yes, we do have those 
separations. All of us have come through the attest 
function to become partners in the firm, to become
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CPAs and have had considerable experience in the 
audit function. I dare say that our management 
advisory services have given us a much broader 
insight into the problems and the opportunities 
to perform a better audit as a result of management 
advisory services than would otherwise be the case.
PROFESSOR CARY: What is the size of your 
firm in terms of professionals?
MR. GREEN: We have at the present time 
in the United States about 600 professional staff. 
Overseas I don’t know. It is more like another 
thousand, I think, over the world.
PROFESSOR CARY: If you were to identify 
your role in the field of management advisory 
services, how many of the areas would it cover that 
are referred to in the notice here including marketing 
consulting, plant layout, product design and executive 
recruiting, insurance actuarial services, employee 
benefit and so forth? How many of those would it 
cover?
MR. GREEN: The main impact on our 
practice would be in the marketing research area 
specifically. It would cover others to a less degree. 
For example, executive recruiting—like many firms we 
don’t have a large department doing it, but we 
certainly don’t want to be denied the opportunity 
of assisting our clients in seeking executives.
There is an important thing that we bring 
out in our written brief regarding market research. 
It struck us as curious that there was no suggestion 
of proscribing what are commonly known as economic 
feasibility studies of which we undertake a great 
many. In so doing over the years that we have been 
doing them, we have grown more and more aware of the 
need for quite intensive market research in undertaking 
a satisfactory economic feasibility study. That can 
cover such things as attitude and behavioral studies 
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because all those things of that nature enter into 
the judgment regarding the success of a proposed 
venture about which an economic feasibility study 
is to be written.
It struck us as curious that some aspects 
of those market research questions were not considered 
to be suitable for CPAs to undertake, whereas the 
way we look at it, we think it is absolutely 
essential that many of them do be undertaken, and 
we firmly believe that we should undertake them in­
house rather than relying on outside authorities 
to give us the information that we should need any 
way in order to complete the study.
MR. WOOD: If you gave a client some brief 
recommendations on market research and they accepted 
your recommendations and they turned out badly and 
business was a flop, how would that affect your 
attest function?
MR. GREEN: I don't think it would affect 
our attest function. It might affect our pocketbooks 
very rapidly.
MR. WOOD. You answered the question as 
I thought you would. If you give some market research 
advice and it doesn't pan out as you hoped or as 
management hoped when they accepted your advice, I 
don't see how it would affect your independence as 
an auditor.
MR. GREEN: No, we don't think so.
MR. NOONAN: And more so, our advice is 
purely that, Mr. Wood. It is advice and recommendations 
and in order for that advice to become reality and a 
fact of life, that advice has to be accepted, adopted 
and implemented by the client who then assumes the 
responsibility for it. We don't duck a responsibility 
for performing the service, but we certainly don't 
assume, and the client recognizes this, that we do 
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not assume or assure a guarantee that the outcome 
will be as projected.
MR. GARRETT: You wouldn't imagine there 
being any temptation to cooperate in making it look 
a little better?
MR. NOONAN: Oh, it never crossed our minds 
that such a thing could happen.
MR. GREEN: Those of you who are familiar 
with the internal working of accounting firms, I can 
assure you there is a pretty strong independence of 
thought, particularly differences of opinion, among 
the audit partners and the MAS partners on many 
occasions, but the thought of a compromise, no.
MR. GARRETT: They wouldn't be that eager 
to make you look good?
MR. GREEN: No, I think they really wouldn't.
MR. NOONAN: It might be just the contrary. 
(Laughter)
MR. MATUSIAK: For a non-audit client, 
because of your expertise in the hospitality industry, 
would you accept an assignment which was quasi-management 
in nature for a non-audit client?
MR. NOONAN: Oh, yes, we do it regularly. 
In fact, for clients who are non-audit clients of any 
firm who are seeking an objective determination as to 
the potential success of a project that they envision, 
they have in mind a certain project, and they say: 
"Would this succeed under these circumstances in this 
place?" And they will come to us.
MR. MATUSIAK: You provide manpower then to 
perform the management function.
MR. NOONAN: No, no.
MR. GREEN: I think perhaps there has been 
a misunderstanding of your question. We undertake 
management advisory service work for non-audit clients, 
but not if we would not be independent. We would not 
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undertake a study if, in fact, we were going to become 
the managers. We do not become managers.
MR. NOONAN: Oh, no. In no instance would 
we be involved in the implementation of those 
recommendations or the supervision of construction 
or management of a project, no.
MR. McCLOY: Roughly, how many of your clients 
are SEC registered?
MR. GREEN: Some 35. We are not heavily 
involved in SEC clients. In the other hand, our SEC 
clients are very important to us. We certainly intend 
to maintain a position in the SEC Section of the AICPA.
MR. McCLOY: What other countries is your 
firm involved in besides England?
MR. GREEN: We have offices in many parts of 
the world, particularly in Africa, the Caribbean, all 
over Europe.
MR. NOONAN: Australia, New Zealand, Canada.
MR. GREEN: And that does raise an important 
issue really in our international practice, the 
consistency with which we can approach work.
MR. GARRETT: Are there no similar restrictions 
in the British practice?
MR. GREEN: No.
MR. GARRETT: Maybe your lawyer wouldn’t 
want you to answer this too accurately, but would you 
read the Executive Committee’s proposals as it applied 
to you making a severe dent in the MAS that you now 
supply, requiring you to give up some services that 
you now provide?
MR. NOONAN: I really could answer that no. 
But we still feel so strongly about any attempt at 
proscription on the profession as a whole that we feel 
forced to speak even though we might be affected very 
slightly.
MR. GARRETT: I see. Thank you very much
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MR. NOONAN: Thank you. 
MR. GARRETT: Mr. Auerbach. Please proceed. 
MR. NORMAN E. AUERBACH: I am Chairman of 
Coopers & Lybrand. May I personally congratulate you 
and your staff for the very excellent discussion draft 
and issue identification document that you released in 
preparation for these hearings.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you.
MR. AUERBACH: I am, however, concerned with 
the degree of focus on the particular issues that we 
are discussing here today.
To state it very simply, I believe all our 
efforts and concentration toward improvement must be 
directed to the basic reasons for the public’s concern 
over the certified public accountant’s performance. 
The prevention of audit failures is the first problem. 
The second problem is keeping pace with the public's 
expanding expectations relative to the auditor's 
responsibility.
Analysis of the failures leads one to certain 
positive conclusions: First, the causes were primarily 
failures in judgment in the auditing area, much more than 
in the accounting area. Most often, the failure to 
recognize the significance of certain events or 
weaknesses that in one way or another were revealed 
to the CPA during the course of his work. The analysis 
leads you down a certain path—we must have good 
quality control in the firm, our people must be well 
trained, and above all we must understand our client's 
business. I would emphasize, we must have on board 
the special competencies necessary to deal with 
specialized areas such as computers, inventories, 
pensions, taxes, et cetera.
We are in a world of increasing sophistication 
and complexity. To think in terms of arbitrarily 
limiting the competencies in the current environment 
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would be like Bud Wilkinson, the new coach of the 
St. Louis Cardinals Football Team, deciding he is 
going to compete with the other teams in the league 
but stick to the old single platoon of his college 
coaching days—no two platoon concept, no special 
defense team, no special place kicker, no special 
punter, no kickoff team or kick return team, no 
special line coaches, no defensive coaches, et cetera. 
How would he do? And more interestingly, what would 
the public's perception of his team be when they 
lose 16 straight games, which they would do.
MR. McCLOY: It would change if he won 16. 
(Laughter)
MR. AUERBACH: Gentlemen, in a period when 
we auditors are being challenged to step up to ever­
broadening responsibilities, in the detection of 
fraud and irregularities, in the internal accounting 
control aspects of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
in the whole area of performance auditing as it breaks 
ground in the government area, how can we conceive 
of taking steps to limit the talent available to us?
One fact also comes through very clearly, 
and it has been repeated many times. There is no 
evidence that performing management consulting 
services has in any instance been shown to have 
contributed to an audit failure; to the contrary, 
I would speculate that the performance of such services 
and the broader knowledge base which it provides to 
the auditor and the greater skills available to deal 
with problems have contributed to the prevention 
of failures.
As the Chairman of my firm, I also believe 
that we must be responsive to the needs of those 
we serve. We are in a service profession and have 
been for 80 years. In that period, we have performed 
management consulting services for our clients, 
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admittedly organized more formally today than before. 
In the same way that the small accountant provides 
an ongoing consulting capability to his clients, 
so must the larger firm be responsive. Coopers & 
Lybrand has also performed actuarial services for 
almost two decades. We have twenty-three actuarial 
partners and a total staff of over 250 persons, with 
52 members or associates of the Society of Actuaries. 
We have a volume of approximately 9 million dollars 
in this particular area.
MR. McCLOY: Actuarial area?
MR. AUERBACH: Actuarial area. We are 
professionally competent, have never had any public 
criticisms or lawsuits involving our performance, 
and have been most helpful to our audit staff in an 
area of ever-increasing concern to the public, namely, 
the pension liability, a concern in both the public 
and private sector.
In exploring the area of responsiveness, 
I would like to take a few moments to discuss an area 
in which there has been much flag waving, although 
I am not sure it is very important when compared to 
the focus which it has received. That is Executive 
Search.
How does one get into executive search?
Does one do it for the opportunity of great financial 
rewards? The answer is no. It comes about as a result 
of a desire to serve.
Our clients know we have an appreciation 
of their needs. They also know that some of our 
professionals in public accounting want to go into 
the private sector. In sum, our clients recognize 
our general knowledge of the marketplace and so they 
seek us out. At first we responded by asking someone 
in the personnel department to see if they could help 
our clients out, or the partner or the manager himself 
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would scurry around and see if he could provide some 
help to their clients.
We finally concluded that we cannot and 
should not accommodate this need in less than a 
professionally competent way, so we hired professional 
search people who could capably match the needs of 
our client with the qualifications of the candidate. 
Were we trying to take over the search function in 
the country? Hardly. There are about 25,000 search 
persons in the United States, and our strategically 
placed professional staff never exceeded ten in this 
country.
The principal issue is independence, in the 
sense that the candidate placed would favor us as 
auditors if he were in a financial position. I say 
we must deal with that issue in the only way we can; 
that is, with an independent audit committee.
There is also a concern that we would later 
cover up for the employee on the theory that our being 
involved in his employment constituted vouching for 
his capabilities. You are, of course, aware that a 
search firm generally presents three candidates for 
a position, from which the company selects one; so 
we don't make an actual selection or the recommendation 
of a particular person.
What is more interesting is the current idea 
that auditors should be prepared to respond to audit 
committees when asked their evaluation of the competency 
of the financial management of a company, and this 
notion is included in a proposed SEC release. Are 
we auditors to be precluded from giving such views 
on the competency of a client’s employee on the basis 
that once having given such an opinion, we would not 
be independent thereafter with respect to that man 
because we had already made a representation? I 
doubt whether we could so behave in today’s environment.
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Executive search is not really a gig issue. I don’t 
think it should ever have been proscribed. We 
shouldn’t retrogress to doing this job in less than 
a highly professional manner; and I am fearful with 
proscription that is what the result will be.
Gentlemen, we have submitted a detailed 
paper to the Board. My objective here is not to 
read or attempt to cover that paper, since I am sure 
it will become part of the record and you will have 
an opportunity to focus on it.
I would like to just very briefly deal with 
the six key questions which you asked.
We must agree that independence is a 
fundamental issue, and we believe it is the only 
key issue bearing on scope of practice.
On the question of the appearance of 
independence, I find no factual evidence that audits 
have been compromised; and as I indicated earlier, 
the contrary is probably the case. I believe that 
a strong audit committee focusing on the relationship 
with the auditor can assure the public that the 
relationship is a beneficial one to the stockholders 
and that they, being in the best position to judge, 
are satisfied as to the auditor’s independence. You 
will never deal effectively with the appearance issue 
until we have the auditor retained by an accountable 
to the audit committee, not the management, even though 
we understand that there must be a good working 
relationship with management if an effective audit 
is to be conducted.
The sole test, other than independence, is 
that the service performed in a professional manner 
with highly qualified personnel, provides meaningful 
benefits to our clients, and is supportive and not 
disruptive to the performance of the attest function.
I think there should be no arbitrary limits 
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to the scope of our consulting practice. It must 
be responsive to a need, obviously, and if it 
broadens our abilities to better understand our 
client’s business, and if a committee of independent 
outside directors is in agreement that it does not 
affect our independence, the client and the public 
will ultimately benefit. Our own good business 
judgment, and I want to emphasize this—our own 
good business judgment and our consciousness as to 
how the market views us and the importance of that 
perception will act as an appropriate governor 
on what we choose to do.
The effect on the business community 
of performing a needed service in a highly 
professional manner can only be positive. Our 
proximity and familiarity with the business and 
its operations, the fact that we continue on the 
scene, affords us the unique opportunity to be 
constructive in a cost effective, and reasonably 
undisruptive manner.
A proscription of advisory services would, 
if one looks to the nature and character of the advice 
given, probably hurt the small accounting firm in 
a fairly significant way. The smaller firm takes 
pride in its hand holding, continuous type of 
business consulting. This service is needed, and 
it should be permitted to continue. The larger 
firms practicing management consulting are involved 
in the more complex, sophisticated areas, but then 
so are their clients.
I prefer not to draw a distinction between 
tax and other advisory services, although we are 
all aware that one can do nothing in the area of 
accounting that doesn’t carry with it tax 
ramifications. To force any kind of separation 
between tax and audit practice would be cost
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prohibitive, particularly to smaller companies. 
The impact of any proscription on small firms would, 
in my view, be devastating and clearly against 
the public interest.
MR. McCLOY: How about a proscription on 
taxing?
MR. AUERBACH: That's right. Let’s analyze 
the arguments for restricting service, not necessarily 
in the order of importance. The first argument is 
generally advanced by the regulators and goes 
something like this: the auditing profession owes 
its growth and strength to the various Securities 
Acts and their amendments. Therefore, the sole 
reason for the existence of the profession is the 
Securities Act.
This simply is not so. Coopers & Lybrand 
has been in existence for 80 years, long before 
the Securities Acts came into existence; and over 
these years, we have performed many valuable 
services for our clients in response to their needs. 
Furthermore, regulation is not the only means of 
accomplishing social objectives. I believe that 
private enterprise would have found a substitute 
for the securities laws to mandate reliable financial 
reporting.
If we examine operations in other countries, 
we find that indeed alternative approaches, relying 
on the services of the independent accountant, have 
developed and are flourishing. The regulatory 
argument tends to fall of its own weight.
A second argument is that an auditor, 
in furnishing management consulting services, somehow 
becomes inextricably involved in the client's actual 
decision making, thereby undermining the objectivity 
critical to the exercise of the attest function. 
This is an invalid argument for two reasons: To 
75
begin with, our consultants, as a matter of principle 
and practice, do not make management decisions. 
Second, the argument runs contrary to human nature 
itself. Management decisions are made by those 
who have the responsibility to act. A highly placed 
executive is not willing to turn over to a consultant 
the responsibility to make decisions that he himself 
is responsible for.
The third argument has been tendered, namely, 
that providing some types of non-audit services places 
firms in the position of auditing their own work. 
This question would arise, for an example, if an 
auditing firm were engaged to derive, actuarially, 
the amount of the contribution a client should make 
to its pension fund. Given this view, the fact that 
the auditing firm’s staff made the original calculation 
would somehow deprive it of the auditor’s "second look" 
if the amounts were used in preparing the financial 
statements. I would like to expand a little bit 
on this particular subject because I think it is 
important.
Let me try and explain some of the issues 
that relate to the concept of self-auditing. In today's 
environment, the independent auditor often uses the 
skills of other experts—for example: an appraiser, 
an attorney or an engineer—to provide sufficient, 
competent evidential matter to afford a basis for 
the auditor’s opinion regarding financial statements.
What is the auditor required to do on those 
occasions when he has used the work of other experts? 
Must he audit the work, or can he use it without 
attempting to apply procedures that go beyond the 
other experts’ report? The truth is that the auditor 
takes a course which avoids both extremes. Under 
today's requirements the auditor’s education and 
experience enable him to be knowledgeable about 
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business affairs in general, but he is not expected 
to have the expertise of a person trained for, or 
qualified to engage in the practice of, another 
profession. Thus, the procedure that the auditor 
applies to the report of a specialist is limited 
to obtaining an understanding of the qualifications 
of the specialist and his relationship, if any, 
with the client, and an understanding of the scope 
of the specialist's work, since it will form the 
basis of a representation in the financial statements. 
When the auditor uses the work of a specialist, he 
has no duty to go further unless he has reason to 
believe that the specialist’s findings were 
reasonable in the circumstances. Under these 
rules, the auditor can appropriately use the work 
in the same way as the auditor would examine the 
client's other computations or calculations. Because 
we think independence from the client is critical, 
we apply special rules when the specialist is 
related to the client.
Under the present rules, the auditor is 
prohibited from making reference to the fact that 
he has used the work of another expert in conducting 
his examination. I personally feel that this 
restriction should be changed, and I believe that 
my view is supported by the findings of the Cohen 
Commission. I think if it were made clear that 
we often to rely on the work of experts and that 
we do not audit their work, there would be less 
concern about the position of the actuary whose 
work is treated in this way.
There is another way in which the auditor 
could deal with the work of a specialist. That it, 
he could audit the work of each expert as he audits 
any other bit of evidence which he obtains from the 
enterprise's management. A decision to move in 
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this direction would inevitably increase the 
reliability of the related financial statements. 
What is the old saying? Two heads are better than 
one. We would have two performances of the same 
task. It would also, however, also increase 
substantially the cost of the auditor's examination. 
Take, for example, the work of the geologist on 
which the auditor relies. If that work has to be 
redone in the case of every oil company in 
determining its reserves, the cost would be 
significant. The fundamental question that remains 
is: Is the expected increase in reliability of 
financial statements sufficient to justify the 
additional costs that would be imposed on the 
enterprise and ultimately on the shareholders 
and consumers of its products?
In reaching its decision regarding 
treatment of the work of a specialist, the 
accounting profession recognized that the auditor's 
existing "social contract" mandates that increases 
in audit costs should be forced on American business 
only when it can be clearly shown that there will 
be appropriate benefits.
Some of those who have explored the areas 
of self-audit have not faced the problem squarely, 
but perhaps they have not properly identified it. 
The real issue is: Can the work of actuaries be 
treated in the same way as the work of other non- 
audit specialists; or, stated differently, can the 
work of an actuary be distinguished from the work 
of other specialists, for example, the appraiser, 
the attorney or the engineer?
I don't think they can be or should be 
distinguished. I think the actuaries do comprise 
a professional group. They, through their various 
organizations, have begun the work of establishing 
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the framework of self-regulation. Just as the 
auditor deals with measuring the financial impact 
of completed transactions, the actuary deals 
with the measurement of financial implications 
of expected transactions. I share with them their 
keen desire for full recognition in the family 
of professionals. To single out the actuary’s 
work for treatment different from the work of 
other specialists—appraisers, attorneys, engineers— 
whose work we do rely upon, would, in my view, be 
an error. In this respect, the self-audit issue 
is not a real issue as it related to the actuaries. 
I believe the Cohen Commission’s report implicitly 
supports my view. The Commission further suggested 
that, as a preventive measure, the auditor’s 
standard of care be extended when he uses a 
specialist who is an employee of his firm. We 
accept this concept, because we believe that the 
same high standard of care that prevails in the 
auditing environment should be extended, can be 
extended, and is being extended to every 
professional service that my firm offers.
When we, as Coopers & Lybrand, are 
involved as the actuary, we take on a substantial 
responsibility, because we are now responsible 
for the work of the expert as well. From the 
point of view of the protection of the public, 
we can’t get off the hook by a statement that we 
were relying on the work of an expert to whom 
we are not related and to whom we attribute the 
failure if there has been a failure. We are 
on the hook, and therefore, from the point of 
view of the public’s protection, the public is 
afforded even greater protection perhaps than 
they might otherwise be.
On the subject of competition, some 
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contend that accounting firms offering a broad 
spectrum of non-audit services are waging unfair 
competition with other companies offering similar 
services. I just don’t believe that to be the case. 
We are competing with others and the competition 
is healthy. Our clients and the business world 
are fairly sophisticated when it comes to consulting 
services, and that is an area that has become 
very competitive. It is very unusual in today’s 
environment that the company will limit the 
proposal opportunity to its accountants and auditors.
Competition is healthy. The ultimate 
beneficiaries are the stockholders in American 
enterprises. There is no reason to believe that 
the results of competition in this area would differ 
and have any other effect than from competition 
in any other field.
Some of the areas under discussion here, 
such as actuarial services, have long been associated 
with accounting. We consider ourselves co-professionals 
with actuaries, and we have had many important links 
with them. This is so since the auditor, as I said 
before, may be said to be the primary examiner of 
the current financial implications of past events 
while the actuary measures the current financial 
implications of future events. We are both very 
much in the financial business of dealing with 
figures. There is a close relationship. One of 
the earliest professional institutions in the 
world was the Accountants and Actuaries in Scotland, 
under that very name; and Coopers & Lybrand, as I 
have indicated, has offered actuarial services 
for almost two decades.
Gentlemen, we do compete. We compete 
with actuaries, we compete with other management 
consultants, and we even compete rather aggressively
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with other accounting firms. I think this competition 
is appropriate and desirable.
There is no logical or ethical reason to 
force us to divest ourselves of any part of our 
consulting practice. Our standards are vital and 
rigorous. Our auditors benefit by the association 
with experts from other disciplines and thus broaden 
their own capabilities.
My last comment, gentlemen, an important 
point which cannot be ignored, is the influence that 
the breadth of our practice has had on entrants into 
our profession. The green eyeshade days are gone, 
and the young people sense it. The diversity of 
problems, the alternative career paths, the opportunity 
to contribute to the profitability and effectiveness 
of American business are bringing to us better young 
people than ever before. With proper training and 
proper quality controls, the contribution of our 
profession will be significant because we are a 
people’s business; the better we are, and the more 
talent we possess, the better shall the public be 
served.
Thank you.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Auerbach. 
Are there questions? Mr. Wood.
MR. WOOD: I don’t have any.
MR. STARK: I have one. Do you agree with 
the restrictions that are suggested in the Executive 
Committee’s proposal with respect to actuarial 
services, and would the application of those 
restrictions have an impact on your firm?
MR. AUERBACH: I don’t agree with the 
restrictions; and yes, they would have an effect. 
I can't give you the exact financial effect that 
the particular revisions relating to insurance 
work would have, but we do have a number of people 
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involved in that area.
We don’t agree with the insurance work 
restrictions. We recognize, of course, that the 
rules are established by the majority of the Executive 
Committee.
MR. STARK: In the pension benefit area, 
you would continue to be able to function?
MR. AUERBACH: We would be able to under 
the proposed rules.
MR. WOOD: In those firms, insurance 
companies that you audit, and for whom you provide 
actuarial service, is there in every case an in­
house actuary or an in-house actuarial staff?
MR. AUERBACH: I don’t know, so I couldn't 
give you an answer whether in every case there is. 
The way we function with management however does not 
depend on whether they have an actuary or not. They 
are fully aware both how we propose to deal with 
a particular matter, and what we propose to do. 
When we present our recommendations, management is 
then able to adopt an approach that they believe is 
sound. As auditors, we have to be satisfied, of 
course, that the approach adopted is professionally 
satisfactory to us.
MR. WOOD: If you were auditing an 
insurance company and did not provide actuarial 
service, you indicated in your remarks you would 
rely completely on the actuarial service of a 
professional actuary that served that insurance 
company.
MR. AUERBACH: I didn't say that we rely 
completely on it. I think, as a matter of fact, 
the existence of consulting actuaries within our 
firm has made our auditors a little more astute 
in respect of the appropriate questions to ask, 
particularly when we use the work of non-independent 
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in-house actuaries. I think we are even just a little 
better at asking the right kind of questions when 
we are dealing with independent experts, and we do 
recognize that under SAS-11 we rely on the work of 
these experts.
MR. WOOD: You go beyond reliance then and 
you pose some questions.
MR. AUERBACH: We are required to make 
certain inquiries and we use the knowledge and 
capability which resides in the firm.
MR. MANZONI: Has that resulted in some 
specific improvements?
MR. AUERBACH: Improvements in?
MR. MANZONI: Improvements in financial 
statements.
MR. AUERBACH: It is very hard to give you 
specific instances where this competency has resulted 
in a better end result. We feel, however, that this 
has been the effect, particularly in the case of 
pensions.
MR. MANZONI: If you were the actuary in 
that instance, though, you wouldn’t have that ’’second 
look," even though the second look isn’t required, as 
I understand it, under the standards.
MR. AUERBACH: In a sense we do have a 
second look. We get this through the quality control 
procedures within the actuarial group itself. We 
satisfy ourselves that reviews have taken place by 
two accredited professionals during the engagement 
and that we can feel comfortable, recognizing the 
exposure of the firm.
MR. MANZONI: Would that be the same person 
that made the determination in the first place?
MR. AUERBACH: A different person.
MR. McCLOY: Do you accept the fact that 
today the public is somewhat skeptical of the
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reliability of the accounting profession?
Is there something that this Board should 
be doing something about trying to improve the 
credibility of the attest feature of the accountants, 
or is this something that you just let the marketplace 
deal with?
MR. AUERBACH: Oh, no, no, I think there is 
a lot to be done in the area of credibility, and I 
think you gentlemen, as part of your responsibility, 
are going to be focusing on what I think are the key 
areas—the areas of quality control and peer review, 
the quality of the work that is being done, and 
whether you are satisfied with the steps being taken 
to maintain quality.
MR. McCLOY: Audit committees and so forth.
MR. AUERBACH: Audit committees, the whole 
bit. This is the crucial area. What we are talking 
about here is important only because as business gets 
more and more sophisticated, we can be better auditors 
to the extent we have greater competencies available 
to us that we can draw upon—and we do draw upon them.
When you get specialized problems and 
difficult inventory situations, we draw on our experts 
who are better equipped to deal with them. Certainly 
the computer—I don't need to go into that—has been 
the best example where sophistication is required; 
and the development of the auditing process, through 
the computer and the security that is required 
surrounding the computer is such that special 
capabilities are a must.
MR. McCLOY: But you wouldn't think that a 
proscription would help. You know, you set up a 
rule sometimes, and you have to wonder after you have 
set it up, and the exception then becomes the rule. 
I think the key test is that there is a benefit going 
to the client, that you are qualified to do the 
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service, and that you are satisfied that it doesn’t 
disrupt or undermine your ability to be effective 
in the attest function.
MR. McCLOY: I am sure that is entirely a 
subjective test.
MR. AUERBACH: It is a subjective test, but 
we are business people and I think we are pretty good 
at applying that test.
MR. McCLOY: But you have a public 
responsibility.
MR. AUERBACH: I think part of your function 
of peer review and the other examinations of our 
performance is to look for any evidence that we have 
done anything to improperly impact on the public. 
That would be very much a part of what any peer 
review performance would entail.
MR. McCLOY: I have this feeling—I am just 
thinking aloud here because we are just new in this 
abstruse question—that you fellows have been dealing 
with, I am told, for the last 10 years. There is 
sort of the feeling, I think, around that you are 
into everything that comes along, no matter. 
Anything that will turn over another dollar, that 
you are sort of a jack of all trades and master of 
none. You don’t have the professional focus that 
you ought to have in order to maintain your reputation 
as objective.
MR. AUERBACH: But that is speculation. It 
actually hasn't happened that way. We talk of 
executive search, and that gets played up, but I 
tried to explain to you how we get into that. It 
is not a dramatic thing. It is really very, very 
small, just trying to respond to a need.
We don’t do any plant layout. I have 
been trying to find the accounting firm that does 
plant layout work, and yet I see in every bit of
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writing there’s plant layout all over the place.
I see these things, but they are not 
significant. Maybe in one instance somebody had a 
situation and said: "Well, if you changed the plant 
over there, maybe the paper flow would be better." 
I don’t know. Maybe that is plant layout work. But 
I am just saying that I don’t know of any significant 
area that we are involved in, that my firm is 
involved in, that is not handled in a fully 
professional way. No service that we provide could 
cause any embarrassment to the profession, or doesn’t 
make good sense for us to be in, or would not be 
easily understood by any one examining what we do. 
I say that as long as we have the appropriately 
qualified people it is appropriate for us to provide 
that service to clients.
MR. McCLOY: You are aware that the Congress 
is very skeptical about this.
MR. AUERBACH: I am very much aware of what 
Congress has done. I am also very much aware that 
Congress came to the conclusions before they made the 
study. (Laughter)
MR. McCLOY: They came to the conclusion 
before we came onto the grounds. But we are reaching 
out to find out what the situation really needs at 
this time in order to restore confidence.
MR. AUERBACH: I get a little troubled 
frankly, when people talk in terms of confidence. 
I don't find as I deal with the business world that 
businessmen are any less confident in us today that 
5 years ago. I will have to tell you I think they 
are a lot more confident. They think we are a lot 
tougher, perhaps they wish we weren't so tough. 
I think generally the confidence level in what we 
are doing in the attest area is higher that it 
has every been.
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I think the perception as to whether or not 
confidence has eroded is coming initially from the 
Congressman who says: "You have got to do something 
about an Equity Funding." Everyone is upset because 
there have been failures. There will continue to 
be some failures because we are in a people business, 
and there will be judgmental mistakes. Our job is 
to minimize them.
The important thing is not to try to narrow 
the capabilities that reside in the firms. We must 
try to satisfy ourselves that we have the control 
procedures within the firm, the checks and the balances 
to be satisfied that we are giving the greatest 
protection to the stockholders. That is the key, 
and to the extent that we can minimize the failures, 
the confidence level will go up.
MR. McCLOY: Keep your eye on the third 
party suits, too.
MR. AUERBACH: Absolutely. They are 
beginning to bother us more than ever.
PROFESSOR CARY: I have two questions. 
One, you have emphasized, as many of the large firms 
and others, how much the proscription would hurt 
the smaller firms.
Accepting the premise that there would be 
some proscriptions, do you think you could 
differentiate and say they should not apply to small 
firms?
MR. AUERBACH: The problem becomes one of 
the ease with which you can define what is being done. 
When the smaller firm provides consultation to a 
client, it is on a very broad, informal ongoing 
kind of basis. We set up a separate department, 
and we begin to identify the particular departments 
that provide specific management consulting services. 
When you proscribe any service for a big firm, I 
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don’t think you could say that a small firm can 
perform the same service in respect of a public 
client. I just don’t think you can differentiate 
that way, because then you get to the problem 
of at what point does one become big and at what 
point is he small.
I think the biggest problem is one of 
defining what it is that the small accountant does. 
I can tell you what the tendency will be. The 
tendency will be to pretty much ignore what the 
small firm does in the sense of not bothering 
with them, and maybe from the public point of 
view that is all right.
I am trying to give you the practice 
answer even with respect to proscription. I think 
the likelihood is that there won’t be too much 
bothering with the small firms.
PROFESSOR CARY: The other question I 
had was the one I asked Mr. Vanatta, and I am 
going to ask every major firm that is very widely 
involved.
What is your reaction to proposals of 
merger with Booz, Allen and McKinsey and major 
geological engineering firms or what-have-you?
MR. AUERBACH: I know one thing. The 
lawyers won't let us alone.
I would say again that you have to examine 
each situation.
If, for example, we were to get involved 
very much in replacement costs or fair values 
and some of the similar determinations, and the 
accountants are asked to take responsibility for 
some of the evaluations that are going to go into 
financial statements, somebody might convince me 
that maybe I ought to have some appraisal competency 
within the firm.
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PROFESSOR CARY: This may come.
MR. AUERBACH: It may come, and I say let’s 
not try to decide right now what is appropriate. I 
think when the circumstances come up, if one concludes 
that it makes sense from the point of view of being 
responsive to a need and consistent with the 
responsibility you are being asked to assume, we 
may decide we need a new kind of competency on 
board that is going to make us comfortable. So I 
say, I would want to deal with it in the circumstances 
when the situation or the responsibility is presented 
to us. Then I want to say: How do I best respond 
and deal with it?
MR. GARRETT: Norm, isn’t there any need 
to preserve some proportion in such situations? I 
mean, is there any danger in the attest function, 
of the auditing becoming ancillary to the sale of 
some other service?
MR. AUERBACH: I would say the likelihood 
of that is very slim. I happen to believe that the 
profession is on the threshold of tremendous expansion 
in the auditing function, and I look particularly at 
the government area because I think that is where 
it will come first.
The GAO is sort of leading the way in 
getting involved in performance auditing. That is, 
the auditing of government expenditures not from 
the point of view of the accountability for the 
dollar spent, but whether the purpose of the 
expenditure as identified and prescribed was ever 
achieved.
More and more, auditing is taking on a 
perspective that is much broader than we here are 
trying to define. I think we have to respect the 
fact that this is coming, and as one gets involved 
in performance auditing you will need special 
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competencies just as the GAO draws upon many 
competencies to perform what it considers to be 
a very important auditing task.
We are not there yet, and we are certainly 
not there in the private sector, but in the government 
sector we are going to see it, and it is going to come 
soon.
MR. GARRETT: So you are saying even if it 
might be an evil for the audit function to be a 
sort of throw in, along with the sale of other 
services, the practical likelihood of that occurring 
is so remote that we don’t have to worry about it.
MR. AUERBACH: It is very remote, very 
remote.
PROFESSOR CARY: What you are saying really 
is the attest function may become much broader. Is 
that it?
MR. AUERBACH: That is correct. I do believe 
that.
PROFESSOR CARY: On that premise, then, you 
need persons on your staff to analyze performance in 
a broad way.
MR. AUERBACH: In a broad way. I think that 
is true.
PROFESSOR CARY: That has not yet been quite 
clearly articulated by anybody before, and I just 
think it is an interesting thing.
Is the accounting profession, as a whole, 
your Big Eight, for example, are you pushing toward 
a performance audit?
MR. AUERBACH: I will be honest with you. 
The last thing the private sector would want—I am 
talking about American industry—is to have the auditors 
go around pushing for the opportunity to opine in 
respect of their performance from that point of view. 
I am not running after that. (Laughter) But in 
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the government area, I think is the area in which 
you have an entirely different situation.
You have got that third party out there, 
the public, who is very interested. And they are 
going to look to the accountants, and the GAO is 
not going to be able to do it for the whole country, 
not at the state and local level. They do it to 
a degree at the national level, and even there they 
are not competent, or capable, or big enough.
MR. WOOD: There is one big difference 
that Congress can’t fire the fellow who is wasting 
the money; we can in business, and the accountability 
factor in the private enterprise and the government 
are just two totally different things.
MR. AUERBACH: Two different worlds, and 
I respect that. That is why I say I think the avenue 
and the direction come from the government area, and 
there it is important.
MR. WOOD: I just want to slow down my 
friend, Bill Cary.
PROFESSOR CARY: Their premise is performance 
and if they start with that, then they say because 
performance is gaining, therefore, we need all this 
variety of skills, so I am trying to get down to 
their logic because I am not for it at all.
MR. GARRETT: What we really need is the 
legal audit, Bill, you know that. (Laughter)
MR. WOOD: Back to the actuarial services, 
are we really talking about MAS or MS when you are 
providing actuarial services: Is it advisory service?
MR. AUERBACH: Sure.
MR. WOOD: Or isn't it management service?
MR. AUERBACH: No.
MR. WOOD: You go and tell an insurance 
company what its reserves ought to be on either 
casualty and liability claims or on life. Isn't that
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a management service?
MR. AUERBACH: No, I think I draw a 
distinction in the sense that you will discuss with 
management the approach to the determination of the 
figure, and they will come to an agreement, but 
overriding that is the profession judgment which 
you, as a professional, have to exercise that you 
are satisfied with the conclusion that has been 
reached. There is a difference.
MR. WOOD: Thank you.
MR. GARRETT: Finally, would you associate 
yourselves with Mr. Vanatta's recommendation that 
the peer review expressly include some examination 
of the role played in the performance of management 
advisory services?
MR. AUERBACH: I would have no problem with 
that at all.
MR. GARRETT: You would agree that the role 
could be such as to impair independence?
MR. AUERBACH: I don’t quite—
MR. GARRETT: All right. The role is the 
term that one of the other speakers used in this, I 
guess Mr. Arnstein, in this respect, but that 
management advisory services could become what Mr. 
Wood was talking about. That is, participation in 
management or operation.
MR. AUERBACH: I think as a matter of policy 
we as a firm are very careful—
MR. GARRETT: I am sure you are.
MR. AUERBACH: —that management services 
don’t become
MR. GARRETT: The suggestion was that that 
is a danger area and peer review should look into it.
MR. AUERBACH: I have no problem with peer 
review looking into it. I am comfortable as to what 
they would conclude.
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MR. GARRETT: Very good.
We are only a half hour late the first half
day.
Should we take an hour for lunch and convene
at 1:30?




The hearing reconvened at 1:40 o’clock with 
Mr. Garrett presiding.
MR. GARRETT: May we come to order, please.
There are several that are interested in the 
transcripts, and what is going to be in them. You should 
know that people that have made statements will be 
given an opportunity to correct the first copy of the 
transcript before the official transcript is finally 
settled upon.
Mr. Keating, will you please proceed.
MR. RICHARD C. KEATING: My name is Richard 
Keating. I am an officer of A. S. Hansen, Inc. A. S. 
Hansen is a consulting firm with approximately 500 
employees operating out of 22 offices. We provide 
actuarial services to about 3,000 pension plans most 
of which are subject to the provisions of the Employees 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
We have previously submitted written comments 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission in which we 
asserted that there was a self audit involved in a CPA 
firm providing actuarial services to its audit clients 
which could present a conflict of interest and a threat 
to independence. In the comments we quoted certain 
luminaries within the accounting profession who held 
the same view.
There has been public concern about the 
management advisory services provided by some CPA 
firms. This concern has been expressed by individuals, 
by the media, and in the Halls of Congress. Evidently 
the concern has been serious enough and broad enough 
to provoke these hearings.
My purpose today is not to repeat what we 
have said but to comment on some of the reason or 
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rationalization that has been put forth by persons 
who would put no restrictions on the activity of CPA 
firms, or at least no restrictions on what they are 
presently doing.
An argument is that there is no hard 
evidence of an audit being impaired by advisory 
activity. What this means is that if impairment 
has occurred we don’t know about it. An audit 
impairment or a lack of independence is not something 
we would ordinarily find out about. It could be 
extremely subtle. It would have to be dug out. Is 
it necessary to wait for a scandal?
I believe that most businessmen, and 
especially most businessmen charged with the 
administration of pension plans, are honest. I 
believe that most auditors are honest and ethical 
and competent. I believe that most actuaries are 
honest and ethical and competent. The point is 
that not all are—or we don't know that all are. 
Even if there has been no impropriety there is 
opportunity for impropriety. Hence the role and 
reason for being of the auditor.
What we have here is the old theological 
concept of the proximate occasion of sin. In the 
old theology this is something to be avoided.
If we consider a firm offering the whole 
panoply of MAS being offered by CPA firms (not all 
by any one firm), where for a client the firm has 
been involved in the recruitment of managers, design 
of systems, actuarial valuations, marketing service, 
etc., and then auditing the client we cannot picture 
Ceasar’s wife as the managing partner of such a 
firm. For public acceptance, the appearance of 
independence must be preserved.
There is the argument that the services 
are in the public interest, that they can be provided 
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with competence and efficiency. For some services 
this may be true. But for many services the offering 
of such service is not filling a social void. It 
is purely an expansion and diversification. The 
service is already being provided competently and 
efficiently through other sources.
In the actuarial realm, there is the 
argument of the close interrelationship of accounting 
and actuarial work, that they are logical extensions 
of one another. I won’t go into that because I have 
reason to believe that that will be discussed further 
in subsequent testimony.
With respect to actuarial service it is 
argued that the provision of such service is proper 
provided that management understands the principles 
and implications of all that is involved. In the 
general case such understanding simply doesn't exist. 
To assume that it exists in a particular case is 
highly questionable.
In my practice I frequently attempt to 
explain to management the principles and methods 
going into pension costs; not because I have to but 
I think I ought to.
At times I bring a lecture to a quick end 
because I realize the client doesn't want to be 
bothered. He has other things to do. The question 
also arises as to what is management. If some 
middle manager understands, this is not Management.
On pages 22 and 23 of the Notice of these 
hearings are listed the Employee Benefit Consulting 
Services that an audit firm may properly do.
These services impinge heavily on the legal 
area as well as the actuarial .
The list depends upon the concepts that 
actuarial service for pension plans is something 
that one can do from time to time and then walk 
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away from, and that management is responsible for 
actuarial determinations. Both of these concepts 
became obsolete in September of 1974. It seems to 
me that the actuary in presenting his work has to 
assume the responsibility or at least significantly 
share in the responsibility. Under ERISA the 
position of the enrolled actuary is a continuing one— 
even to the point that if the sponsor or administrator 
changes the enrolled actuary he must give a reason. 
A main point of ERISA is to take away from management 
the right and responsibility of making actuarial 
determinations for pension plans. There had been 
alleged, and some real, abuses that the Reform 
Act was supposed to take care of.
I appreciate the fact that the concern 
of the SEC is the provision of information to investors 
and shareholders. However, any policy and rules 
must be embedded in a larger social context. Part 
of this social context is the law of the land. 
Overlooking pieces of this can cause confusion 
to shareholders as well as plan participants 
and the general public. I also realize that it 
is presently not necessary to report to shareholders 
the same actuarial numbers as are embodied in the 
ERISA Funding Standard Account. However, it seems 
clear from Committee Report that concordance in 
reporting was the intent of Congress. Shareholders 
can also be plan participants. Conflicting and 
confusing numbers can only lead to more reform 
legislation.
I thank you for the opportunity to present 
this statement.
MR. KEATING: Are there any questions?
MR. GARRETT: Mr. McCloy.
MR. McCLOY: The first item you referred 
to was the self-review, I believe. There are a 
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number of services which accountants render. I suppose 
the chief example is the tax situation, the tax area.
There seems to be very little, at least as 
far as I can understand, objection at this stage of 
our history to accountants becoming involved in the 
income tax situation, the preparation of returns and 
what-not.
To the extent they engage in that tax service, 
aren’t all accountants self-reviewing their own work 
when they take into account the work of their tax 
service, the effects of their tax service and the 
attest that they make?
MR. KEATING: I am not an expert in tax 
service. I am not really cognizant with all that is 
involved in this. I think as with other services, 
there is some possibility of self-review.
MR. McCLOY: I just say self-review per se 
is not necessarily vicious or not necessarily an 
argument against permitting the MAS. I will just 
give the example of tax service. Maybe another 
example would be the computer services that they 
render.
To an extent, there is an element of self­
review in areas whereby almost by common consent you 
have already said that the accountant should have 
freedom of action. So in itself it doesn’t 
necessarily condemn the offering of such services 
by the accountants.
MR. KEATING: Self-review always in itself, 
to my mind, in any form, does to some degree interfere 
with the audit function.
MR. McCLOY: Would you say it is determinative? 
MR. KEATING: That self-review is determinative 
MR. McCLOY: The fact that there is a self­
review, once you find there is any element of self­
review, would you then abolish, would you then
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proscribe, any advisory service which has that element 
in it?
MR. KEATING: I think any service which has 
that element in it is questionable. Whether I would 
proscribe it or not? There are certain other issues 
involved.
You mentioned the tax service situation. It 
is entirely possible—I am not asserting that this is 
true—but it has been held that this is performing a 
social service, an essential service, that is filling 
a void, that the accountants are tax experts, and it 
is highly efficient that they perform this service.
That might be taken into consideration as 
one point, but to get back to your question, unless 
there are extreme safeguards involved, the concept 
of self-review is incompatible with audit.
MR. McCLOY: It isn’t entirely so, is it, 
because there are a number of things that the auditors 
can do, or the accountants can do, or are accepted 
now as doing. No one really can object. You wouldn’t 
go so far as to say no accountant could make out a 
return for a client anymore?
MR. KEATING: No.
MR. McCLOY: In the case of the tax return, 
isn’t there some element of self-review?
I don't want to press the thing too far. 
What I am trying to get at is the most serious, the 
most important objection that the actuaries have to 
the furnishing of actuarial service by the accountant 
firm.
I just question whether the self-review 
element is the chief objection.
MR. KEATING: I believe it is. The accountant 
working, doing tax work for a client, he then does not 
turn around and audit that tax work. That is something 
entirely different.
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MR. McCLOY: His work is such an important 
element in the accuracy or the fairness of the statement 
that he is in a sense reviewing, and I just wanted 
to get what the real gravamen, what the real substantial 
objection is on the part of the actuarial association. 
What is the chief defect in permitting the accountants 
who are retained, who are presumably as well equipped 
or reasonably well equipped as actuaries to do the 
work in connection with pension calculations and what-not.
MR. KEATING: I believe the primary thing is 
the self-audit.
PROFESSOR CARY: Just to rephrase Mr. McCloy’s 
question, assume that the accountant certifies a balance 
sheet with a large tax liability. What is the 
difference between that and certification, or 
attestation with respect to a large pension liability 
on the balance sheet? Aren’t they comparable in every 
way, in that in both these is the element of self-review?
MR. KEATING: You are saying that the 
accountant has done all the work in preparing this tax 
liability. He signs off and says this is, in fact, 
the case.
I think that in my response to Mr. McCloy, 
I believe that there could be a problem there in the 
interest of self-review.
PROFESSOR CARY: Equally.
MR. GARRETT: I understand your premise also 
to be that you think it more often than not, at least, 
that the accountant or auditor performing the actuarial 
function with respect to the pension plan would be, 
in fact, making the decision for management?
MR. KEATING: In fact, yes, he would be 
making the decision for management. There are certain 
rare circumstances that it might be otherwise, but by 
law the actuary is required under ERISA to make the 
decision with respect to actuarial assumptions, and 
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actuarial procedures. This falls upon the actuary, 
and it cannot be shifted off upon management.
MR. GARRETT: So that if the auditor is 
playing that role, the enrolled actuary for an ERISA 
plan, by law the decision is the auditor’s and not 
management’s. Is that right?
MR. KEATING: That is right. By law the 
decision, the responsibility, is the actuary's. The 
person is wearing two hats. He is wearing the actuary 
hat when he comes under the law.
MR. GARRETT: We didn’t inquire of any of 
the auditing firm spokesmen this morning, but I 
gather from what you say that the auditors do play 
that role if they are offering actuarial service 
because they go so far as to become the enrolled 
actuary.
MR. KEATING: It is my understanding that 
it is the case that the employees of the auditing 
firm are the enrolled actuaries for certain plans, 
yes.
MR. GARRETT: If that is not true, I am 
sure we will be straightened out.
MR. KEATING: That is true.
MR. GARRETT: If there are some people 
that don't think it is true, I am sure we will hear 
about that, too.
MR. MANZONI: To what extent do auditors 
now question your actuarial determinations or review 
them?
MR. KEATING: Actually, they do not 
question our actuarial determinations to the point 
of arguing with us about them. I hope the 
treatment becomes a bit more uniform. We receive 
questionnaires from auditing firms. We receive 
lists of data that we are asked to check and 
respond. Is this what was actually used in the 
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calculation? The lists vary by firm and ask some 
very pointed questions.
First of all, is an enrolled actuary doing 
the job? What are his credentials and so forth? And 
then questions as to the method, procedure, assumptions.
We routinely answer these questions. We 
get further questions and we respond to them. What 
is done with all this information, I do not know, but 
there is a review typically with respect to the content 
of the figures we put out for funding a plan for ERISA 
or also for reporting to shareholders under the P & L.
MR. MANZONI: If auditing standards did not 
require auditors to do anything other than determine 
what your competence was and rely upon the work that 
you did as an expert, would you have any problem with 
auditors performing actuarial services?
In that context there doesn't seem to be 
any review, so consequently, there couldn't be any 
self-review. They just perform separate specialized 
service.
MR. KEATING: I think there is the self­
review, or the danger, as I mentioned, of impropriety 
there.
MR. MANZONI: That presumes that they review 
you. What if the auditing standards didn't require 
an auditor to review the actuarial assumptions and 
determinations in the first place but simply to audit 
what the actuary did as an expert?
MR. McCLOY: They may rely on their own 
actuary in one case and they have relied on outsiders 
in the other.
MR. KEATING: We have the circumstance that 
in reliance on an expert the auditor, as I understand 
it, is supposed to satisfy himself with the competence 
at least of the expert and he is satisfying himself 
with the competence of his own expert.
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MR. GARRETT: I believe that is it. Thank 
you very much, Mr. Keating. We appreciate your 
coming.
Next we have Mr. Boynton, Mr. Gustafson and 
Mr. Latto all for the American Academy of Actuaries.
Gentlemen, will you identify yourselves for 
the benefit of the Board.
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MR. EDWIN F. BOYNTON: I am Mr. Boynton; 
to my right is Mr. Latto and to my left is Mr. 
Gustafson.
By way of background as individuals, Mr. 
Gustafson and I are officers of the Academy in a 
volunteer capacity. For the past twenty-five years 
I have been a pension consultant with a consulting 
firm. Mr. Gustafson's background is principally 
in life insurance and is Vice President and Actuary 
for a large mutual insurance company.
The Academy itself was formed in 1965 as 
an umbrella organization to bring together into one 
body the actuarial profession in the United States. 
There are presently about 4,500 members of the Academy, 
out of approximately 7,000 members of the four 
national actuarial organizations that are under 
the same Academy umbrella. The difference in 
numbers results from experience requirement to 
become a Member of the Academy.
That sounds like a small number compared 
to the American Institute of CPAs. It is, but it 
does represent a very substantial percentage of the 
qualified actuaries in the United States.
We have filed a rather lengthy written 
statement, and we have also prepared a summary 
statement. That is also too long to read, so I am 
going to try to summarize the summary.
In our principal statement, Part I sets 
forth our position that an independent audit cannot 
be conducted where some of the items in the financial 
statement being evaluated constitute or result from 
work performed originally by an actuary who is 
employed or affiliated with the auditor. It is 
the self-review question that you have heard so much 
about today.
In our written statement, we deal at some 
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length with the findings of the Cohen Commission. 
In this regard, and in Part II of our statement, 
we have discussed the practical application of the 
AICPA prohibition against the auditor effectively 
becoming part of management. We think the concept 
is a sound one, but the real question is in its 
application. It is evident to us that the central 
application of this concept means that whether you 
call a relationship advising, assisting or helping, 
the proper test is whether the actuary, in fact, 
repeatedly provides or takes a position on the 
recommendation that becomes part of the management 
decision. This does not mean, of course, that 
management should not obtain ongoing counsel. It 
is just we don’t think we should obtain it from 
his independent CPA.
Part III starts from the premise, as 
stipulated in the proposal, that CPA firms in SEC 
practice would be limited to management advisory 
services that call for the use of accounting and 
auditing-related skills. We take no position 
as to whether such restrictions are necessary or 
desirable. If it is imposed, however, we believe 
the proposal is in error in asserting that 
accounting and actuarial skills are significantly 
related. We show in the third part of our statement 
that while there is some partial overlap in certain 
of the elementary subjects (introductory statistics 
and statistics) there is none at all in the much 
larger set of advanced subjects, the subjects that 
are critical to professional qualification. So 
the two skills, in fact, require almost totally 
different education and training and are not 
significantly related.
In Part IV we apply the concepts of self­
review, management decision-making and related skills 
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to specific services that are listed in the insurance 
and employee benefit sections of the proposal.
I will comment first on self-review. It 
all boils down to the fact that it is difficult 
for us to conceive how it can be claimed that any 
firm could review its own work and assert that such 
review is independent. The position taken in the 
proposal is parallel to the position taken by the 
AICPA Ethics Committee in its accounting services 
interpretation of the independence requirement, and 
that interpretation has been rejected by the SEC 
as not meeting the independence requirement. The 
Commission stated its opinion that an accountant 
cannot objectively audit the books and records which 
he has maintained for a client, since it ultimately 
places the accountant in the position of evaluating 
and attesting to his own record keeping. We believe 
that principle should be extended to the provision 
of actuarial services in the same fashion, perhaps 
even to a greater degree.
The proposal before the Board makes it 
clear that independence requires both integrity 
and objectivity. In assessing the circumstances 
that impose obstacles to objectivity, however, 
the proposal pays attention only to relationships 
between the CPA firm and the client that can have 
such an effect. Where the involvement then is 
too close or too constant, or where there is a 
financial relationship, objectivity is said to 
be impaired. What the proposal fails to recognize 
is the classic principle that one cannot be 
objective about his or her own work. Even where 
a CPA firm has been scrupulous in giving advice, 
and only advice, and can ensure that all significant 
decisions are, as a practice matter, made by 
management, it is still the case that where the 
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advice is taken and acted upon, or even been given 
and rejected by the client, the independent 
evaluation that the public has the right to believe 
is an intrinsic part of an audit will be lacking. 
The persons involved in the audit will know in 
advance that a position on the determinations has 
been taken by one of their colleagues and will 
therefore not be capable of providing a truly 
independent check.
It has been argued by some accountants 
that an auditor, who has the necessary integrity 
and competence, will in practice make a wholly 
satisfactory evaluation of work done initially 
by an employee or colleague. It is also asserted 
that there is no "evidence" whatever to the 
contrary. This misses the point entirely. The 
identical argument could be made to support 
permitting auditors to have a moderate direct 
financial interest in a client. Of course, 
integrity and competence are extremely important. 
Experience has taught us, however, that objectivity 
and disinterest are also essential qualities in 
a person who reviews and evaluates the work of others. 
And, the proposal is unequivocal in stating that 
both independence and the appearance of independence 
are essential to public acceptance of the auditor’s 
work. The effort to justify and reconcile self­
review and objectivity appears to be contrived 
and should be rejected.
I would like to comment also on the 
statements that are being made that the accounting 
firms do not really audit the work of specialists. 
In the narrow sense, in the very narrow sense of 
the word, "audit" that in terms of accounting for 
the number of securities in the safe deposit box 
and that kind of thing, that may be true. They 
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do not generally get deeply involved in "number 
checking" as it relates to actuarial work.
However, in any reasonably broad sense 
of the word, "audit," they certainly do get involved 
in it.
As a pension actuary I have filled out 
17 page questionnaires regarding actuarial assumptions 
and the source of the assumptions for auditing firms.
We know of cases where auditing firms 
have come in an independently done separate valuations 
of a pension plan, even without the knowledge of the 
client until after the fact. They have challenged 
assumptions. They have come in and done what amounts 
to a very thorough audit in some cases.
In the case of insurance company work, the 
firm I work has a group or division that handles 
the insurance company side of our business. One 
major part of that business is assisting CPA firms 
who do not have their own staff actuaries in reviewing 
the actuarial reserves of life companies. So I think 
it is very misleading to say that they do not "audit" 
the work of the specialist. It is a different kind 
of review, but the fact is there is a review. There 
has to be a review because the auditor is responsible 
for signing off on the bottom line. He is giving 
his opinion on the financial statement of the company, 
and he necessarily has to take that responsibility.
The question of whether actuarial services 
should be barred for other reasons requires consideration 
of separate issues posed by the Proposal—specifically, 
the issues of management decisions being made by the 
audit firm and related skills. The key to a 
determination as to whether the audit firm is involved 
in management functions is of course, a practice 
question of the extent to which its recommendations, 
by and large, over time, are sought or put into 
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effect. Also pertinent to this determination is the 
interpretation of "continuous involvement." For 
example, in the typical pension plan there is an 
annual valuation. If the actuary employed by the 
CPA firm carries out that annual valuation once 
a year—that is, if he is responsible for all the 
actuarial valuations—it seems to us that that is 
a continuous involvement even though it may be done 
on a more sporadic basis.
It has been pointed out previously, and 
I want to emphasize, in terms of this management 
decision question, that in the pension field, for 
example, the Enrolled Actuary must give his opinion 
that the actuarial assumptions represent his best 
estimate of the long-range experience of the plan. 
It is the Enrolled Actuary of the plan who must 
approve and provide an opinion on the assumptions. 
Management has the prerogative of firing that 
actuary if he does not agree with him and them 
must explain to the Labor Department why he did 
so. One might debate whether the actuary or 
management has the final control over actuarial 
assumptions, but it is clear that the actuary 
making the determination of minimum funding 
requirements under ERISA is deeply involved in 
the management decision process. He has a legal 
obligation to do so under ERISA. In addition, 
if the actuary employed by the CPA firm makes 
original determinations, which are then subject 
to review in a firm audited in response to a SEC 
firm, we again have a clear case of self-review.
With respect to the question of related 
skills, we think that consideration of the 
training requirements involved in qualifying 
to practice as a member of the actuarial profession 
demonstrates the significant difference in the 
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skills used by actuaries and those by CPAs. 
Actuarial examinations in the necessary disciplines 
typically cover some 40 hours of testing, which 
is almost twice as much as for a CPA, covering 
9 examinations over a multi-year period, all of which, 
save for some elementary material, is material foreign 
to CPA exams.
The "bottom line" of the proposal comes down 
to the application of certain principles enumerated 
in the Proposal to six specific proposed services, 
and we will focus only on the two which affect the 
actuarial profession.
In analyzing the Proposal’s Scope of Services 
criteria related to actuarial skills we have applied 
the three tests. One is the self-review concept; 
secondly, the management decision-making concept; 
and third, related skills.
We strongly endorse the prohibition on self­
review by auditors. We agree with the AICPA 
admonitions against an auditor’s involvement in 
management decision-making. As far as the related 
skills test is concerned, we take no position as to 
whether or not this is a legitimate test of the scope 
of services, but we will point out the implications 
of applying this test to the provision for actuarial 
services by CPA firms.
Our general conclusion, after reviewing the 
list of actuarial services which the AICPA has 
concluded as permissible for a CPA firm to offer, 
is that most of the permitted services are in direct 
conflict with the principles stated by the Proposal 
that should guide the decision on services which 
may be offered. We have analyzed the specific 
proposals made, and I won't repeat that analysis 
here. These comments deal with the details of why 
we think many of the provisions for services are
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inconsistent with the underlying principles.
It appears to us that the list of permissible 
actuarial services is for the most part a list of 
current practices of CPA firms providing actuarial 
services and is inconsistent with the basic principles 
and state limitations on such services which are set 
forth in the Proposal.
If the AICPA position regarding related 
skills should be changed, I would modify our comments 
to a significant degree because many of the services 
that are under consideration would have to be rejected 
by the related skills test.
We appreciate the opportunity to be heard, 
and we will try to answer any questions you may have.
MR. GARRETT: Questions.
MR. McCLOY: I will put the same question I 
did to your predecessor about the tax service. There 
the element of self-review is present but nobody really 
seriously, I gather at this point, is suggesting that 
the accountant should not be able to render the tax 
service that they are now rendering or have been 
rendering for the last ten or twenty years or more. 
So that I raise the question again whether self-review 
is per se an impediment or an obstacle here to 
objectivity or independence.
MR. BOYNTON: I guess I really can’t speak 
for the Academy as far as whether or not CPA firms 
should provide tax services. It is not our bailgame, 
but certainly the same principles, we feel, would 
control, which means that if the CPA firm was deeply 
involved in the preparation and determination of 
taxes and then turned around and audited them, I think 
they would still be subject to the same criticism.
MR. McCLOY: You want to proscribe it?
MR. BOYNTON: Right. I think the 
fundamental thing is that self-review is hard to
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reconcile with the concept of independence. How can 
anyone review their own work and call it independence? 
It just boggles the mind as to how you can reach that 
conclusion.
There may be instances of minor things that 
are not important enough to make an issue of, but we 
feel that with respect to any material facts in the 
statement you cannot claim to be independent when you 
are reviewing your own work.
MR. WOOD: I asked a question on this very 
point. Would not a CPA firm be much better qualified 
to review the actuary’s work, assuming you did it for 
the client, if it has on its staff experts in actuarial 
practice?
MR. BOYNTON: Yes. Let me make it clear; we 
are not saying that accounting firms should not employ 
actuaries and use them in the audit function or use 
them in other areas.
I believe where we would draw the line is 
when the actuary is involved with the preparation of 
material being subject to the auditor's opinion, and 
the same actuary—or the same firm is involved, both 
in the original determination and in the audit. 
Then we think there is a violation of independence 
requirements, but we have no quarrel with the concept, 
that an accounting firm that, say, audits life 
companies regularly would be well advised to have 
actuarial competence either on their own staff, or 
calling in other consulting actuaries to review their 
reserves. They must, "sign off" on the entire 
statement.
MR. LARRY J. LATTO: Just to amplify that 
slightly, there are actuarial services which can be 
rendered by an accounting firm to an audit client, 
but where the nature of those services are such that 
the results do not find their way to the balance 
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sheet, there is no reason at all, dealing only with 
the self-review concept, why there could be any 
objection to that, and there is no objection to it 
on the part of the Academy when dealing with the 
question of self-review because those determinations 
do not find themselves subject to review.
So it is useful to have that actuarial 
capability. No objection is made to that.
MR. BOYNTON: I think there was a question 
asked earlier by Mr. Manzoni, I believe, and I would 
like to respond to it. I think he posed a hypothetical 
question as if there was total reliance upon the 
actuary, and the accountant did not question the work 
of the actuary. If we assume he was allowed by SAS-11 
or by AICPA Guides to rely upon the work of the 
qualified actuary, we have no quarrel with the concept 
of the accounting firm providing the basic actuarial 
services. There is no review involved. It is an 
acceptance of the work of a qualified actuary.
MR. MANZONI: As a user of financial 
statements, do you think auditors should audit 
actuarial determinations, or should they be permitted 
to rely on actuaries in that particular area?
MR. BOYNTON: As a professional actuary, and 
I am speaking for myself now, since I don't know that 
the Academy has taken a position, I would like to see 
reliance on the professional, yes.
MR. McCLOY: You would like to see?
MR. BOYNTON: Reliance.
MR. McCLOY: Didn't Mr. Keating say that 
the accountants generally did rely upon the actuarial 
opinion in the case where there was an outside actuarial 
judgment? That his experience was that the accountants 
did rely. There wasn't an element of review in that 
situation.
MR. BOYNTON: The practice varies rather 
widely. In any event, there is a review. The degree 
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of the review, the extent of the review varies widely. 
Some firms will go through a pro forma kind of 
questionnaire. They send you a short letter.
Others go into a great deal of depth. We have other 
cases we know of where there has been great analysis 
of the actuarial assumptions by the reviewing firm.
I think in Mr. Keating’s case and as 
in my own case, we both work for rather large, 
prominent, nationally known firms. We are a lot 
less likely to be challenged than will the small, 
independent actuary.
MR. McCLOY: But your point is that in 
every case there is an element of review.
MR. BOYNTON: There is an element of review. 
The degree varies.
MR. McCLOY: It is only as to competence.
MR. BOYNTON: Well, in some cases it goes 
well beyond just the competence area.
MR. McCLOY: But that is an element of review 
to review the competence, I suppose.
With this educational business, what 
difference does it make how many hours the accountants 
are subject to examination in distinction to the 
qualification for the actuaries? If the people that 
are employed by the accountants are actuaries, they 
have to pass that examination.
MR. BOYNTON: If they are actuaries, yes, 
but we were saying the basic—
MR. McCLOY: I understand the position is 
that they do have qualified actuaries.
MR. BOYNTON: The point is that the 
educational program for actuaries and accountants is 
quite different. Someone trained as a CPA is not—
MR. McCLOY: I understand that.
MR. GUSTAFSON: I would like to make a 
comment on your question that you have asked several 
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times, Mr. McCloy, on the Federal income tax and tax 
services provided by accounting firms, and this is a 
thought that has just occurred to me here at this 
hearing. Is it significant in the probing questions 
that you have been asking that Federal income tax, 
uniquely Federal income tax, is subject to an 
additional audit through the IRS review itself?
MR. McCLOY: That isn’t an identical 
situation.
MR. GUSTAFSON: That is not directly 
comparable to some of the others.
PROFESSOR CARY: The IRS audit would be 
years later when the statements will be out.
MR. GUSTAFSON: But it is inexorable. 
(Laughter)
MR. GARRETT: But it also involves how much 
you reserve against how much you are going to lose. 
(Laughter) It is auditing judgment.
MR. WOOD: I have another question too, Ray. 
Do you have any objection in the Academy 




MR. WOOD: No professional pride here. 
MR. BOYNTON: We try to be consistent. 
MR. GARRETT: You don’t like it, but you 
have no objection to it. (Laughter)
MR. GUSTAFSON: I wouldn’t even say I did 
not like it. I have no objection to it whatsoever.
MR. GARRETT: Those were my words.
MR. WOOD: So then, in effect, your whole 
argument here deals with an issue of the auditing 
profession and the Congressional interest in it.
You are saying, in effect, that if it is a non-audit 
client, then Peat, Marwick can come in and do a fine 
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actuarial job, but if it happens to be an audit 
client, oh, no. So aren’t you really here giving 
an opinion on an auditing issue?
You are talking about self-review. You 
know, that is your number one problem. Continuity 
of service.
MR. BOYNTON: The actuarial profession 
itself has looked at the independence question and 
has its own guidelines which do not allow for self­
review. That is one reason we are here, because 
the interface where this comes up most frequently 
is with the accounting profession. That it 
actuaries working for accounting firms.
MR. GARRETT: Tell me more about the 
actuarial profession. They are not licensed, 
or are they? Do you have to be qualified in some 
official way, for example, to be an Enrolled 
Actuary under ERISA?
MR. BOYNTON: Under ERISA, yes, you enroll 
before a Joint Board, which is a government board.
MR. GARRETT: This is new then, isn’t it?
MR. BOYNTON: Since 1974. It is the first 
statutory recognition in the pension field.
When you get to the insurance company side, 
which is controlled by states, the NAIC standard 
blank now requires—maybe Mr. Gustafson should 
answer that.
MR. GUSTAFSON: I will just stop you if 
you are wrong.
MR. BOYNTON: —that the statutory blank 
have an opinion by a qualified actuary, and that 
generally is defined by most states as a Member of 
the American Academy of Actuaries or some other 
person deemed qualified by the Commission of the 
state. So the two principal legal recognitions are 
in the NAIC requirements for the statutory blank 
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and ERISA for pensions.
MR. GARRETT: Does the Academy administer 
an examination?
MR. BOYNTON: The Academy itself does not 
administer an examination. One of the affiliated 
organizations does. The primary educational and 
testing body id the Society of Actuaries. The Society 
is a much older organization and it has long been 
giving examinations. They are the educational, 
research, testing organization.
MR. GARRETT: That is not governmental.
MR. McCLOY: No state or government, Federal 
government examination?
MR. BOYNTON: There is now a Federal 
government examination to become an enrolled actuary.
MR. McCLOY: That is the 40-hour thing that 
you are talking about?
MR. BOYNTON: No. The Joint Board exam is 
a one-day affair just on pension mathematics basically. 
The Society of Actuaries examinations cover a whole 
field of life insurance, accident and health, pensions. 
In addition, there is another organization, also 
within the umbrella of the Academy, called the 
Casualty Actuarial Society, which gives comparable 
examinations in the casualty insurance field.
MR. GARRETT: Does the degree of self­
review vary significantly between, say, insurance 
and pension plan services?
MR. BOYNTON: Probably more heavily in the 
insurance company area.
MR. GARRETT: Of course, an insurance 
company would have to have an in-house actuary, 
or would it?
MR. BOYNTON: No.
MR. GARRETT: Does not have to have. The 
NAIC requirement does not require that the actuary be
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an employee of the insurance company?
MR. BOYNTON: No. Many of the consulting 
firms have very large departments or divisions that 
consult with small life companies. I don’t know 
what the count is, but there are 1,800 life companies.
MR. GUSTAFSON: About 300 of them have 
their own in-house actuarial staffs.
MR. GARRETT: The others use outside 
firms?
MR. GUSTAFSON: Yes.
MR. GARRETT: Do some of them use accounting 
firms for that purpose?
MR. BOYNTON: Yes.
MR. MATUSIAK: Did you say that the Academy 
has an independence standard for consultants?
MR. BOYNTON: We are in the process of 
developing additions to our Guides for Professional 
Conduct. The profession had a study by a committee 
which extended over a couple year period. Mr. 
Gustafson was a member of that committee. It came 
back with recommendations regarding independence of 
the actuary. The principles were adopted by the 
boards of the various organizations, and now they 
are in the process of being implemented by the 
organizations.
MR. MATUSIAK: Would it follow then that 
any member of the Academy would have to prohibit 
himself from doing what Mr. Keating said that he 
often had to do, namely, make management decisions?
MR. BOYNTON: No, the independence 
requirements do not get into the management decisions 
category.
MR. MATUSIAK: How is independence then 
defined or could be defined?
MR. LATTO: The circumstances under which 
independence would be required will be different.
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There is no requirement, as there is not now, that 
a financial statement be certified by an independent 
actuary. There is no suggestion that there will 
be a requirement that an actuary must be independent 
of, say, the company for which he is working or a 
consulting actuary must be independent of a company 
for which he is doing work.
There will not be a comparable requirement 
as part of the independence rules of the Academy.
MR. MATUSIAK: But it will be permitted to 
make management decisions as Mr. Keating said he has 
to do.
MR. LATTO: There is no suggestion that 
there will be any change in what is going on now in 
that an actuary frequently finds himself involved in 
management decisions. Under those circumstances, 
independence will not be required.
MR. GUSTAFSON: May I comment on that, too. 
The distinction that was made by this study group 
based the distinction on the difference between an 
initial actuarial determination and an actuarial 
review.
We opined that independence is not required 
for a determination; that is, a management decision— 
the state of actuarial opinion that I append to my 
company's financial statement. But in the review 
function where an actuary is asked to review another 
actuary's work and that is done on occasions on life 
insurance company statements, most especially in 
purchase and merger situations, then we identify that 
independence must be present in the review function, 
so there was the distinction that we made.
MR. WOOD: Can Arthur Stedry Hansen's 
partners own stock in the company through which they 
are performing actuarial service?
MR. GUSTAFSON: Unless they are involved 
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in review. I guess I don't know. You answer that one.
MR. BOYNTON: There is no prohibition against 
it.
MR. LATTO: They may.
MR. WOOD: So if they decided to compromise 
their standards and reduce the funding requirements 
for their pension plan by 15 or 20 million dollars.
MR. LATTO: If they are not in the reviewing 
situation, they may be part of management. They may 
be employed—having a financial interest is no 
different than being employed. There is no independence 
requirement in that case. It is only when there is 
a review.
MR. WOOD: The CPAs don't let you own stock 
in the company.
MR. BOYNTON: The CPAs are in an audit 
situation.
There is a distinction. Most of my work 
is directly with clients making original determinations. 
We are not generally doing audit work.
MR. WOOD. It seems to me the original 
determination is more serious than the review.
MR. GUSTAFSON: There is no requirement that 
an accountant that is employed by a company be 
independent of the company, and he makes the original 
determination.
PROFESSOR CARY: I have a question that is 
total naive, but we run into numerous examples of 
so-called busted audits, frauds and that sort of thing.
Are there any examples of gross mistakes 
in actuarial determinations which have led to litigation 
and the like?
MR. BOYNTON: The case that pops in mind 
immediately is the name just whispered to me, which 
is Equity Funding. It was not really a gross actuarial 
mistake. It was just deceit.
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MR. GUSTAFSON: The mistake was not an 
accident. (Laughter)
PROFESSOR CARY: I didn’t think of that.
MR. BOYNTON: Nothing comes to mind, any 
prominent case at all of that kind of situation.
MR. MANZONI: Did Congress require enrolled 
actuaries to get involved in pension plans. Are you 
aware of any legislative history that suggests there 
needed to be some regulation there?
MR. BOYNTON: We endorsed the idea of having 
competent actuaries work with pension plans.
Mr. Manzoni: I don't know. Were there any 
cases brought before?
MR. BOYNTON: No. In fact, when we were 
discussing it with staff people, that was one response: 
Everything has been running fine so far. Why? One 
of the problems is that pension liabilities, long-term 
cost, do not emerge for many, many years, and the growth 
in pensions has really taken off in the last now 30 
years. But it takes so long for a pension plan to 
mature and the growth has been so phenomenal the 
last several years that mistakes—I will be retired 
before my mistakes catch up with me, I hope.
MR. McCLOY: There were some pretty bad 
actuarial mistakes in connection with that Social 
Security legislation. (Laughter)
MR. BOYNTON: I prefer not to comment on 
that as President of the Academy.
MR. GARRETT: I think we had better move 
on. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We appreciate 
your coming.
Now Mr. Watson and Mr. Daskais. Conference 
of Actuaries in Public Practice.
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MR. CHARLES B. H. WATSON: Good afternoon, 
gentlemen. My name is Charles Barry Watson, and I am 
President of the Conference of Actuaries in Public 
Practice.
Seated on my right is Richard Daskais. Both 
Mr. Daskais and I are members of independent firms 
of consulting actuaries and have substantial consulting 
experience.
The Conference did submit to you a written 
statement and, as a matter of fact, I handed to Mr. 
Matusiak this afternoon another version of it. I can 
assure you that this new version essentially corrects 
typographical errors and amplifies a few points. It 
is not intended to change the tenor of the statement.
Mr. Daskais was Chairman of the Conference 
Committee which drafted that statement, and he is here 
today in that capacity.
Since you have received our statement, I 
do not intend to read it or even to summarize it 
in depth. I would, however, like to comment on some 
of the points which are brought out in the statement.
I might say first of all, just to establish 
the background, that the Conference of Actuaries 
in Public Practice is one of the actuarial organizations 
in the United States which was referred to in the 
previous statement as being affiliated with the 
American Academy of Actuaries and which joined in 
its founding.
We presently have somewhat over 600 members. 
Nearly all those members are also members of the 
American Academy of Actuaries, but we are a specialist 
organization. Our members are actuaries engaged in 
public practice, and that means in most cases engaged 
in the practice of giving consulting advice on pension 
and employee benefit plans and to life insurance 
companies. Therefore, we have a very direct interest 
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in the matters which are before you this afternoon. 
This is why we have asked for the opportunity to 
make a statement.
I might add that the statements of our 
two organizations—the Conference and the Academy— 
were developed quite independently. For my own 
part, though, having just seen the Academy statement 
today, I find nothing inconsistent in that statement 
from what the Conference has said.
Unfortunately, though, there is a certain 
degree of repetition in the two statements. I 
apologize for this, but that is what happens when 
separate statements are developed by groups with 
similar concerns.
The major question which concerns us, as 
it has concerned the two previous testifiers, is 
the matter of self-review, or, if you wish, the 
matter of independence.
We have been basically told, and we have 
seen in the regulations and in the various 
pronouncements of the AICPA and others, that much 
of this concern about the possibility of self-review 
arising when the auditor makes use of a specialist 
who works for the auditing firm is removed or 
alleviated if the client is able to appreciate 
the significance of the advice given by that 
specialist, if he is able to have an informed 
judgment on what the specialist has done and therefore 
in essence, embraces that work as his own.
So, therefore, the client makes the decision 
and it is his decision, and this presumably eliminates 
the question of whether there can be self-review, 
because it is the client's decision that is being 
audited.
It may be true that, for the purpose of 
reaching a decision in the most elementary sense,
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it is sufficient that the client appreciates the 
significance of the advice he has been given and 
the likely results of taking that advice. He may 
look at the advice and say: ”I like the results; 
I like what they do to my profit and loss statement," 
and accept it, or he may say, "I do not like the 
results, and I don’t like what they do to my profit 
and loss statement," and reject it.
It may be that this is the type of 
elementary decision we are talking about, but 
unfortunately, such a decision process says nothing 
about the quality of the advice that has been given.
It is entirely possible for incompetent 
advice to provide "good" results, and for competent 
advice to provide "bad" results. Sometimes the 
competent adviser must be the bearer of bad news.
This is recognized, of course. The 
auditor realizes that it is not merely sufficient 
that the advice be accepted. The auditor is expected 
to render a judgment as to the quality of the advice 
which has been given. This is where we get into 
the requirement of SAS 11 that the auditor must 
in effect review the professional qualifications 
of the specialist and the way in which the specialist 
has conducted his work. It is assumed that this 
review of the qualifications and of the scope of 
work can be done in such a fashion that the 
auditor can satisfy himself as to the competence 
of the specialist.
The problem is that, as has been said 
in your Notice, this review must be done objectively 
if independence is to be preserved.
We argue that it is impossible for an 
individual to render an objective appraisal of 
the competence of someone who is a member of his 
own firm. I would certainly find it impossible 
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to be completely objective as to the competence of 
the work of another member of my firm, merely 
because I know him too well. I have built-in 
biases because of the fact of his relationship 
with me, and I must admit them.
In our statement, we did include perhaps 
the novelty of a dissent to the statement. One 
of the members of our Committee which drafted the 
statement is the employee of a CPA firm, and he 
appended a dissent which represented essentially 
his views. We are happy to present them.
In this dissent, he commented on the 
matter of self-review and independence and claimed 
that it would be possible to establish certain 
objective criteria—educational qualifications, years 
of practice, etc.—as to whether the auditor would 
accept the qualifications of a specialist.
It seems to us that such standards could 
be extremely broad, and in fact so broad as to 
perhaps go to the length that Mr. Manzoni raised 
in one of this questions, i.e., accepting the 
individual just on the basis that he is an Enrolled 
Actuary. If the standards were to be this broad, 
I wonder whether this would really be in the best 
interests of the public. It seems to me that the 
public should have a certain degree of concern 
as to the qualifications of the specialist. It 
is in this case, when the standards become more 
detailed, that I would argue that the issue of 
objectivity comes in, and whether an auditor can 
properly and objectively appraise the qualifications 
of his own colleagues.
A second major issue which is raised by 
your Notice is whether the actuarial adviser is 
involved in the decision-making process of management. 
Does the fact that one gives actuarial advice involve 
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him somehow in management?
The Conference would argue that an actuarial 
consultant has a certain degree of participation in 
the management process.
The client presents a problem to his actuarial 
consultant, and the consultant is asked to advise the 
client on how to solve that problem. The consultant 
offers alternative solutions to the client and tries 
to advise him as to the consequences of those solutions.
But then how broad is the range and scope 
of alternatives offered? If the scope is extremely 
broad—if, for example, the consultant is telling 
the client "Here is a buffet of facts and comments, 
go and take what you want from this plate, and what 
you want from that plate, and make your own decision”— 
one could argue there really is no need for the actuary. 
He merely dug out facts and laid them before his client. 
He is not really advising the client, and not making 
recommendations—which is the job he has been hired 
for, as a consultant.
On the other hand, the scope of the 
alternatives offered may be extremely narrow. One 
alternative. Do this, or don't do this.
In reality, the range lies somewhere in 
between. Usually it is not a case of yes or no, and 
not a case of take your pick. It is a question of: 
Here are several possibilities, and here are the 
potential consequences of each possibility, as the 
actuary sees them.
The client in this case does have the 
decision, but the point is that the actuary has so 
narrowed the scope of the alternatives available 
to the client—has so restricted the universe of 
possibilities from which the client can select— 
that he has in a very real sense participated in 
the decision-making process.
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This is the general situation. There are 
also within the actuarial field two specific areas 
wherein statutory law effectively requires that the 
actuary participate in management decisions.
One of them is ERISA, and we have heard 
a great deal about that already today. ERISA mandates 
that the actuary, acting on behalf of the plan 
participants, is the individual who must choose the 
actuarial assumptions.
There are more things to be determined about 
a pension plan beyond the actuarial assumptions but 
I would argue, and I think that nearly everyone in 
my profession would agree with me, that it is the 
choice of the actuarial assumptions which ultimately 
determines whether a pension plan will be soundly 
funded.
Granted, there are different cost methods 
that can be chosen. There are different periods for 
amortizing the past service liabilities. Provided, 
however, these choices are made from within the 
legally permitted range of possibilities, then one 
will end up with a satisfactory result provided, 
and provided only, the actuarial assumptions are 
properly chosen.
In the life insurance company area, there 
is a legal constraint placed on the actuary who 
signs the annual statement. He is required to testify 
on his own reputation that the reserves make good 
and sufficient provision for the liabilities of the 
company. To my mind, anyone who can so testify 
must indeed participate in the management process.
I might add this participation goes so 
far that Best's Life-Health Insurance Reports often 
lists the consulting actuary as one of the officers 
of the company. I have before me a page from Best's 
on which Coopers & Lybrand is listed as an officer
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of a particular life insurance company because they 
are the consulting actuary. Whatever this may mean 
in fact, it at least gives the appearance that 
Coopers & Lybrand participates in the management 
process of that insurance company.
MR. MATUSIAK: Are they also the auditors?
MR. WATSON: It does not say, and I agree 
that is a valid question. In any event, they are 
listed as an officer of the company.
On another matter, your Notice raises the 
question of continuity of employment. It is stated 
that, if one is continuously employed by a client, 
then there is a danger that he will at least appear 
to be involved in the management process, and such 
an appearance can compromise independence.
Your Notice make a distinction between 
periodicity and continuity which I find extremely 
subtle.
It is part of the nature of the services 
of an actuarial consultant that those services are 
rendered periodically, and not continuously. I 
would argue, though, that if every time a client 
thinks of an actuary, the words that immediately 
spring into his mind are Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, 
then this means that Peat Marwick is really acting 
continuously as the actuary. It is the only firm 
that is doing actuarial consulting work for the 
client. It is continuously hired but only 
periodically used.
Next, I come to the matter of scope of 
services. This is, I think, a very, very difficult 
question for us to deal with. Certainly it is not 
for actuaries to comment upon how the accounting 
profession wishes to limit the services that its 
firms provide. However, within the particular 
parameters that are laid down by the Notice—the 
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observations that the services should be accounting- 
related or auditing-related—I do think that we as 
actuaries have legitimate criticisms to express 
of the conclusions that are drawn from those parameters. 
Quite frankly, we view actuaries and 
accountants as being very different. This morning, 
I heard myself described as a co-professional with 
accountants, and although I do not take real umbrage 
over this, I must confess it is the first time I had 
ever thought of it.
From the actuary's perspective, we view 
the accountants as basically looking backwards, while 
occasionally turning their heads to peer briefly into 
the future. We see actuaries as gazing constantly 
into the future, while once in a while looking 
backwards to check where we have come from.
I think Mr. Auerbach expressed this 
difference extremely well in this morning's session. 
He said that accountants are concerned with the 
current financial implications of past events, whereas 
actuaries are concerned with the current financial 
implications of future events. I would agree with 
this distinction.
To my mind, it is a distinction of type, 
not just of degree, and I think it does make 
actuaries and accountants radically different 
creatures.
I have had some personal experience with 
this difference when I was part of a committee of 
actuaries working with the AICPA to develop 
generally accepted accounting principles for life 
insurance companies. It became clear from the 
beginning that our two professions looked at the 
whole financial process in different ways. Put 
very simply, the accountant believed that, when you 
went from one year to the next, you were looking 
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at two income statements, and the balance sheet was 
merely the item which tied them together. The actuary 
on the other hand, thought always of two balance 
sheets, and the income statement was the item which 
tied them together. To my mind, this is further 
evidence that basically we are different professions.
I can understand a desire to allow a scope 
of services which is very general, to say that any 
activity which involves the collection and analysis 
of data is somehow accounting-related, and to say that 
any activity which draws conclusions from data and 
makes evaluations based on it, is somehow auditing- 
related. This is, at least, how I read the parameters 
as they are defined within the Notice. In our 
opinion such a definition is far too broad, and in 
our statement we make a number of specific comments 
upon the ways in which we believe that the extent 
of services which the Notice suggests should be 
permitted is far broader than it should be, given 
the parameters of the Notice itself.
Finally, we would maintain that the public 
has expressed no clear need for actuarial services 
to be provided by CPA firms. Although we agree that 
the public is well served by competition, this 
competition already exists outside the CPA firms.
We heard this morning that it is the 
public’s expanding expectations of auditors’ 
responsibilities which leads to the desire on 
their part to provide these sorts of services. We 
do not see the great pressure from the public for 
this. There are clearly other ways of having these 
services provided.
We believe that it is important for the 
accounting profession and for this Board to make 
a judgment as to whether these sorts of services 
should be provided by CPA firms on the basis of 
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whether it is in the best interests of the CPA firms 
and of the public. Are these services truly 
supportive of the attest function, or are they 
diversionary?
Thank you very much, gentlemen, for the 
opportunity to make this statement. I would be very 
happy to answer questions.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Watson.
Do any of the Board members have questions? 
MR. McCLOY: That was very interesting. 
MR. MATUSIAK: If three consulting 
actuaries from the Conference were selected by a 
given client to perform the consulting services 
and all given the same facts by the client, how 
different would the results of the three actuaries 
be. Would they be similar, primarily similar or 
would they be diverse?
MR. DASKAIS: Let’s talk about it as to 
different situations. One is a pension situation 
under ERISA where each one has to come up with his 
best estimate, and then in the insurance company 
situation, there is perhaps more latitude.
Both of us are pension actuaries, by the 
way.
I would think that there would be significant 
difference, but on the order of 10, 20, 30% would not 
be unexpected as to the required contributions under 
ERISA of three highly competent actuaries.
MR. MATUSIAK: Does that speak for the 
need for having a review by a consultant or another 
consultant’s work?
MR. DASKAIS: These differences would 
primarily arise out of different expectations about 
macro economics, basically interest rates and salary 
increases which ERISA has made all of us experts 
on, but we may not be quite as expert as the
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economists who I understand disagree from time to 
time. (Laughter)
MR. STARK: While you were speaking, I was 
looking at the appendix page 22 and 23 which set forth 
the Executive Committee's proposal regarding employee 
benefit consulting services. I understand that is 
the area in which both of your gentlemen are experts.
I notice that the Executive Committee's 
proposal deals with many of the points that you made. 
For example, you have made the point that the accounting 
firm should not get into making management decisions, 
and that is the very first point that the Executive 
Committee makes. You mentioned that the auditing 
firms should not get into the position of continuous 
involvement, and that is the second point that the 
Executive Committee mentions. You also mentioned 
the necessity of assuring that the client has sufficient 
comprehension to be able to make a management decision, 
and that is the third point that is made.
I am not sure I understand exactly where 
you would fault the Executive Committee's proposal.
MR. WATSON: I would certainly not fault, 
in any sense, the proposals that the Executive Committee 
has made as to the criteria which should determine 
whether these services be provided or not. Our 
problem is that we do not agree with the conclusions 
that are drawn from the criteria.
Basically, we view, certainly in the case 
of ERISA where one acts as an Enrolled Actuary, and 
I would argue in many other areas, one inevitably 
becomes in some fashion entangled in the management 
decision.
We would also argue that, even though the 
provision of actuarial services might appear to be 
periodic in that the actuary only comes in once 
a year to value the pension plan, that is effectively 
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a continuing assignment which is done year after year, 
and therefore is indeed a continuous assignment.
Thirdly, there is the question of whether 
the client has the understanding to make the actuary’s 
work "his own" for decision-making purposes. This 
is certainly arguable. As I tried to make clear at 
the beginning of my presentation, there is a distinction 
between the client understanding the results and the 
consequences that flow from them and the client 
adequately appreciating what has gone into producing 
those results. That is where I believe the audit 
function does become important.
By the way, you may have noticed from our 
statement that we also support the principle that an 
auditing firm should have available to it, either 
on its own staff or through the services of an outside 
consulting firm, actuarial expertise in order to 
reassure the auditor, if he needs reassurance, that 
the actuarial work has been carried out properly. 
We do not disagree with the parameters, the criteria 
of the Notice.
MR. STARK: It is impractical to carry them 
out.
MR. WATSON: We just disagree with the 
consequences.
PROFESSOR CARY: It is practically impossible 
on your part to carry them out on your part. Isn’t 
that right? That is what you are saying.
MR. WATSON: Yes.
MR. STARK: I was interested also in your 
memorandum which says that you would oppose auditing 
firms providing actuarial services to non-audit 
clients.
It seems to me that is a difficult line to 
draw when your major premise is the difficulty in 
relation to the audit clients.
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I can’t see that you can extend that 
logically to the non-audit client.
MR. DASKAIS: I think there we were 
applying the criteria suggested in the Notice for 
Hearing of: Are the skills audit related?
We do not consider actuarial skills audit 
related, and therefore, accepting that criterion, 
we would say if that criterion is to apply to 
non-audit clients, then it would not be appropriate 
for auditing firms to provide actuarial services for 
non-audit clients.
MR. MANZONI: Would it be wise to have an 
actuary on the staff of an accounting firm?
MR. WATSON: Oh, yes.
MR. MANZONI: Is that consistent with 
actuarial skills not being audit related?
MR. WATSON: First of all, I would 
certainly maintain that it would be desirable for 
an auditing firm, as was said a minute ago, to have 
an actuary available to assist in all the actuarial 
aspects of auditing and it would probably be very 
desirable to have this actuary on the staff of 
the firm itself for that purpose.
Secondly, I think that we have to make 
the same caveat that the Academy did in our 
objection to the provision of the actuarial service 
of non-audit clients. We were operating strictly 
within the framework here.
If the provisions with respect to auditing- 
related and accounting-related services were to 
be relaxed, then we would have a different position 
to maintain. We were doubtful as to the 
desirability of providing any actuarial services 
basically because of the restrictions there 
provisions led to.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you, gentlemen. I 
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really believe we had better cut this off now, or 
we will get even further behind in our timetable.
MR. WATSON: Thank you very much.
MR. GARRETT: Let’s take a short standup 
break of about five minutes.
(A short recess was taken.)
MR. GARRETT: Let's resume, please. Mr.
Cardinal, will you proceed, please.
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MR. ROBERT J. CARDINAL: Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a statement. 
Knowing the load of reading which you have had, 
I would like to summarize it briefly.
First, I would like to thank you for this 
opportunity to appear before you and present my 
opinion and that of the company which I represent 
on what we feel is a very critical issue.
In the statement I reviewed my background 
and that of the company. Very briefly, I have 
degrees in engineering and management. I am on 
the staff of a graduate management school. I 
am a certified management consultant, Director 
of the Institute of Management Consultants, and 
have been in consulting for 12 or 13 years with 
Lester B. Knight & Associates, headquartered here 
in Chicago.
During that time I have headed up almost 
all of our various areas of practice including being 
the head of all of our management consulting. I 
am currently Executive Vice President.
In addition, during my career, I have 
run companies and been a buyer, both management 
consulting and audit services. I have been on 
both sides of the fence.
Our firm is a large one for our business, 
with about a thousand professionals providing 
management consulting and consulting engineering 
services. We have been in business for 33 years 
and completed some 18,000 assignments in 53 
countries.
Of the several questions which have 
been discussed here, it would seem that the most 
paramount issue is the one which is stated on page 
7 of the Notice of the meeting, and if I may 
quote it. It is "Whether management advisory 
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services furnished to an audit client either 
compromise the audit firm's independence or create 
the appearance of compromising its independence." 
And I would emphasize that last portion.
There are other questions that have been 
raised by many in my profession, and in my opinion, 
they are either moot or belong outside the realm 
of this Board and certainly of the government 
controls that have been discussed.
I happen to believe, and my firm believes, 
that CPA firms can hire people who are equally 
competent as any of ours and are as capable of doing 
quality work as are we or any other independent 
management consulting organization.
There is a great deal of concern among 
many in my profession regarding the apparently unfair 
advantage held by CPAs in acquiring work. I have to 
acknowledge that this certainly has an advantage 
in many situations, and I envy them.
I also envy those of my contemporaries who 
do executive recruiting and place a key executive or 
those who sit on the board of directors of a firm and 
then do work for them, or who happen to play golf 
with the key decision-maker and walk away with an 
assignment.
But I don't think there is anything we 
should do to prohibit these or any other form of 
advantages in a competitive environment. I think 
that if we have a better product or service than do 
the CPA firms, (we being the independent management 
consultants), then we should just get about our 
business of trying to sell this to the public and 
to management and informing them of what we have.
I don't think we should be looking for 
regulation to control advantages in business or 
crying on any government agency's shoulders.
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A lot of the selections are based on faith 
and trust, and they are always going to be based on 
personal relationships.
The independence of the MAS practice and 
the influence of the audit practice on management 
consulting services is another source of some concern 
within my profession of management consulting.
However, I feel we have similar potentials 
for conflicts of interest all throughout management 
consulting. We all have to be constantly aware and 
police them. I think the Institute of Management 
Consultants has taken one step, and I think they have 
provided a statement to you. They require an 
attestation of independence on the part of the MAS 
practitioners in the CPA firms basically stating 
that the MAS practitioner reports to an independent 
MAS control and is not subject to undue influence, 
but I think this addresses only the independence in 
management consulting. That is a private service 
to a generally educated and aware clientele, i.e., 
the management of the firms and the associations. 
I don’t think it addresses the central issue for this 
committee which I would like to get back to, and 
as I stated before, it is the influence the other 
way around of management advisory services on the 
public audit.
The certified public audit is created, as 
we all know, by law, regulation, and it is essentially 
a guaranteed market which is the exclusive practice 
of CPA firms. In fact, with the largest firms, it 
is almost the exclusive province of the big eight 
CPA firms.
They have a very specific trust. They act 
as middlemen or interpreters to represent the public 
which provides the capital for the operation of these 
firms. They are held in such a position of trust 
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that senior citizens when investing their savings 
rely on that signature and the letter in the annual 
report. That is a unique position of trust.
I think we owe this public a certification 
which is not only independent, but beyond any 
suggestion of any taint or loss of independence 
from any source whatsoever.
The public today, as we all know, has 
lost a great deal of its faith in government and 
business, and I think we should rebuild this faith 
by not compromising our principles for the sake 
of expediency or more revenue or a few more partners.
Many of the management consulting services 
proposed by the CPA firms to remain a part of the 
MAS practice, present opportunities for conflicts 
of interest and certainly cast some doubt or give 
reason to doubt the possible independence of the 
public audit by the same firm.
Let me just pause for a moment and say 
that the limitation of services that we announced 
in the appendix of the Notice of this hearing is, 
in our opinion, almost no limitation whatsoever. 
The criteria are a limitation, but the actual 
services from which they are limited is almost no 
limitation whatsoever, and it would appear to us that 
they would be continuing to perform essentially the 
full range of management consulting services.
Let me cite some examples of the kinds 
of services with which you are familiar that can 
raise doubts as to the independence of a public 
audit by the same firm.
One type is strategic planning and 
organization. It is a significant portion of management 
consulting practice of most firms, and involves working 
with top management as many of you have to devise 
long-range or strategic plans and develop the
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organization necessary to carry these out.
It results in major changes in directions. 
It results in new product lines, organization 
revisions, acquisitions, divestitures, and major 
investments in new programs.
Many of these have been successful, but 
there are also many examples of unsuccessful 
strategies. Such as the number of companies that 
we are all aware of that have gone into and out of 
the computer business, and who have lost millions 
of dollars in this business.
How independent can a public auditor be 
when he is going through and auditing a company that 
has just gone through a major change of direction 
and strategy such as these but where that strategy 
was developed and recommended by the partners and 
principals of the same firm and where the audit 
partner shares the professional liability for the 
actions.
I am not trying to suggest that there is 
an intentional misleading of the public, but rather 
acknowledging recognized human frailties.
I know when I am auditing someone’s 
else’s work I am much more critical and point out 
shortcomings much more quickly, I think, than I do 
when I am auditing someone’s work whom I have 
directed or which was performed by someone whom 
I personally know of with whom I have a relationship.
I think we tend to be blinded by our 
friendship, our relationship with that individual, 
our confidence in what he can do, and we lose 
sight of what the facts show us. Certainly there 
is cause for the public to have doubt in these 
situations.
Another area is financial and management 
systems. A major cause of poor performance of
140
many companies is poor costing, poor pricing, 
nonresponsiveness due to a lack of financial and 
management information. The design and 
installation of systems to correct this usually 
using computers is a major portion of the business 
of many of the MAS practices of CPA firms.
This can be one of the major expenditures 
facing any company, and what is more critical, 
the results are a long time in coming, and they 
are often very subjective. It is difficult to 
determine whether or not the investment is going 
to pay off, and the information is going to be 
valid.
It is no uncommon, as a matter of fact, 
for one of our client to suggest utilizing the 
services of a CPA firm to audit our progress 
and the results of our programs in this area.
I have got to confess it does keep us 
on our toes, and I think it is a proper role for 
the CPA firms when they are not trying to compete 
for the same business. When a CPA firm designs 
and installs this system, who audits and reports 
on the progress and the results? The same audit 
firm? Management literally is just replete with 
stories of misguided systems programs, as I am 
sure every one in the room knows.
We often come in to a client who has 
had an aborted effort sometimes involving years 
of time and millions of dollars. The question is 
how independent an auditor can be in reporting 
on a systems installation when it is his firm 
and his partners who are responsible for the 
project.
These are not simple questions in the 
systems areas because well designed systems often 
lie unused and fail because management doesn’t 
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support them or sometimes because of the inability 
of the management team to use them, and a consultant 
rightly or wrongly usually tends to share in some 
of the blame.
We really question, and we think the public 
would question whether an auditor can be sufficiently 
diligent in reporting a shortcoming on a financial 
or management system when his partners have done the 
design and installation and he shares in their 
professional liability.
Another service which is remaining in the 
province of the MAS firms as we see the announcement 
is facilities planning. Somehow it has been determined 
that this relates to accounting. I must confess that 
as a practicing registered professional engineer and 
having done a lot of facility planning, I don’t see 
that relationship. This involves a complex set of 
interrelationships between management plans, 
industrial engineering, product design, manufacturing 
processes, machining, inventory control, material 
storage, et cetera. These facilities often require 
major long-term capital commitment. They can require 
relocations of families. They oftentimes mean growth 
or death of a community.
Many of our clients require detailed 
appropriation requests. They are subject to extensive 
analysis and scrutiny by their internal and/or their 
public auditors.
The increased sales, the reduced cost, the 
improved productivity have to be projected to 
justify these capital expenditures and then these 
are usually audited after the fact to determine 
whether or not they were obtained or were false 
promises made.
Despite all the planning and analysis, 
corporations, agencies, the government, all build 
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white elephants. The facility planning projects 
do go wrong. Some one has to find them. We only 
have to look in the real estate section of any 
major city to find all the ones that went wrong.
Sales projections don’t develop as planned. 
Labor problems develop. The public has adequate 
cause to question, in our mind, the diligence of 
a public auditor in reviewing the performance 
of a major new facility or a major capital investment 
when, in fact, his firm through the MAS partners 
received a handsome fee for doing the industrial 
engineering or the planning of the facility and 
possibly recommended that it be built.
Another example what we won’t discuss 
in detail is acquisition and merger analysis. 
A practice that is often performed by management 
consulting organizations, this is not doing 
brokerage or finding merger and acquisition, 
but evaluating some or all aspects of a merger 
or acquisition.
These are difficult questions. They 
are based on a relative probability and business 
feasibility of some future action occurring. 
Everyone has to feel they are getting a value, 
so therefore, it isn’t some simple recommendation 
or simple analysis. You really need an independent 
auditor to analyze whether the results of an 
acquisition or a merger is successful.
It requires an outside hard look at these 
things. We have serious reservations that with 
the significant dollars that are involved—I think 
IC just paid 400 million dollars to get Pet—with 
the significant size of some of these things, doesn’t 
the investing public have a right to question the 
independence and the objectivity of an auditor 
who is reporting on a performance of a new 
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combination, when, in fact, it was his firm that 
made the recommendations and may even have helped 
establish the price.
Again, the critical question in today's 
environment of doubt is not if the auditor is 
independent, but whether or not we have given cause 
to the public to doubt his independence. That to 
us is the major question.
I won't go on with a long series of examples 
but we think there are a lot more in the areas that 
the CPAs are proposing to remain in, and we ask 
that consideration be given that they not be allowed 
to perform MAS with their audit clients.
Mr. Chairman, if there are any questions 
for me, I will be glad to try to answer them.
MR. McCLOY: What is the net result? What 
is the bottom line of your advice? That they be 
directly excluded from all MAS?
MR. CARDINAL: No, just MAS with their 
audit clients. I am not one of those that believe 
they ought to be kept out of MAS. I think they 
can do a good job, but I don't think they should 
be doing it for their audit clients.
MR. McCLOY: In other words, without 
exception.
MR. CARDINAL: Yes, sir.
MR. WOOD: Professor Cary this morning, 
if you were here, asked whether CPAs should involve 
themselves in performance reviews.
It seems to me one of your principal 
points of departure here is that a CPA firm would 
be compromised because its MAS people had recommended 
the installation, let's say, of a particular plant 
or a strategic plan for the company, and the P & L 
came up that the profits weren't as planned.
Are you recommending that CPAs conduct
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performance reviews? It seems to me what they 
are supposed to do is check the accounting system 
and the inventory controls and so forth, the 
quality of internal controls, and then certify 
the results in the P & L and the balance sheet.
MR. CARDINAL: You mean the performance 
reviews of the projects or the individuals?
MR. WOOD: Of the projects.
MR. CARDINAL: Of the projects? I think 
I have seen them successfully utilized for that 
when there are not any other conflicts. When 
management has said: We would like an outsider 
to take a look, and audit if, in fact, these 
results are coming as planned because they are 
difficult questions.
The numbers tend to get blended in. 
The sales are up, but would they have gone up, 
or is it the result of this program or not. I 
have seen CPAs used very effectively for that.
MR. WOOD: For them to do it, if you 
recommend that they should do it, then they should 
have expertise in house to do just this.
MR. CARDINAL: The expertise becomes 
a financial one. It is a matter of reviewing 
the results and the numbers.
MR. WOOD: All right, reviewing the 
results. The results are that this new plant 
has produced a loss, period.
MR. CARDINAL: Right.
MR. WOOD: That is enough for management 
to get busy and say, "What went wrong?"
MR. CARDINAL: Fine. That is what I am 
suggesting.
MR. WOOD: I don’t see anything wrong 
with that.
MR. CARDINAL: That is all that I am
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suggesting.
MR. McCLOY: You are only suggesting that 
management get alert again.
MR. CARDINAL: One could say that.
MR. McCLOY: De novo, when you start out, 
would you eliminate all these MASs in the hands of 
accountants?
MR. CARDINAL: No, quite frankly, I think 
what would happen would make my own life much more 
difficult, but I believe strongly enough in the 
principle to persist. I suspect the answer, were 
such a rule to come down, is they would probably 
become an independent organization and relieved of 
some of the restrictions that some of them do have 
from their parents, and they would probably become 
twice the competitors that they are today.
MR. GARRETT: And they would spin off the 
MAS departments?
MR. CARDINAL: Yes, and then they would 
really be tough, but I believe enough in the principle 
of it that if that is the way it goes, so be it.
MR. GARRETT: I can understand if management 
decided they wanted an outside review in respect 
to a particular project and the regular auditors 
that participated in planning that project, that 
review wouldn't seem very outside, but for the 
ordinary attest function for ordinary financial 
statements, why would the auditor be contaminated 
in some way in reporting the results because he 
participated in the planning?
MR. CARDINAL: We are blinded by our faith 
in the people we know, and if the results of a new 
project are not going as planned, but we have at 
the assurances of some known individuals, we think 
this is going to come out all right. Because we 
planned it, we know it is going to come out all 
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right, we tend to be more lenient, and I think the 
critical question is beyond that. Again, "does it 
give the public cause to doubt the independent." 
If, in fact, someone has spent 150 million dollars 
for a facility, I think the public could have cause 
to doubt the audit on the results of that performance 
if it is done by the same organization who helped 
plan it.
MR. GARRETT: The audit of the results 
of the project is something different from the audit 
of the financial statements.
MR. CARDINAL: But the annual financial 
statement can be significantly influenced by the 
results of these major capital expenditures of facility 
plans, sir.
PROFESSOR CARY: Not in the year of the 
planning or not in the year of the activity.
MR. CARDINAL: No.
PROFESSOR CARY: It could be in years hence. 
Therefore, you are assuming that somehow they will 
be altering their audits over a period of years in 
order to demonstrate that the project that they planned, 
or whatever, or the facility or what-have-you, has 
been successful rather than unsuccessful.
MR. CARDINAL: I have been very careful 
not to suggest, sir, that they have modified any 
audits. What I am saying is that the situation 
arises which can give cause to the public which they 
are intended to be representing to, that there was 
a loss of independence and a conflict of interest, 
and, in fact, they have been the recommender and a 
party and share in the professional liability for 
errors in the planning of a project and development 
of a project, I think the public has a cause to doubt 
the independence of the audit.
MR. WOOD: May I ask a simple, silly
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question.
MR. CARDINAL: If there is such a thing.
MR. WOOD: How does the public know that 
the audit firm performs an MAS for the client?
MR. CARDINAL: In some cases they do become 
aware of it. I really don't know the public source 
of knowledge.
MR. GARRETT: They will from now on with 
the new rules.
MR. WOOD: Do we have to specify in the annual 
report that the MAS was in a certain area?
MR. GARRETT: We don't know yet, Arthur. 
By type of service, but whether it would have to be 
more specific than than, I think we will have to find 
out.
MR. CARDINAL: The question, it would almost 
seem to me is: Does the fact that we are not going 
to tell the public unless they get in there and find 
out, make it any lesser of a conflict, I suppose. 
When people do find out, then it is almost like you 
are keeping it a secret, because the information is 
available if someone asks and looks. It becomes 
quite visible. It is hard to hide who you are when 
you are around these organizations.
MR. WOOD: There are a lot of philosophical 
arguments here. It has been brought out today that the 
accounting firms consider themselves to be just as 
honest and competent and their standards of integrity 
are as good as the consulting world or the actuarial 
world or any other, and the appearance of independence 
gets an awful lot of emphasis out there.
I think that I, for one, have a difficult 
time in finding incompatible the integrity of an 
accounting firm on its audit side with its service 
side. I don't like to see the government or the SEC, 
for example, unless there are real factual grounds 
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or bases for experience where there have been failures 
where an auditing firm might be found to have given 
poor advice and then covered it up, for us to inhibit 
services where hundreds of small companies, for example, 
can't afford to have separate consultants, they work 
with accounting firms to perform all kinds of services, 
and I am just troubled. I need some help, I think, 
on this question of appearances of independence.
MR. CARDINAL: I think the appearance is a 
very critical question in today's world, sir. As I 
said, I have been one of those within our profession 
who has stood up and felt that the MAS groups can 
perform as good a management consulting as any of us, 
that their conflicts of interest on the management 
consulting side versus audit is probably no more, 
no less, than many of our own. We have to police them.
I think when you get to the audit side, 
however, there is a specific public responsibility. 
You are not dealing with an aware, educated clientele 
such as the management. You are dealing with the 
public, and I think the public has lost enough 
confidence in public institutions these days that I 
don't think we should contribute to it, and appearance 
of conflict can be as important as conflict itself 
in decisions affecting the public because you don't 
often get a chance to prove your well meaning with 
the public.
MR. MATUSIAK: The Cohen Commission suggested 
that the more knowledge that the public has about the 
services performed by CPA firms, the less they are 
concerned about the impairment of independence. 
Therefore, the Cohen Commission suggested that perhaps 
what was needed is an educational program on the 
part of the profession to educate the public as to 
what CPA firms do. How would you respond to that?
MR. CARDINAL: I think any education that 
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that you can do in that area is fine, but I still feel 
that appearance of conflict becomes an equal problem 
whether they are educated or not. It might just make 
them more aware to what Mr. Wood was saying of finding 
out what other services they might have provided, and 
they might start asking who were the consultants that 
advised on this acquisition or this merger or who worked 
on such-and-such a firm.
MR. McCLOY: You might build up confidence 
as they examine that.
MR. CARDINAL: It might go either way.
MR. GARRETT: They will begin to get educated 
with the next proxy season. One might wait and see 
how that works out.
I can imagine that if the auditors had 
worked in planning on a project and the project was 
a turkey, that they might be a little late in 
recommending recognition of the loss, and a big 
writeoff and things of that kind. You certainly 
have got on the inside of firms in the course of 
your profession, I am sure. I wouldn't dream of 
asking you to name anybody. Have you actually seen 
this or thought you have seen it?
MR. CARDINAL: I won't say that I have seen 
any instances where auditors have tried to cover that 
up, no sir. I have seen a lot of projects go wrong. 
I have not seen instances of coverup.
MR. CARDINAL: Be slow or whatever.
MR. GARRETT: Someone might say, "We will 
have to write it off this year. It's a dud." And 
they say, "No, give it one more year. We will put 
in another little gimmick and see what happens."
MR. CARDINAL: I haven't gone looking for 
them either, frankly.
MR. GARRETT: Lou, is there coffee back 
there? We will take ten minutes.
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(A short recess was taken.)
MR. GARRETT: Please resume your seats.
Robert Mautz and Thomas Testman.
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MR. ROBERT K. MAUTZ: My name is Robert 
Mautz. I am a partner in the firm of Ernst & Ernst. 
I am accompanied by my partner, Thomas Testman, this 
afternoon. Tom is in charge of our management 
advisory services on a firm-wide basis.
We appreciate the opportunity to meet with 
you and to express our views. We have already supplied 
you with a paper, including a summary, and we will 
try to help you get back on schedule a little by not 
reading that paper or any part of the summary.
It may be useful, however, in view of some 
of what has been said here today, to express our 
views a little differently. I will try to be 
brief.
We think that the reasons offered for 
restricting the scope of CPA services, as they have 
been expressed so far, tend to fall into two groups. 
One is the question of independence; the other is the 
question of compatibility or image of status or 
credibility or whatever. We think the matter of 
independence is a very real issue, and an important 
one. It is really an unavoidable issue in view of 
the way the profession of public accounting is 
structured. But it is an issue not so much of 
scope of services as it is one of source of fee. 
As long as the independent CPA gets his fee from 
the audited client, his ultimate independence is 
bound to be questioned. Because of that relationship, 
and because CPAs recognize it and have been concerned 
about it for a long, long time, we practicing CPAs 
have developed a whole array of controls which 
are designed to protect and assure our audit 
independence. These include such things as the 
way we recruit, our staff training programs, our 
rules regarding financial interests, the divisions 
of duties we have within the firm, the procedures
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we have for accepting engagements accepting clients, 
our second partner reviews, the partner rotation 
program that we will have now, intrafirm peer review, 
external peer review, and now, as some one pointed 
out this morning, perhaps the most important of all 
is audit committee review of our independence.
All of these are designed to assure, as 
well as we can, given the structure of the profession 
that we are independent. Some of these provisions 
are quite burdensome and all of them are expensive. 
In addition to this, we have the ever present threat 
of litigation which gives us every reason to strive 
to meet these requirements and to be as independent 
as we can.
So we see independence, then, as something 
about which we have taken a great many positive 
steps, and we see restriction of services in any 
way at all as not really helping with the basic 
problem. If we restrict any one service, about all 
we are saying is that we are not really content with 
the extent of our independence efforts. We could 
restrict services a long, long way, but unless we 
restrict the audit service right out of existence, 
we don’t get to the real basis of the independence 
issue. We see the restriction of scope of services 
with respect to independence. First as superfluous 
because we already have a satisfactory array of 
relevant controls, and second, as irrelevant to the 
basic question.
With respect to compatibility or image or 
status or credibility because we supply management 
advisory services, we tend to think of this as not 
important because market forces will take care of 
it. It is true that when we accountants are 
authorized to provide the attest function, we are 
given a very important and a very valuable authority, 
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but no guarantee of any clients comes with that 
authority.
The profession is guaranteed clients, but 
no individual firm is. Ours is a very competitive 
profession. Each firm must provide services that 
clients want badly enough to pay for them. We must 
have sufficient credibility and status, on the 
basis of whatever standards clients use, that we 
impress them with the fact that we can meet their 
needs which includes being accepted as independent.
Companies are free to choose their 
independent auditors. Differences among CPA firms, 
including differences in the scope of their services 
provide an opportunity for choice on the part of 
companies. We think that companies in search of 
independent auditors will themselves discipline 
the profession if its members engage in activities 
which threaten their audit independence.
Mr. Cary has asked a number of people 
and he has indicated he will ask us all today the 
question of what would happen if an announcement 
appeared tomorrow in the paper that Booz, Allen 
& Hamilton and one of the major firms had merged. 
I can’t speak for the clients of other firms, but 
if they were our clients, they would be on the 
phone immediately to ask what in heaven’s name 
we were doing. They have arranged with us to be 
their auditors. Are we changing our emphasis? 
Are we changing the nature of our professional 
commitment? Do we want to become something we 
weren’t before? That would be a sufficient change 
that many, many of our important clients would be 
very interested and would comment to us.
This is not to say, on the other hand, 
that we would not be interested in merging with 
some management advisory services firm somewhere 
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if it had a degree of competence in something that 
we were interested in and needed in that locality. 
We would probably seek such expertise, but that does 
not mean that we could ignore client reaction. We 
must always give thought to how our clients will 
react to any activity that would indicate a major 
change in direction.
Clients feel we have a commitment to them 
just as we feel they have a commitment to treat us 
honestly and fairly. So we see the market system 
taking pretty good care of this matter of 
compatibility of MAS with auditing. We view any 
artificial limitations of the scope of services as 
constituting an interference with the functioning 
of the market system, and we tend to think that there 
is too much interference with that system already.
May I add just two more thoughts before 
we take your questions. The first is that the total 
range of services which public accountants engage 
in isn’t nearly as broad as is often implied. There 
is a general consensus that we restrict ourselves 
to a reasonable range that relates to our basic 
audit function. There are all kinds of things that 
we would not do.
You have asked some people the question: 
Are there any services you would not perform? There 
are a whole lot of these. We wouldn't do an appraisal 
for you. We wouldn't give you investment advice. 
We wouldn't plan an insurance program. We wouldn't 
conduct a fund raising program or an advertising 
campaign. We wouldn't do anything for you about 
public relations. We could run through a whole list 
of these. There are lots of things that we wouldn't 
dream of doing.
There is really a fairly narrow range for 
management advisory services, and there are only a
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few services that some firms perform that most of the 
other firms do not.
The other point I would like to make was 
brought up by the preceding commentator. That is 
this matter of how the public perceives our independence 
and whether the public is really concerned about our 
appearance of independence.
The question is whom are we talking about 
as the public? If we mean the little old lady in 
tennis shoes, she doesn’t have the faintest idea 
about things like this, and she is not interested. 
If we are concerned about the skilled and qualified 
financial analysts, they seem very unbothered by 
the whole thing. I don’t see any of them here to 
make an oral statement or writing about this in 
their professional literature, or really concerned 
about it in any way at all. Whatever ways they have 
of determining whether or not we are satisfactorily 
independent, they apparently are satisfied. I tend 
to think that the people who raise the independence 
issue the loudest are academics who need something 
to write about. I can say this rather bluntly 
because I spent a quarter of a century as an academic, 
in some cases writing about the independence issue. 
(Laughter)
PROFESSOR CARY: What position?
MR. MAUTZ: I was very critical, Mr. Cary., 
and I could be because I had no direct interest in 
it. Some of my friends come to me now and they say, 
"Bob, you have changed your position."
That is a very hard question to answer 
fairly. Yes, I have changed my position. But I 
have changed it over a period of some 15 or 16 years 
during which the profession has also changed. Many 
of the present controls to protect independence didn't 
exist that long ago. I have changed my position 
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because I know a whole lot more about the subject 
now than I did then. It is very easy to be critical 
of that which you know very little about. It is 
very easy to sit in the comfort of a classroom and 
talk to your students or write about those practitioners 
and what they should or shouldn’t do without recognizing 
what the impact of that can be not only on the firm 
and its partner, but upon clients and their needs.
I didn’t mean to go on this long. Tom 
and I will be glad to try to answer any questions 
that you have.
MR. McCLOY: Do you see any field at all, 
any area at all here, where we, the POB, could be 
helpful in restoring the credibility of the profession 
by way of any limitation of the MAS?
MR. MAUTZ: One of the services we shouldn't 
render is giving political advice and really this has 
become a political question. (Applause)
PROFESSOR CARY: That is very good.
MR. GARRETT: Why do you think we are lawyers 
up here?
MR. MAUTZ: I think it may be very, very 
important politically that some kind of a concession 
is made, but I think from a substantive point of view 
that concession won’t mean a thing, and it will hold 
the wolves off only for a very short time. I recognize 
it is very easy for me sitting here to say that you 
should be courageous, take the right position, and 
wait to see what happens. If I were in your position, 
I don’t quite know what I would do, but I can’t see 
restriction of the scope of our services as any 
kind of a lasting solution.
MR. McCLOY: You would put no outside 
restrictions at all on MAS?
MR. MAUTZ: No, I would vote for the free 
market and let it go at that.
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MR. McCLOY: Even at the risk of government 
regulation instead of self-regulation of the profession?
MR. MAUTZ: There is a very fine difference 
between government enforced self-regulation and honest 
to goodness self-regulation. I think in this case we 
may get regulation, but I would rather it were forced 
upon us than we volunteered it because I don’t believe 
it is substantive or effective or useful in the long 
run.
PROFESSOR CARY: I have a couple of questions. 
One, I noticed that Ernst & Ernst doesn’t engage in 
actuarial work. Is that a matter of principle or don't 
you think it is profitable, or what is the reason, 
because you do engage in quite a variety of MAS types 
of services?
MR. MAUTZ: I am not sure I can answer that 
question. Sometimes there is a pretty fine difference 
between principles and profits. We do have some 
actuaries on our staff. We have been acquiring them 
because we feel that we need them in our insurance 
audits. We are very heavy in the insurance field.
With such expertise available, I can see 
where we might be led to render some client an actuarial 
service. You move from one step to another. Once you 
have the service available, your clients know you have 
it available, and they may ask for it. I wouldn’t 
want to pre-empt the decision that will be made some 
day as to how far we will go in offering actuarial 
services. It is a little hard to see the direction 
in which auditing will develop. We have seen over 
the last two decades an increase in the breadth of the 
auditing service we are called upon to do, including 
some kinds of things that at the moment we won’t 
do. I am sure we don’t do them now for a number of 
reasons. Whether we will offer that service in five 
or ten years from now will depend upon the trends in
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the profession, what others do, how useful the service 
is, and whether clients demand it.
PROFESSOR CARY: That ties in with the 
question you referred to. You are right. I was going 
to ask about your merging with Booz, Allen or something 
like that. Your reply was: Well, that it is a political 
question, that what you would do, it would shock your 
clients because you do it too fast, but if you merged 
with one small actuarial firm and a very first class 
young management consulting firm and so forth, in 
principle this doesn't bother you. This is a proper 
proliferation of the roles that your firm can perform. 
Right?
MR. MAUTZ: If that consulting firm was 
providing a service and had a competence that we thought 
we needed to serve our client, I would see nothing 
wrong in principle with us doing it.
PROFESSOR CARY: Then how do you go to 
geologists and appraisers? Why not those?
MR, MAUTZ: I guess there are a couple of 
reasons I could mention. One is that we have the 
problem not only of providing the competence, but having 
in our partner category the ability to manage that 
competence and to supervise it.
We would be a long time developing that 
supervisory ability in geology. That is not to say 
we couldn't but we would be a long time developing 
it. And then we come back to the point: What are 
we in business for? We are in business to make 
a profit, but not solely to make a profit. We are 
proud of being accountants. We are an accounting 
and auditing firm. We want to be thought of as such. 
I think there are a number of things that we could 
do, services that our clients would accept but that 
we just feel are out of our range of interest as a 
professional firm. Whether that would be geology 
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or something else, I don't know, but there are bound to 
be limits. I think we have no intention of trying 
to be all things to all people.
PROFESSOR CARY: There is much difference 
between plant layout and geology in the sense that 
they are both unrelated to accounting, aren't they, 
would you say?
MR. MAUTZ: You can relate them if you try 
hard enough. Let me try a little bit. Not geology. 
I won't try that. You mentioned plant layout. We are 
very concerned about internal control. That is 
certainly accounting. We are also concerned about 
inventory control. Internal control over inventory 
has to do with warehouses and the physical transfers 
of product, locked storerooms, records, and the like. 
It might be that occasionally we would be asked by a 
client to give some advice on how to improve internal 
control over materials handling, and we would get into 
some form of plant layout in that way.
That doesn't mean that we set ourselves up 
as experts in general plant layout and that we would 
start from scratch in designing a complete plant layout 
for someone. We may be drawn into those things by 
our interest in internal control.
PROFESSOR CARY: I was just trying to see 
where you draw lines.
MR. MAUTZ: Some lines are very hard to draw, 
as you know. The ends are very clear, but in the 
middle it gets very fuzzy, and this is one of them.
MR. McCLOY: Do you do executive recruiting? 
MR. MAUTZ: The firm does, yes, sir.
MR. WOOD: At the outset you pointed out 
independence and compatibility were the two principal 
facets of this problem, two principal considerations 
on MAS.
You used interchangeably, or you mentioned 
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compatibility or image. Doesn't image go to independence, 
this appearance question, rather than to compatibility? 
Where do you get image on compatibility?
MR. MAUTZ: I thought the two terms had been 
used almost synonymously this morning is why I used them, 
but image is certainly a problem of independence, yes. 
Especially the appearance.
MR. McCLOY: I think it was used in a different 
connotation.
I have a feeling that you have got a great 
asset in the public’s mind and in your clientele’s 
mind by the fact that you know your business. You know 
your main business. You don’t want to dilute that.
MR. MAUTZ: That is right.
MR. McCLOY: That is a part of credibility. 
If you get the impression that you are just trying to 
pick up the bottom dollar wherever you can, then you 
lost a certain standing.
MR. MAUTZ: And it is the sort of thing that 
the market test will do for us only on a very slow 
basis over a long period of time. That is part of the 
difficulty.
The market will discipline the profession 
for us, but it takes a while to react to things.
MR. GARRETT: Mr. Mautz, will the market 
encourage independence?
MR. MAUTZ: I have no doubt of that.
MR. GARRETT: Is there a big market for 
more independence. You get more clients if you are 
more independent than if you are not?
MR. MAUTZ: Absolutely, but it takes a while 
for the absence of independence to become apparent, 
and it is not one of those things that is immediately 
visible.
MR. GARRETT: Is the absence of independence 
often something that management has sought to achieve?
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MR. MAUTZ: I wouldn’t accuse management of 
it, but that is one of the possibilities, yes.
MR. GARRETT: You can accuse them of it, 
but I think they tend to like it, it seems to me. 
When you get in trouble for lack of independence, 
it is because you have been playing games with management 
isn't it?
MR. MAUTZ: One of the ways the public has 
demanded more independence is through the use of audit 
committees. That is a great factor.
MR. GARRETT: There might be a demand there?
MR. MAUTZ: Yes. That is one way of increasing 
the independence. I think, of course, our firm and 
the other firms as well have been enthusiastic about 
audit committees for that purpose.
MR. GARRETT: You heard Mr. Cardinal's 
statement, did you not, earlier?
MR. MAUTZ: Yes.
MR. GARRETT: With respect to the sort of 
fear that he was seeing through engagement in projects, 
particularly substantial projects, that would tend 
to generate a corrupt desire to want to make them look 
good or at least defer making them look bad and perhaps 
not report deficiencies as early as might otherwise 
be done, can internal procedures protect against 
that, if it is a danger?
MR. MAUTZ: I would say yes, they can. I 
think it would be a very, very short-sighted public 
accounting firm management that would lean that way 
at all in the long run. We would lose far more than 
we would ever gain.
I can imagine the conversation taking place, 
but I can't imagine any agreement: Well, let's try 
it this year and see if we can't push this off. We 
are going to have to face it sooner or later. If 
we have made a bust, let's face it and get it over 
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with. Clients don’t appreciate us hiding our mistakes. 
If we have made them, we have to face up to them. 
The sooner, the better.
MR. WOOD: Could I ask what review you as 
the chairman or the senior partner or a couple of your 
close associates have of the audit that is conducted 
by one of your newer partners of the client engagement?
Do you require the partner who has completed 
an engagement to appear before a committee of Ernst 
& Ernst.
MR. MAUTZ: Are we speaking of an audit now?
MR. WOOD: Of an audit. We get away from MAS. 
MR. MAUTZ: No, the partner in charge of the 
engagement, whom we call the client executive, will have 
the people assigned to him as staff complete the audit. 
He will review the work papers and the conclusions and 
approve them, and then we require a second partner review. 
That is, another audit partner who has had no relationship 
with that client is assigned to review the audit 
memorandum which spells out the various audit decisions 
that have been made and what we think are the sensitive 
and crucial issues, and to examine any work papers he 
feels necessary in support of the review memorandum 
and audit opinion.
He will make that review, and if he approves 
the work, that is the sum total of the review.
MR. WOOD: Why do you have him do that? Why 
is that partner reviewed?
MR. MAUTZ: There are a number of ways to 
respond to that question, but one of them certainly is 
to assure that he has approached these issues from an 
independent point of view.
MR. McCLOY: If there is disagreement, does 
it go higher?
MR. MAUTZ: Yes, sir. We have a policy 
memorandum—I mention this because I was just talking 
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about it to an MBA group the other day—we have a 
policy memorandum that provides protection for anybody 
on the audit staff, from the lowest level on up.
If he has a dispute with his superior and his superior 
does not give him a satisfactory answer, he is required 
to take the question to the next level above his 
superior, and it marches all the way up until we 
ultimately get to the managing partner if necessary 
to provide a satisfactory resolution for the person 
raising the issue.
MR. GARRETT: Would you see some disadvantage 
to the reputation and the credibility of the profession 
if it got too far out in advisory services with some 
of the kinds that you say you wouldn’t want to do?
MR. MAUTZ: Certainly. I can see any given 
firm might get itself so extended that it lost the 
reputation for a tight focus on its specialty that Mr. 
McCloy was talking about.
If that happened to any given firm, it hurts 
the whole profession. I don’t think it is likely to 
happen.
MR. GARRETT: But you think other forces at 
least as far as self-regulation is concerned ought to 
be allowed to handle that problem?
MR. MAUTZ: I have, and our firm has, a great 
deal of faith in the market system. The market makes 
mistakes and it is slow to correct them, but so does 
regulation make mistakes. With a profession that 
is changing as ours is, and with a business environment 
that is growing as ours is, regulations that appear 
appropriate today may just raise the dickens with what 
we ought to be doing ten years from now.
It is very hard to repeal a regulation, and 
we can see that regulation could possibly prevent 
us from acquiring competence that we will badly need 
a few years from now.
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MR. GARRETT: Do you see any harm in these 
two situations? One, your firm’s revenue from MAS 
gets to be more than 50% of your total revenues, or 
with respect to a specific client, your aggregate 
revenues from MAS exceed your audit fee. Do either 
of those cause you any worry?
MR. MAUTZ: I don't think either of them 
cause me worry because of the other controls we have 
over independence. From an independence view I 
wouldn't worry about it. I think it is very unlikely 
to happen.
MR. GARRETT: You mean, no matter how 
successful your MAS gets, do you think you could still 
maintain your independent professional quality as 
an auditor?
MR. MAUTZ: The way we are organized, yes, 
sir.
MR. GARRETT: That is all I have.
MR. WOOD: Just one further question. The 
previous witnesses, particularly from the actuarial 
field, objected to a continuous service in MAS by 
CPAs.
Would you care to comment on that point?
MR. MAUTZ: You might do that better than 
I can, Tom.
MR. THOMAS R. TESTMAN: You are doing so 
well, Bob, that I don't think we should change.
MR. WOOD: In the actuarial field, for 
example, and it is in the appendix here.
MR. GARRETT: It is in the Executive 
Committee proposal.
MR. WOOD: That continuous service in the 
actuarial field would be objectionable. Do you have 
a comment on that?
MR. TESTMAN: I won't respond to it as it 
applies to the actuarial field because we are not
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providing that service. The continuous service that 
I think is being referred to has to do with whether 
or not we are assuming a management role. We do 
not get ourselves postured so that we are involved 
in a management role.
We have a number of clients that we perform 
a large number of MAS projects for during a given year— 
thus we may be involved for several months with this 
client. We have other instances where a single project, 
particularly if it is a systems engagement, may well 
run for several months or even a couple of years.
For these same clients, we may do very little consulting 
in subsequent years. I don’t believe that is what 
is meant by continuous consulting. Again, in no case 
do we assume a management role.
MR. McCLOY: What is your chief field in the 
MAS area?
MR. MAUTZ: I am not in the MAS area. I am 
on the audit staff.
MR. McCLOY: I mean your firm.
MR. TESTMAN: We are heaviest in the systems 
area and in accounting, cost, budgeting, and financial 
planning and control. We have a number of individuals 
that have skills and disciplines in management science, 
industrial engineering, marketing (although not many 
in this area), organization and personnel and the 
like. We have a multi-disciplinary practice.
MR. GARRETT: How do you tell when a 
recommendation that you make on a systems project is 
your decision as against management's decision?
The suggestion was made that an adviser can 
produce recommendations that are tantamount to the 
decision, depending upon a variety of things, and I 
think we are all familiar enough with how that can 
be done.
How do you know when it really represents 
166
a conscious management decision as against circumstances? 
MR. TESTMAN: In our guidelines to practice, 
we make quite a deal out of the fact that we do not 
want to undertake an engagement unless we are satisfied 
that the client can successfully implement the engagement. 
MR. GARRETT: What do you mean by that? 
MR. TESTMAN: To implement an engagement means 
that they have to understand it. They have to have the 
competency and skills. They have to have the organization 
to make it work. It would not behoove us to go in and 
design a system if there was no one on the other end to 
make it work successfully. We have to live with our 
recommendations.
MR. McCLOY: You don’t operate the system? 
MR. TESTMAN: We do not operate the system. 
However, if it doesn’t work, it obviously is going to 
be a reflection on our work. Therefore, we make every 
effort to assist the client in successfully implementing 
the system.
MR. MAUTZ: In many of our MAS engagements, 
I think our practice is to help the client get to where 
he can make a decision. We advise him what kind of 
information he needs, tell him how to gather it, tell 
him what he has to do, and show him the way to go 
about it rather than come to him and say: Here is 
our recommendation.
MR. GARRETT: At some point don’t you get 
told to come in with a good system?
MR. TESTMAN: I would not say so. Obviously 
there are technical elements of a system that perhaps 
management is not in a position to make a sound 
judgment on. In that sense they might rely on us. 
However, management is the one that makes all of the 
significant decisions impacting the management function.
MR. GARRETT: If it is a financial control 
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system and the time comes in your management letter 
to comply with SAS-20 on significant deficiencies, 
who makes the decision whether to report a deficiency 
in control within your firm?
MR. TESTMAN: That would be the partner in 
charge of the audit engagement.
MR. GARRETT: Would he have had anything 
to do with the work in recommending the system?
MR. TESTMAN: He would have an oversight 
responsibility. Before we would undertake any work 
with a client, we would have reviewed and conferred 
with that partner in charge of the engagement as to 
the appropriateness of providing that service.
He would then on a continuing basis want 
to be satisfied that we were being responsive to that 
client and doing the kind of job that we said we 
would do. Generally, he would be not involved in 
any extensive way in the assignment itself.
MR. GARRETT: What I am getting at, of 
course, is the suggestion that if you had recommended 
the system, you would be reluctant to point out the 
deficiencies that otherwise should be pointed out.
MR. TESTMAN: I could not accept that. 
One of our arguments and our clients see it as a 
real advantage in systems work, is that we are 
very concerned and very responsive to the need for 
good internal control and good audit trails. I 
have seen other non-accounting organizations provide 
systems work that are not too attuned to that aspect. 
I think you will find a significant difference in 
this respect.
MR. McCLOY: You mentioned a number of 
things that tended to insure your independence. Can 
you mention any that you didn’t mention before that 
you think could be added to insure this element of 
independence other than eliminating MAS? Are there 
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any other things that you can think of that this 
Board might recommend that would insure independence? 
Beyond what you are doing now.
MR. MAUTZ: I think the audit committee is 
a great development, but I fear that what we are tending 
to do now is perhaps overrate it, and there aren’t 
enough trained people. I don’t know that it would be 
your problem, but it would be very useful if we had 
some way of training audit committee members, teaching 
them their responsibility.
MR. GARRETT: How do you train a generalist?
PROFESSOR CARY: How about retired senior 
partners of accounting firms?
MR. MAUTZ: That is happening, yes. Our 
retired managing partners are on a number of audit 
committees already, and I think there will be more of 
this.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much, gentlemen.
MR. MAUTZ: Thank you very much.
MR. GARRETT: Now Mr. Henry Gunders of 
Price Waterhouse.
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MR. HENRY GUNDERS: Gentlemen, thank you for 
the opportunity of making a statement on the issues 
which have been so well exposed in your Notice of 
your hearing.
I am Henry Gunders, a partner of Price 
Waterhouse & Co. and its Vice Chairman of Management 
Advisory Services.
I have been engaged in providing advisory 
services since 1951. During these twenty-seven years 
of practice I have seen much of the evolution of the 
MAS segment of the public accounting profession; 
further, I have twice served on the MAS Executive 
Committee of the AICPA, once from 1960 through 1963, 
and again from 1974 through 1976.
The scope of services offered by independent 
accounting firms has been a source of debate for more 
than twenty years. Some critics of the profession 
continue to allege that the mere performance of certain 
services, not considered traditional accounting and 
auditing services, impairs the auditor's independence.
Several independent investigations into 
this issue have been undertaken; we are aware of no 
evidence that has been uncovered to support these 
criticisms. But the criticisms continue. We 
believe they result in large measure from a lack 
of understanding of the real nature of the services 
performed by independent accounting firms and of 
the ways in which those services do—and do not-- 
affect a client's decision-making process. Further, 
the measures that accounting firms themselves have 
taken to safeguard their audit independence may not 
in the past have been adequately communicated.
We believe strongly that the public concerns 
surrounding this issue must be resolved. We have 
serious doubts, however, whether this is an issue 
that the profession should resolve itself through
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joint action.
We recognize that the members of the SEC 
Practice Section have worked hard to attempt to identify 
those services that have been the cause of most concern. 
Moreover, they have set forth criteria that should be 
used, in their view, to judge the types of services 
that accounting firms should be permitted to provide 
to their audit clients. But we find ourselves in 
disagreement with the approach taken in the Section’s 
report, in two fundamental respects.
First, we do not believe that it is either 
practical or in the public interest to make the 
profession’s ability to provide services depend upon 
how those services are characterized—that is, as 
related to either "accounting" or "auditing." The 
scope of services offered by auditing firms should 
not be limited by some abstract idea of what is 
deemed "appropriate" for an accounting firm to do. 
Independence should be the sole test; only where audit 
independence would in fact be impaired should a service 
be proscribed.
Further, we seriously question whether the 
profession itself should attempt to limit the services 
offered to the public by its members. Any limitation 
on the scope of services offered by independent 
accountants would narrow the range of services 
available to the public. Moreover, our attorneys 
have advised that, if such a limitation comes about 
as the result of an agreement among firms that would 
otherwise be competitors in offering the restricted 
services, the antitrust implications are serious and 
cannot be ignored.
Because of the significant dangers posed 
in this regard, we believe that, if a limitation on 
the scope of services offered by accounting firms is 
to be imposed, it must come from outside the profession.
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The AICPA has for many years worked closely 
with the SEC in developing specific examples to guide 
in performing advisory services, as related to the 
issue of independence, and should continue to perform 
that supportive role. These examples are available 
to and understood by members of the profession. As 
a result, the SEC is sensitive to the concerns of the 
day, and is able to deal effectively with the 
independence issue as it pertains to scope of services. 
Given these circumstances, it is abundantly clear 
that the SEC has both the needed background and the 
ability to set forth appropriate, enforceable 
guidelines for independence as they relate to scope 
of services.
Indeed, we believe that the continued public 
concern over the scope of services offered by the 
profession results in large measure from the fact 
that the SEC has not faced up to this issue. In 
September of last year, the SEC called for public 
comments to consider whether the provision of non- 
audit services impairs the auditor’s independence. 
It did not decide that issue, however, or even 
establish guidelines for others to make the decision. 
Instead, in its recent rule, ASR-250, the SEC shifted 
the responsibility for making that decision to 
individual boards of directors or their audit 
committees.
ASR-250 requires audit committees to disclose 
whether they considered the possible effects on 
independence before permitting the auditor to perform 
non-audit services for the corporation. That portion 
of the rule was not even in the SEC’s initial 
proposal and, thus, was not exposed for public 
comment. Moreover, while it purports to be simply 
a procedural rule of disclosure, ASR-250 may well 
have a devastating substantive effect—spilling
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out the baby with the bath water.
Audit committee will obviously be reluctant, 
in the face of ASR-250, to state that they have not 
even considered the issue of independence. Thus, ASR- 
250 is, in practical effect, a mandate to audit 
committees to consider in advance of the engagement 
of an accounting firm whether the provision of any 
non-audit services will impair the firm's independence. 
But how are audit committees to make that determination? 
What specific guidelines should they apply? The SEC 
has failed to establish any. Yet at the very time 
the SEC is asking the profession to consider whether 
the provision of non-audit services may impair 
independence, it has in effect required individual 
audit committees to make that factual determination 
in advance, without any standards to guide their 
decisions.
Let me make it clear that we do not oppose 
the disclosures of advisory services to audit 
committees, investors, or the public. To the contrary, 
we strongly support the disclosure of all services 
performed by the principal accountant. We encourage 
audit committees to monitor closely the manner in 
which we perform those services to assure that our 
audit independence has not been impaired. Indeed, 
we believe that complete disclosure is critical 
to enable the public to understand the steps we 
have taken to safeguard our audit independence to 
ensure that it is never compromised.
But, as I have mentioned, ASR-250 is far 
more than a rule of disclosure. It places what seems 
to me to be an impossible burden on audit committees, 
requiring them, in effect, to make a factual 
determination in advance of an engagement without 
any facts or any standards to guide in their decision. 
It requires them to make their determination in a 
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vacuum. I do not think the SEC can fairly expect 
this of audit committees.
There is another reason why ASR-250 is 
fundamentally unfair. Accounting firms have been 
providing non-audit services to their clients now 
for many years. Any limitation on the ability of 
accounting firms to continue providing a particular 
service must be based on a comprehensive review of 
the years of existing experience and the determination 
that the service has in fact impaired independence. 
No matter how capable they might be, individual 
audit committees simply do not have the tools 
needed to undertake that review.
Evidence is already accumulating that 
ASR-250 will have an overbroad and "chilling" effect. 
Audit committees are reading ASR-250 as evidence 
of the SEC’s hostility to the provision of non- 
audit services. Rather than risk criticism for 
making a "wrong" judgment, and having no standards 
to guide their determinations, audit committees may 
simply rule out the provision of any such services 
by the firm that audits their financial statements. 
As a result, firms may be barred from offering 
services to their audit client even though they are 
best able to provide those services and even though 
no threat to independence exists. In short, by 
avoiding the issue, the SEC may well have decided 
it—and done so in a way that is contrary to the 
public interest.
The scope of services issue raises 
important and difficult questions. The SEC has the 
responsibility to face those issues directly and 
to resolve them, not simply to finesse them.
In coming to grips with this issue, the 
SEC must keep firmly in mind that any restriction 
on the scope of services to be offered by the 
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accounting profession is anticompetitive. It limits 
the services available to consumers and restricts 
the number of firms competing to provide those 
services. If such an anticompetitive restriction 
is to be imposed—from whatever source—it must be 
based on the finding that audit independence will, in 
fact be impaired. Absent such a finding—absent 
proof that the provision of non-audit services 
presents a real threat to independence—there should 
be no bar to independent accounting firms providing 
services to meet consumer needs. And that should 
be so whether or not the services are normally 
considered or characterized as "accounting or auditing" 
services. Any bar not based on evidence that 
independence would in fact be compromised would be 
anticompetitive and detrimental to the public interest.
Making the profession’s ability to provide 
services depend on what someone at some future time 
might consider "related to auditing or accounting," 
would place the profession in a strait jacket, and may 
well deprive the public of exactly those services that 
auditing firms are best and most economically able to 
perform.
Let me add a personal note here. Based on 
my more than two decades of experience in this field, 
I believe that the characterization of services as 
either "accounting" or "auditing" is simply irrelevant 
to the critical issue—whether audit independence may 
be impaired. When would—or could—a non-audit service 
threaten the independence of the principal accountant? 
Certainly not because the service is rendered by someone 
with expertise in a field other than strict accounting— 
for example, in engineering, mathematics or computer 
technology. Nor is a threat posed by the fact that 
the service bears on activities that take place 
outside the client's accounting department, let us 
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say, in the manufacturing plant, the warehouse, or 
the sales office.
The threat arises not from the type of service 
performed, but from the nature of the accountant's 
relationship to his client while providing the 
service. Recommending that a client's management 
take an operating decision—to build a new plant, 
market a new product, or acquire a new facility—these 
are the types of activities that would involve an 
auditing firm in the role of management, and may pose 
a potential threat to its independence.
It is not how the service is characterized, 
or even the type of service, but, rather, the accountant's 
involvement in the role that can only be management's 
that poses the threat to independence. What are needed, 
in my view, are not arbitrary proscriptions of 
particular services, but clear definitive standards 
that will serve as guides in performing all services, 
to assure that independence is not compromised.
Moreover, I must emphasize again that, when 
the SEC examines this issue, it will not be writing on a 
clean slate. As I mentioned before, accounting firms 
have been providing non-audit services for years. 
A substantial reservoir of experience exists that may 
be drawn upon to determine whether the provision of 
any particular service has in fact impaired audit 
independence. Any restrictive regulation by the SEC 
must be based upon this extensive experience, and not 
upon surmise or speculation.
For example, in the notice of these hearings 
you raised the question of the possible impact on 
independence that might flow from the performance 
of tax services. And, you asked whether a distinction 
should be drawn between them, and other advisory 
services.
The rendering of tax services to clients of 
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our firm is the responsibility of the Tax Department, 
and, therefore, I cannot reply with the same 
background of experience as is the case with 
management advisory services. But I believe that 
tax services may perhaps provide the best example 
of the need to examine the experience of which I have 
spoken.
Bear in mind that the one main feature of 
tax advisory services that distinguishes them from 
other advisory services is the existence of an 
external and independent review mechanism unrelated 
either to the auditor or the client. All tax 
advisory services are conducted within the context 
of rules, regulations, and interpretations established 
by the particular taxing jurisdiction, and the 
results of actions taken by a client in response 
to tax advisory services are subject to adjustment 
based on an external government review. This special 
feature, in my view, virtually eliminates any threat 
to the auditor's independence.
More important here, however—that view 
is borne out by experience. As the Cohen Commission 
Report noted, whatever potential conflict might 
appear to exist is contradicted by the years of 
actual experience. After 60 years of experience 
in providing tax services, no independence problems 
have occurred.
To set my comments today in the proper 
context, I believe it is important to mention the 
limitations Price Waterhouse has imposed on its own 
practice. Let there be no misunderstanding here— 
we are not advocating caution in limiting services 
because we at Price Waterhouse want to offer the 
widest possible variety of management advisory 
services to the public. Far from it. Seven years 
ago Price Waterhouse adopted perhaps the most 
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restrictive policy of any of the major independent 
accounting firms with respect to management advisory 
services. We do not undertake any assignment that 
would place any responsibility upon us for making 
or recommending commercial decisions to management. 
Moreover, we do not engage in actuarial services, 
market analysis, product analysis, plant layout, 
or product pricing. We imposed these limitations 
upon our practice because we believe they are 
appropriate for Price Waterhouse.
In summary, we believe it is inappropriate 
for the profession, or for the Public Oversight 
Board on behalf of the profession, to limit the 
services to be provided by independent accounting 
firms. The decision to proscribe services must be 
made, if at all, by the SEC, and only on the basis 
of its own factual determination that a particular 
service has in fact impaired audit independence.
Moreover, we recommend that the Public 
Oversight Board, and the Institute, petition the 
SEC to withdraw that provision of ASR-250 which, 
in effect, requires audit committees to determine 
in advance whether the provision of non-audit 
services might impair independence. We urge the 
SEC to come to grips with this issue itself.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Gunders.
MR. McCLOY: Who are your lawyers? 
MR. GUNDERS: Arnold & Porter 
MR. McCLOY: Maybe we ought to retain them. 
(Laughter)
MR. GUNDERS: Conflict of interest.
MR. GARRETT: If we can’t get them, we 
might try Milbank.
MR. STARK: I was going to ask if your 
lawyers have prepared a memorandum on this topic that 
would be of interest to the POB that you would want
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to submit?
MR. GUNDERS: Just a comment that I would 
wish to submit; I believe that antitrust was a 
consideration which was given to our position with 
respect to the Metcalf inquiry.
MR. McCLOY: How would the SEC be any better 
equipped to decide this question than the audit 
committee?
MR. GUNDERS: For a number of reasons.
The SEC has had a constant stream of specific inquiries 
such that if we do this, for example, if we maintain 
a computer service bureau, will that allow us to 
remain independent or not. It is a methodology which 
I will call making case law. You will be relieved 
that I am not an attorney, but I do believe that is 
in tune with our system of jurisprudence in this 
country. I for one think it has served the profession 
well.
Were that not to be the case, in the 
litigious climate of today, it is strange that there 
would have been no third party litigation.
MR. GARRETT: I am beginning to wonder 
who voted for the Executive Committee proposal. Do 
you happen to know? (Laughter)
MR. GUNDERS: Yes, I know.
MR. GARRETT: Those other guys, whoever 
they are.
Any other questions.
PROFESSOR CARY: I take it this is consistent 
with Price Waterhouse’s position and the Metcalf 
Committee in that you believe fundamentally in 
government intervention more than leaving it to 
self-regulation.
MR. GUNDERS: Not so, sir.
PROFESSOR CARY: In a sense this is what you 
are suggesting. This is short of government intervention 
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i.e., via the SEC.
MR. GUNDERS: This suggests no legislative 
action.
PROFESSOR CARY: No, but it does suggest 
movement.
MR. GUNDERS: This suggests the translation, 
if you will, of the case law made by the SEC with 
respect to independence provisions into a set of 
standards.
PROFESSOR CARY: I don’t think they would 
yet say that they have made a clear cut sort of set of 
standards via case law yet, so therefore, it would have 
to be, it would seem to me, a set of rules, you might 
say, rule making.
MR. GARRETT: They haven’t in this area.
I presume they imagined it was a little too sensitive. 
In some other, they have, as you know, restated a 
series of interpretations into the guidelines that 
have been published over the last couple of years, 
but those perhaps probably fall short of what some 
of the more stringent ideas are within the Commission, 
and it doesn’t seem suitable for that treatment right 
now.
PROFESSOR CARY: Is there any evidence that 
leaving this, as you have pointed out, in the hands 
of audit committees via ASR-250, has actually already 
had an impact on, shall we say, a decision by those 
committees, and therefore by their companies, to shift 
from one auditing firm to another because it is 
engaging in management services?
MR. GUNDERS: Yes; that evidence is limited 
because the final rules are hot off the press, so to 
speak. But, as Mr. Garrett has pointed out, the 
audit committees are themselves making case law 
because it is necessary in their proxy statements 
to set forth what prior consideration they gave to 
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the engagement of their principal accountants in 
rendering their audit services; so, under those 
circumstances, each and every audit committee 
whose accountants have performed anything defined 
as non-audit services obviously must deal with the 
problem, and deal with it now.
MR. WOOD: That is, effective with annual 
reports, sir, September 30.
MR. GUNDERS: September 30 is not here 
yet. But the drafting is hard upon us.
PROFESSOR CARY: Therefore, in theory, 
at least, the companies will be moving toward your 
firm and one or two others one could mention because 
they have most scrupulously avoided a broad range 
of management advisory services. Isn’t that right?
MR. GUNDERS: I think that would have to 
be conjecture. I really can’t say.
PROFESSOR CARY: It seems to me if they 
have moved from somewhere, they now have to move 
to somewhere else.
MR. GARRETT: Would you drop the firm 
or just drop a service? It could be either.
PROFESSOR CARY: In other words, they 
could drop the service in respect of that company. 
That is right.
MR. GARRETT: Unless the contamination 
is beyond that kind of treatment.
PROFESSOR CARY: That is right.
MR. GUNDERS: Let's examine the issue in 
this respect. I think both colleagues and competitors 
sitting back of me would readily agree that a great 
many management problems which will yield to 
solution with better accounting data are not 
diagnosed by the client. They are diagnosed by 
the accounting firm. They are diagnosed by the 
accounting firm to the extent by which the accounting 
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firm is able to penetrate the facts at hand, and 
in a sense, flush out the problem.
To some degree, the interplay which I 
foresee, broadly, and have specific evidence as yet 
very narrowly,—I can count the cases on the fingers 
of one hand at this point—run something like this. 
Usually the authority for engaging an accounting 
firm to render management advisory services will 
be located within the management advisory services 
will be located within the management structure, 
setting aside those circumstances where the size 
of the engagement would throw it into the purview 
of the audit committee or the board of directors.
Under the provisions of the ASR-250, two 
interesting and potentially far-reaching new issues 
fit into this particular picture. The first 
involves a statement with respect to the need 
for a particular service such that that need becomes 
known to the audit committee. This is an extremely 
legitimate area of concern and one with which, 
I repeat, we have no difficulty whatever.
It is our considered view that the 
appearance of independence or, if you will, 
noncompatible services, to the extent that an audit 
committee member can deal with a particular issue 
with understanding and prudence, will yield only 
to education because appearance is in the eyes 
of the beholder.
MR. McCLOY: You said the audit committee 
had no equipment to deal with this.
MR. GUNDERS: I think, sir, by and large 
the audit committee does not have equipment to 
do it. I will define such "equipment" as being, 
first, a series of do’s and don'ts if you will, 
and second, as having a broad base of past 
experience.
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The latter can be gained by case law over 
a period of years as it develops in a given company, 
and by a retrospective view of what has, in fact, 
been done by the accounting firm over years past 
in evaluating whether that did or didn’t threaten 
independence as proven out by the facts in the 
intervening years. The first, we recommend, should 
be the standard setting, as a responsibility of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
MR. WOOD: It seems to me that your 
position opposes self-regulation.
PROFESSOR CARY: That is my view, too.
MR. WOOD: That is what we are here for, 
it seems to me, and what you are saying, in effect, 
is that the industry, your profession, should not 
regulate itself on this question of services. It 
should be controlled by standards uttered by the 
SEC.
MR. GUNDERS: Might we not regard what 
I have said in a somewhat different context? The 
SEC would determine, as it consistently has done 
in the past what, in fact, constitutes a threat 
of a loss of de facto independence. I go no 
further.
The profession would regulate itself, 
having those standards available for interpretation, 
and then subjecting the practice of each and every 
firm to peer review, and all of the other mechanisms 
which the SEC division of firms contemplates; so 
I draw a line, if you will, between the promulgation 
of an interpretation of when an accountant is, in 
fact, independent, and the monitoring of that 
independence.
PROFESSOR CARY: Except that the SEC 
generally makes its rules by cases, and therefore, 
it has to take action in order to generate those
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cases, and therefore, you are assuming the way 
you are approaching it that it is likely to be 
that it will not only be just setting up a rule 
but also taking positions in court and what-have- 
you in order to develop that set of standards.
That is the way the SEC certainly has 
operated as you well know recently in improper 
payments and what have you.
MR. GUNDERS: I am not certain that we 
have a perfect analogy as between the improper 
payments issue and the independence issue. Maybe 
the SEC independence rulings which we read about 
in the profession deal with a particular set of 
circumstances that some practitioner has brought 
before the SEC; thus, he might say, "Under these 
circumstances, if I render these types of 
services to a client, will that endanger or threaten 
my independence as principal accountant? And the 
SEC then takes a position.
It seems reasonable that one could distill 
principles from the case law that has thus been 
created over so many, many years.
MR. WOOD: If I follow you correctly, 
you disposed of appearances of independence and 
came down that only fact, only history, case, 
facts on the compromise of independence should 
govern the SEC, or govern the establishment of 
proscriptions of services.
Am I correct so far?
MR. GUNDERS: The SEC has in the past 
provided advisory comments which are based on a set 
of factual determinations placed before it.
The second part of your statement in which 
you refer to, I believe, individual scope is one 
which we would feel could be appropriately determined 
by each particular set of the parties of interest, 
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having in their possession these standards of independence. 
MR. WOOD: But getting back to this question 
of appearance, the SEC has indicated in what I have 
read that appearance of independence is very important. 
How can you hope that a petition by the AICPA and this 
group, the POB, to the SEC is going to detour their 
thinking or rearrange it, so that they will come down 
only on the side of the factual records? They are 
already on record as saying that the appearance of 
independence is threatened—I mean, they have imlied 
that. Perhaps the Chairman hasn’t come down that way 
yet, but it seems to me that you ought to face that 
question before you resolve it so clearly that it is 
up to the SEC to do.
MR. GUNDERS: I have Chairman Williams’ remarks 
very closely at heart, all of them, including the most 
recent ones, and I suppose I would have to echo what 
Bob Mautz said a few minutes ago. In dealing with an 
issue of this nature, one can deal with it in terms 
of how one perceives reality; or one can deal with 
it in terms of appearance, and also in terms of 
political, or if you will excuse the expression, 
cosmetic aspects.
I would hope that it could be dealt with 
in the former regard only.
MR. WOOD: In real terms.
MR. GARRETT: To say that restrictions 
would have to be based upon a factual finding of loss 
of independence is really saying that there will 
never be any restrictions except in perhaps the most 
extreme cases.
It seems to me to resemble very much the 
development of the profession’s attitude about 
independence and financial interest, and that one 
of the statements that we received I think described 
this in summary fashion very well, and the argument 
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was early made that if independence is a state of 
mind, that is something ultimately known only to 
the person whose state of mind is material, and it 
certainly isn’t determined by whether he does or does 
not own a hundred shares or a thousand shares of 
stock or has some other little interest in the 
company, he is still quite capable of being 
independent.
The profession didn’t buy that for pretty 
good reasons. In fact, it perhaps overbought the 
opposition by taking an extremely strict view with 
respect to what kind of financial interest 
contaminates or impairs independence, at least, 
under the rules, not in fact in terms of what is 
in the person's mind. There are plenty of people 
that are capable of ignoring the effect of their 
actions upon the market value of 100 shares of 
stock.
Congress has trouble understanding this 
with proof of government appointments, too, but it 
seems to me that if there are to be any rules in this 
area, they really cannot be based upon a finding 
of specific cases in which you can demonstrate through 
direct causal effect the provision of a management 
advisory service and a loss of independence.
You won't know about the loss of independence 
until you see something else that has gone wrong, 
namely, that the auditors in some way have been 
deficient, and even then, you won't know whether 
it was really caused by the management advisory 
service or not. If that is cosmetic, I think if 
anything is to be done in the area, it really has 
to be done on a conviction that certain things 
would appear to create, as one of our earlier 
speakers said, the proximate occasion for sin or 
something of that sort, something that ought to be 
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eliminated in a prophylactic way because the 
temptations are too great and the experiences bad, 
just as you say you can’t own 100 shares of stock.
If you are saying that the present standards 
are all right, there is more regulatory type law here 
than we know about through a collection of these 
interpretive opinions that have been received on 
particular cases by the staff, maybe those could be 
codified or at least made known more broadly, and 
out of those we could construct a sort of a restated 
common law of management advisory services as they 
relate to independence, and that is perhaps enough.
Maybe it is. I don’t know what we would 
get out of all of those opinions because I don’t 
know what is in them. Certainly the political case 
is that something more needs to be done. What we 
are trying to decide is whether we agree with it.
MR. GUNDERS: I think that is certainly 
the case.
MR. GARRETT: It is different now than 
on previous occasions because not many people have 
gone to the staff to ask whether they could pay 
a bribe or not. A few have.
MR. GUNDERS: To your knowledge, Mr. Garrett, 
has the SEC undertaken a searching inquiry to determine 
whether some standards of independence can be 
distilled from all of these opinions that have been 
promulgated throughout the years?
MR. GARRETT: I do not know.
PROFESSOR CARY: I would like to ask one 
other question.
In view of the fact that this is totally 
in another area, but in view of the fact that Price 
Waterhouse over the years has carefully, as you have 
pointed out, avoided many areas of what fall within 
the category of management advisory services, can you
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give any rationale for it. Does it carry so far 
as to raise a question whether these other firms 
should be engaged in it?
MR. GUNDERS: I think that question was 
probably dealt with in the Metcalf testimony as well 
as I could deal with it here; in that testimony 
we made a rather strong statement that we felt 
under no circumstances should that scope of 
services which we have chosen ourselves become any 
sort of a standard for the profession.
The reason that we have restricted our 
scope as we did is based on our own perception of 
the kind of enterprise that we want to be, and the 
kind of services that we choose to render.
There is a great deal to be said in any 
enterprise for being very clear about what function 
one wishes to serve, and trying to be as competent 
as one can at rendering that function, and that 
function only.
MR. GARRETT: If, accepting for purposes 
of argument, that the Board should advise against 
any limitation on services based on the concept 
of compatibility or accounting-and audit-related 
skills or areas, and recommend that the problem 
be addressed only as a question of independence, 
is there anything that could be achieved in a 
constructive way by way of guidelines by which 
peer reviewers might examine with respect to the 
reviewed firm for the furnishing of services and 
the possible effect on independence? Is there 
anything in that area that would be helpful?
MR. GUNDERS: I can see two possibilities. 
One which you mentioned earlier, which would be the 
best possible set of statements with respect to 
indicia of independence which must be present, 
culled from past SEC experience, and the other one 
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would be possibly something similar to that which 
we accountants have insisted our legal friends 
provide to us in connection with an audit, and that 
is an "independence" letter.
MR. GARRETT: An independence letter from 
the lawyers?
MR. GUNDERS: No, from the accountants.
MR. McCLOY: Saying what? What does it say 
today?
MR. GUNDERS: It could set forth a scope of 
services which is consistent with independence as 
stated by the SEC.
MR. McCLOY: You haven’t got that statement 
from the SEC yet, have you?
MR. GUNDERS: No, sir.
MR. GARRETT: Obviously, the SEC doesn’t 
know what it thinks or it would have said something. 
There is considerable debate as to what its current 
views are.
Now, what is has said it has collected from 
past interpretations. Certainly for the last decade 
or so they are available.
MR. GUNDERS: Yes, they are.
MR. GARRETT: Has anybody done that sort of 
job, a restatement job on those letters? I suppose 
some firms have on particular areas.
MR. GUNDERS: I suppose as an intellectual 
exercise it is something which holds some promise of 
being useful, yes.
MR. GARRETT: I have some hesitation about 
glorifying that kind of expression from the staff 
into law, but maybe it would be helpful.
MR. GUNDERS: Or rules.
MR. GARRETT: We know what the rules are.
MR. WOOD: May I ask a question. Does ASR- 
250 require an audit committee to approve, before
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the services are rendered, MAS services hereafter?
MR. GUNDERS: Yes.
MR. WOOD: Or only to review MAS services 
that have been performed, let’s say, in the preceding 
year.
MR. GUNDERS: Mr. Wood, the initial 
September, '77 proposed ruling which went out for 
public comment and exposure, called only for the latter. 
In other words, it was incumbent upon an audit committee 
to satisfy itself as a matter of review that the 
services of a non-audit nature performed by the 
principal accountant did not endanger that accountant’s 
independence.
The final rules, which were issued without 
comment, revised that in two respects. One, which you 
have named, is that prior approval is now required. 
The second one requires that prior approval be 
provided in each individual instance. As to that 
second part, I must say I have some personal difficulty 
as to its practicality because many audit committees 
meet perhaps only once or twice a year.
MR. WOOD: You put your finger right on it. 
They would have to meet whenever. Management would 
have to alert the audit committee that it was proposing 
to accept a new service from its auditing firm, and 
that would require lots of attention to a new subject.
Thank you. I will adjust my schedule as 
an audit committee member.
MR. GUNDERS: As you know, the down-stop 
is 3% of the audit fee. That is a rather fine mesh.
MR. GARRETT: Obviously, you should increase 
the fee.
MR. GUNDERS: I don’t think that is the 
solution our clients are looking for, Mr. Garrett.
MR. GARRETT: I think we had best move on. 
Thank you very much, Mr. Gunders.
Mr. Seitz.
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MR. JAMES E. SEITZ: My name is Jim Seitz. 
I am the partner in charge of the Los Angeles office 
of Touche Ross & Co. Prior to this assignment I spent 
a great deal of my professional career in the management 
advisory services area of our firm.
 By way of background, I have served on the 
Board of Directors of the AICPA for a period of four 
years. I served on the Management Advisory Services 
Committee for a period of four years. I was Chairman 
of that Committee for two years. In addition, I served 
on the Scope and Structure Committee of the AICPA, which 
produced an excellent report. If you gentlemen have 
not had the opportunity to review that, I would urge 
you to do so. I think it deals directly with the 
subject at hand.
MR. McCLOY: What is the report?
MR. SEITZ: The report on Scope and Structure 
for the accounting profession.
Because we have submitted our written report, 
and in view of the time of day, the lateness of the 
hour and the issues that have been raised, I will 
deal with issues that I think are paramount to your 
interest as I have heard expressed today. Of course, 
I will respond to any questions that you might have.
Mr. Garrett, we were one of the firms that 
voted for Amendment B.
MR. GARRETT: You are very welcome.
MR. SEITZ: As I understand it, 13 of 21 
members of the Executive Committee did so, and we were 
one of those 13.
MR. GARRETT: That is close.
Do you have any more insight as to who was 
for and who was against, big and little, national, 
regional?
MR. SEITZ: I think the real answer is only 
a partial insight, and I don't think that is appropriate 
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to report on that at this point in time.
MR. GARRETT: We have been told all that 
sort of thing is available to us.
MR. SEITZ: I am sure it is.
I think what’s most important for you 
gentlemen to understand is that we voted for this 
because we thought it was perhaps the most 
realistic, pragmatic solution available to the 
profession at this point in time. Interpreting 
that another was is that we don’t like it, but 
we like it better than what we thought were 
available alternatives.
Mr. McCloy, I gathered from your 
questioning this afternoon that in a sense you 
are seeking some advice and counsel from us as to 
what this Board should do relative to this whole 
sticky issue, and at the risk of being presumptuous 
I will give you my point of view on that.
I think that the only safe road is to 
have a conceptual framework which is logical and 
rational that people can live with. I think the 
only thing that I haven't heard today which to 
me is very important is that management services 
in CPA firms is not like a conglomerate. We 
don’t get the next best available service that 
looks as though it has marketability and then 
bring it into our home and make a profit on it.
As a practical matter, the way a 
professional firm evolves, is that you start with 
a core service and then you add adjacent services 
to that as the marketplace, the economic conditions 
and the time and place warrant.
Within the public accounting profession 
over the last 10 or 15 years, we have had a 
propensity to add two types of services, those 
that become more quantitative and those that become 
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more qualitative as the marketplace demands. Each 
service tends to, if you will, open up new vistas 
and new requirements, and you get a fan effect 
from your core service on each side, quantitative 
and qualitative.
The important fact is that there is a 
servo mechanism that stops us—stops any firm—from 
going beyond, to extremes that do not have a 
rational cause, and although that servo mechanism 
is hard to describe, it is very important.
Mr. Auerbach, for example, said he had, 
if I recall correctly, 9 partners in executive search 
in his firm. I don’t know the exact number of people 
in Coopers & Lybrand in the U.S., but I would suspect 
it is in the neighborhood of 8,000 to 10,000 people.
Now, why does he have 9 as opposed to a 
hundred or five hundred. I am not being presumptuous 
I just want to use this as an example.
The way a CPA firm behaves in this day 
and age is that there is a need for 9, but there 
is not a need for a hundred. A hundred would not 
find a comfortable home in that environment. Their 
home would be more comfortable in other environments, 
so you have a mechanism that allows for that.
Similarly, if we brought bookkeepers into 
our firm, they would become very uncomfortable in 
the firm because they would not be part of the group. 
They would not be in the nucleus and the hub of 
what we do, and they, too, would fall out.
This is very hard to describe to Congress. 
It is very hard to describe to audit committees. It 
is hard to describe to people who haven’t lived with 
the function, but it is a reality, and somebody 
hopefully some day can articulate that so that 
an informed public will understand.
Let me relate this concept to the Amendment 
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we endorsed. We think this amendment is based upon 
the realities and the exigencies of the day, thus, 
we voted for it.
With respect to both the fact and appearance 
issues of independence, I can no longer deal with 
appearance. I don't know how to deal with it. It 
is a witch hunt.
The proscriptions that are placed upon us 
are very real. They are legal and marketing 
proscriptions. If we do something wrong, we are 
going to get sued, and if we don't do something 
well or if we are not as good as our competitors, 
we are not going to have a place in the market.
I think that is terribly important to 
recognize, and I would really urge that this 
thought be emphasized in all of your deliberations.
Another thing hasn't been said. Those 
of us who live with the audit partners know they 
are living in a very tough world these days. If 
you assume they are Mr. and Mrs. Average American, 
they are not going to be intimidated by something 
that will cause them to impair their independence 
because the buck stops there. If they are wrong, 
they will go to jail, and we have to recognize 
that. So as a practitioner consulting within a 
CPA firm, I can assure you I speak for all of my 
partners. Our audit partners are nonintimidatable, 
as far as I am concerned.
Will you have a rotten apple in the barrel 
as Krushchev said? I suppose we will. I don't 
think we are going to be a perfect profession, but 
I think the pressures that have been placed upon 
us these days are very healthy and I am happy 
with them.
As to the quality of audits, I think all 
of you gentlemen would agree that we are under
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pressure to improve, and we cannot improve by 
eliminating the things we need.
The way the GAO audits has previously 
been discussed, I think that process is a forerunner 
of what is ahead of us in the private sector.
One of the questions you asked is what 
are the probable effects in the business community 
if management services went away. Basically, I 
think three things would happen. One, business 
would be short of a supplier of professional services 
that they have shown they want. Two, to reiterate, 
I think the quality of audits would deteriorate over 
time, and three, most importantly, over time, 
probably within the next ten years, you would see 
a general diminution of the quality of the people 
that enter the public accounting profession.
For those of you who haven't been on 
campuses for a number of years, I can assure you 
that the things that the top, young, bright leaders 
of tomorrow want is to work in an environment that 
is challenging, that is not restrictive, that it 
not sterile, that permits them to open their 
horizons. The more you contain disciplines, the 
more you attract mediocrity, the less attractive 
the profession will become. I would rather have a 
full scope service and take the risks that go along 
with it than have a limited scope service and do 
a poor quality job over time. I think that is the 
choice we face. We have trade-offs that we have 
to make.
Your last inquiry about the distinction 
between tax and MS was almost an unfair inquiry 
as it is so difficult to answer. I think if you 
listened, as I have, you got no answer so far 
on that particular issue. We don't know how 
to answer it. Taxes are an acceptable part of 
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the accounting profession. It has a formal structure. 
People don’t even want to ask the question. It 
becomes embarrassing. But, when you relate it to 
other advisory services, then you either have to 
throw the baby out with the bath water or say the 
logic has to be applied in a different way to other 
advisory services.
I would concede and concede totally that 
the format of the tax structure, the review by IRS 
and so on, do make it somewhat different, but in 
the final analysis from a conceptual point of view, 
I think there are very strong correlations.
In closing I would like to suggest this.
It seems to me today is not your concern, but rather, 
it is important that you be sure that five and ten 
years from now we have the right mechanism in the 
accounting profession.
So you might have to swallow hard, make 
some tough decisions, but to be certain that ten 
years from now we have the auditing profession we 
need in this country.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much, Mr. 
Seitz. Gentlemen.
MR. McCLOY: I don’t know that I have any 
questions. How deeply are you, Touche Ross, in the 
MAS business?
MR. SEITZ: In response to your question, 
it represents approximately 15% of our dollar volume.
MR. McCLOY: Do you do executive recruitment? 
MR. SEITZ: We did, sir, and within the 
last six months to a year we eliminated that from our 
activities.
MR. GARRETT: Would you tell us why?
MR. McCLOY: What are your main areas?
MR. SEITZ: We are not at all unlike E & E 
as Mr. Mautz reported. Basically, we concentrate in 
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the areas of financial planning, organization, 
administration and control, systems activities and 
derivatives thereof.
MR. McCLOY: Do you do engineering in any 
form at all?
MR. SEITZ: Engineering is a very broad 
word, Mr. McCloy.
MR. McCLOY: I am talking about layouts.
MR. SEITZ: I would suggest this, sir. The 
engineering that is typically done in 99% of CPA 
firms is really in the field of industrial engineering 
and since industrial engineering and accounting are 
so closely related these days in the college 
environment, it is very hard to separate the two.
That relates to such things as: how the 
job gets done, inventory control, production control, 
these kinds of things. Productivity improvements, 
if you will.
MR. MATUSIAK: Would you explain to us 
the actuarial services that Touche Ross renders?
MR. SEITZ: As a practical matter, we have 
not been in the actuarial field very long.
MR. MATUSIAK: There is a group called 
Touche Ross Stennes?
MR. SEITZ: That was a joint venture. That 
has been disbanded, and we are in the process, as 
I think E & E reported, of auditing in-house actuarial 
talent at this point in time. Again, part of this 
spectrum of requirements we feel we have to have.
MR. GARRETT: One of the problems that 
keeps arising with respect to the Executive Committee 
proposal, I am sure you know, has to do with this 
auditing-and accounting-skills related question 
and some challenge of its relevancy as a matter of 
logic and reason. Others would say: Even if it 
makes sense, it is so open ended that it isn't 
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really a control at all, if an audit-related skill 
or some sort of skill is useful to you in the conduct 
of an audit.
Do you have any helpful answer for us?
MR. SEITZ: I have some thoughts. I don’t 
know how helpful they will be, Mr. Garrett.
I remember many years ago there was an 
article in the "Journal of Accountancy" by Herman 
Bevis. This article could have been written ten or 
fifteen years ago. You might recall it, Lou. The 
thrust and essence of the article was the accountants 
requirements and ability to deal with economic data. 
Let me editorialize from that point on.
If you really look at what we are trying 
to do as accountants in this society, it seems to 
me that what we have is a common language of business 
which we ought to be very proud of because it must 
have been an enormous breakthrough to come up with 
something like that. That language of business has 
now become a translator of economic data, all kinds 
of economic data from the floor of the shop, from the 
advertising department, from the research department 
into a common denominator we call dollars or money 
or whatever the case might be. Frankly, I don't 
want to try to suggest that I am a semanticist and 
know exactly what auditing skills and accounting 
skills mean, but from a deep set of convictions 
and from a long history of dealing in this field 
in my judgment you cannot deal effectively as 
accountants unless you are able to deal with economic 
data of all types and translate it properly. It 
seems to me that if all we have in the accounting 
profession are translators as opposed to understanders 
of economic data, we have nothing at all and we end 
up to be a bunch of eunuchs.
MR. GARRETT: I understand that. I have
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two questions.
One of them is commonplace in the discourse, 
but I still want to put it. The one that I hear the 
most often is: Well, if you need actuarial skills in 
order to effectively audit a company that has actuarial 
elements in its financial statements including pension 
plans, and that justified having actuaries and actuarial 
services, why isn’t the same thing true with respect 
to geologists or oil and gas engineers if you are 
auditing an oil company, and move on from there to any 
sort of company you want to select.
Secondly, granted, if it is true that you 
need to understand actuarial science to some degree to 
audit an insurance company, why does that mean you have 
to sell it as a separate service?
MR. SEITZ: Let’s deal with the first question 
first, geologists and so on.
Again it seems to me, and I think I will 
pattern an answer after one Mr. Gunders made, that it 
is totally contingent upon the firm that you have 
decided to be the services you have decided to render 
and the industries you have decided to serve.
If, for example, one decided to set up an 
accounting firm that dealt solely with the oil and 
gas industry and they were going to be the experts in 
that field, there is probably a more prima facie case 
available for having those skills that relate 
specifically to the industry expertise, be they 
geological, or whatever the case might be.
From our point of view, we would have 
absolutely no rational business reason for putting 
those types of skills into our organization if we 
didn’t have that kind of clientele. I think you 
have to take specifics and deal with them, and I 
would reiterate that you have to get back to the 
concept of a spectrum of services that make sense
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for the marketplace that you are dealing with.
MR. GARRETT: The only difference you would 
draw between actuarial services and oil and gas 
engineering would be the nature of the concentration 
of your business?
MR. SEITZ: No, sir, I think there is one 
other basic distinction, and that is that the data and 
the type of data you are dealing with and its direct 
total impact on financial statements of actuarial 
services is, in a sense, in this day and age, a bit 
different than the geological data that you are 
dealing with as it related to reporting on oil 
companies.
I think there is a direct one-to-one 
correlation right now which is not quite existent 
in the other examples that you make.
MR. GARRETT: Because of the intellectual 
faculties necessary to understand?
MR. SEITZ: Because of the nature of our 
balance sheets right now and what is required to be 
reported on down the line.
I think there are subtle differences there, 
quite frankly. I don’t pretend to be an expert in 
the oil industry.
MR. MANZONI: In adding actuarial services 
or starting to add actuarial services, was that done 
because you feel that it is necessary to do something 
other than rely on the competence of the actuaries 
performing actuarial services for clients whom you 
audit?
MR. SEITZ: I think the answer that does 
depict our policy in that regard has two parts, one 
of which is that we are developing a very good sized 
practice in the insurance industry, and secondly, as 
a result of that, we want to do the best job for the 
industry we can and that includes having in-house
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actuaries and understanding it as well as we can.
MR. MANZONI: So is there something to the 
argument that there is a self-review if the auditors 
actuaries, perform primary actuarial services?
MR. SEITZ: I think the answer is yes, but—. 
The review that the auditors would make of the actuaries 
is a different form or review than the actuaries would 
make themselves.
Secondly, I think it might be appropriate to 
answer a question which you didn't ask which related to 
the quality control services within our own firm as was 
asked of another firm.
We, too, have a general services partner who 
is in charge of each audit engagement. There is an 
outside second partner who reviews the work. We have 
a professional standards review function within each 
office or within each territory that independently 
reviews the work. We have regional technical centers 
located around the country. When any issue comes up 
that is debatable, it is passed through the technical 
center. We have an appellate court procedure within 
the firm which begins with the partner on the job and 
goes to the managing partner of the firm. Thus, this 
whole review process even as it would relate to actuarial 
services at this point of time, would be touched by 
those mechanisms if such mechanisms were required. 
Therefore, I would suggested that simply using the 
word "self-review” is maybe not quite adequate.
MR. MANZONI: It seems that what you are 
saying is that you have such good procedures that you 
ought to be able to perform all sorts of management 
services whether they are advisory or whether they are 
primary because you have very good control procedures 
internally.
MR. SEITZ: Be definition and design, all 
the services that we perform in that area are advisory.
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MR. MANZONI. What about actuarial services? 
MR. SEITZ: I think if you recall the points 
made in, I think it is appendix B of your document, 
we have subscribed to those precepts in that context.
MR. MANZONI: Do you perform actuarial 
services for ERISA plans?
MR. SEITZ: Yes.
MR. MANZONI: We were told earlier when you 
are performing actuarial services for the ERISA plans, 
the actuary has to make the determination rather than 
management.
Could you elaborate on that a little bit?
MR. SEITZ: You are asking the wrong man 
very technical questions in an area I really don’t 
feel equipped to comment about, quite frankly.
MR. McCLOY: I will put just a couple more 
questions. Is there anything that you can think of 
that we might recommend? I won’t say proscribe—that 
we could recommend which would better insure the 
independence of the accountancy firm that are not now 
being applied? That is one question I have, and the 
other is I would like to have you tell me whether you 
have a set of principles in Touche Ross which prescribes 
the conduct of the accountants in their relations with 
the corporations.
Do you have an ethic in the form of 
principles in terms of your relation? You don’t own 
stock in the particular companies, do you?
MR. SEITZ: No, like all other public 
accountants, we don’t own stock in the companies we 
audit.
MR. McCLOY: Is there a set of rules that 
you apply as to joining the same clubs? What kind of 
gifts can you accept? Do you have any such principles?
MR. SEITZ: Neither a lender nor borrower 
would be one precept.
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Can you join clubs? You betcha. You know, 
we are only on this earth one time as far as we know, 
and we are going to enjoy it in that process. I think 
we would be just absolutely foolish to become monistic 
in this whole process. What are our principles?
MR. GARRETT: Unless you could find a club 
where you didn't have any clients. (Laughter)
MR. SEITZ: Those are hard to find these 
days, but Mr. McCloy, we talk with the audit committee 
these days about everything we are doing and why we are 
doing it and how it stands, and we do that on anything 
significant quite clearly. So, I think the name of 
the game these days is open and above board. Putting 
the cards on the table.
MR. McCLOY: There is no other principle you 
think we could endorse that would be helpful toward the 
maintenance of the objectivity and the independence of 
the accounting firm?
MR. SEITZ: I could suggest that the better 
the people you get, the more independent you are, these 
kinds of things.
MR. McCLOY: There is no mechanic?
MR. SEITZ: I can't think of one offhand, no, 
sir.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much, Mr. Seitz.
MR. SEITZ: Thank you
MR. GARRETT: Professor John 0. Mason.
We are glad you could stick with us, Mr. 
Mason. Please proceed.
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PROFESSOR JOHN 0. MASON, JR.: I appreciate your 
letting me appear at this late hour.
I am John Mason. I am a Professor of Accounting 
and Information Systems in the School of Accountancy 
at the University of Alabama.
I have been a professor for a number of years. 
In addition to being active in the academic community, 
I am active in consulting work, participating on 
cooperative engagements with several local CPA firms, 
both in Alabama and in West Virginia. I also consult 
in my own name.
I am active in the Alabama Society of Certified 
Public Accountants and have served as Vice Chairman of 
its MAS Committee. I have also served on one of the 
MAS subcommittees of the AICPA.
Some consultants might refer to me as a 
moonlighting consultant. On the other hand, some of my 
academic colleagues, hopefully tongue in cheek, refer 
to me as a moonlighting professor.
In addition to my relationships in academia 
and in practice, I am Chairman-elect of the American 
Accounting Association’s MAS Section. The American 
Accounting Association is the umbrella association 
for professors of accounting. It is actively supported 
by members of the public accounting profession.
The MAS Section is a special interest group 
within the American Accounting Association, and it has 
approximately 400 members. Though I am an academician 
and serve as Chairman-elect of the MAS Section, I 
cannot speak for all academicians or for that matter 
the 400 members of the MAS Section.
The views I express here are mine alone. 
They do not necessarily represent those of the American 
Accounting Association or its MAS Section.
MR. McCLOY: Only academicians belong to 
this American Accounting Association?
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PROFESSOR MASON: No, some practitioners 
belong to the American Accounting Association, but I 
would say that for the most part it is run by 
academicians.
One of my primary purposes in being here is 
to put in perspective some of the academic comment 
that has come forth in the last several years relative 
to public accounting and management advisory services.
But let me return to Public Notice 78-1, in 
which the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice 
Section has proposed two criteria for management 
advisory services: One, independence; the other, 
skills relating to accounting and auditing.
Although I agree with the committee’s 
independence criterion, yet I disagree somewhat with 
its juxtaposition of "appearance of independence" to 
MAS, I strongly oppose the proposed criterion that 
the SEC practice member will "not undertake an 
engagement for its audit clients registered with the 
SEC where...the skills required are not related to 
accounting and auditing." The reason I am opposed 
to this criterion is that I don't think it is 
practicable.
The old adage: "Beauty is in the eyes of 
the beholder" applies to the Executive Committee's 
accounting and auditing related criterion. What may 
be "accounting and auditing related" in one person's 
view may not necessarily be "accounting and auditing 
related" to another person. For example, some 
individuals might make the case that any decision 
process leading to the authorization of a transaction 
of any type is accounting and auditing related. 
Therefore, any advice that a CPA would contribute 
to such a decision-making process by management would 
be accounting and auditing related. This would be 
one end of the spectrum.
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At the other end of the spectrum stand 
those who insist that accounting and auditing related 
services are those dealing with the design of an 
accounting system. Therefore, I think that, in 
practice, we would find that this second criterion, 
’’accounting and auditing related,’’ would prove to be 
ambiguous. This remark leads to my major concern 
and one of the reasons that I am here.
I think if the accounting and auditing 
related criterion is adopted, it would lead to an 
erosion of many management advisory services that are 
presently conducted by CPAs for audit clients.
The rest of my comments relate mainly 
to the second criterion, although some of them do 
relate to the independence issue and to the origins 
of the practice of public accounting.
First of all, I would like to make a 
comment with respect to a sentence on page 3 of 
Public Notice 78-1. This sentence states that ’’the 
practice of public accounting has its origins in 
the attest function.’’
It is my belief that the practice of public 
accounting has its origins in bookkeeping and advisory 
services. To emphasize my belief, I have provided 
with my comments a copy of my article which appears 
in the Proceedings of the 1978 Southeast Regional 
Meeting of the American Accounting Association. In 
this article, which I will not read to you, you can 
see that advisory services can be traced to 
'Eighteenth Century Scotland, which strongly indicates 
that our profession is really based on bookkeeping 
and advisory services. Tax and attest services 
are relative newcomers to our profession.
We have a rich tradition of providing 
business counsel and advice to our audit clients. 
I am amazed that the Executive Committee of the SEC
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Practice Section and also the Public Oversight Board, 
without benefit of hard data, would embark on a course 
of eliminating this rich tradition of CPAs providing 
business counsel and services to their clients.
MR. GARRETT: Professor Mason, I suppose 
that I ought to interject as a matter of clarification. 
We haven’t embarked on a damn thing except to develop 
views in response to a request from the Executive 
Committee that we advise them on their proposals.
PROFESSOR MASON: Okay.
MR. GARRETT: Otherwise, we wouldn’t have 
come close to this problem. They laid this on us 
and said: "Now you tell us what you think of it," 
and we are trying to figure out what we think. 
(Laughter)
PROFESSOR MASON: That’s fine, but it depends 
on how one defines the word "embark."
MR. GARRETT: All right.
PROFESSOR MASON: A second point I would like 
to make, and this one deals with independence, is that 
hard data does not exist to support the notice that 
the area of services provided by public accounting 
firms to their audit clients results in a diminished 
independence or appearance of independence of the 
auditors. By hard data I mean specific instances where 
independence was compromised as a result of an MAS 
engagement.
What we have is soft information, that is, 
unsupported allegations, information that relies 
almost exclusively on opinions, predictions, estimates, 
and subjective evaluations.
We have seen over the last several years 
three or four studies conducted by Professor Titard, 
Professors Hartley and Ross, and others; and these 
studies imply that as a result of advisory services, 
the auditor identifies with the point of view of
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management.
I just don’t buy that. In fact, if we take 
a look at the Standards of Professional Conduct and 
Practice of the Association of Consulting Management 
Engineers (ACME), we see an emphasis on objectivity 
by the consultant. For example, Rule 1.1 of this 
Code states: "We will at all times place...or serve 
them /our clients/ with integrity, competence and 
independence. We will assume an independent position 
with the client, making certain that our advice to 
clients is based upon impartial consideration of all 
pertinent facts and responsible opinions."
Rule 2.7 states: "We will not serve a client 
under terms or conditions that might impair our 
objectivity, independence or integrity, and we will 
reserve the right to withdraw if conditions beyond 
our control develop to interfere with the successful 
conduct of the engagement."
Management consulting literature is replete 
with the need for consultants to be objective and 
independent; and yet, at the same time, we hear that 
because we are consultants, because we are providing 
management advice, we are not independent. Herein 
lies an obvious conflict, one involving what consultants 
profess to be an ethical code as opposed to unsupported 
opinions with regard to a CPA’s supposed lack of 
independence when providing advisory services.
Further, I have reviewed the studies on 
MAS and auditor independence; and they seem to present 
a mixed bag of results. For example, if you take a 
look at the Titard study, you will note, for example, 
that one of the key areas where the respondents 
felt that advisory services would impair independence 
was business acquisitions and mergers. Yet if you 
look at the Hartley and Ross study, you will see that 
their results indicate that this is one of the areas 
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where respondents felt that independence would not 
likely be impaired.
In another area, plant layout and design, 
Titard found that his respondents foresaw little 
impact on auditor independence, whereas Hartley and 
Ross learned from their respondents that audit 
independence would be significantly impaired by such 
concomitant consulting advice. We have obvious 
conflicting results here.
Another aspect of audit independence we 
keep hearing about it the common stockholder, the 
common stockholder's confidence in the public 
accounting profession, and the common stockholder's 
view of the independence issue. I am not so certain 
that stockholders, the general stockholder, the Mom 
and Dad who happen to own 200 or 300 shares of AT & T, 
view auditor independence as an issue. In fact, when 
they look at the auditor's report, I sometimes think 
they look upon it as an insurance certificate. If 
something goes wrong with the corporation, they 
can sue the auditors and perhaps recover part of their 
loss. But to return to a point I made a few moments 
ago, at best such notions about the lack of independence 
are unsupported allegations. At worst, they are 
biased viewpoints, in my opinion, expressed by personnel 
agencies and non-CPA management consultants for the 
purpose of removing CPAs from management consulting 
and thus decreasing competition in such fields as 
executive recruitment, marketing analysis, and plant 
layout.
I doubt that this decreased competition 
would prove beneficial to audit clients, their creditors 
or shareholders. I think we are dealing here with 
an issue of who is goring whose ox. I think some 
of these individuals who represent or own personal 
agencies, or who represent or own management consulting 
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houses, think their ox is being gored because they 
don’t have as close a relationship with clients 
as CPAs have with their audit clients; and I think 
they would like to have a bit of a turnabout so 
that the CPAs can’t provide management advisory 
services for their audit clients. Limiting CPAs 
to auditing would give consulting houses and 
personnel agencies a clear advantage.
Another point I would like to make is 
that MAS capabilities within a CPA firm can enhance 
the audit function. We have already seen such 
enhancement with respect to information systems. 
As a result of providing clients with information 
systems skills and services, CPA firms have been 
better able to develop techniques for computer 
controls, computer controls evaluations, and computer 
auditing.
The same holds true, I believe, in the 
areas of marketing analysis, plant layout and other 
non-accounting fields of MAS or what some have alleged 
to be non-accounting fields of MAS.
For example, I believe that in the areas 
of plant layout and marketing analysis, the CPA’s 
expertise, the in-house expertise possessed by CPA 
firms, can assist the firm in making audit decisions 
involving realization of assets.
Further, I point out that there is no 
evidence that the performance of these services has 
compromised any auditor. Quite the contrary, the 
performance of such services generally assists the 
CPA firm by providing its representatives with greater 
knowledge about the way its clients operate, the 
industries in which clients operate, and the quality 
of client personnel. In my opinion, such knowledge 
can only enhance the performance of the audit function.
Finally, two additional points: One, any 
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conclusion reached by this Board to recommend ending 
certain advisory services provided by CPA firms 
for their SEC audit clients will effectively curtail 
the performance of these services for non-SEC audit 
clients. Two, curtailment of advisory services by 
CPA firms may have a detrimental effect on accounting 
education.
Let me elaborate further. With respect 
to the former point, the ultimate impact, in my 
opinion, will be that many small and medium-sized 
business firms will be precluded from obtaining 
competent business counsel and advice. I say this 
because, given the legal environment in which CPA 
firms now operate, it would be extremely difficult 
for the profession to support two sets of standards, 
one set for SEC audit clients and a second set for 
non-SEC audit clients.
Thus, any action, and by action I mean 
recommendations made by this Board, could ultimately 
cutoff small and medium-sized businesses from 
management advisory services of CPAs, which could 
prove detrimental to these businesses; any, in my 
opinion, these detrimental effects would filter 
down to their creditors and shareholders. I say 
this because clients precluded from procuring services 
from their CPAs may do without such services altogether 
or, under certain circumstances, receive inferior 
services. This last possibility concerns me the 
most.
I work with a number of local CPA firms 
in Alabama and in West Virginia, and I have seen 
what I refer to as the "disco inferno" that is played 
for many small and medium-sized clients by hawkers 
of computer systems. I believe we are going to see 
more of this peddling of computer systems to small 
and medium-sized clients between now and 1985; and 
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if you cut these firms off from business counsel 
by their CPAs, you will see more disastrous computer 
acquisitions in the future than you have seen up 
to now.
Finally, as an accounting educator, I 
feel that curtailment of advisory services by CPA 
firms may have a detrimental effect on accounting 
education. Though accounting graduates enter into 
public accounting, business service and government 
service, many departments or schools of accounting 
gear their curricula to the public accounting career 
track. If these departments or schools of accounting 
perceive that public accounting consists only of 
auditing-related services, they might effectively 
remove the field of business from accounting 
education. Such a move would set accounting education 
back 20 years, to a time when most of our courses 
dealt with how to record debits and credits for 
retail stores, for manufacturing firms, and 
for hotels.
In the last ten to fifteen years we have 
been able to include a considerable amount of business 
education in accounting. If we effectively remove 
management advisory services from the field, or if 
we give a signal to the universities and colleges 
that we are proscribing or limiting advisory services 
that can be performed by CPA firms for their audit 
clients, we will also signal them to begin removing 
non-accounting business courses from the accounting 
curriculum.
As one who maintains that a good auditor 
must have a keen understanding of business and how 
it operates, I am gravely concerned that any action 
by this Board or the Executive Committee to curtail 
significant advisory services will, in the long run, 
adversely affect accounting education.
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I am not a Pollyanna. I do foresee problems. 
One of the problems I foresee is competence—one of the 
cornerstones of this profession. There is the collective 
aspect of competence by CPAs. Competence insures public 
confidence in all of the services that CPAs provide.
I recommend, therefore, that instead of looking at the 
appearance of independence issue, that this Board look 
at the competence issue, and that certain standards 
of competence should be designed before a CPA firm, 
whether local, regional, or national, be able to 
offer services in a given area.
I think competence is the key, but how do 
CPA firms become competent to offer advisory services? 
Do they accomplish this through hiring of personnel, 
formal education, examination? As far as I know, 
there are no examinations required for CPAs before 
they can offer certain types of advisory services.
Another means of acquiring competence is 
experience, and still another is continuing professional 
education.
To insure competence in management advisory 
services and thus maintain the public's confidence 
in all services that CPAs provide, I recommend that 
clear standards be established for competence before 
CPA firms can offer management advisory services.
In conclusion, I recommend that this Board 
not act without regard to hard evidence, and that 
in the absence of hard evidence the Board not 
recommend the curtailment of services which are 
beneficial both to business firms and their auditors. 
Further, I hope that this Board keeps in mind the 
impact that its recommendations could have on accounting 
education.
Again, in terms of recommendations, get 
some hard data. Since SEC Practice Section firms 
are going to have to submit to peer review, one might,
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to insure both independence and competence, extend 
beyond auditing services to management advisory 
services engagements and then try to draw conclusions 
about whether or not such MAS engagements compromise 
the audit process.
Moreover, conduct extensive interviews. If 
we are going to rely on soft information, I would much 
rather see the Board rely on extensive interviews 
rather than the more impersonal questionnaires. The 
questionnaire technique presents, more or less, a 
binary choice situation; for example, does the 
respondent feel that such a service might impair 
independence or might not? From the questionnaire 
we have no idea as to how hard and fast the 
respondent’s convictions are.
Secondly, the questionnaire doesn’t tell 
us very much about cause and effect. Even in situations 
where respondents reported no confidence in CPAs, 
eliminating management advisory services does not 
mean that we would upgrade their responses from 
"no" to "perhaps" or "maybe?" We don’t know from 
the questionnaire technique why the respondents 
voted "no confidence." For this reason, I recommend 
that research be conducted through in-depth interviews 
rather than by questionnaire.
Those are my comments.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you, Professor Mason. 
I am sure you still teach the basics that debits 
are toward the door and credits are toward the 
window.
PROFESSOR MASON: I basically teach in the 
auditing area, systems area, and operations area. 
Therefore, I really don’t become involved with 
debits and credits to any great extent, although 
I appreciate their importance.
MR. MANZONI: I just have one. One of the 
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commentators—it wasn't today—it was in the written 
comments—talked not so much about having a competitive 
edge on the inside track, but talked about auditors 
having access to trade secrets through auditing 
information and such. I think the comments were 
from an EDP group.
Is there any merit to that sort of argument? 
Are there trade secrets that an auditing firm can obtain 
by doing an audit of an information system?
PROFESSOR MASON: I don't think you would 
learn any trade secrets. I think you could build 
an extensive data bank of experience relative to 
information systems, and I think that would be 
extremely helpful.
MR. MANZONI: So that auditors in effect 
then, they do have a better chance of gathering 
information through a means which other EDP people 
don’t have an opportunity.
PROFESSOR MASON: CPA firms have an 
opportunity to develop hands-on EDP expertise and 
maintain a data bank on this expertise. Should they 
run into a problem, and the chances are that someone 
in their organizations has probably run into a similar 
problem elsewhere. They could contact that individual 
for assistance. There are certain economies, you know, 
that are brought about by size of firm and diversity 
of client base.
MR. MANZONI: This is not largeness. This 
is having an opportunity to go in and audit everyone 
else’s system.
PROFESSOR MASON: That is acquired through 
being a large auditing firm, I would think.
MR. MANZONI: A data processing company that 
was very large but it wasn’t an auditor wouldn't 
have the same opportunity.
PROFESSOR MASON: Well, an auditing firm 
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probably has devoted a great deal of time to considering 
controls that ought to be there; and therefore, that 
should give a firm a significant edge, I would think.
I would think that many of those in EDP 
who do not have an accounting background do not place 
the same emphasis on controls as do CPAs.
MR. GARRETT: Mr. Mason, at this hour of the 
evening the idea of embarking on a program of research 
through interviews is not terribly enticing. (Laughter) 
But maybe it will be in the morning.
The idea of a lack of hard data and clear 
evidence keeps coming up, and I keep coming back with 
the same question.
How would you ever get it, and we have never 
got it with respect—
PROFESSOR MASON: —I think—
MR. GARRETT: Let me finish the thought because 
I think they are somewhat parallel. We have never gotten 
it and don’t even ask for it with respect to independence 
based upon financial interest, and it is well established 
in the profession and in the regulatory views also that 
if you own stock in the client, your independence is 
impaired, and nobody says that to establish that we have 
to show that you deliberately or because of that did 
not audit carefully or participated in something that 
was improper in the way of financial reporting. But 
when it comes to MAS and independence, everybody seems 
to want to say that we have got to find a smoking 
gun before there is a case.
I suppose somewhere there might exist a tape 
some day in which some idiot says: "I am going to 
blow this audit because I can sell them my actuarial 
service if I cooperate," but I don’t really expect 
ever to find that. If any principles in this area have 
to be based upon that kind of data, then of course, 
it is an argument leading you to do nothing because 
you will never build that kind of case.
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Interviews conceivably, we might. I quite 
agree with you on the questionnaires. All of us were 
laughing at this Streichman questionnaire that Haskins 
& Sells sponsored and passed around. That was with 
respect to whether MAS can impair auditors' 
independence, the lawyers as a category—and they 
have several categories if you have seen it—came up 
with the highest score adverse to independence. That 
is because the question was: Do you think that the 
providing of MAS might impair independence? Any 
lawyer is going to answer that yes. I mean, there 
is only one possible answer to that. Of course, it 
might, and I agree with you, but I do think in 
criticizing the Section on its addressing the problem, 
we have to accept the fact that the kind of hard data 
that you think you want is just not going to be 
attainable one way or the other.
PROFESSOR MASON: But I am also reminded 
of the numerous court cases that came about during 
the Sixties and Seventies where everyone from lawyer 
to SEC to CFAs to financial executives, conducted 
an autopsy of every corporation that turned belly 
up, and they came with many reasons like: "The 
auditor was too close to management;” but I have 
yet to see a case at this close scrutiny where one 
even suggested, except perhaps for Professor 
Briloff,—
Mr. GARRETT: You may be right about that. 
PROFESSOR MASON: —that the CPA did not report 
fairly or did not conduct an adequate examination and 
prepare a proper report because of an MAS engagement 
conflict. It would seem to me that every possible 
allegation of compromise of independence was suggested 
during these autopsies of those cases that went to 
court. I have not examined, and therefore I don’t 
know, whether the auditors for those clients conducted
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MAS engagements; but no one was able to come up 
with any relationship between an MAS engagement 
and the alleged poor quality of the audit.
MR. GARRETT: That is an interesting 
observation. I had not heard that before.
MR. McCLOY: I join you, Mr. Garrett;
I don’t place a great deal of importance on the fact 
that we haven't had a nice all fours case here.
I think there are cases that one could find where 
too close an association did tend to prejudice 
the objectivity of the report. I wouldn't want 
to quote particular instances from my experiences, 
but I do think it is a concern. I am not comforted 
by the fact that so many people have testified 
that after years of years of investigation of 
this and not a single case came up. I don't 
think that means that there weren't cases where 
the association distorted the result.
PROFESSOR MASON: Perhaps it is a type 
of negative assurance!
MR. McCLOY: I don't think I have got 
anything more.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much for 
coming and giving us the benefit of your views. 
It was very interesting.
PROFESSOR MASON: Thank you for permitting 
me to appear.
MR. GARRETT: We meet again at 8:30. 
That is what Lou Matusiak's schedule says.




The hearing convened at 8:30 o’clock with 
Mr. Garrett presiding.
MR. GARRETT: Ladies and gentlemen, let’s come 
to order for the morning.
For those of you who were not here yesterday, 
there are a couple of bits of information I could add. 
This is a hearing for the purpose of educating the Board. 
We are grateful to all of you that are willing to share 
your views with us.
Our immediate remedial purpose is to respond to 
the request of the Executive Committee of the SEC Prac­
tice Section who have issued proposed rules in the area 
of scope of services--rules for the SEC Practice Section 
and have requested our views on these proposals before 
taking any further action.
This Board itself does not take official action 
in the sense of adopting rules or repealing them. Our 
role is advisory. Nevertheless, in the posture in which 
this particular problem finds itself, we expect our views 
will have some influence.
On administrative matters, with respect to the 
transcript, it will be a publicly available document. 
Those persons that are making presentations will be given 
an opportunity to correct the transcript before it is put 
in shape for any broader distribution, and anybody wishing 
to get on the list to obtain a copy should get in touch 
with Lou Matusiak either during today or write or tele­
phone him when you get back to your offices.
Copies of the submissions that have been made 
in writing are also available. These can be examined at 
Lou’s office in New York City where copies are available 
upon request for a nominal charge determined by Lou to 
approximate the cost of reproduction.
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With that, is 
Altschuler, Melvoin and 
Good morning,
Mr. Moss here? Henry Moss of 
Glasser is our first witness. 
Mr. Moss.
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MR. HENRY S. MOSS: Good morning, Mr. Garrett. 
MR. GARRETT: Indeed I should also explain we 
have allotted a half hour to each witness. Whatever 
you do not spend in your prepared remarks, I suspect will 
be taken up with questions, but you are free to proceed 
in any way that you wish.
MR. MOSS: Thank you.
Gentlemen:
Thank you for affording to me the opportunity 
to discuss possible limitations of MAS as they may apply 
to the scope of practice within our profession. I wish 
to point out that I am not directly concerned about these 
limitations as they may impact upon "national firms" 
and their publicly held (i.e., SEC clients). Those firms, 
I am sure, have provided to you their insights, 
experiences, and thoughts regarding the future, far 
more thoroughly and with greater relevancy that I could 
hope to achieve. However, I am deeply concerned that 
judgments which you, the Public Oversight Board, render 
with respect to constraints upon service scope for SEC 
clients will inevitably impact (and impact adversely) 
upon the very large segment of the U.S. economy—the 
small business enterprise, which I might say are the 
type of clients that we in our firm handle.
I speak to you this afternoon as a CPA whose 
area of professional practice is limited to providing 
management advisory services therefore not as either 
a partner of Altschuler, Melvoin and Glasser although 
my partners are in agreement with these remarks or as 
a representative of any group of CPAs or CPA firms. 
I don’t speak to you as a representative of any group 
of CPAs or CPA firms, although I have reviewed my 
remarks with fellow members of the MAS Small Business 
Subcommittee and I can report to you that they are in 
full agreement with these remarks. To help you view 
my remarks in context, the following describes some of 
my major exposures within our profession.
221
I am presently, and have been for the past ten years, 
the partner in charge of management advisory services for 
Altschuler, Melvoin and Glasser. We are a single office firm 
located in Chicago. I might add parenthetically that we have 
had at least one full-time MAS practitioner for more than 
thirty years.
I am a member of the Illinois CPA Society, and 
former Chairman of its MAS Committee.
I am a member of the American Institute of CPAs and 
a former member of both the MAS Executive Committee and the 
Technical Standards Subcommittee.
I am presently Chairman of the AICPA MAS Subcommittee 
on Small Business Consulting, Codirector of the National MAS 
Training Program and Chairman of its Steering Committee.
I speak to you from this background of experience 
gained over time and through such exposures to a relatively 
broad spectrum of our profession and its members.
First, let us address "Will limitations placed upon 
SEC practitioners impact upon smaller CPA firms providing ser­
vices to privately held clients?"
In my judgment, any artificial limitation imposed 
upon the segment of the profession consisting of approximately 
500 practice units must, of necessity, filter through to all 
of the other 20,000 practice units.
We all hold ourselves out as Certified Public 
Accountants and most of us (as members of the AICPA) do, in 
fact, represent to our clients that we meet its high practice 
standards and do observe very rigid ethical practice and 
restraints. Therefore, to legislate that one class of CPA’s 
may perform certain services and that a different class may 
not is to deny both the rules and realities of our profession. 
This is not to say that we all practice with similar client 
bases, or provide a homogenous mix of services. Some prac­
titioners provide solely tax assistance, others solely finan­
cial advisory services, others maintain books and records for
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their clients and others a broad mix of audit, accounting and 
other related services. But it is the personality, and skills 
of the practitioner, and the demands of the, clients of the 
firm that shape scope, not an imposed rule. Thus, when any 
CPA, regardless of the size of his firm or his clientele, per­
forms a service, that specific service is provided to the best 
of his ability in accordance with standards established for the 
entire profession. Indeed, it would be difficult, if not im­
possible, to provide two sets of standards which a practitioner 
must follow, which depend not upon the nature of the service 
or the client, but solely upon some other aspect, such as how 
broadly the client’s stock may be held.
Therefore, I conclude a limitation upon a few of us 
will, in fact, become (soon) a limitation upon all of us. 
The only alternative to this approach of consistency will, in 
my judgment, be the fracturing of the AICPA into two complete 
entities, i.e., those practitioners who choose to provide 
services to publicly held clients in the one, and those practi­
tioners who provide services to privately held entities in 
the other. Such a schism would inevitably both reduce the com­
petitive choices available to business entities and impair 
the quality of services provided to each client segment.
I will now address the impact, of MAS scope limitations, 
on our clients.
Our clients are typically part of that large segment of 
business, the privately owned, closely held, owner-managed 
enterprises, which usually do not have in its organization any 
depth of professional business skills.
According to statements I have recently seen, 96% of 
all of the U.S. business entities, some 9,000,000 units, have 
these characteristics.
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A privately held company, of the type with which I 
am most familiar, will typically select as his independent 
accountant the firm or practitioner that he feels will be most 
responsive to his total perceived needs. Thus, in terms of 
the fees he pays, the audit may represent the largest segment 
by far, but in terms of his satisfaction with his CPA, the 
audit may often rank far behind the general and specific 
advice he solicits and receives in business management and tax 
matters. He wants a trained practitioner to provide guidance 
in such matters as tax planning, product cost, plant expansion, 
sales commission plans, acquisition and utilization of a com­
puter and, specific assistance in such matters as cost accounting 
systems, computer programming and in recruiting controllers, 
bookkeepers, data processing personnel and the like. Let us 
look at the impact upon the client if some of the talked about 
restraints were placed upon us. Typically, the advice type of 
questions, which now are handled over the phone or at lunch, 
are not now discussed by the client with anyone other than his 
CPA. If he were to utilize some other consultant, it would be 
at significant cost, because he (the consultant) did not have 
the continuity of understanding of that particular business 
that is inherent in the CPA's relationship with his client.
Let us look for a moment at a specific service area, the question 
of executive recruiting from the client's point of view.
If the client has need for staffing assistance in 
his accounting function, he normally comes first to his CPA. 
He can do this confidentially without unduly alarming the 
existing personnel. He will be presented with several candi­
dates whom the CPA considers to be technically qualified for his 
final selection. If the client were to receive a comparable ser­
vice at comparable cost through other qualified sources, he 
would still in most instances request his CPA to help define the 
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position, to interview the prospective candidate, and evaluate 
his technical qualifications. This redundancy of work effort 
would, of course, increase the total cost to the client.
So thus we have a situation whereby if recruiting 
services were prohibited, the client’s needs might be met only 
at increased cost, and with no assurance of a better quality 
of service.
Finally, I would like to consider the impact of scope 
limitations upon the very important and needed "attest" function 
of our practice. We are a large single office firm, and yet 
we are not large enough to maintain on our audit staff, full- 
time capability in such quantitative areas as electronic data 
processing, statistical sampling, and the current techniques 
of resolving discounted cash flow and present value problems. 
Our MAS staff are continually striving to upgrade their skills 
in these functions. Thus, the cross-pollination for continuing 
improvement of our audit skills is enhanced by the MAS function. 
Scope limitations which might cause us to reduce our MAS staff, 
and thus lessen our ability to attract and retain qualified 
specialists because of lessened opportunities for advancement in 
a smaller environment must therefore, of necessity, ultimately 
impact adversely upon the quality of our remaining MAS practi­
tioners. This, in turn, would reduce their ability to support 
the auditor, and thus the future quality of our audit service 
may be diminished.
I have not addressed myself to the elusive specter 
of potential impairment of independence through MAS activities 
because I understand others have done so. However, I do wish 
the record to show that in my judgment our clients consider them­
selves well served if, as they request, we provide service 
with integrity and objectivity. That is what they are paying for 
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and that is what we strive to provide. If as the current 
Institute pronouncements indicate that such qualities truly 
define independence vis-a-vis MAS, then the question of 
theoretical impairment is moot.
If the definition of independence for MAS is to in­
clude all possible aspects of appearance in addition to in­
tegrity and objectivity, then it should only be so changed if 
there is a demonstrated need based upon factual presentation. 
I am not aware of any such presentation. But I am well aware 
that our clients have needs for these services and continue 
to request that we provide them.
I will be pleased to respond to any questions you 




MR. McCLOY: You say you have a rule in your execu­
tive recruitment that you proffer three or four candidates 
rather than one?
MR. MOSS: Multiple, sir, and always two, hopefully 
more.
MR. McCLOY: Why is that?
MR. MOSS: Because we never want to be in a
position of providing only one alternative to the clients. The 
client must make final decision.
MR. McCLOY: If you did provide one alternative, 
would that impair, in your judgment, the independence concept?
MR. MOSS: I think it would relate closely to it,
sir, yes. If we present a recommendation to a client of any 
type whether it be executive recruiting or selection of a com­
puter and say there is no other alternative, we are, in effect, 
putting ourselves in the role of management, and we try very 
hard to shy away from that.
MR. McCLOY: Can I ask how large a part of your 
business is executive recruitment very roughly?
MR. MOSS: We have an eight-person MAS Staff.
We probably spend less than one full-time person, or the equi­
valent of that. In essence, in terms of dollar revenue to us, 
it is a very small portion. In terms of the contacts at the 
top level of a client, it becomes a very significant portion.
Mr. McCLOY: You are constantly being, I suppose, 
telephoned or called up and they would say, "Do you know a good 
man here or there?"
MR. MOSS: That automatically, but for example, it 
just so happened yesterday one of our clients who happens to 
be based in Milwaukee was on the phone three or four times with 
me yesterday, arranged for a data processing manager candidate 
from the Minneapolis area to come down to our offices yesterday 
afternoon. One of our managers and myself spent two hours with 
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him, and then I brought that candidate out to the client’s 
house in the northern suburbs yesterday evening.
That is not unusual that our clients want that type 
of close contact.
MR. McCLOY: Do you always charge for that service?
MR. MOSS: We always charge for our time, sir, so
that it makes no difference how we spend our time. If we are 
spending it productively for the client, then we charge for it.
MR. McCLOY: Outside of your tax service, what is the 
other main MAS that you engage in?
MR. MOSS: The vast bulk of our services are related
to a computer in one form or another. We will make computer 
feasibility studies.
I got another phone yesterday authorizing us to make 
an operational audit of the efficiency of one of our larger 
client’s data processing department.
We, in some cases, will assist clients in actually 
programming their computer.
MR. McCLOY: Do you do any actuarial work?
MR. MOSS: No, sir.
MR. McCLOY: That is all.
MR. GARRETT: Bill, do you have any questions?
PROFESSOR CARY: May I ask Mr. Moss, taking the 
average client—that is rather difficult to pick the average 
client—but on the average, what would you say the revenue 
for you in respect to the attest function versus the other 
functions that you perform is? What is the relationship?
MR. MOSS: I don’t know if I can quite state it
in terms of the average client, but in terms of the total firm 
revenues, it is approximately 85% audit, 10% tax and 5 % MAS. 
I may be a few percentage points off.
PROFESSOR CARY: And the balance is MAS.
MR. MOSS: And the balance is MAS.
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PROFESSOR CARY: So that in a sense the notion that 
if we throw tax into audit because at least some of us have 
this notion that tax is an absolute essential role of account­
ing firms, historically, and therefore probably today, if we 
throw that out, there will be very little evidence that the 
amount you do in respect to MAS would interfere with the 
independence that you would exercise in respect of audit. Isn’t 
that correct?
MR. MOSS: I would certainly concur.
PROFESSOR CARY: You would concur. That is where you 
come out?
MR. MOSS: Right. Our posture regarding MAS is not 
that it is a money maker for my partners and myself. Our 
posture is that it is a service necessary to support the 
client relationships, to give the client help in those areas 
which he requests, and we feel it is very good both from a 
business attraction and a business retention standpoint even 
though it does not materially affect our revenues.
PROFESSOR CARY: You don’t have many cases in which 
the MAS side of it is more than, say, 25% of the total fees 
from the audit firm?
MR. MOSS: In some instances, some very few instances, 
this may happen if we are assisting a client in, let’s say, 
a rather large computer installation.
PROFESSOR CARY: One shot.
MR. MOSS: Then in the one or two years that that
takes we may get larger fees than the audit, but over the 
life cycle of a client relationship, the MAS fees tend to be 
very small compared to the total audit fees.
PROFESSOR CARY: Thank you.
MR. MATUSIAK: A question of clarification. This 
is an 85-10-5% breakdown. Does the 5% include only formal 
MAS engagements that are subject to separate billing, or does 
that also include the day-to-day consulting on operational 
matters?
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MR. MOSS: I think your clarification is a good
point. I am breaking our fees down in terms of the people 
who are in each of the departments.
There is no question that my audit partners do 
frequently, either without me or with me, will spend time in 
conference with the clients discussing their broad business 
matters.
MR. MATUSIAK: That is accounted for as auditing 
fees?
MR. MOSS: We don’t segregate. That is why I 
can’t give you an exact breakdown, but it would be listed 
in our time sheets as conference time. Most of the con­
ference time would be what we are calling advisory services 
here, so from that standpoint probably our advisory function is 
more like 10% than 5% of our total revenues.
MR. McCLOY: On your recruiting business, may I inter­
vene again, sir, if you were making a recommendation, say, for 
an accounting officer to the client, do you ever recommend an 
accountant from competitor of yours?
MR. MOSS: I would say the vast majority of the
people whom we recommend who have had public accounting ex­
perience are non-AM & G alumni. The AM & G alumni that we help 
place probably amount to less than one person a year.
What happens is that most of our alumni who are 
very competent go into smaller CPA firms. They tend not to 
go into public practice on their own.
MR. GARRETT: Mr. Moss, we have heard from you and 
from others including Professor Mason yesterday afternoon on 
the stimulating effects, so to speak, of the MAS aspect of the 
public accounting practice both in attracting students into the 
profession and also attracting graduates of schools into parti­
cular firms. But one thing we have neglected to ask, and I 
certainly don’t know, is the extent to which these MAS services 
are performed by CPAs.
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I wonder how stimulating it would be to have an 
actuarial capability if it was all done by actuaries who 
weren’t CPAs and sat off in a different office and were not 
part of the normal career development.
How does it work with your firm? Is your MAS staff 
all or predominantly CPAs?
MR. MOSS: I am sorry to say no. Right now of the 
eight of us, I am the only CPA. I might mention I am trained 
primarily as an industrial engineer, and when I got into this 
profession, I felt it important to become a CPA, but I can also 
say to you that of the eight, six are in school in the evenings, 
and if you were to hold these hearings a year from now, I hope 
I could make a much more positive statement.
In our firm we do put, if not pressure, we certainly 
hold out an enticement or carrot saying: We want you very much 
to become a CPA and be a full part of the profession.
MR. GARRETT: But the MAS experience, I gather from 
your response, is not part of the normal career path develop­
ment for someone looking toward leadership in a CPA firm?
MR. MOSS: No, in a firm such as ours, typically 
the senior partners and typically the fastest track to 
partnership is through the audit function.
We have been unable in our firm to attract men 
and women for MAS, from the audit staff, because they see 
that if they were to do that, they would perhaps be coming 
in at the bottom end of a department while they already 
have progressed quite well within the audit functions.
MR. GARRETT: One other question. Have 
you had a chance to examine the Executive Committee's pro­
posals that are the specific subject of this hearing and 
measure your own MAS services against them?
MR. MOSS: Yes sir.
MR. GARRETT: And do you think it would affect 
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what you are now doing if they were to become Section rules?
Don’t give away the store if there is something 
you are going to want to argue about, but some ideas.
MR. MOSS: If you are asking me: What do I feel 
vis-a-vis our own firm's practice, I can answer fairly speci­
fically.
As I mentioned before, I am trained as an industrial 
engineer, but we long ago decided that we were not going 
to do industrial engineering work or plant layout, time 
study or whatever it may be because it didn't fit into our 
perceived areas of the services we wanted to render, not 
that we felt that it was inherently wrong, but we as a firm 
just chose not to enter into that.
The same thing for the marketing and the actuarial 
services, perhaps because we never had a large enough demand.
I know of no way that we can stay in business as 
CPAs and not provide assistance in recruiting bookkeepers, 
accountants, controllers, because we get the phone call that 
you mentioned earlier: "Do you know somebody who can help 
us in this area?" or "I am thinking of hiring this person 
as my controller. Will you talk with him. Will you check 
out their references?" Whatever it is.
These calls have been in existence since we as a 
firm have been in existence. We just don't know how to get 
out of that business and still meet the very needs of our 
clients.
MR. GARRETT: But your other businesses, your other 
services, would seem to come within the standards set out in 
these proposals, auditing-and accounting-related skills?
MR. MOSS: I certainly consider anything having to 
do with a computer today related to accounting and auditing. 
I don't know how to distinguish between them even though 
some applications we work on in the computer area, for in­
stance, sales history or inventory management are not specifi­
cally related to the books of account, but they flow from or 
to the books of account.
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MR. GARRETT: Anything else?
PROFESSOR CARY: I would just like to follow through. 
Certainly one of the basic reasons why there is a rationale for 
MAS in an accounting firm as another function is a point I 
think you have brought out, namely that it helps in the 
auditing today. I mean it is almost a necessary ingredient I 
take it.
Doubts were raised in my mind when you say you are 
the only CPA, and therefore, the rest are not.
How do you tie in the MAS role, computer under­
standing and so forth with the audit function in your firm?
MR. MOSS: We perform no MAS services without re­
viewing the project in advance with the audit partner and 
manager. We make no recommendations to the client without 
reviewing those recommendations with the audit partner 
and manager, and generally, half way through, let’s say we 
are designing an accounting system, a fairly standard sort 
of thing, then we will review the design and concept with 
our audit people to make sure that the controls and checks 
and balances are there.
Also, as I indicated in my prepared remarks, we 
provide assistance to the audit staff in such matters as 
internal control systems, EDP audit techniques, statistical 
sampling and present value analysis.
I might also say that our people by and large on our 
MAS staff are either trained as or are training themselves 
through formal education as accountants, and they speak and 
lunch with and are a part of our in-house training programs. 
They just have not passed the exam, but they hopefully will do 
so fairly soon.
MR. MANZONI: You mentioned that there is heavy 
emphasis in your firm on computers.
Do you do what has been referred to as turn key 
arrangements ?
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MR. MOSS: We will not use that word because a 
turn-key to us implies that the client waves a magic wand and 
everything is ready.
We will do nothing unless the client participates 
very actively, but we will provide services in a broad spec­
trum from systems design, program specs, programming, testing 
and training of the people, but we expect the client, and 
will not touch a job to have an executive working with our 
project team every step of the way and will not touch such 
a job without such an assurance.
MR. MANZONI: You mentioned that in one of the 
cases you were involved in you actually did some programming.
MR. MOSS: Yes sir.
MR. MANZONI: To what extent would the client have 
been involved in that process?
MR. MOSS: The client will review the program 
specifications, will review the test results.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much, Mr. Moss.
MR. MOSS: Thank you, sir. Thank you, gentlemen.
MR. GARRETT: Mr. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell 
& Company.
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MR. STANLEY R. KLION: Good morning, gentlemen. 
I am Stanley Klion, Vice Chairman of Management 
Consulting of Peat, Marwick & Mitchell Company. I 
am Chairman of the AICPA MAS Executive Committee.
By way of background, I have been with my 
firm since 1955, always in the MAS department, and like 
Henry Moss who preceded me on the stand, I am also an 
industrial engineer and a CPA.
During all of my career, I have participated 
actively in Institute and State Society affairs, and 
I guess I have participated in a good deal of the 
professional writing that has been referenced in all 
of the documents that come before your Board, including, 
I might add, SAS-11 to which reference has been made 
frequently.
Rather than read my testimony, which I 
submitted to Mr. Matusiak several weeks ago, I would 
like to highlight, if I may, a few points which I 
think are particularly relevant and then engage in 
such dialogue as the Board might require.
I am very grateful for the opportunity to 
come here as is my firm because I believe the judgments 
that derive out of this Board will be particularly 
significant to our profession.
Mr. Garrett observed early on this morning 
that you do not stand the test of law, but sir, I 
would suggest to you that your opinions may have more 
than just a little bit of weight, and you will not 
only affect our scope of practice, I think indeed, 
you will affect the vitality and the viability of 
or our practice and everybody will be so affected, 
practitioner, many of whom will be before you, the 
clients whom we serve, the Federal government and 
society at large. I do not believe those are 
separable; I think they all relate one to the other.
I am sure that many of my predecessors to 
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this table have some and spoken about the single criterion 
which so many of us believe is the only yardstick 
against which we should measure the practice that we 
do, namely, independence. Independence, of course, 
depends upon role and that is a word I am sure you have 
your fill of, but let me speak for just a minute about 
what most of us believe role to be. It means careful 
control of not participating in management decisions. 
That is not something that is unique to the CPA 
profession. That is indigenous to quality consulting.
It is interesting that the role of the CPA 
firms, of which I know, which have standard manuals 
and most of the non-CPA management consulting firms, 
of which I know, including the major ones whose names 
are familiar, all stipulate quite clearly that they will 
not engage in management decision making, and they 
measure their performance against that rule.
The effort to define scope of practice in 
terms of functions or the technical content of work 
that is being done, has simply failed to be effective. 
To put it another way, I can be just as contaminated 
in terms of independence by doing accounting-and 
auditing-related work as doing non-auditing-and 
accounting-related work. It simply depends on whether 
or not I am a participant in management or I am a 
counselor to management.
I would agree that that is not an easy 
line to draw. That is the skill of the consultant. 
It is in the client's self-interest to see that the 
consultant maintains that role, and the adherence 
to that role is absolutely crucial to an understanding, 
it seems to me, of the definition of scope and the 
constraints that may be placed upon it.
To repeat, I can be just as guilty or just 
as pure by doing accounting-and auditing-related work 
as nonaccounting and nonauditing-related work.
That is not the criterion against which my 
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independence should be measured because it isn’t relevant 
to my independence.
Mr. Cary commented to the previous witness 
as to the support that the auditor gets, indeed, must 
get from MAS services. I am sure many have said to 
you before that the existence of MAS activities becomes 
increasingly more attractive to the young people whom 
we attract to this profession and on whom all professions 
depend wholly.
I think there is a clear correlation between 
the quality of person that enters the accounting 
profession now, who is discarding the old green eye 
shade stereotype, if you will, that many of us have 
considered as accountants heretofore, and the diversity 
of activities which the accounting profession renders 
to its clients.
We are charged by the public and by the 
government, to know the businesses we audit, to know 
the business, not just deal with "the figures," and 
that requirement to know depends upon a broad array 
of professional skills.
Chairman Williams of the SEC has said quite 
clearly that we are going to have to report on the 
internal controls of our clients. Current value 
accounting is here upon us. Prospective reporting 
is something that all of us are asked to speak to.
Our responsibilities to the public increase, 
and in my view, properly so. It is ironic, indeed, 
that the GAO, the Congress’ own accounting arm, has 
more than half of its people in non-audit activities, 
in what we would call MAS skills, because the GAO 
perceives the need for such talent, and the very 
same Congress, through some of its representatives, 
is trying to say to us that we should go the other 
way, that we should narrow the skills that we have.
It simply doesn’t stand the test of logic.
238
I would argue, as so many have argued before, that the 
presence of MAS assists in making better audits, 
and the converse of that is equally true—the absence 
of MAS will make poorer audits.
Finally, let me observe that as again I am 
sure many have, that there is simply no evidence that 
has ever been presented to suggest that the practice 
of MAS clouds our independence. In my briefings last 
evening and this morning, I have been told that the 
Board considers the absence of a "smoking gun" not 
particularly relevant. I might share in that view 
in some measure. But there is hardly a subject that 
has gotten more research than the potential compromise 
of independence of MAS services. It has been the 
subject, I suppose, of more doctoral theses of schools 
of accounting than almost any other you might think 
of, and if a "smoking gun" were there, the Lord knows 
somebody would have found it by now because an awful 
lot of people have looked for it. The fact is that 
it just doesn’t exist. It just doesn’t exist.
We would argue my firm—I personally, and 
a great many of my colleagues—that society becomes 
the poorer from the service of accountancy if we are 
not permitted to render competent services which are 
generally described as MAS. I should say, of course, 
that competence and due care is a presumption. If 
you do not have that, then all of the other arguments 
go aside. Then you simply shouldn't practice your 
profession.
Now may I serve the Board in any other way.
MR. GARRETT: Gentlemen:
MR. McCLOY: I think I am one of those that 
have probably been quoted as being a little bit 
skeptical about this talk about no case ever having 
come, no smoking gun having ever been found.
I think I know out of my own experiences, 
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of cases where there has been too close an association 
between the accountant and the management which has 
not been conducive to good results.
There does seem to be a substantial amount 
of opinions, that have been quoted, I guess, a 
significant minority who felt that this area did 
in some way compromise independence.
It is a little difficult to analyze and to 
put your finger on it.
Let me start out by asking you, out of your 
great experience, what, if anything, should we be 
doing that we are not doing now to help insure the 
objectivity and the independence of the accountants? 
Is there any area that you feel would really be 
relevant that we might look into to enhance the 
probability of objectivity that we are not doing 
now?
MR. KLION: Yes, sir. I would like to 
answer perhaps one comment you made as well as your 
question.
I don't doubt for a minute that there are 
cases where accountants and management have been 
perceived to be too close together and indeed even 
having actually having been too close together. 
I submit that problem is not a function of the 
particular activities they were practicing, but 
rather a function of the relationship of two people. 
One can compromise one's independence just as 
easily doing audits as doing MAS work.
MR. McCLOY: I am interested in what you 
say about that.
MR. KLION: I think there is one enormously 
important thing that this Board could do, and that 
is to bring this discussion to the beginning of its 
end.
I think accountants have labored under a 
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cloud relative to MAS activities for virtually as 
long as I have been practicing, and that is 23 years.
In the late Sixties we went through a burst 
of time not unlike this. As my testimony suggests, 
the late Manuel Cohen made observation about some of 
the concerns that he had, and I would observe with 
some comfort that his Commission, which he chaired 
so brilliantly before he passed away, came to the 
conclusion that no restriction was necessary. We 
have invested enormous time and enormous costs and 
more importantly credibility, I think, with the 
public, and we seem to be dealing solely with 
perceptions or possibilities. As to the "significant 
minority" sir, to which you refer, I think the same 
source comments that the more familiar or the more 
sophisticated the observer is with the (MAS) service, 
the less concern he or she has.
I think it is time to bring the subject to 
an end, and I think the opinion of this Board will 
be enormously important in so doing.
I made the case in my testimony that, 
recognizing very clearly that my Chairman also serves 
as Chairman of the SEC Practice Section, I believe 
the amendments which are really the principal subject 
of this hearing are excessively restrictive. I do 
not think they stand the test of logic, and my 
testimony, with his very clear approval, says that.
We are quite prepared to live with that 
testimony in spirit and in letter, and indeed, we 
have adjusted our scope at the moment to accommodate 
everything that is there. That doesn’t represent 
very much of an adjustment for us, but whatever was 
necessary, we have done.
We have done so in the hope that this will 
be the end of this cloud, that we will be permitted 
to practice our profession soundly and competently
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and under the constraints that we impose upon ourselves.
I know of no profession that has put stronger 
constraints on its behavior than the accounting 
profession has. So, despite the fact that we believe 
this amendment is excessive, we believe it is important 
to get this matter behind us, and Mr. McCloy, if this 
Board does nothing more than assist in that activity, 
I think it will help the accounting profession to re­
establish its credibility beyond anything else.
That is sort of a long-winded answer to 
your question.
MR. McCLOY: That is quite a responsibility 
you put on this Board. We are new boys in this 
thing. After all, as you say, there have been 20 
years of discussion. We have only been seized with 
this question for the last couple of weeks.
I understand your point on that, but I 
was reaching out, I think, for something else. I 
can understand that is a negative position. We put 
this thing to bed. That is fine.
Is there anything affirmative in addition 
to that which we could do that would tend to insure 
or help insure, enhance the atmosphere of 
independence?
You can’t legislate independence. You 
can’t legislate that. I am perfectly clear on that.
MR. KLION: Legislating morality, and that 
isn't a doable thing.
Mr. McCLOY: You can't do it, but there are 
things that can be done.
A number of people testified yesterday 
about pointing out a number of features that were 
conducive to the concept of independence.
I just wondered whether out of your 
experience you think there is anything that we should 
stress on the positive side.
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MR. KLION: I think the existence of the
Board is a positive manifestation of the things that 
have been done. The profession has, in fact, put 
its stewardship under the surveillance of a distinguished 
panel of five non-accountants. You have dealt with 
questions of peer review. You have dealt with 
questions of sanctions against misbehavior, and I 
think all of those things are fine.
I might add that while peer review at the 
moment relates only to audit activities, my own firm, 
and most of the large firms of which I know, provide 
internal quality assurance procedures involving all 
three departments under the same type of review.
I have in my bag now the results of our 
own internal quality assurance program which is an 
around-the-clock, constant thing. Indeed, one of the 
persons present in this room now who is one of my 
partners, is a member of what we call Professional 
Practice Review Committee.
It is a major job of reviewing our own 
performance, and I think the establishment of this 
Board is a way of doing that for the profession as 
a whole. This quality assurance is indeed a very 
positive step in that regard.
MR. McCLOY: Does your firm do executive 
recruiting?
MR. KLION: Yes, sir, we do.
MR. McCLOY: Do you have this rule that 
you never make a proposal unless it is multiplied?
MR. KLION: Yes, sir, and for the reasons 
that Henry Moss spoke because if you offer only one 
person, you are making a management decision de 
facto if not de jure.
MR. McCLOY: But if you did offer only 
one man, do you think that would impair the objectivity 
or the independence of your position?
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MR. KLION: I don’t think it would impair 
it in fact, but it might impair it in appearance, 
and that is one of the reasons why we don't do it.
I might add, sir, that providing executive 
recruiting services as those of us who do, under formal 
rigorous professional constraints, in my view, is a 
great deal sounder than having the permission or the 
ability "to refer some one known to us," to quote the 
amendment.
If ever there is an opportunity for the 
appearance of a lack of independence, it is clearly 
that. Which is preferable—"I have a friend, and 
wouldn’t you like to hire him?" or "would you like 
to pay me for the service of really researching 
whether these candidates meet your needs?"
I don't have a great deal of problem in 
deciding which one appears to be better.
MR. McCLOY: The one is more professional.
MR. KLION: Absolutely.
MR. GARRETT: Mr. Klion, after that, what 
is your attitude or your views toward the Executive 
Committee proposals?
MR. KLION: Well, sir, as I tried to set 
forth, Mr. Garrett, I believe the amendment that is 
the subject of this hearing is based on incorrect 
criteria, because it is trying to define independence 
in terms of function or technical content.
MR. GARRETT: You would drop the accounting, 
auditing skill?
MR. KLION: That criterion, I do not believe, 
is relevant.
Let me say quite clearly that the impact 
of that amendment as it presently stands is deminimus 
to my firm. It costs us some modest amount of business 
and we are quite prepared to dismiss it.
What is wrong about it, in my view, is the 
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fact that it is fallacious in its reasoning and it 
is susceptible to expansion on equally fallacious 
grounds.
MR. GARRETT: Do you see no room for a 
compatibility concept or even a dignitary concept, if 
 you wish?
MR. KLION: Yes, sir, I think compatibility 
is a perfectly rational thing. I think dignity, which 
is another way of saying the same thing, is fine. I 
just don’t believe that proscribing what I do is a 
function of my independence. It is a question of my 
relationship with my client.
MR. GARRETT: That may be true. I don’t 
know that the Section’s rules have to hang on scope 
rules on independence. You have urged that that be 
the only thing.
MR. KLION: As I understand it, the 
limitations that the amendment seeks to place on 
scope is to establish beyond doubt the independence 
of the accountant and the totality of his relationship 
to his client.
MR. GARRETT: That is the way it is presented, 
and you are saying compatibility or auditing-related 
skills have nothing to do with independence.
MR. KLION: No, sir, I don’t think I said 
compatibility had nothing to do with it.
MR. GARRETT: No, you didn’t; I did.
MR. KLION: Auditing-related skills are 
not the criterion that I would use. That won't keep 
me from lacking independence.
MR. GARRETT: I understand that point, but 
perhaps unrelated to independence, should there be 
some professional rule with respect to the sort of 
things that firms that hold themselves out to be 
CPA firms and skill in auditing should engage in?
MR. KLION: Yes, I think compatibility is 
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a very logical one. Activities that relate generally 
to the control structure of the environment, the 
client—the services that derive out of that require 
a pretty broad spectrum over the management problems 
of the company.
Unfortunately, problems don’t compartmentalize 
themselves very easily, and to solve problems which 
clients request us to solve require a diversity of 
skills that aren't easily defined within the constraints 
that the amendment sets forth.
But certainly compatibility is one that I 
would urge. I don't think we ought to find out what 
kind of soap powder the housewife wants to buy and 
take that kind of poll.
MR. GARRETT: Do you think we need a rule 
on that or recommend a rule?
MR. KLION: Yes, I think a rule on compatibility. 
I have no problem with that.
MR. McCLOY: Wouldn't we be charged with 
having just as slippery a test as you have with relation 
to skills, if you did that?
MR. KLION: No, sir.
MR. McCLOY: How do you define it? We had 
some difficulty defining compatibility, yesterday.
MR. KLION: I am sure that is so, Mr. McCloy. 
You observed before that it is very hard to define 
independence. It is a state of mind.
I find it distressing that in all of these 
conversations the word "integrity" never comes up, 
and that is the hallmark of any professional.
I guess in today's environment it is easy 
to observe that we are all considered rascals, or a 
great many of us are considered rascals, and without 
any question there are rascals in every profession, 
but we are defending against all of us being rascals, 
when, in fact, that isn't really the case.
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I don’t know how you define integrity. My 
father used to tell me that the test of an honest 
man is what he would do when he knew he wouldn’t get 
caught. I have lived my life on that basis, and 
I think that is a perfectly fine way to do it, and 
I yield to no one in the integrity of the accounting 
profession as a body. I think they are the highest 
grade of people I have ever encountered.
So to define compatibility is a terribly 
difficult task just as defining independence is.
MR. McCLOY: You are saying that the only 
criterion that amounts to anything now is the 
independence theory. Is that what you are saying?
MR. KLION: Yes, sir.
MR. McCLOY: There is no other criterion 
that would be relevant?
MR. KLION: I put compatibility in there.
MR. McCLOY: Compatibility.
MR. GARRETT: But you wouldn't hang it 
on independence. That is to say, you wouldn't say 
for independence you must limit the scope of your 
services to those that are compatible?
MR. KLION: I don't think compatibility 
clouds independence. I just don't think it is 
appropriate.
MR. GARRETT: Room for compatibility 
restrictions must have their base in something else, 
than independence.
MR. KLION: Yes.
MR. GARRETT: I have some more, but I will 
defer to Bill.
PROFESSOR CARY: May I say with respect 
to integrity, the reason it hasn't been raised, it 
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is assumed, and therefore, we don't need to raise it, 
at least, that has been my attitude and I think 
that is speaking for the rest.
I would like to develop a few points. 
Obviously, you are the largest, I believe you are the 
largest firm and the most diversified in the profession. 
Isn't that correct?
MR. KLION: We are the largest by the general 
numbers that are available. Our scope of practice is 
among the broadest. I can't speak to it precisely, 
but certainly we are at that end of the spectrum.
PROFESSOR CARY: I have been raising this 
question perhaps, too, repeatedly about what would 
you think about merging with a major management company, 
Booz, Allen or McKinsey.
Probably you don't need to because you have 
already reached that stage, but if you did merge with 
them, would that offer any new areas of activity that 
you do not presently perform?
MR. KLION: In the first place it would 
surprise the daylights out of me. It would not concern 
me provided I could apply to the firm that was 
affiliated with us the same constraints that we apply 
to our own practice.
You have mentioned Booz. Booz does a great 
many things which are wholly competitive to what we 
do and they do a great many things which are not 
competitive to what we do.
This is obviously not a value judgment 
on their scope of practice. It is simply describing 
my understanding of their firm.
PROFESSOR CARY: Such as?
MR. KLION: They do a great deal of technical 
research. We would not wish to do that. We don't 
have that competence, to use a word that we have been 
struggling with a little bit before. I don't think 
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it is compatible with our firm, but to the degree 
that they counsel with industrial and not-for-profit 
clients, as we do, in areas that broadly relate 
to the control structure of those clients, if there 
was a commercial reason for so doing, affiliating 
with that kind of a firm would not bother me.
I don’t believe that a CPA firm ought to 
be 80% consulting and 20% auditing, although I 
would observe that most small and medium-sized 
practice units might have that kind of a relationship.
Their attest function is very much the 
smaller portion of their practice, but the perception 
of that in the major firms I think would be distressing.
I don’t know what a proper mix is, sir. 
In our own firm our MAS practice is approximately 
13% of the firm. Our attest function is two-thirds 
of the firm. That is to say our accounting and 
auditing function, not all of which is attest. If 
MAS services should be 18% or 20%, I wouldn't 
be terribly disturbed, and I know some of my 
competitors, some of my excellent competitors, 
have MAS departments that approach 20% of their 
total firm.
MR. GARRETT: Would it bother you if it 
got over 50%?
MR. KLION: Yes, sir, I think it would 
because I do think we offer ourselves as a major 
business service CPA firm, and I don’t think we 
should be more than 50%, but if you ask me why 50 
and not 40 and why 50 and not 60, I would be hard 
pressed to say.
We have grown in this area. We have 
rendered management advisory services for 70 
years. I have on my wall a draft of a report that 
we did for the Boston Navy Yard in 1907 or something 
of that order, and we have been looked to for that 
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kind of work since the profession started.
Most people believe that the profession 
started in the attest function. That simply isn't 
so. The firm of Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, an 
enormously competent, highly regarded firm, was 
founded by Messrs. Haskins & Sells who did a 
consulting job for the U.S. Congress in the last 
decade of the Nineteenth century. That kind of 
business counseling permeated the accounting 
profession from the day the first man established 
himself as an accountant until today, so there 
is nothing new about rendering business counseling, 
business advice to clients.
As I said before, I believe in the 
medium and particularly smaller practice units, 
advice giving is the largest portion of their 
practice. Like Henry Moss, I fear a so-called 
ripple effect. I don't believe there are two 
standards of independence.
If you impose one on the large firms, 
you will impose it on all firms.
PROFESSOR CARY: What I am trying to ask, 
maybe this is a question of compatibility, but 
we are always searching for some definition of 
it. But where does a firm of your diversity, 
and which is growing, and by the way, everything 
is growing. I have seen the emphasis is on 
growth. I mean, growth and success at the same 
time. Where do you stop? Why, for instance, 
couldn't you go into investment counseling?
You probably move toward having more 
economists in your firm. I should think that is 
a necessary ingredient of a firm of your magnitude 
and distinction.
MR. KLION: For auditing purposes. 
PROFESSOR CARY: Why wouldn't you move
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on to investment counseling and things of that kind?
MR. KLION: I think there are several reasons 
for that. One is compatibility.
Was it Mr. Justice Potter who said he couldn’t 
define obscenity but he surely knew it when he saw it?
Compatibility is much the same way. I 
guess there are just terrible risks in investment 
counseling, and most people don’t do it terribly well. 
It only gets very close—
MR. GARRETT: The risks are the customer’s 
risks.
MR. KLION: Not in today's litigious society. 
I just don’t think it is a proper area of practice 
for an accounting firm to render investment advice.
MR. McCLOY: Would you apply a rule to it? 
Would you suggest that the POB should apply a rule or 
recommend a rule?
MR. KLION: If the rule were part of this 
compatibility problem which we have been speaking, I 
would have no problem with it.
PROFESSOR CARY: Do you see any areas directly 
at the moment which a firm of your character could move 
and should move perhaps over the next five years?
MR. KLION: Do you mean new areas which 
we presently are not?
PROFESSOR CARY: Right, new areas.
MR. KLION: I don’t think so. I think our 
scope, which has, incidentally, not changed over the 
last ten or fifteen years, is as broad as we choose 
it to be because we think it responds to our perceptions 
of compatibility and our perceptions of what our clients 
seek of us.
It is very hard to be quite specific about 
that, Mr. Cary. As new developments come up in 
computers, for example, there may be things that we 
didn't do work 10 or 15 years ago such as tele-
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communications. You can’t be in computers now without 
having data transmission problems, and I guess 
you could argue that is a new scope or an extension 
of an existing scope. That type of thing I can 
perceive, but major new areas such as investment 
counseling, I do not believe so.
PROFESSOR CARY: I have one other question 
in this area, if that is all right. I don’t want 
to take too much of your time, but it relates to 
the point made by Mr. Gunders yesterday who is here, 
I see, and I think it was new to us, or at least 
it was new to me. Insofar as he indicated, and 
perhaps I am misstating, Mr. Gunders, on the ASR-250, 
I believe you were referring to, and the indication 
that in the near future there would be this possibility 
that clients would be judging the auditing firm in 
part on whether or not or what areas of MAS and 
other services they were performing, and that that 
in turn might likely affect the possibility of a 
firm like your own of being selected.
Have you found any evidence of that? He 
seemed to indicate that there was evidence of it.
MR. KLION: There is no question that there 
has been evidence of it, and I would suspect that 
every firm in this room that has major management 
consulting practice with SEC clients has already 
seen some evidence of it.
The rule, as I understand it, provides 
that proxy statements issued subsequent to 
September 30 of this year will disclose whether 
the audit committee of the Board, and the Board 
itself, has pre-approved all non-audit services as 
defined that were rendered to the company by its 
principal accountant, will itemize each of those 
services and will indicate the percentage of fee 
of each service as a numerator of a fraction, the 
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audit fee being the denominator. The relationship, 
I must say, escapes me as to relevance, but that is 
what we are talking about.
Now, to put that in cold terms, if you have 
a client whose annual audit fee is $200,000, and that 
is a very nice client, indeed, asks you do do some 
work with respect to the cost system of a small 
plant in upstate Iowa, the fee for which is $8,000, 
according to ASR-250, there must be disclosure as to 
whether or not the audit committee pre-approved that 
work since $8,000 is obviously more than 3% of 
$200,000. Such an engagement is a perfectly normal, 
routine type of service. I postulate a service 
that would not be under anybody’s proscription of 
service if you accept the fact that MAS does exist, 
and you are now placing management in the position 
of saying—management now, not the board—of saying, 
"We have a choice. We can go to our board and get 
such prior approval, all the while convening a 
meeting of the auditing committee which may be 
spread all over the country, and then disclose 
the fact that we had done so in our proxy statement, 
or we can go to another firm and have the same 
service done, presumably with the same degree of 
quality, possibly more expensively because of 
the startup cost and make no disclosure at all 
in the proxy statement."
I submit, sir, that it will take a very 
confident and secure management to opt for using 
the principal accountants when disclosure must be 
made, and go through that routine, rather than 
going to a competitor when no disclosure need be 
made.
There isn't any firm here who hasn't 
been affected by it. I know of my first-hand 
knowledge of at least three situations already 
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where we have been told we will not be considered 
for work for just this reason.
PROFESSOR CARY: It seems to me, therefore, 
that yours being the most diversified would be the 
most jeopardized. I mean, that seems to follow. I 
don’t know.
MR. KLION: No, sir, I don’t think diversity 
will be the impact here.
We are, as far as we can tell, not the 
largest MAS practice among the big eight firms, so- 
called, and I think the other question that will have 
to be asked is: What percentage of the work is done 
for SEC registered clients, and all other clients?
I guess most of us who have labored in these 
vineyards have been concerned that we haven’t done 
enough work for SEC clients rather than having done 
too much work for them, so I don’t know who will 
be affected more, but there is no question that 
all of us will be affected.
I think what the SEC has done by rule 
making is to indirectly try to achieve what appears 
to be the desire of our critics.
I have no doubt that there are a number of 
clients who will believe that this is—forgive me— 
a bureaucratic requirement that they are willing to 
live with, and they have sufficient confidence in the 
posture of their principal accountant and their 
competence as to go through the procedure that I 
have outlined, but there is no doubt that some will 
not. All that means is if we are accused of being 
too aggressive now, if I may use my friend, Henry 
Gunders’ firm, that we will look after PW clients 
and PW will look after PMM clients. I am not sure 
that is particularly in society's interest.
MR. McCLOY: We have had several priorities 
suggested to us. You suggested one. He suggested
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one yesterday. You kill ASR-250 and we will acquire 
merit.
MR. KLION: I share his view as to the 
distressing impact of it, I will tell you that. 
(Off the record.)
PROFESSOR CARY: One other area that I am 
not alone, I think, in wanting to discuss, we have had 
these discussions by the actuaries yesterday, and we 
somehow on the points of difference we have never been 
able quite clearly to identify.
I understand you have a fairly large 
actuarial service.
MR. KLION: Yes, sir.
PROFESSOR CARY: You are undoubtedly keenly 
aware of the positions taken by the actuaries. How 
do you respond to their basic criticisms?
MR. KLION: The actuary and the accounting 
profession really started together. The first 
professional association of the two professions was 
in Scotland, the Society of Actuaries and Accountants, 
or some name of that nature, and they have been 
interrelated for 125 years.
Actuarial work is obviously quantitative 
in nature, and by the narrowest scope definitions that 
one would want to provide, including accounting-and 
auditing-related skills, as a functional criterion, 
that is a rational relationship.
I am not an actuary, and perhaps I don’t 
plead the case as well as my actuary partners would, 
and to that end I would refer the Board to an article 
that appeared in the July issue of the Journal of 
Accountancy, July, 1978, written by our National 
Practice Director of Actuarial Services and our Vice 
Chairman for Accounting and Auditing, Mr. William 
Dreher and Mr. Clifford Graese respectively. I 
incorporated that article in my testimony. Let me
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say briefly to respond, Mr. Cary, we believe, and 
our actuaries believe, just as I have described before, 
that one does not make a management decision.
One requires in doing competent actuarial 
work that the client understands the substance of 
the actuarial assumptions and the alternatives that 
are available to him, and then makes a judgment based 
on the alternatives that are available.
It is the actuary’s responsibility to 
educate his client that way, and it is the client’s 
responsibility to be educated that way.
One of the concerns that has been expressed, 
I am sure, is that if the auditor and the actuary 
are in the same firm that, in essence, the auditor 
is auditing his own work, as it were. But such is 
not the case.
As I indicated in my introductory remarks, 
I served on a task force that led into SAS-11 which 
deals with the use of non-accounting specialists. When 
an auditor examines actuarial work, he is not auditing 
the actuary. He is trying to establish the actuary’s 
qualifications and credentials. He is trying to 
establish that alternatives have been set forth and 
that assumptions are rational.
The auditor does not have the competence to 
make actuarial judgment because he is not an actuary.
I am sure the illustration has been used of 
the geologist or the gemologist or any other kind of 
a specialist, and the actuary is the same.
If the actuary offers, as many do, that only 
an actuary can understand what an actuary has done, 
then they sort of have a Catch 22 argument. Then 
they can’t accuse the auditor of auditing his work 
because by definition an auditor is not an actuary, 
and therefore, he doesn't understand what an actuary 
is doing.
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As I say, I would prefer that the Board for 
its research consider Mr. Dreher’s and Mr. Graese’s 
article because it is a very logical exposition, I 
think, and it is done with a great deal more 
scholarliness than I have just done it.
PROFESSOR CARY: I gather that they think 
it is practically impossible. That is their point. 
It is practically impossible to inform the management. 
In other words, you are willy-nilly making management 
decisions.
MR. KLION: They say that, Mr. Cary, but 
they carry water on two shoulders.
There is a citation in that article which 
is relevant. As you know, the actuarial profession 
divides itself into several pieces. One relates to 
employee benefits, using that phrase broadly; one to 
the life insurance industry. There is also some 
casualty work as well.
There is a precept in the actuarial profession 
that actuaries impose upon themselves, that says when 
an actuary is employed by an insurance company, and 
he provides actuarial services to his employer, 
(speaking of independence and clouds and appearance, 
of course) that in fact, the employer is his client 
and the executives and the shareholders and trustees 
and directors are all his clients, and it is required 
of him that he inform those people as to the 
assumptions that he has made, the very things that I 
have just cited.
I don't believe you can argue that that is 
an appropriate environment for one piece of their 
profession but not for another piece. If they can 
persuade trustees and shareholders and executives 
as to the assumptions that they use, and they 
require that in their codes of behavior, we believe 
that is fine.
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All we are saying is that that particular 
approach to professional services is a decent one 
and should be applied to all of their services. We 
don’t agree that you can’t inform clients because, 
in fact, we do, and we obtain from clients confirmations 
of the fact that they do understand what we are talking 
about.
PROFESSOR CARY: Thank you.
MR. GARRETT: One last thing, Mr. Klion. 
The suggestion was made yesterday, I believe by Mr. 
Vanatta of Arthur Young, who had the same basic view 
that you expressed, the nature of the skill or the 
nature of the service is unrelated to independence 
and independence should be the criterion. It was 
also suggested that perhaps something could be done 
to beef up or extend the peer review to more expressly 
examine into MAS as it relates to independence.
We didn’t have all the time in the world 
to explore it with him or with anybody else, but 
we have been puzzled in thinking about it as to just 
what a peer review team could do.
It is easy enough for them to identify the 
services that the firm provides. Does it seem practical 
to you that they could do something that would have 
some meaning to it in the way of reporting, whether 
the firm did or did not participate in management 
decisions to a degree of compromising their independence?
MR. KLION: Yes, sir, I think it is because 
we try to do the same thing within our own firm, and 
most of my competitors do the same as well.
There is no question that it is somewhat 
more difficult to try to re-establish after the fact 
the environment in which a problem has been presented 
and the solutions that have been offered. But you 
certainly can measure—we do, and we have very successful 
work programs to which this Board is quite welcome— 
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to measure the administrative controls that are placed 
upon the engagement, the criteria which we impose upon 
our engagement teams, the extent to which alternative 
judgments have been reached because we document those, 
the offers of alternative recommendations to our 
clients. It would not be hard to include to certain 
specific constraints which might be established by 
the SEC Practice Section or this Board and the SEC, 
to include those in our work programs.
We read all of our proposal letters, the 
fact-finding which is documented in our work, the 
reports that are submitted to see whether they hang 
together logically, and whether there is a rational 
presentation of the case.
We also include in our own firms, and I 
think other firms do as well, an on-the-job quality 
assurance review. That is to say, during the course 
of an engagement we will send in a review team.
We put constraints on jobs in excess of 
certain limitations, and in greater complexity to be 
sure that judgments are properly rendered.
MR. GARRETT: So there is something in 
the peer review team.
MR. KLION: I think there is something that 
could be done. It is not quite the same thing as 
auditing, but I would be perfectly comfortable with 
it, and we would be very happy to submit to it.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much. 
Go ahead, Dick.
MR. STARK: Since Mr. Klion's firm is so 
heavily engaged in the actuarial work, I wonder if 
it wouldn’t be worth pursuing that just a moment 
further.
Yesterday one of the witnesses explained 
that an auditing firm that is reviewing actuarial 
work will go further than merely testing the
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qualifications of the actuary.
Does your firm generally apply tests and 
make examinations beyond the qualifications of the 
actuary when your firm is auditing, say, an insurance 
company or is involved in looking at the pension plan?
MR. KLION: I am not sure I quite understand 
your question, Mr. Stark. We do have insurance 
actuaries on our staff who are partners, and I might 
add that some of them are certified public accountants 
as well as Fellows of the Society of Actuaries, and 
they will test actuarial valuations as part of the 
audit activities. They do not provide those services 
to audit clients who do not have either their own in­
house actuarial services or use third party actuaries 
to provide it.
That is to say, we are not the principal 
source of that actuarial service, but we satisfy 
ourselves as to the competence of the actuarial work 
because after all, in an insurance company, that is 
the very guts, the very heart of the balance sheet.
We will do that as well as satisfying 
ourselves as to the quality of the actuarial 
assumptions that are made and the actuarial services 
that have been rendered.
MR. STARK: So you go beyond SAS-11?
MR. KLION: Yes, we do.
MR. STARK: In the case of an actuary other 
than your own where the actuarial work is other than 
your own firm?
MR. KLION: Yes.
MR. STARK: In the case where your firm 
provides the actuarial work, how do you go about—I 
guess you satisfied yourself in SAS-11 because you know 
your own actuaries, but how do you go beyond the 
qualifications?
MR. KLION: As I say, in insurance companies 
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we don’t do the primary actuarial service on the 
accounts to which we attest.
MR. STARK: You mean as a matter of principle, 
you do not?
MR. KLION: As a matter of principle we do 
not. On the benefit side, to the degree that we 
attest to pension plans, for example, where our 
actuaries provide valuations, we satisfy ourselves 
as though they were non-PMM actuaries.
There is some professional literature that 
requires that special care be given because of the 
potential appearance of this relationship, and we 
satisfy ourselves accordingly.
I might add, incidentally, that the Department 
of Labor which has jurisdiction over ERISA, has quite 
explicitly indicated that an auditor and an actuary 
being in the same firm does not create a conflict of 
interest or a cloud on independence.
There is a specific regulation which is 
again cited in that article. It is quite explicit 
on the subject.
MR. STARK: But you would be having different 
people on your audit side than the people on the 
actuarial side, and applying as you say, extra care 
because of the self-audit potential.
MR. KLION: That is correct. We have auditors 
who are trained in the area of auditing pension plans 
and other types of products of actuarial services 
who are especially trained for this purpose.
MR. STARK: And they would apply, I suppose, 
in principle, the same tests to actuarial work done 
by some one other than your firm.
MR. KLION: Absolutely, because the bulk of 
the pension plans which we audit, we do not provide 
actuarial valuations for.
MR. STARK: Do you find the proposals of 
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the Executive Committee as to insurance actuarial 
services and employee benefit consulting services to 
be unduly restrictive on your firm?
You have already said that you have conformed. 
I take it that was done as a matter of policy and 
that it has not had a material impact on your firm, 
but as a matter of principle, do you find these 
proposals unduly restrictive?
MR. KLION: Without trying to be redundant, 
Mr. Stark, I find the structure of that amendment 
conceptually incorrect. Now, if you pass that point 
and say, "Here is what I have," no, sir, I do not. 
That caused us no restriction at all. It is the 
concept that I have a problem with, and if I can 
make one more comment to that, there is an ill-used 
cliche about salami slicing and that is what we are 
afraid of. We think the concept is wrong, but we 
can live with it and the interpretations that come 
with it in peace, let us get on with our business. 
But if this becomes the point from which we now 
make additional concessions, that we are building a 
house on a very poor foundation in my view and that is 
what I object to.
MR. STARK: You salami was not sliced by 
this one but it will be by the next one?
MR. KLION: No, sir. It was modestly by 
search, unwisely in my view because I think you are 
permitting us now to do unprofessional work instead 
of professional work, and we won’t do that in any 
case. But I think it is an incorrect constraint. 
I don’t think it accomplishes what you seek to, but 
I am willing to live with it explicitly, and we are 
living with it right now.
MR. STARK: Do you think that the rule 
should be expanded to say that a firm will not audit 
its own actuarial work for insurance companies? You 
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say you don't do it as a matter of principle. That 
is only as a matter of internal policy with your firm?
MR. KLION: I don't think we are limited. 
I don't think we are the only firm that says that.
MR. STARK: You say you can't do it.
MR. KLION: You can't audit your own work 
now.
MR. MATUSIAK: What about the employee 
benefits area?
MR. KLION: In employee benefits the wording 
is a little close. The employee benefits, the ERISA 
rules as I understand them require that the actuary 
prepares the reports for the plan. I think that is 
close to the wording, which we may, in fact, audit.
We impose the same requirements on that as 
we do as I have described before.
We believe that the plan as an entity to be 
audited should understand very clearly what it is that 
has been done, and agree with the work to be done— 
the assumptions and the presentations and the alternatives. 
There is no solution in actuarial work as I understand, 
and there are alternatives from among which choices 
are made, and we do require that our people inform 
their clients accordingly.
MR. MANZONI: We were told yesterday that 
in the area of the employee benefit actuarial 
determination, the law requires that the actuary himself 
file the report with the Department of Labor but also 
that the determinations and the actuarial assumptions 
are those of the actuary and not those of management.
Do you agree with the statement, or is it 
something that you are sufficiently involved in to be 
willing to give an answer?
MR. KLION: I am not sure I can speak as 
credibly as I would like to, Mr. Manzoni, because I 
am not an actuary. I would be happy to get you a
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specific answer. If you will just give me one second, 
I think there is a reference to that in here.
The reference here, it says: These principles 
of professional conduct have been reinforced by ERISA 
which requires that an independent CPA be engaged on 
behalf of all plan participants to conduct an audit 
of the financial statements of the plan, and that 
an enrolled actuary be engaged on behalf of all plan 
participants to prepare the actuarial statements 
specified in Section so-and-so of the Act.
I cannot speak more precisely than that. 
If you like, I will see that you get that information 
or at least give you my perception of it anyway, 
but just to conclude, the Department of Labor which 
has regulatory responsibility for ERISA has considered 
this specific issue, that is, independence, and has 
concluded in Regulation 2509.759 that "The rendering 
of services by an actuary associated with an accountant 
or an accounting firm shall not impair—shall not 
impair the accountant's or accounting firm's 
independence."
MR. MANZONI: It was really a different 
question. What I was getting at, in all these other 
MAS areas we are told about the role of the accounting 
firm and the role is advisory.
It would seem that if the statements made by 
the actuaries are correct, there is departure from that 
role in this one narrow area.
MR. KLION: If, as you describe it, I guess 
you could argue that way. Again, I believe that, 
at least in the way we practice, our clients have 
available, admittedly through our education and 
their willingness to be educated, the alternatives 
that are offered, and make those judgments before 
the die is cast, as it were.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much, Mr.
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Klion. We appreciate very much your views.
Incidentally, we have two cancellations 
for this afternoon.
Let us now take 15 minutes for coffee.
(A short recess was held.)
MR. GARRETT: Mr. Elliott. We will now 
resume with Mr. Elliott and Mr. Mitchell from the 
MAS Executive Committee and MAS Division of the AICPA
Will you proceed, please.
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MR. MERLE S. ELLIOTT: I am Merle S. Elliott. 
I am a CPA. I am active in the AICPA’s MAS Division. With 
me today is John Mitchell who is the Director of the MAS 
Division of the Institute. I have also asked Mr. Stan Klion 
who just testified before you to join us. He is the Chairman 
of the MAS Executive Committee of which I am a member and on 
whose behalf I am here today.
The Executive Committee has previously submitted 
written testimony which you have. I will not read that. It 
is my intent today to give a brief summary of the points that 
were made in that presentation. The MAS Executive Committee 
is the AICPA’s official voice on MAS matters.
By way of personal background, I am the Executive 
Partner of Smith Elliott Kearns & Company. I founded my own 
predecessor firm as an individual practitioner in 1956 and 
created along with my partner in 1963, by merger, the firm 
that is presently so named. We have a staff now of about 
60 people, and we practice in Western Maryland and South 
Central Pennsylvania. For the past 22 years, since I formed 
my own practice, I have constantly been involved in advice 
to management. In fact, that was my very beginning in 
public accounting. I was in public accounting on my own 
account for several years before I had my first audit client. 
I believe that this advice to management is considered by 
our clients to be the most important service that we render.
Many of our clients today receive such service from 
our firm by way of background of the firm; we have about 22% 
audit work, about a third tax work with the balance consisting 
of accounting services and advice to management. Some portion 
of our audit work might be construed to be advice to management 
since we don’t necessarily break down in full detail work done 
by auditors when they are involved in advising clients.
Our clients ask for advice. They expect it. Such 
advice is in areas that are not necessarily related to the 
audit function. We have full-time personnel to provide the 
more formal MAS advice, and we have a fairly significant staff 
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that provides accounting services and tax advisory services. 
Through our affiliation with approximately 85 
other firms, we have more sophisticated, more highly 
specialized professionals, to provide the more highly 
structured MAS services and more complex engagements.
My own service to clients is largely the sort 
of thing that does not relate to the conduct of audits. 
I have not been personally involved in auditing other than 
as an advisor to auditors, for some time.
As I said, my purpose is to summarize the Executive 
Committee's formal statement previously submitted to you. 
I intend to emphasize the conclusion of the MAS Executive 
Committee, that the provision of MAS does not threaten audit 
independence.
Additionally, as a subsequent report from the 
Institute, we have submitted on behalf of the AICPA Private 
Company section of firms their comments with respect to this 
hearing, emphasizing certain points that they have that relate 
to matters which I will comment on a little bit later in my 
presentation.
First, I would like to point out that we consider 
that there is no basis for a prohibition of MAS services. 
We consider that surveys of attitudes are not evidence. 
Factual research has not disclosed any cases of an impairment 
of audit quality or independence as a result of providing 
MAS services.
I won't go into lengthy quotes about the research 
of the Cohen Commission which is probably the most 
definitive factual research with respect to that topic. 
But as has been pointed out to you before, there has been 
no empirical evidence of an impairment of audit independence. 
On that basis the Commission concluded that there would be 
no justification for a prohibition if that were the only 
thing to be considered. Nevertheless, the Commission did 
determine that there was a significant minority that should 
be considered even though it could not be proven that there 
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was a problem, but, they further stated that, on balance, there 
is no justification for the prohibition of any particular 
service. The Cohen Commission further observed that the 
fears of those who express concerns about threats to audit 
independence decrease as their familiarity with the 
services provided by CPA firms increases.
We feel that it is appropriate for us to forcefully 
argue that there is no reason to curtail MAS services.
From my perspective as a smaller practitioner, I 
know that in many cases our clients would not be able to 
secure the services in management advisory and other advisory 
services if it were not for the CPA. In fact, we are in many 
cases the only source. We believe that without any evidence 
of an auditing inadequacy resulting from management 
advisory services that a prohibition of such services is 
unjustified and wrong.
In a more positive vein, let me briefly comment 
on what we believe are the benefits that are derived from 
the provision of MAS services.
We think that MAS competencies enhance better 
audits. We know that many of the skills that are 
necessary in audits with respect to the evaluation of 
systems controls, the analyzation of financial controls, 
evaluating internal controls, the application of latest 
business technologies and the understandings of the 
operations of our clients' firms are greatly enhanced 
by the management advisory skills that we have developed.
Our auditors better understand the signs that 
come from the tests, and I think it is important to 
realize that audits cannot completely test or 
completely examine every transaction in a business. 
Auditors test the records. On the basis of testing the 
records, they test the systems. They have to understand 
the basis for these tests for them to have validity. If 
they don't understand what the systems are about, they 
can't really do effective audits. Management advisory 
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services skills enhance the auditors' abilities to do a 
better job.
We think that the clients have a better 
impression of CPA firms and of auditors because of the 
breadth of services and the ability of CPAs to attract 
more competent, more highly skilled individuals into the 
profession.
This has resulted in improved audit effectiveness. 
We believe, and we think we can demonstrate, that users 
of financial statements better respect the audited 
financial statements, recognizing the high level of skills 
and the breadth or range of skills that are applied 
to support the decisions that are made by auditors in the 
application of their audit judgments.
We think the clients benefit most particularly. 
CPAs have an ongoing familiarity with the client, and 
as a result, are able to be extremely effective in 
providing management advisory services to clients.
Continuing client relationships gives a 
great incentive for the maintenance of a high quality 
standard of management advisory work. We think that in 
many cases, and from my personal experience, I am certain, 
that recommendations by CPAs made as a result of a 
advisory services engagement are more likely to be fully 
implemented (as opposed to being in a book placed on a 
shelf and never referred to again.). This is true 
because of the continuing relationship of the CPA with the 
client.
Following are disadvantages that would result from 
the prohibition of management advisory services.
The major disadvantage is the loss of the 
advantages (particularly from the perspective of the smaller 
firm) would be the business-absorbed cost increases and the 
difficulty in getting those services from some other source 
(assuming such services were even available).
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Now, normally we would expect that the result 
of the SEC Practice Section’s prohibitions with respect 
to management advisory services would only apply to 
registrant companies, but we know from past experience 
that that will not be true. We know that it will filter 
down and it will affect all CPA firms and all clients 
for a couple of reasons. One, two standards, two sets 
of independence standards, will simply not be acceptable. 
They won’t be acceptable to our clients. They won’t be 
acceptable to users of financial statements, and they 
won’t be acceptable to CPA firms. CPA firms will fear a 
charge (or an appearance) of inferiority from a competitive 
standpoint, and additionally, they will be concerned 
about the possibility of increased legal liability resulting 
from the possibility that a court will later hold that 
the more stringent standards ought to have applied.
Though it might be possible in theory for two 
standards to exist, we don’t believe that it is possible 
in fact.
Let me summarize and offer a few conclusions. 
Given competence and due professional care, we believe 
that independence is the only criterion for the rendering 
of services to audit clients or to other clients.
It has been pointed out previously that the 
profession’s roots are in the early accounting and 
financial advisors to business. My own practice evolved from 
that, and I perhaps flatter my firm, but I believe that its 
evolution is in a manner the profession in miniature. 
From one client with an annual fee of $125. to our present 
size with a steady increase in the percent of fees represented 
by auditing. We have always provided accounting and financial 
advice to our clients. That is how we kept them. That is 
how we got more.
Our firm’s clients view those advisory services 
as the most important thing that we do.
Audits are generally imposed by third parties.
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Advice to management is something that management itself 
seeks out.
As a profession, the MAS Executive Committee 
and the entire Institute is concerned about threats to 
audit independence. Audit independence has been one of 
the standards of auditing for a long time. We are 
concerned about any loss of independence. We have ethical 
constraints that address that concern.
With respect to the activities of CPAs, and their 
role in serving businesses, it has long been established, 
as amplified by the SEC itself, that advising business is a 
proper role for a CPA.
Decision making and management is the prerogative of 
management.
I would like to conclude with these comments. 
Obviously, we think that what we do in public accounting 
is an appropriate thing to do. We think that our clients 
agree. Otherwise, they wouldn’t continue to have us do 
these things and they wouldn’t continue to pay our 
fair charges and expand the services that they have us 
perform, (the additional services that they request of us) 
if they did not think these services were useful. We 
think we should be permitted to continue to provide these 
services and I certainly hope that you will agree.
Further, we strongly recommend that the conclusion 
of this Public Oversight Board be communicated and promul­
gated in such a way that the thought processes with respect 
to independence as it relates to the provision of MAS 
services be available to audit committees and boards of 
directors of registrant companies and other companies in 
assessing the independence of their certified public 
accountants and their auditors.
That is a very brief summary. Our more complete 
formal presentation has already been submitted to you, 
In the interest of conserving time, I have limited our 
oral presentation.
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At this point I would like to respond to any 
questions that might have been suggested by my remarks or 
our formal testimony, or the testimony that was submitted 
on behalf of the private companies group.
Mr. Klion as Chairman of the MAS Executive 
Committee is here to further respond where that is appropriate 
as is Mr. Mitchell.
Thank you for your attention.
MR. McCLOY: I gather that you think that the 
proposals that are put forward in the Notice are unduly 
restrictive.
MR. ELLIOTT: From my personal perspective.
Mr. McCloy, I do, and from the perspective of the Committee, 
we also think that they are unduly restrictive.
However, the Committee has agreed by formal 
action that we can, in fact, live with those.
MR. McCLOY: Live with this?
MR. ELLIOTT: Right. We don’t accept the 
rationale, but we do accept perhaps the necessity.
MR. McCLOY: I don’t think I have anything 
further.
MR. GARRETT: Would the Executive Committee's proposals 
cause a severe curtailment in the services that your firm 
provides?
MR. ELLIOTT: No, as a matter of fact, Mr.
Garrett, they would cause no curtailment at all in our 
particular case.
MR. GARRETT: But I suppose anything more drastic 
in the way of prohibition against MAS would shatter the firm.
MR. ELLIOTT: It depends on whether we decided 
to continue to do audits.
MR. GARRETT: You might drop auditing?
MR. ELLIOTT: That is right.
MR. GARRETT: We keep coming back to the idea 
that the possession of MAS skills with firms improves 
audits, and yet we keep hearing that the MAS personnel don’t
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do auditing, and frequently aren’t even CPAs.
MR. ELLIOTT: That isn’t true in our case.
MR. GARRETT; It is not?
MR. ELLIOTT: No, sir, we do not have the tight 
formal structure that larger firms evolve into. When I 
started in practice, Mr. Garrett, I did everything there 
was-including typing the reports. Later on I found it 
appropriate to get a typist. Later on I employed auditors. 
Just recently we have added MAS skills, and our one full-time 
and two part-time MAS practitioners are CPAs. All of them 
graduated, if you will, from our auditing section.
MR. GARRETT: It seems at least conceivable that 
if the auditing personnel, the CPAs were also in between 
audits,so to speak, providing management services and 
advisory services to the same client, you would generate a 
degree of familiarity and involvement that would threaten 
objectivity.
MR. ELLIOTT: I certainly question that. I have 
had such experiences fairly recently in my lifetime.
I don't believe that my integrity will be compromised.
If as a result of audit, I find that a person I recommended 
be employed had turned out to be a thief, it does not 
follow, that I won't blow the whistle.
I think there is a question of integrity that 
must be taken into account with objectivity. As Stan 
Klion said earlier, I don't think that our profession is 
comprised totally of rascals, although, there obviously 
are some.
MR. GARRETT: Certainly we would not suggest 
that, but it is also true that some rules and ethical 
canons exist for prophylactic purposes or for appearance 
purposes, or as one of the persons yesterday said, to avoid 
the proximate occasion of sin.
This is most obviously true in the financial 
interest test of your independence.
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MR. ELLIOTT: Right.
MR. GARRETT: I haven’t checked the history of 
it, but I dare say when the principle was being established 
and the independence required the absence of financial 
interest, that nobody observed that there weren’t any cases 
proving that the ownership of 100 shares of stock of a 
client caused an impairment in the quality of the audit.
The question would have seemed almost irrelevant, 
and I think the same idea persisted in this area.
MR. ELLIOTT: May I comment. I think that it is 
true that you can’t prove that there has been an impairment. 
Conversely, we can’t prove that MAS services do not cause 
the possibility of a threat on independence. In fact, I 
personally believe that in some cases, they do cause a 
threat to audit independence but I think the trade-off is so 
much worse from the standpoint of our economy of small 
business. That if you put these constraints on the people 
who are knowledgeable and can provide those services, 
(throw the rascals out and throw the baby out with the 
bath, so to speak), that the negatives of not having those 
MAS services are so much worse than taking the chance of maybe 
a little bit of appearance of the possibility of impairment. 
That is overcome by individual integrity in almost every case.
MR. GARRETT: Let me finish along that line of 
thought. You would say there is no need for the auditor to 
ever have a financial interest in the client, and there is an 
obvious suggestion of temptation, and therefore, no harm is 
done by prohibiting it since its being there wouldn’t do any 
good, but when you turn to MAS, you would say the same things 
are not true. There is some benefit in the MAS, and while it 
can have an appearance of impairment of objectivity, the pros 
outweigh the cons.
It is that line of thinking that has led us to 
question the validity or the cogency of the argument
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that there is no record of problems because it isn’t 
susceptible to a record. At least, what we are worrying 
about it not provable, what the critics are worrying about.
MR. ELLIOTT: It would be very difficult for me 
to testify that I say him not do it. (Laughter)
MR. KLION: Mr. Garrett, may I comment to a 
question that you put to Mr. Elliott and I guess 
inferentially to me about the number of MAS practitioners 
who are not certified and how that assists in the examination.
In my own firm, we have in excess of 800 full-time 
professionals in MAS work. I would say something on the 
order of a fourth to a fifth are certified. Some smaller 
number are probably seeking to become certified and the 
great preponderance, certainly more than half, never will 
be certified.
Having said that, they are almost always 
scheduled, depending upon their skills, quite formally into our 
audit procedures because our audits require the kind of 
talents that they bring to bear.
The rationale is that if a man comes up with, 
let us say, data transmission skills which is important to 
an audit of a multilocation client, he will ask the 
question: I am trained as an accountant doing data processing 
work, and I want to keep current in my profession which 
happens to be data transmission, and to go through the 
procedure of getting a CPA certificate, which I will 
never practice as such, simply diverts my efforts away from 
what I do very well into something which has more of an 
appearance than a factual benefit to my career and to my 
clients.
We have 135 or 140 MAS partners, and the same 
proportion obtains. Perhaps a fourth are certified, and the 
rest are not.
MR. GARRETT: They directly participate in audits?
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MR. KLION: Yes, sir. Not every single one 
of them in every audit, but virtually every audit, has MAS 
Practitioners if no other place than a review of the data 
processing center, and there are other places, too, but that 
is clearly the one that gets the most attention.
That is a formally structured thing. The time 
goes into audit time sheets or audit contracts, and they are 
very much a part of it.
We train people along these lines, some of whom 
have MAS backgrounds, and some of whom do not. We 
interchange our people for their own benefit. We put some 
MAS people on the audit staff for a year or two, and 
conversely, some auditors on the MAS staff for a year or 
two because we feel that cross-training makes them better 
auditors.
MR. GARRETT: So a young CPA coming in could 
look to a period of time possibly, that is, in the MAS 
Division?
MR. KLION: Yes, sir, and some of them stay 
in the MAS Division. Every year we probably have three 
or four partners who are admitted to the MAS practice who 
started as auditors.
MR. GARRETT: It at least offers a possibility 
for them of additional experience.
MR. KLION: Yes, sir. The managing partner of 
our Chicago office, which is our second largest office, 
is both a CPA and a very distinguished consultant.
The Regional Vice Chairman on the West Coast, 
the same observation. He is a consultant and he is 
certified. He brings to the management of the firm 
skills that we think are quite appropriate for his position.
MR. GARRETT: I stepped out of our usual order, 
but I might as well go on with one more question, and that is, 
Mr. Mitchell, I would like to know what the MAS Division 
of the AICPA does.
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Do you promote, or do you fuss at MASers?
MR. MITCHELL: Technically, the MAS Division 
consists of the staff which is myself and Mr. Kuttner and 
a secretary, and the members of the MAS committees 
and task forces.
The staff’s responsibility is primarily to support 
the committees in whatever activities they undertake, which 
could be the development of standards, the development of 
guidelines for specific practice areas, it could be 
assisting the Executive Committee in developing a statement 
such as the one submitted here. It could be considering 
new approaches to the education and training of MAS 
personnel, but our basic function is to support, the staff’s 
basic function is to support the committee activities.
MR. GARRETT: I see. Thank you.
MR. KLION: At the risk of embarrassing 
Mr. Mitchell, he does it with great distinction.
PROFESSOR CARY: I’ve just got a couple of questions. 
First of all I would like to ask you, Mr. Elliott, 
you have pointed out that your firm does 22% audit, and the 
balance is in other areas including tax and MAS.
Obviously, you can’t speak for the whole spectrum, 
but let's take a firm of 200 professionals, and less. That 
would be a good cut-off point.
Are there many firms having that relatively 
minimal percentage of audit and time predominantly in other 
areas.
MR. ELLIOTT: There have been two surveys, one in 
1974, the Roper survey, and one more recently, more narrow 
in application, that addressed just that question to the 
smaller firms.
It seems to follow, and Mr. Mitchell may be able 
to comment more definitively on this—it follows that 
the smaller the firm, the larger a percentage of nonaudit 
activities or advisory activities.
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In my own personal experience that follows 
because, when you are a one-man organization, you have a 
small number of clients and you deal an awful lot of the 
time in helping them solve problems in their real world, 
and their real world is making money in their business, 
not getting an audit. That is a third-party imposed 
obligation. They are more concerned about making a "buck." 
PROFESSOR CARY: Thank you for that. The other 
point that we harped upon a bit over a period of time, it 
would seem in addition to independence, many of you would 
accept some sort of concept of compatibility. Maybe you 
would accept some sort of concept of compatibility. Maybe 
you wouldn’t. I don’t know.
MR. ELLIOTT: My own personal view, sir, is that 
I think competence and skill and ability are the only 
criteria other than independence.
Obviously, we would not as a firm undertake to 
design a space ship to go to Mars, nor would we attempt to 
advise in the installation of a 370/158. (We hardly even know 
what one looks like). But, I could say that an IBM 370/158 
is compatible, but we don’t have the skill to do anything 
with it. We don’t even know how to deal with it, but we do 
know how to deal with the smaller computer.
PROFESSOR CARY: As I recall, I think Mr. Klion, 
you said compatibility was something you might consider.
MR. KLION: I share Mr. Elliott's view. 
Competence is clearly the overriding consideration, but I 
guess you could argue if a CPA firm wished to do so, it 
could get competent people to take opinion surveys, and 
design space ships. I don’t think we would do that.
PROFESSOR CARY: I just wonder. This is probably one 
question I should have asked you initially, Mr. Klion, because 
we are all searching for what we mean by compatibility.
As you take some of these forms of service which 
are specifically addressed in this implementation of the 
scope of services criteria, and apply it, for example, to such 
things as plant layout and product design and so forth, could
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we then ask the question whether or not, at least, the 
limitations that are suggested here have a basis in compatibility 
without using the work "skills" at all?
MR. KLION: I think more so. That is to say, I 
agree with what I understand the thrust of your statement 
to be. Conceivably, we could get engineering skills on our 
staff, and indeed, we have some registered professional 
engineering backgrounds.
When we get involved, for example, in activities 
in a manufacturing plant, it relates to the control structure 
of the company, the effectiveness with which manufacturing 
activities are performed and the collection of data for entry 
into the accounting system or inventory management or things 
of that nature.
We might speak to the location of plants or 
delivery points from a cost effectiveness point of view, 
using mathematical techniques to come up with those answers.
We certainly wouldn't design the structure 
because we don't have and don't wish to have construction 
engineering skills, and I would say that is a function of 
compatibility, not a function of a skill-related criterion 
that spoke to independence. I guess I could argue very 
easily designing a building would not compromise my 
independence as an auditor. I just don't think it is 
something I should do.
PROFESSOR CARY: Therefore, in a sense you don’t 
object to some of these limitations if you accept the 
compatibility theory.
MR. KLION: I do not object to the limitations, 
save the one in search on the basis of its pragmatics. 
I think the rationale that puts it there is what concerns 
me.
PROFESSOR CARY: Fine. Thank you.
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MR. McCLOY: You might go out and hire a 
space expert, might you not, if you saw space was 
becoming a pretty important commercial activity in this 
country?
MR. Klion: Not likely, Mr. McCloy. There are 
more easily attainable targets of commercial advantage 
that we might do which we also elect not to because we 
fundamentally —
MR. McCLOY: But you wouldn’t have a rule that 
restricted you. You would leave that to the market.
MR. KLION: We have a self-imposed rule.
MR. McCLOY: You would have your own rule, 
but you wouldn’t have an externally imposed rule.
MR. KLION: I think there is a merit to the 
perception of what you do. I used the phrase before, the 
control structure of a company. My own sense is that is 
a fair set of parameters around which we would work.
PROFESSOR CARY: That is a good phrase. I am 
not sure I know what it means because after all even 
law firms, God forbid, which are most individualistic 
have some forms of control. Therefore, everybody has a 
control structure.
MR. KLION: The name of our department used to 
be the Management Controls Department, and I found it a 
very useful—it was a self-defining title. I am not 
sure I don't wish I still had it.
MR. MITCHELL: Mr. Cary, in that connection, 
yesterday Mr. Vanatta itemized the criteria that his 
firm uses acceptance of engagement. That is a going-in 
part of the control structure.
We have also heard about the subsequent review 
or the while the work is being done review and control 
structure, the subsequent review within the firm, and I 
think Mr. Vanatta made a strong case for peer review and 
applying peer review to the acceptance of MAS engagements.
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I think those are the things we are thinking of 
when it comes to a control structure on MAS and particularly 
its effect on independence.
PROFESSOR CARY: Thank you.
MR. GARRETT: We, at least I, have also been 
exploring playing with the notion that there is some sort 
of notion involved that certain things are not appropriate 
for people to hold themselves out to be professionals in 
the accounting field to do. I think you could easily think 
of some absurd examples, but it is a little hard to imagine 
just how that might be phrased, and the truth of it may 
be since we are not looking at a list of horrible examples 
of auditing firms, member CPA firms that are now hawking 
stuff that embarrasses the profession or what-not, that 
we needn’t really worry about it very much.
I think there is a sort of lurking principle in 
your own thinking, and your own decisions as to what sort of 
services you want to add to the auditing function, but maybe 
it doesn’t need precise articulation, I am sure.
MR. McCLOY: Your weren’t suggesting that you 
put another criterion of absurdity? (Laughter)
MR. ELLIOTT: Or lack of it.
MR. GARRETT: There might be a marketplace function, 
too. Perhaps an auditing firm that was also known to be 
hawking debit insurance around the neighborhood or 
what-not would lose standing so fast.
MR. McCLOY: Sort of the department store idea.
MR. KLION: There are management consulting 
firms that deliberately engage in renting management. 
They are quite good. There is one in Philadelphia and one on 
the West Coast, and their purpose in being is to, in essence, 
rent management to troubled companies.
Most management consulting firms quite clearly 
avoid that type of procedure, but there are at least two quite 
reputable firms that do that.
MR. GARRETT: There are bookkeeping firms, too, or 
accounting firms that don’t or ought not to hold themselves 
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out, at least, as auditors with respect to the same company. 
Not those of any size, I presume.
Have we any other questions?
Thank you very much, gentlemen. We appreciate 
it.
MR. ELLIOTT: Thank you, gentlemen.
MR. GARRETT: Mr. James A. Korreck.
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MR. JAMES A. KORRECK: My name is Jim Korreck. 
I am Chairman of the MAS Committee for the Illinois 
CPA Society, and I want to thank you for allowing me 
the opportunity to present to you the views of the 
Illinois Society with respect to this most critical 
issue, that of limiting the scope of services that 
CPAs are allowed to perform.
The Illinois Society represents over 11,000 
active members. As Chairman of the MAS Committee, 
the responsibility for developing a position paper 
fell upon our committee. I can assure you that that 
responsibility was not taken lightly. We spent many 
hours deliberating these various points arguing, both 
pro and con, for an against, the various positions, 
most of which have been presented in the last day and 
a half before you.
In a committee such as the Illinois Society, 
we are a little bit unique. The committee is made up 
of representatives from different firms and different 
viewpoints as a result from different firms having 
different viewpoints.
As a result, the committee evaluated several 
positions before reaching the final position.
The first position paper adopted by the 
committee parallelled the logic of the majority of 
those who have been presenting position papers here 
today and yesterday. That was, that the sole criterion 
should be independence and competence. A CPA should 
perform those services which do not jeopardize his 
independence with respect to the audit and those 
which he is competent to perform.
This position was based on the following 
factors, many of which have been presented again 
before.
There is absolutely no factual evidence to 
substantiate the allegation that independence has been
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impaired through the provision of MAS services.
It is also the firm belief of our committee 
that the CPA enjoys a privileged and unique position 
of trust with respect to users of financial statements.
It is also the feeling of the committee that 
there are adequate controls within the profession and 
outside the profession to insure that independence is 
protected.
We also feel that there are positive benefits 
to be derived by the client and the public when the 
CPA is allowed to perform management advisory services 
along with the audit function.
The MAS function has evolved to the status 
it has today not because of some Machiavellian attempt 
to control all management services but rather has 
evolved in response to the needs of the profession and 
our clients. This need has been precipitated by two 
major factors, one, the advance of technology and 
secondly, the technical awareness of management. We 
are constantly in a changing environment. Fifteen 
years ago computers were not even a factor. We 
wouldn’t even have considered them in our audit. 
Today it is absolutely essential that we understand 
computers and their impact on the controls of a 
corporation.
We have developed statistical techniques 
which we employ in auditing to assist us in providing 
a more comprehensive audit, more objectivity of 
criteria. For example, use of statistical sampling.
Our clients have become more educated, more 
knowledgeable in advanced techniques. They want and 
they look to their CPAs to provide them with assistance 
in implementing some of these advanced techniques 
that they perhaps have heard about in college, have 
taken some courses on, but do not fully understand. 
They are asking for us to assist them in employing 
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these or implementing these techniques to help them 
better manage their corporations.
The committee points out, in its final 
position paper, that it accepts the fact that there 
is a significant minority who believe that independence 
in appearance may be jeopardized when a firm is 
permitted to practice diverse and unrelated fields. 
The final position of the Illinois Society reads as 
such. CPAs should not be constrained from providing 
for audit clients any services which, one, do not 
compromise audit independence, and two, which utilize 
accounting-and auditing-related skills.
For non-audit clients, the constraints 
limiting services to those related accounting-and 
auditing-skills are not applicable.
I would be more than willing to answer any 
questions that the committee has.
MR. McCLOY: I don’t think I have any.
MR. GARRETT: You came back to what is 
substantially the Executive Committee's proposal, did 
you not?
MR. KORRECK: That is correct.
MR. GARRETT: Not necessarily endorsing 
their analysis of various tenets but accepting the 
principle of accounting-related skills.
Why did you do that—the committee?
MR. KORRECK: I think it is evident from the 
testimony that you have received today and yesterday 
that although there is absolutely no question about 
independence, and the provision of MAS services, there 
is the compatibility factor.
We don't believe that CPAs should be involved 
in services which are not related to accounting and 
auditing.
MR. GARRETT: Anything that would require 
people with completely different types of backgrounds
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and training you think would be inappropriate?
MR. KORRECK: We feel we have the opportunity 
to get into that field, but it would not be compatible 
with the image of the CPA firm as we believe it to be.
MR. GARRETT: That is really a bow to the 
perceptions of the significant minority, that the 
Cohen Commission referred to.
MR. KORRECK: Yes, it is. Our first position 
paper said that there should be absolutely no controls 
whatsoever, but we felt that we were avoiding the 
issue. The fact of the matter is that there are 
people who have this perception and what can we do to 
alleviate that misperception? I can tell you that 
there were some heated debates going on and that a 
"significant minority," on my committee, felt that 
we are succumbing to external pressure.
But in light of the real world, as we see 
it, it is essential that we limit somehow the scope 
of services on a compatibility basis, not as it impacts 
on independence.
MR. GARRETT: We were not privy to the 
deliberations of the Executive Committee, but we get 
the impression that your reasoning rather parallelled 
theirs.
MR. KORRECK: Yes.
MR. GARRETT: And perhaps they weren't too 
thrilled with their own logic either, but they saw 
the necessity to adopt some sort of standard to cut 
off at least—I don't want to say abuses, but cut 
out the things that cause the most alarm and suspicion 
on the part of the public.
PROFESSOR CARY: And as I see it, the way 
you have framed it, compatibility and skills are 
rather co-related. In other words, it is something 
that is deemed incompatible because it requires a new 
skill.
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MR. KORRECK: I avoid the use of the word 
"skill" and prefer the expression that Mr. Klion used, 
accounting and auditing related and control related. 
Control is an important aspect of the audit, and I 
think, for example, performing inventory control 
studies is well within the scope of services that a 
CPA firm should provide.
PROFESSOR CARY: One other point, just to 
get your reaction, since you are representing Illinois 
group and a very large number, what about size in 
terms of relatively—I have asked this question before— 
relatively small firms? How do you find the percentage 
of activity in those firms generally to be?
MR. KORRECK: There is no question that 
the smaller the firm, the greater the MAS services 
provided.
PROFESSOR CARY: That seems to be accepted 
by you, too?
MR. KORRECK: Oh, yes, very definitely. 
There is no question about it. The problem is that 
these may not be formal MAS engagements, but rather 
informal engagements.
MR. GARRETT: What is your own affiliation?
MR. KORRECK: I am with Harris, Kerr, Forster.
MR. GARRETT: I see. Did your committee 
consist of people from small firms?
MR. KORRECK: Yes, we had 18 members on the 
committee. We had six who were Big 8 representatives, 
five national firms, non-big eight, and the rest, six 
local practitioners and one executive search consultant.
MR. GARRETT: Could you break down the vote 
according to those? (Laughter)
MR. KORRECK: No, I can tell you that it was 
very close.
MR. GARRETT: I wondered about your willingness 
to make the concession to this significant minority,
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whoever they are, whether it was predominantly a big 
firm willingness or—
MR. KORRECK: No, it was evenly split.
MR. GARRETT: Evenly split.
MR. McCLOY: Are there any other elements 
that you think that this Board could recommend that 
would enhance the concept of independence? I have 
asked that question before of others. Is there 
anything that we can do to improve the credibility 
and the actual fact of independence that this Board 
might recommend, in your judgment?
MR. KORRECK: The Cohen Commission recommended 
education. I would be lax if I didn't suggest that 
we better educate the public, but I accept the fact 
that that is almost impossible. We can't even educate 
the judges, much less the general public, so in answer 
to your question, no.
MR. McCLOY: No, you don't have anything.
MR. GARRETT: Not all lawyers are beyond 
reach.
There will be education, I suppose, at least 
 with respect to the 34 Act active reporting companies 
in proxy rules, but in a sense it may only display the 
alarming side rather than the other.
I believe that completes our questions. 
Thank you very much, Mr. Korreck. Thank you for coming.
Mr. Dowell, thank you for coming. Please 
proceed.
288
MR. LARRY L. DOWELL: We appreciate the 
opportunity to present our views.
By way of introducation, I am Larry Dowell, 
a partner and the Management Advisory Services Coordinator 
of McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn & Company. We are a 
regional CPA firm with 31 offices in seven Western 
and Midwestern states. We employ approximately 800 
people and of those 27 are full-time management advisory 
services specialists.
MR. McCLOY: How many?
MR. DOWELL: 27. Of those 27, approximately 
half are CPAs and have come up through the audit ranks 
of our CPA auditing practice or other CPA firms. We 
have performed management advisory services in some 
form for our clients since the establishment of the 
firm in 1926. We serve over 23,000 clients, 
approximately 30 of which are Section 12 SEC clients. 
So the vast majority of our work is performed for 
non-SEC reporting clients.
MR. GARRETT: How many clients?
MR. DOWELL: Approximately 23,000.
MR. McCLOY: Of which 30 you said are SEC 
clients.
MR. DOWELL: 30 are SEC reporting clients.
By further way of introduction, I am a member 
of the Iowa Society of CPAs, the Illinois Society of 
CPAs, a member of the AICPA Management Services 
Executive Committee that presented their views, and 
I am Chairman of the Management Advisory Services 
Committee of a group of CPA firms called Associated 
Accounting Firms International which is composed of 
firms with various sizes of practices throughout the 
United States and several other countries.
The views that I am presenting are my views 
and my firm's views. We did provide the written 
comments in response to your request for information.
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I would like to just very briefly highlight some of the 
things that we consider to be most important.
We have provided written comments in response 
to your request for information and views concerning 
management advisory services by CPA firms and we would 
like to emphasize several of our comments. These points 
are:
We do not believe that the providing of 
management advisory services to an audit client 
compromises the auditing firm’s independence; it only 
creates the appearance of compromising this independence 
to a very small audience.
We believe that the question of scope of 
services should be directed toward that of role rather 
than the proscribing of specific services based on 
the functional or technical aspects of the services 
performed. In this regard, we feel strongly that 
the role of the CPA firm in providing these services 
to its clients should be advisory and providing 
technical assistance, and should not include 
participating in the client’s management decision 
process or providing ongoing operating assistance.
As business and their related systems and 
governmental regulations become more complex, it will 
become increasingly important for CPA firms to be 
able to staff and make available the needed expertise 
to satisfactorily perform audits of their clients’ 
financial statements. The maintenance and continuing 
development of these needed skills requires that 
firm personnel possessing these skills be given 
opportunities to develop, refine and maintain the 
needed skills. During recent years we experienced 
needs for additional skills in connection with audits 
involving sophisticated data processing systems and 
some of the various types of operational audits and 
reviews requested and needed by governmental agencies 
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of various types. We believe that this can be best 
accomplished through retaining these individuals 
in a management advisory services practice which 
utilizes those needed skills in performing other 
services for clients.
We believe that any restrictions of management 
advisory services for publicly-owned audit clients 
will eventually affect management advisory services 
for all clients, regardless of whether the client is 
public-owned. We fear the precedent, that regulators 
will attempt to continually increase the restrictions.
Because we believe that eventually any 
proscribed services will spill over to these services 
performed for all clients, we believe that the 
proscribing of management advisory services could be 
very detrimental to small and medium-sized companies, 
whose CPA firm is probably the only logical source 
for obtaining that needed advice and assistance on an 
economical and practical basis. The innovator, the 
entrepreneur is already discouraged by an excessive 
number of regulations and "don’ts." One more would 
increasingly discourage him. Concern about this 
possible spill-over effect is perhaps our greatest 
objection to the proposed proscriptions.
We would be happy to respond to any questions 
that the Board would like to ask concerning either 
our written or oral responses.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you. The association 
to which you belong, your firm belongs, Mr. Dowell, 
do you take advantage of each other’s special skills 
in the MAS area?
MR. DOWELL: We do.
MR. GARRETT: If some of the members of the 
association have a skill that you do not have, you would 
draw upon it?
MR. DOWELL: Right, and some of the firms 
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who belong to that association are small firms who do 
not have full-time specialists on board, and we 
continue to receive requests for help.
MR. GARRETT: Your skills would be available 
to them then if they had a client that wanted that 
sort of help?
MR. DOWELL: Right. We assist a number of 
those firms every year.
MR. GARRETT: On the other hand, that would 
be a non-audit client with respect to your firm, 
wouldn’t it?
MR. DOWELL: We would be performing a 
service for that other CPA firm.
MR. GARRETT: I don’t know whether I am 
asking you a sensitive question or not, but do members 
of the association plan the development of skills?
MR. DOWELL: One of the purposes—
MR. GARRETT: You say: "We need a 
particular skill. Let's decide who is going to have 
that?"
MR. DOWELL: One of the purposes of the 
organization is the banding together so some of these 
skills do become available on a basis that they feel 
comfortable with.
The association has a number of professional 
education programs, joint sharing-type programs, that 
are really geared to increasing the skills of the 
firms represented.
MR. McCLOY: Do you do recruiting?
MR. DOWELL: We do a very minor amount of 
recruiting. Most of our work in that area is limited 
to interviewing.
MR. McCLOY: For financial jobs?
MR. DOWELL: For financial and data processing 
jobs, providing a client with our opinion as to technical 
skills.
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MR. GARRETT: Can you observe any relationship 
between the availability of MAS services and the 
gaining of clients, the retaining of clients or the 
loss of clients because of the absence of it? Can 
you see it or feel it as a competitive factor?
Mr. DOWELL: I feel a competitive factor 
is whether you can provide full services. I think that 
with some clients this relates back to being able to 
adequately handle the audits to cope with their systems.
PROFESSOR CARY: Just a question. Of course, 
your firm is a very substantial size, but when you look, 
out in your area, you may be aware of much smaller firms. 
Would you confirm the statement made in the past that 
as a firm gets smaller, the non-audit role of the firm 
increases?
MR. DOWELL: I believe I would share those 
views. I think the management advice provided by the 
smaller firms is probably a higher percentage than 
larger firms.
PROFESSOR CARY: Despite the fact, just taking 
your own, you have 27 MAS people out of 800, and you are 
smaller than the big eight considerably, but, therefore, 
a larger percentage of your work is not of MAS work, 
is it?
MR. DOWELL: Right. It is not. I believe 
in a couple of the surveys that were referred to, there 
was a very high percentage by some of the smaller firms 
while some of the medium-sized firms dropped down to 
a smaller percentage.
MR. GARRETT: As it gets smaller, it seems 
to vary a lot according to the accidents of the 
particular background of the dominant partners.
The 23,000 surprises me. How many clients 
does Price Waterhouse have, Mr. Gunders?
MR. GUNDERS: A very small fraction of that.
MR. GARRETT: You don't have 23,000 clients?
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MR. GUNDERS: Nowhere near.
MR. DOWELL: This would be total clients.
MR. GARRETT: Where do you turn to for
management consultants for keeping track of the 23,000?
(Laughter)
MR. DOWELL: We keep a computer running.
MR. GARRETT: I imagine you do.
MR. DOWELL: I believe that number refers to
tax clients and clients of all types.
MR. STARK: Individuals.
PROFESSOR CARY: That includes individuals?
MR. DOWELL: Right. That would be our total
client base.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much, Mr. Dowell
MR. DOWELL: Thank you.
MR. GARRETT: Mr. Hebert. We will proceed
in the scheduled order
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MR. S. BEN HEBERT: I am Ben Herbert, Chairman 
of the Management Advisory Services Committee of the North 
Carolina Association of Certified Public Accountants. I 
am here today as the representative of this Committee 
to express its views on the Scope of Services to 
the Board. The Committee has approved this statement, and 
does not require approval from any other body to present 
it. Although it does not require any other approval, 
it has been passed by our society officers, and they 
concur with the statement.
Some information on the make-up of the Committee, as 
well as my own back-ground, may be helpful to the Board in its 
evaluation of these comments. The Committee is composed of 
thirteen members, all of whom are members of the North 
Carolina Association of Certified Public Accountants. Of 
these, eight are sole practitioners or members of local firms, 
two are members of small regional firms, one is a member 
of a large regional firm, and two are members of 
"Big Eight" firms. I believe the mixture of firms represented 
on the Committee is significant to the evaluation of these 
comments.
I am a partner in the MAS division of A.M. Pullen 
& Company, a large regional firm headquartered in 
Greensboro, North Carolina. Prior to joining Pullen, I 
managed my own local firm in Tennessee for some six years. 
Before that, I was employed in sales and sales management 
with Burroughs Corporation and later with the Business 
Equipment Group of Litton Industries.
Before moving into the main topic, I would like to 
point out that the thoughts, views, and conclusions expressed 
here by the Committee are the collective views of its members, 
and do not necessarily represent the position of the firms 
with which they are associated.
The area to be covered is large, and has been the 
topic of much research and many writings in recent years. 
We could not possibly cover all aspects of this issue, and
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make no attempt to. We will, however, address the relevance 
of the criteria, advantages of management advisory services 
provided by CPA firms, and the impact of restricting management 
advisory services on the profession and the public.
We would also like to point out here that the 
profession did not have its origins in the attest function, 
as stated in the Board’s notice. Indeed, public accountants 
were performing a variety of accounting, management services, 
and other services for their clients before independent 
audits became widespread. Thus, there is historical precedent 
for the present day CPA’s provision of management services 
to his clients.
We also observed that the Board’s notice refers 
in several places to tax and management advisory services. 
These are two entirely separate areas of practice, and we 
have confined ourselves to the area of management 
advisory services. If there is concern about tax advisory 
services, perhaps separate hearings on that practice area 
are in order.
The criterion of independence has been in the 
past the cornerstone of the profession, and we believe that 
it should continue to be so. It is the quality which gives 
the underlying value to our work.
However, we feel that the second criterion, that 
of accounting and auditing related skills is both vague 
and restrictive. It ignores the variety of backgrounds and 
skills represented by many members of the profession, 
especially those engaged primarily in the field of management 
advisory services within many CPA firms.
We believe that requiring a CPA firm to possess the 
expertise necessary to perform any specific engagement with 
professional competence is a better criterion. This substitute 
criterion would allow the varied educational and experience 
backgrounds of many of the profession’s members to be taken into 
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account.
A number of outstanding writings on the 
advantages of management advisory services exist. The 
most recent of these is Stanley R. Klion's article, MAS 
Practice: Are the Critics Justified?, which appeared in the 
June, 1978 issue of The Journal of Accountancy. This 
article is in your possession and was referred to in the 
Notice of Hearing. Mr. Klion makes a number of very fine 
points in his article, but in the interest of brevity, 
we will not review them all here. The principal point is that 
the performance of management advisory services by the CPA 
enhances, rather than diminishes, the quality of audits, 
and that seems to be the heart of the matter that this 
Board is addressing in these hearings. In fact, the 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities in its Report, 
Conclusions and Recommendations states on page 95:
"An audit requires considerable knowledge 
about a company, its operations, and its 
industry. Providing management advisory 
services for an audit client may increase 
the auditor's understanding and knowledge 
and prove advantageous in conducting the 
audit."
We submit that the very fact of the auditor's 
independence enhances his ability to perform management 
advisory services engagements. His objectivity and independence, 
in concert with his professional competence, give authority 
to the findings and conclusions developed in the performance 
of management advisory services engagements.
The vast majority of American businesses are small 
to medium sized privately owned enterprises, which generally 
lack the resources necessary to maintain in-house capabilities 
in many areas of today's business activity. These areas 
are the ones to which management advisory services engagements 
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are usually directed. Many of these business feel 
that their best, and sometimes only, source of 
competent advice on a host of business problems is their 
CPA. Any restrictions on the scope of services of CPA’s 
would have a detrimental effect on these businesses, and 
would ultimately have an adverse effect on our economy. 
This would clearly not be in the best interest of the 
general public.
The proposal that restrictions be placed on 
management advisory services only for audit clients, or 
only for publicly owned clients establishes a clear 
double-standard. Such a double standard would be unacceptable 
to both the profession and the business community because it 
implies that one standard is inferior to the other.
Restrictions on management advisory services would 
be detrimental to the profession generally, but particularly 
to the smaller practice units which spend a substantial 
amount of their client-chargeable time providing 
management advice. This time has been reported by some 
small practice units as almost forty percent of their 
client-chargeable hours. The economic impact on these 
firms and their employees is obvious.
Of particular concern to the smaller practice 
units is the question as to whether the definition of 
management advisory services (if such a definition should 
be formulated) should include day-to-day consulting. If 
this informal advice is included in some expanded 
definition of management advisory services, which services 
are subsequently proscribed, the impact on both the smaller 
firms and their clients will be much more serious.
The key point in the Scope of Services issue is 
perceived as independence. Indeed, the problem does not seem 
to be in the fact of independence, but in the appearance 
of independence. We again call your attention to the Commission 
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on Auditor’s Responsibilities Report, Conclusions, 
and Recommendations, page 102, which states:
"Except for the Westec case, the Commission’s 
research has not found instances in which 
an auditor’s independence has been compromised 
by providing other services. Indeed, some 
of our research indicates that performing 
consulting services may improve the audit 
function and benefit users. If the 
empirical evidence were the only consideration, 
the Commission’s conclusion would be clear: 
The evidence does not support the theory. 
No prohibition of management services is 
warranted. ’’
On examination, we find that the Westec case 
involved the rendering of advice on accounting principles, 
and thus was not a management advisory services engagement 
in the sense which has been implied in the Board’s notice 
of hearing. We believe that the Commission felt this was not 
a typical management services engagement and implied as much 
by referring to "other" services rather than to management 
advisory services.
We have no knowledge of any new hard evidence 
supporting the assumption of impairment of independence, and 
in the absence of empirical evidence in support of this 
assumption, urge the Board to recommend that there be no 
prohibition of management advisory services. We believe 
the Commission's Report says it most eloquently on page 94: 
"Decisions on the other services offered 
and used should be made by individual 
public accounting firms and boards of 
directors of clients."
Should the Board have any question on the comments 
made in this presentation, or desire amplification of any 
of these comments, I will be happy to respond. On behalf 
of the Management Advisory Services Committee of the NCACPA, 
I wish to thank you for this opportunity to present our views 
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to you.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Herbert.
MR. McCLOY: What, if any, menace do you 
see today to the concept of independence. I am not limiting 
it to MAS.
Do you see any area where you feel that the 
independence of the accountants is being impaired or any 
threat to it that you think we ought to take cognizance 
of?
MR. HEBERT: I can think of nothing that I 
would conceive as a real threat. I think again it is a 
question of appearance of independence.
I would like to expand, if I might, and endorse 
the comments that Mr. Vanatta made yesterday as well as 
Mr. Mautz' from Ernst and Mr. Klion’s comments this 
morning.
I think that, and I really believe, that the 
best answer to this problem lies possibly in education. Maybe 
I should say not possibly, but very definitely in education. 
which is a difficult thing, I know, to accomplish, but I 
think that having the boards of directors and audit committees 
responsible for overlooking the independence of their principal 
accountants, it is a very positive step. I believe extending 
the peer reviews to include peer review of MAS engagements 
is a positive step.
Certainly while it may not respond quite as quickly 
I think that the marketplace is an excellent place to have 
our practices limited if they are to be limited.
MR. McCLOY: But you don't see any other threat to 
the independence of the profession that we ought to take 
account of?
MR. HEBERT: Very frankly, Mr. McCloy, I hadn't
tried to think of that in advance, and nothing comes to mind 
offhand.
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MR. GARRETT: Are you engaged in the MAS 
operations of your firm?
MR. HEBERT: Yes, I am.
MR. GARRETT: What services do you perform—not 
you individually, but does your firm supply?
MR. HEBERT: We are pretty well engaged in a 
broad range of services with the exception we do not provide 
any plant layout. We are not in executive search, and we 
are not in actuarial services.
I might expand that to say that we are not in 
executive search because we don’t feel that we have the 
competence at this point to do a professional job in that 
area, and we are not in the actuarial services for the 
same reason.
I don’t know that we would ever want to be in 
plant layout.
MR. GARRETT: One thing that has not be explored, 
at least at these hearings very much, was smaller firms, 
particularly, and I guess not just the smaller firms, is the 
extent to which it matters whether we are talking or the 
Executive Committee’s proposals are considering only advisory 
services that reach the dignity or the formality of separate 
engagements for which separate statements are rendered as 
against what you described as the day-to-day consulting 
operations which presumably, at least, increased the 
inquiries, I imagine, that would frequently come to the 
audit partner or the manager that the client is familiar 
with because that is who he saw during the audit.
MR. HEBERT: That is correct.
MR. GARRETT: I suppose for the sake of 
information the audit partner might turn to the MAS people 
if it was something he didn’t know.
Do you have a formal MAS department?
MR. HEBERT: Yes, we do.
MR. GARRETT: And do you engage in both types of 
services, that is to say, those in which you are retained 
or your department is retained for a specific piece of work 
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and a separate statement goes out, and then also, those 
in which audit partners will call you and say: "So-and-so 
has asked this. Can you help us?"
MR. HEBERT: The way our firm is structured, our 
department is really engaged in the formal type of 
services, formally structured services, but it is not at 
all unusual, in fact, it is very commonplace, for the audit 
partners to call some one and say, "I had a client with 
such-and-such a problem. What do you think I ought 
to tell him?" Or, "I told him such-and-such.
Was that a good answer? Should I call him back and 
maybe tell him something different?"
MR. GARRETT: So you get both types?
MR. HEBERT: Yes.
MR. GARRETT: With the very small firms, 
I suppose most what we are talking about is the day-to-day 
consulting type.
MR. HEBERT: Very definitely.
MR. GARRETT: How about with your firm, 
Mr. Elliott? What is the breadown with your high percentage 
of MAS?
MR. ELLIOTT: The formal MAS would be about 
6% of the practice. The informal MAS, I really don't 
know because it gets mixed in, as I said before, in 
various other areas, but it has got to be 25 or 30% of 
our total time expenditure. The informal counseling.
In my own personal case, other than the 
administrative work I do for our firm, almost 100% of my 
time in informal advice and counsel to clients both in 
accounting area, the tax area and in general business 
advice.
MR. GARRETT: I don't know that the Executive 
Committee was even trying to reach the day-to-day 
consulting, the telephone call sort of thing, the 
curbstone advice.
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MR. ELLIOTT: You can't deny that is 
exactly the same thing as the formally structured MAS, if 
there is an impact on independence or anything else.
I could not say that I can advise a client 
to take an action informally and not sacrifice independence 
and on the other hand, say if I did it formally, I would. 
That would be unreasonable. So I think both have to be 
taken together.
MR. GARRETT: If there is any contamination 
involved, perhaps it is worse the other way. If it is 
the audit partner who day to day is helping the fellow 
run the business, if there is any possible impairment 
of independence, it might come more from that than 
it would in the formal retention of the MAS department 
which would perhaps, at least, in some firms be different 
people engaged in different affairs.
MR. HEBERT: Yes.
MR. McCLOY: You charge for all this service, 
don't you, by time?
MR. ELLIOTT: As Mr. Moss said this morning, 
we do as his firm does, we charge for our time. If we 
are doing something productive for a client, we charge 
the time.
The only inaccuracy in accumulating that would 
be if we charge it to an improper function, but the 
client will be billed for it.
MR. McCLOY: What is your chief MAS service 
consist of?
MR. HEBERT: About 55 to 60%
MR. McCLOY: That is compared with audit, 
how much?
MR. HEBERT: Our formal MAS department accounts 
for about 4 to 4-1/2% of our total firm revenues. Within 
MAS, about 55—a good 55% of our engagements are directed 
at computer and computer-related types of activities.
MR. McCLOY: Computer, yes.
MR. HEBERT: If I could make one further 
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statement, I would like to, and that concerns the ripple 
effect that we heard this morning. It is not in our 
formal response, but to expand a little bit on the two 
sets of standards that might be developed here, I know 
in Ashville, North Carolina which is where I am located, 
which is a very small town, relatively speaking, that 
we have three local firms there who have already joined 
the SEC Practice Division, who have no SEC clients and 
have probably no real prospects of acquiring SEC clients, 
but they already perceive that membership in the 
SEC Practice Section will be viewed as being superior to 
membership in the Small Firms Division, so I think 
we are already seeing some of this ripple effect.
PROFESSOR CARY: You did mention one case.
You said you had no evidence, that there was no evidence 
you knew of, of MAS and other activities having impact on 
the audit performance, but you said except in the Westec 
case. Did I misstate that? I just wanted to get that 
clear.
MR. HEBERT: No, I said I knew of nothing in 
terms of MAS engagements, and then in fact, the Commission 
only found one engagement which I would not typify as an 
MAS engagement.
MR. McCLOY: You would differentiate that one, 
though?
MR. HEBERT: Yes. I would.
PROFESSOR CARY: It wasn't quite clear when you 
mentioned the case. I just wanted to make sure. Thank you.
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DR. JOHN C. BURTON: Thank you.
MR. GARRETT: We appreciate your coming. 
Proceed.
DR. BURTON: I am pleased to be here. My name 
is John Burton. I am currently the Arthur Young 
Professor of Accounting and Finance at the Columbia 
Graduate School of Business. I was previously Chief 
Accountant of the Securities & Exchange Commission and 
Deputy Major of Finance of the City of New York.
As I indicated in my letter, I believe that 
the Public Oversight Board should urge the SEC Practice 
Section not to adopt scope of services limitations 
beyond those now included in the AICPA Code of Ethics. 
I think the AICPA criteria of competence and compatibility 
have been satisfactory. I think the requirement of 
Section 3(a) of the requirements for membership which 
provides that a majority of firm members are CPAs 
does prevent the tail wagging the dog problem that I 
sense Professor Cary is a little concerned about.
Basically, I believe this for three reasons. 
First, there is no evidence to support any limitation. 
As SEC Chief Accountant, I was, in effect, the pathologist 
at many autopsies of deficient SEC practice and 
deficient auditing practice and while I found 
deficiencies, the disease was not based on management 
consulting in any case that I can recall, and I have 
thought back upon them.
Secondly, I think the Board and the Section 
should have as its principal concern the quality of 
audits. Independence is not a sufficient condition, 
although it is a necessary one, if you define 
independence in the sense of unbiased professionalism. 
If you define independence in the sense of absolute 
avoidance of relationships with the client, I don't 
believe that independence is even a desirable criteria. 
But in the sense that it is normally used, the sense 
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of unbiased professionalism, I think it is a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition. I think accounting 
expertise and knowledge of the client’s business are 
also necessary conditions, and that consulting 
services clearly enhance both of these.
Fundamentally, consulting services enhance 
expertise and knowledge of client business in terms of 
the quality of personnel, where I have watched as a 
university professor the accounting firms attract a 
far higher quality of personnel because they do offer 
consulting services, and because of the knowledge 
of client business which consulting provides to 
auditors. In addition, the improved quality of 
client systems which emerge from consulting practice 
leads to more efficient audits. Therefore, I believe 
that by the test of quality of audits, the consulting 
practice adds to rather than subtracts from professional 
performance.
The third reason that I believe the Board 
should not urge any scope of service limitation is 
that I think the appearance of independence problem 
cannot be solved by a ritual sacrifice of this nature 
or even by a real sacrifice, and quite frankly I 
don't view this as a real sacrifice as the profession 
has adopted it. The appearance problem is dominated 
by two factors. One, the basic fee relationship that 
is associated with the auditor-client relationship, 
and secondly, the cooperative approach to an audit 
which is, in my judgment, essential for both the 
economic and effective performance of the audit 
function.
To the extent that there is an appearance 
problem associated with consulting, that problem is 
in the very areas of accounting-and auditing-related 
skills, not in the more or less peripheral areas.
As the SEC moves to require reports on the 
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adequacy of internal control,as I think they should 
and will, the problem of appearance in the accounting 
and auditing areas would become even greater.
The profession's only approach, it seems 
to me, is to stand on its integrity and competence 
which I think broadly speaking has been demonstrated 
over the decades.
I do believe there are a number of positive 
steps the Board should take which I think would enhance 
its stature and the stature of the profession and 
would perhaps have a positive effect on the appearance 
problem.
First, I believe, it should suggest amendment 
of Rule 3(C) on the requirements of members to require 
peer reviews to include the firm's entire practice 
rather than simply the accounting and auditing practice.
Secondly, I think that an auditing standard 
should be established, and the Board should suggest 
this, that requires the auditor to review the work 
papers of any consulting engagement undertaken by his 
firm. In addition, consultation between audit and 
management services staff should be required to meet 
certain continuing education requirements in auditing 
and accounting problems, so that they will be sensitive 
to the implications of circumstances which they may 
discover in their consulting work.
These are all proposals to tie together more 
closely the auditing and consulting functions and 
thus achieve the benefits of better information that 
arise from them.
Finally, I suggest that the appearance 
problem can best be resolved by full disclosure and 
openness about all auditor-client relationships. 
An open environment reduces suspicion. Thus, I believe 
the Board should suggest amendment to Rule 3(G)8 of 
the requirements (which requires disclosure of clients) 
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to include total fees paid by each client broken down 
by audit, tax and consulting services, and further, 
I recommend that the Board suggest to the SEC that 
disclosure of all facets of the relationship between 
auditor and client be required in proxy materials 
including the processes of auditor selection, 
compensation and communication with the Board and its 
audit committee as well as fees.
I think you are aware, in general, of my 
views from my letter. That is a summary of them, 
and I will be delighted to discuss any of them with 
you that you are interested in discussing.
MR. McCLOY: Let me be sure I have got 
those three things. You are talking about the effect 
on the appearance problem. You would go beyond what 
is now required in the disclosure area, the inclusion 
of fees paid.
DR. BURTON: I believe that the problem of 
appearance to a significant extent arises from the 
suspicions that are engendered by a private 
relationship that is not disclosed.
I think this can be assisted by requiring 
the disclosure of this relationship. I think it is 
beneficial to have disclosure of the total financial 
relationship between the auditor and the client and 
that this will enhance a feeling of openness and 
will reduce the suspicions among those who perhaps 
today believe that first, there is an unholy alliance 
between the client and the auditor, and second, that 
consulting plays a major role in it, which I don't 
think it does, and I think that the evidence has 
not suggested that it does.
MR. McCLOY: What was your third?
DR. BURTON: I had the amendment of the rule 
to require peer reviews to cover the entire firm's 
practice. Second, that auditing requirements be
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established which mandate the review of consulting 
engagements by the audit partner so that he is 
aware of them, and that there be continuing education 
requirements placed upon consulting personnel to 
sensitize them—
MR. McCLOY: Tie that together.
DR. BURTON: Yes, to sensitize them, and the 
third was the question of full disclosure which would 
include both the disclosure of fees to the AICPA and 
in the public document filed, and POB recommendations 
to the SEC that there be disclosure of all facets 
of the relationship in the proxy materials which would 
include the processes of auditor selection, compensation 
and communication with the Board and its audit committee. 
That is part of the disclosure.
So basically, the three suggestions I have 
are first, the expansion of peer review; second, 
tying together consulting and auditing in a more 
effective manner to make sure that the auditor has 
the use of the consulting expertise; and third, the 
full disclosure of the auditor-client relationship.
MR. McCLOY: Is there anything else you can 
think of?
DR. BURTON: No, I think those represent 
my thoughts, at least at the present time, on that 
subject.
MR. GARRETT: Keep him talking, though. 
Give him a little time to think. (Laughter)
To the extent that I was concerned or curious 
about the way in which audits would be improved and 
audit personnel made more competent by the presence 
of MAS services in a firm, in light of the semi-Chinese 
Wall that seemed to exist, at least in some of the 
more structured firms, you would suggest that rather 
than further separation and departmentalization, 
there be a direct interchange and involvement so that
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MAS people would be brought right into the audit 
process.
DR. BURTON: I think that this is the way 
in which their expertise can be best used, and you 
have protection against what would seem to me to be 
a disastrous situation where the management services 
people would be discovering all the bad things in an 
area while the audit personnel were blithely moving 
ahead to opine on financial statements.
I think I mentioned in my letter one case 
where I was involved as a consultant in credit 
policy where our consulting engagement directly 
benefited the audit, and it would have been most 
unfortunate for the audit personnel to have been 
not aware of what we were doing in the credit 
policy area.
MR. GARRETT: There is a practical and 
legal hazard there.
DR. BURTON: Yes, there would be a practical 
and legal hazard as well as a problem in terms of 
the public interest, so-called.
MR. GARRETT: How does the presence of MAS 
stimulate or make it more exciting for students? 
Do they imagine themselves going with firms and 
at least having the opportunity to get into broader 
things than strict auditing?
DR. BURTON: I think it is fair to say that 
to the best students in graduate business schools, 
the term "auditing” leaves an impression which is not 
exactly consistent with what auditing is, but which 
gives a very negative reaction.
Most of the best students say that they don't 
want to be auditors. When they get into the firms, 
they often discover that auditing can be a quite creative 
activity, particularly where it is related to client 
services in a variety of ways, but they are immediately 
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attracted to the consulting side of the firm or to the 
opportunity to go into the consulting side. Some go 
directly, but interestingly enough, some of my best 
students who have originally gone directly into the 
consulting side wandered back into the auditing side 
because they have seen that as the basic product of 
the firm, and they have gotten interested in it. I 
believe there is no question that if I were identifying 
the very best people whom I have seen go into public 
accounting from Columbia, a very significant proportion 
of them, of the order of magnitude of certainly a third 
to a half, were attracted by the consulting functions 
which the firm performed.
MR. GARRETT: They also report, at least in 
some surveys that I have seen, that auditing isn’t 
very well taught. (Laughter)
I am more sympathetic with that than it 
sounds because I have done some law teaching, and I 
know that must be the kind of operation that would be 
difficult to each or make exciting while you are 
trying to teach it.
DR. BURTON: Auditing is an extremely difficult 
course to teach, and I would say that I have personally 
been less satisfied with auditing courses that I have 
taught over the years when contrasted with accounting 
theory and some of the other areas.
MR. GARRETT: It would somewhat like trying 
to train lawyers in certain procedural litigating 
contracts and investigations and things of that sort. 
It is hard to bring into the classroom.
DR. BURTON: Ultimately, I believe, the 
training in auditing is increasingly and appropriately 
being taken on by the accounting firms, that the 
auditing course are giving some institutional 
background about the profession, about ethics, about 
the way in which auditing standards are set, this 
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type of issue, but that increasingly, I think, at 
least the major business schools are viewing their 
role as not to train entry level auditors in the 
techniques of auditing because that is both dull 
and it can’t be related to their experience which 
is the real problem that you have.
MR. McCLOY: I must just give a comment.
The other day I was consulted by a young man who came 
to me and said, should he go into law, should he go 
into accounting. One of the big eight was offering 
him a good job, and he said, "They are telling me, 
gee, they are opening up a tremendous field here, 
and it is not only auditing. Gee whiz, they know 
all about the business. They can do everything 
in this advisory business," so I just wonder how 
much of this is propaganda from the schools and which 
is the leading factor.
I can see how the argument can well be 
made.
I know of another former colleague of mine 
who went over into one of the big accounting firms 
because he thought he was getting a better breadth 
of view in the whole business world than he was getting 
in the law.
DR. BURTON: Certainly than the law. (Laughter) 
MR. McCLOY: I gather there is great competition 
for talent that goes on now. This is one of the arguments 
that is used.
DR. BURTON: This is true, and the accounting 
firms have traditionally paid somewhat less than 
business enterprises, but they have offered a breadth 
of experience, and to the very best students, they have 
said, "There is more to this than simply going out and 
ticking and checking. What you have to do is try to 
understand the business. You are trying to consult 
with business. You are trying to do many different 
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things," and the consulting aspect of the firm has 
been a major drawing card. There is no question about 
it. It may be public relations in part, but it is a 
major drawing card.
MR. GARRETT: Certainly, if you want to 
practice tax law, the accounting firm would be the 
place to go. (Laughter)
MR. McCLOY: Are you opposed to any 
limitation, whatever, on the scope?
DR. BURTON: I believe that the basic 
limitations which are in the Code of Ethics now, 
which deal with competence and compatibility, are 
working satisfactorily. I think that it would be 
inappropriate for accountants to serve, for example, 
as investment advisers. In the first place, there 
would be a conflict of interest and an insider 
information problem, and a lot of others, but even 
beyond that, I think it would be inappropriate, 
if not incompatible. That is a judgment I make;
I don’t think it would be compatible. On the other 
hand, within the consulting area where you are 
providing advice to the management, I see no areas 
where there would be a particular problem in my 
view, and I think that today there is not a major 
problem in the firms adopting reasonable positions 
in this regard. As I have seen consulting practice, 
it doesn’t seem to me that there are examples or 
at least not many examples of services that are 
incompatible which are still being performed, so 
I am not unhappy with the system as it exists 
today. I wouldn’t think that the accounting firm 
should be able to acquire a department store, 
and I similarly don’t think that McKinsey & Company 
should be able to hire 25 CPAs and start an audit 
practice, which is perhaps a more interesting 
question even than the accounting firm acquiring
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McKinsey, and again I think the limitation that says 
a majority of CPAs is a satisfactory protection again 
a tail-wagging-the-dog type approach.
MR. McCLOY: Do you have any difficulty at 
all with the actuarial issues before us?
DR. BURTON: No, I don't. I think that 
there is always some problem of the CPA auditing his 
own work. That is a problem that I think has been—
MR. McCLOY: Don’t they audit their own 
work in a great many cases?
DR. BURTON: That is correct.
MR. McCLOY: Computers.
DR. BURTON: Again they are advising their 
client. If the CPA was serving simply as a black 
box where he was just giving the client the number 
and then putting it in the financial statement and 
then auditing it, then there is a problem, but I 
don't think it works that way.
I think in many cases there is this where 
the CPA is advising on items that are very significant 
to the financial statements.
MR. McCLOY: I treat that as sort of a cliche, 
the argument that you are reviewing your own work because 
it seems to me that in reviewing your own work, it is 
a matter of direct or indirect relationship, but in 
many respects, you are doing it, so per se, I don't 
think that is a condemnation. You have to go further 
with your condemnation.
DR. BURTON: I would agree.
MR. McCLOY: You don't have any problem with 
executive recruitment?
DR. BURTON: No, I think that my own experience 
with it, and as I cited, I am a director of one company 
that has used their accounting firm, indicates that 
the service was an extremely valuable one that has 
contributed to the quality of systems and the quality 
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of personnel, and thus enhanced the financial statements 
and the audit.
I don’t see an executive recruiting problem. 
I think it is a natural service for the firms to 
perform, and I think that in general the step of 
professionalizing it rather than making it entirely 
informal has been a beneficial one, both to the clients 
and in terms of any potential problems. It is more 
than just recommending a friend now.
MR. McCLOY: Do you place any value on this 
principle that you should recommend six or five rather 
than one?
DR. BURTON: It wouldn’t trouble me to see 
one recommended. I mean, I think that in any search 
process it is unlikely you will emerge with only one 
candidate, but I certainly would not hesitate to see 
a CPA firm say, "We have interviewed five candidates, 
and you have interviewed three, and we think this 
one is the best." I see no problem in that.
MR. GARRETT: I would like to add one 
question to that, and that is would you draw any 
line. Presumably, you would not, at the rank of the 
person being put in? Executive recruiting could 
extend to Vice President Finance and the Controller, 
or the top officer himself, without you having any 
problems. Some firms have said: "We stop short, 
if it is somebody that is key to the management 
decision whether to hire or fire the auditors."
DR. BURTON: No, I don’t see a problem, 
and I have heard some people raise questions in 
regard to whether or not executive search should be 
utilized to identify potential outside directors. 
For the same reason, I don't personally see the 
problem. It does not seem to me that the evidence 
supports the suggestion that this will create a 
problem, and as I get back to the question of
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appearance, the appearance is so dominated by the question 
of fee, if I were talking about it—those who are 
suspicious are going to remain suspicious, and providing 
them with a ritual sacrifice is not going to allay 
that suspicion. That is why I disagree with Mr. Klion's 
statement this morning which said: Well, we would like 
to do this and be done with it. If you do this, you 
are not going to be done with it. This is merely the 
first step because those who are suspicious, are going 
to remain suspicious, in fact, more so because they 
will see something that appears to be something that 
it isn’t, and that will make them more suspicious 
rather than the other way around.
PROFESSOR CARY: I think you have covered 
most of the things that I had in mind, particularly 
that one that I addressed frequently and talked with 
you about such as the merger with McKinsey and what- 
have-you.
You did say that it bothered you to see 
them go into investment counseling and what-have-you, 
and that is the question of compatibility, as I see 
it.
What that means is that you are drawing 
some lines, and the issue is whether or not any of 
the lines that, for instance, have been drawn in 
this proposal, in the Notice, were wrong or right, 
or whether, in other words, when they limited 
themselves, in respect to plant layout, I assume that 
is based on the compatibility theory and justifiable, 
or what do you think?
DR. BURTON: It seemed to me in the first 
place that there was very little limitation in the 
proposal. But I don't believe that very specific 
limitations are desirable. You must look at the 
facts in each cash. The general principle of 
compatibility is sufficient without drawing lines.
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I have no problem, for example, with the 
area of contract research which was mentioned this 
morning. It seems to me that there is no reason 
why an accounting firm should not undertake a 
research project for the Financial Executives 
Institute that would deal with certain problems. 
I also see no problem with psychological testing 
within the framework of executive testing within 
the framework of executive search. I think this 
may be a useful tool.
I think there do come some questions where, 
if you employ an independent group of four 
psychologists, and you say: "This is our psychological 
testing department," and they are going to do just 
psychological tests, you raise a question, in my 
mind, at that point, as to whether that is compatible, 
but I don’t see a way of drawing a line by rule 
because when you draw a line by rule, you have to 
cover 100% of the cases, and that is extremely 
difficult.
So my view is that it is sufficient 
to establish the principle of compatibility and to 
identify certain examples of extreme cases, and 
such as I practicing law or investment counseling 
or brokerage. I can see you explaining why certain 
cases are extreme, but I don't think it makes sense 
to come down and say: "We are now going to write 
a rule that explains the difference between dusk 
and dark," even though I can tell the difference 
between noon and midnight, as they say.
PROFESSOR CARY: Looking at the whole 
profession, you don't see any evidence that they 
are moving in new directions? One, are they moving 
in new directions; and two, if so, are they directions 
that one would be concerned about, if we don't have 
some rules, if we don't have some line?
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DR. BURTON: I am not sure that they are 
moving in enough new directions, to tell you the 
truth, but I do not see any new directions that are, 
at the moment, dangerous to the profession.
I believe that it would be very desirable 
for the profession to move more in areas such as 
corporate directorship and areas such as education, 
greater continuing education activities.
There are a variety of things that I think 
would be beneficial both to society and to the profession.
I do not see anything on the horizon that 
strikes me as representing a substantial risk.
PROFESSOR CARY: The last question is, we 
have referred several times to this ASR-250. Mr. 
Gunders raised it, and it has been further developed 
by Mr. Klion.
You have spoken in favor of disclosure, but 
is this the kind of disclosure you would favor?
DR. BURTON: I think that the disclosures 
in 250 are not the right ones to a significant extent. 
I commented to the Commission endorsing the fee 
disclosure proposals that were originally made.
I think that it is desirable to lay out on 
a regular basis the full nature of the relationship 
between the auditor and his client. I think it is a 
mistake to single one out and say: "If you do consulting, 
then you should disclose the percentage of fee, and 
you should disclose whether the audit committee has 
approved," because that implies a criticism of the 
consulting practice.
I think it is far better to have as a routine 
disclosure of the full aspects of the relationship 
between the auditor and the client which includes: 
How is the auditor selected? How does he communicate 
with the board? What is the responsibility of the audit 
committee? What are the services he performs? And 
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this should be put out in the open on a regular 
basis rather than identified as something that is 
a little questionable, which is sort of what is 
implied in 250.
So I don’t think 250 is the right approach, 
but I do believe in a disclosure approach.
PROFESSOR CARY: Do you think 250 is going 
to have some unfortunate results as might have been 
indicated by earlier speakers?
DR. BURTON: I believe, and I admit if I 
were out on the firing line, selling consulting 
services, I might have a different view, but I think 
that the effect will not be in any long-term basis 
very significant. I think it may this year as audit 
committees are particularly talking with lawyers 
who may be nervous and concerned beyond reasonable 
levels, so there may be some short-run effect, 
but I don’t think it is going to have any significant 
long-term effect.
The disclosure will become routinized even 
in this regard, so it may be a first year effect. 
I don’t think the long-term effect will be bad, but 
I don’t think it is the right approach.
MR. McCLOY: But you would advocate 
disclosure?
DR. BURTON: I would advocate disclosure. 
I believe it has to do with the openness of a 
relationship. When you are talking about the 
suspicions that people have, and that is really what 
you are talking about when you are talking about 
the appearance of independence, people are suspicious 
because they know that the auditor is paid by his 
client.
MR. McCLOY: That is the main reason?
DR. BURTON: That is the main reason, so at
least, lay it all out. Let it be known, and they you 
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say: "Yes, it’s true," but then you have to educate 
people to the counter balancing pressures on the 
auditors, and they are significant.
I don’t suggest any method other than having 
the auditor paid by his client. I think that is the 
best approach of any that I have heard suggested.
MR. McCLOY: Is there any place in the world 
where anybody but the client pays the fee? Does 
the government pay the fee anywhere that you know?
What about alternatives to the client paying 
the fee?
DR. BURTON: I am not aware of any place 
where there are other approaches. There are some cases 
where, for instance, in the United Kingdom there is 
disclosure of the audit fee by all companies. That 
is a standard, but it is paid by the client still.
There are a couple of places, I believe, 
where there are certain responsibilities that government 
officials have to look into things, but still the 
basic auditor relationship is the same.
If you are looking for approaches, you 
could have a pool of funds administered by a stock 
exchange. There are other approaches, but I don't 
believe you should remove the economic discipline 
of the client-auditor relationship.
If you look at the world of medical 
reimbursement, you see what happens when you eliminate 
all economic discipline. I think the economic discipline 
is necessary. It is part of keeping the audit fee 
within reason.
MR. McCLOY: Isn’t there a suggestion in 
this ASR-250 of some implicit disapprobation of the MAS 
concept? Before I came to this hearing about a week 
or so ago, as a lawyer I was consulted about ASR-250. 
There was a feeling of the client being discouraged 
about obtaining MAS services from the auditing firm.
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So why have the risk with all this litigious atmosphere 
that we are in today? Why not just go and take the 
MAS from some other firm? And that is rather unfair, 
I think, in view of all the argumentation we have had 
here about the benefits of MAS to the audit function, 
you are suggesting that that implication is diminimus.
DR. BURTON: I think the first year effect 
may be significant, but I don't think the first year 
effect may be significant, but I don't think in the 
long run it is going to be a major problem to the firms. 
I do think there is implicit in ASR-250 a criticism 
of services which I don't believe is appropriate, so 
I think it is the wrong approach. Rather than create 
a regular disclosure vehicle for all services, it 
sets out something as a particular disclosure which 
leaves an implication of criticism.
MR. McCLOY: One other suggestion was made 
this morning by someone—I forget just who it was now— 
they were against this limitation of scope just because 
we were already overregulated in business. Do you think 
this business is being overregulated today? (Laughter) 
You say you are a professor of business.
DR. BURTON: I would say two things to that. 
One, overall, the answer was yes. But as is typical of 
those who are criticizing government involvement who 
don't think government involvement is good in areas 
in which they are not particularly interested but favor 
it in the areas they are, I think in the disclosure 
area, there is not overregulation.
I think disclosure is the right answer in a 
society such as ours. On the other hand, if you ask me 
about OSHA and a few of the environmental requirements, 
I think the cost benefit trade-offs are not recognized, 
and the costs are far greater than the disclosure costs.
MR. GARRETT: We all witness, with respect 
to companies, the tendency to equate disclosability
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with impropriety.
I notice that particularly in the management 
perk disclosures where sometimes there they were 
right, but not necessarily.
I take ASR-250 as also implying that there is 
some significance in the relationship of the total 
revenues that the auditor receives from the auditing 
function as against all others.
Does that suggest that there ought to be some 
limitation, that one cannot have more than 40% - 50% 
relationship, or something of that kind, that you get 
more corrupt. You are making more money out of selling 
your MAS than you are out of your auditing.
DR. BURTON: I don’t believe that is correct. 
I think in a particular year you may have a massive 
consulting engagement, and it may represent three times 
your audit fee that year.
On the other hand, on a continuing basis, 
it is unlikely that your consulting activity will ever 
be substantially greater than your audit fee. One of 
the protections as well as one of the risks in consulting 
activity is that if the auditor does a really bad job 
in either, he is likely to lose the other, and particularly 
since the audit is normally an ongoing job, audit partners 
are always concerned that the consultants will go in 
and butcher a job and it will cost them the audit 
relationship as well. But I don't see any need for 
a quantitative limit on consulting.
Again, I think in the aggregate, when you 
say that more than half the members of the firm must 
be CPAs, you are building in some protection, and that 
really avoids what could be a problem of consulting 
becoming the dominant factor.
MR. GARRETT: Some, though, we hear are 
hiring industrial engineers and sending them to school 
at night to get a CPA.
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DR. BURTON: I don’t think that is necessarily 
a bad situation. I think you could construct a 
hypothetical where I would say that there is probably 
too much consulting where the accounting and auditing 
expertise of a firm is no longer a key element in its 
economic success. I think in the final analysis there 
must be a recognition on the part of firms that are 
in the accounting area that accounting expertise has 
to be a key element in their economic success.
But I see those limits as so far removed 
from anything we have today that I don’t see that as 
a major problem, and as I said, I think the limitation 
of 50% CPAs is a reasonable one because I think when 
you go through the training for CPA you are then 
sensitized to the kinds of problems CPAs must face.
MR. GARRETT: We spent some time yesterday 
worrying—at least I did—about certain types of 
advisory projects, that would cause the firm to be 
so involved, so concerned with the success of a 
project that they helped plan and recommend, that it 
might corrupt, however subtly their judgment with 
respect to recognition of defects or in the extreme 
case, recognition of the need to write it off.
Does that cause you any concern?
DR. BURTON: I suspect you could construct 
a hypothetical where there could be a problem in that 
situation, but I think in large part one of the big 
protections in such a situation is that there are 
countervailing forces of significant magnitude against 
allowing your audit judgment to be swayed by something 
of that sort. The existence of liabilities and the 
existence of the risks that you would take, if you 
allowed your judgment to be swayed, are such that I 
believe they represent a reasonable protection against 
this abuse.
MR. GARRETT: I suppose internally within
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the firm, too, as far as that is concerned. 
DR. BURTON: Yes.
MR. GARRETT: The audit partner might not 
be very eager to make his MAS partner look good at 
his expense.
DR. BURTON: I would say that the audit 
partner would be more worried about what would happen 
if he was wrong. It would not be so much a question 
of worrying about letting the MAS partner look good 
but what would happen to him if he really went too 
far.
MR. McCLOY: That comes up in connection with 
acquisitions and mergers?
DR. BURTON: It might. Acquisitions.
MR. McCLOY: Or major overhaul of the business. 
DR. BURTON: There would be situations. I 
mean, you could construct a hypothetical.
MR. McCLOY: A tendency not to write off the 
mistake as early as you should have.
DR. BURTON: There is such a tendency unless 
you have a bad year anyway in which case you tend to 
write it off earlier than you should. (Laughter)
MR. STARK: Dr. Burton, yesterday Mr. Gunders 
of Price Waterhouse suggested that for a number of reasons 
including antitrust concerns and other reasons, the 
profession should not impose restrictions on itself 
with respect to the scope of services, but he suggested 
that the SEC should have a role in this area. My 
question is whether you see a disposition or a likelihood 
or a pressure that might develop for the SEC to act 
in case the profession doesn’t act on this particular 
issue.
DR. BURTON: There is certainly that 
possibility because if you are looking at a political 
judgment, which is really what the question is, it is 
possible that the SEC will make the political judgment
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that they must take some action.
However, if this is to be a political judgment, 
I believe they are the ones who should make the political 
judgment and the profession should not attempt to take 
a position that we are going to do something not 
because it is right, but because we want to avoid the 
political judgment which the SEC might make.
In addition, if it is to be a political 
judgment, it is probably not bad to allow the SEC to 
make it and to be able to go to Capitol Hill as heroes.
I think that is in the best interest of the 
profession rather than to have the profession go there 
and say: "Here is what we did, and the SEC meekly went 
along." I mean if it is really a political problem 
and someone has to take a step, take a stand, which is 
not based on logic or rationality but based solely on 
political phenomena, I think the Commission is the 
better one to do it.
MR. GARRETT: There was also a suggestion 
of antitrust exposure.
DR. BURTON: Antitrust is an additional 
variable. I guess I am already on record as being 
concerned about this whole structure in that framework 
as a possible problem.
MR. McCLOY: Do you think the POB may be 
liable for antitrust suits?
DR. BURTON: I believe that the ability of 
the Oversight Board and the Section to impose effective 
disciplinary sanctions, which I think is an essential 
component in its ultimate success, is subject to question 
on antitrust grounds. I am not an attorney, but I 
have been told by various people who are attorneys that 
there are some legitimate questions that might come 
up, and if the Oversight Board ultimately is to be 
successful in the public eye, I think it must be seen 
both within the profession and outside as imposing
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effective sanctions where deficient practice is discovered. 
MR. McCLOY: Do you know where any legal
memoranda on this reposes? Have you or the SEC collected 
an authority on that?
DR. BURTON: No, I would refer you to Mr. 
Pitt at the Commission who I understand studied this at 
some length, and I would not propose to practice law in 
this area.
MR. GARRETT: We had better hurry, do you agree, 
because in a couple of weeks it will be expensive? 
(Laughter)
DR. BURTON: That is true.
MR. GARRETT: One other idea, putting words 
in Mr. Gunders' mouth. He can speak up if we misquote 
him, that something could be gained by further exposure 
and perhaps even codification or restatement of the 
series of interpretive advices that the staff have 
given with respect to prospective MAS engagement and 
independence.
I don't suppose you are familiar with 
everything that has been written or said over the 4 0- 
some years.
DR. BURTON: I have looked at a number of 
them in connection with SEC consideration of particular 
problems. I have not made a study of the totality of 
them.
I think that it is always worthwhile where 
a staff or a group is making a series of ad hoc 
determinations to look at them from time to time and 
see if there are any principles that could be enunciated 
as guidelines. But again, I am troubled by trying 
to write a rule because I think that each factual 
circumstance has so many variables that you have to 
be able to consider the variables rather than just 
look at one or two in each situation, so I don't 
think that you will get or should have a rule book,
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but it may be that from time to time where advisory 
opinions have been given that there should be some 
attempt to bring together these opinions and draw 
some general guidance from them. I don’t think it 
should be an official rule that is drawn from these. 
At least that would be my reaction.
MR. GARRETT: No, but it could be 
susceptible of the common law process of taking a 
bunch of specific cases, all of which must imply some 
abiding rule and trying to draw conclusions from them.
I don’t know what we would find if we did 
it, but it would be interesting.
DR. BURTON: You might also at the same time, 
as well as looking at those, go to the description of 
practice that the various firms have and see whether 
there is anything. I know I have heard today a couple 
of firms describe their limitations, and you must 
have on the record a number of these things, and there 
might be from that also some general principles that 
could be drawn, but I am hesitant about writing a 
rule simply because I think it is very difficult 
to contemplate all of the situations that you might 
find.
MR. MANZONI: One of your recommendations 
led to disclosure of the relationship to accountants, 
including disclosure of fees.
I am not entirely clear how that would cause 
anyone’s suspicion to be subsided at all. In fact, 
it seems it may raise a lost of confusion in people's 
minds as to why fees among different firms from 
different audits may vary quite a bit for reasons 
which wouldn’t be disclosed in those documents. One 
firm may have very effective internal control procedures 
which, as I understand it, would cause the audit fees 
to be somewhat lower than someone who didn’t.
Isn’t it possible that kind of disclosure 
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could really create a lot more confusion than solve 
some problems? How do we approach that part of the 
problem?
DR. BURTON: It seems to me that if there 
are dramatic differences in fees that there are 
legitimate questions to be asked from varying viewpoints, 
both from the viewpoint of whether or not an economical 
audit is being performed, and secondly, from the viewpoint 
of whether this says anything significant about the 
differences between firms. It may well be that under 
some circumstances there will be some additional 
disclosure if the firm feels its audit fee need 
requires explanation, but I think that in the first 
place, I am a believer that there are effective 
countervailing forces that exist today against- 
deficient audits, and that it is appropriate that 
there be improved information that will allow the 
economic system to work in a competitive way on 
maintaining some control over the cost of audits as 
well, and I think that this would have some benefits 
in this respect.
I think if you allow concern over the 
possible confusion that might arise to dominate your 
decision as to what will be disclosed, you won’t 
ever disclose anything because there is always the 
possibility of confusion.
I guess I feel that on balance there would 
be a benefit to having this relationship an entirely 
open one and a disclosed one. Not that you could 
not point to some potential problems, but I think 
I would solve those problems by more disclosure 
rather than by eliminating this disclosure.
MR. MANZONI: Do you go so far as to reach 
other suspicions related to joining the same clubs 
and playing golf every Saturday and having been a 
college roommate and a lot of other things like that.
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Where does it all lead to?
DR. BURTON: I think the suspicions are more 
in terms of the economic relationships. That seems to 
me, as I have heard discussed, the greater suspicion. 
There are, of course, some who view the whole world 
as a conspiracy and those people will not be assuaged 
by anything, but I believe that the disclosure of 
economic relationships would go to what I think has 
been the most significant concern. I am not suggesting 
that it would solve the concern, but it might reduce 
one source of suspicion. I think it is an on balance 
thing. It would contribute to the openness of the 
relationship and the perceived openness of the relationship.
I think that there is always the danger of 
greater suspicion in situations that are not disclosed. 
So I think on balance it would be beneficial.
I don’t think it would fully solve the 
problem because you can’t solve the problem of those 
who are fundamentally suspicious. In the final analysis 
they will remain suspicious, but you take a step, and 
that is the kind of step, I think, should be taken 
if this Board wants to do something. The proposal 
of the Section is, on the other hand, a step that says: 
We will appear to eliminate some limited number of 
services, and thus show our good will. I just don't 
think that makes sense at all.
MR. McCLOY: We have heard a good bit about 
ripple effect. I am sitting here as a lawyer. Are 
you going to "ripple" over the legal profession and 
make them disclose their fees? I shudder at the thought.
MR. GARRETT: Well, you do if you are on the 
Board.
DR. BURTON: I am a believer in general 
disclosure, and I would not exempt the legal profession 
although they write the laws and thus have generally 
been able to exempt themselves from many of them.
329
(Laughter)
MR. GARRETT: But they also manifest great 
self-restraint in limiting their behavior to strictly 
legal matters.
We hear a lot about suspicion, and it always 
puzzles me that the surveys are not too compelling. 
I know a couple of people in Washington that displayed 
a good deal of suspicion, but most of them don’t 
impress me with the factual experienced background upon 
which it is based.
Do you in teaching or otherwise get the 
feeling that there really is an image problem with the 
accounting profession as a whole, particularly with 
respect to publicly owned companies?
DR. BURTON: I don’t believe that scope of 
services is seen as a major problem. I mean, if you 
send people a questionnaire, and you ask: Is there 
a greater problem when people do consulting services 
than not? And you simply ask that question without 
exploring costs and benefits, there is an inclination 
to answer yes. More business, more problem. But I 
don’t think there is any widely held concern. There 
are certainly a few individuals, some of whom are 
forceful and articulate, who expressed this, and then 
there are some who have basic suspicions about how 
the whole system works, and this is merely one of the 
manifestations of that, but I don't think it is a 
major problem of broad public perception. I think 
it pales to insignificance when compared with the fee 
question which is the major problem, and which I 
think can't be adequately resolved. I think there 
has been more attention given to it than perhaps it 
warrants in the terms of how public perception exists.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much. It was 
very kind of you to come and we appreciate it.
DR. BURTON: It was my pleasure. Thank you
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for listening.
MR. GARRETT: We shall now reconvene at 1:45. 




The hearing reconvened at 1:55 o'clock with 
Mr. Garrett presiding.
MR. GARRETT: Mr. Varley, is it agreeable 
with you to proceed? We have got the two cancellations. 
Mr. Frechtman is not here yet, so you are the next in line.
MR. CARL J. VARLEY: I am Carl Varley 
with Clifton, Gunderson & Company. We have about 20 offices 
spread between Ohio and Colorado. The clientele is mostly 
small businesses. I think I could count on my hands or my 
fingers and toes the numbers we have with sales volume in 
excess of ten million dollars.
My comments today are going to be based on 
three what I consider factual statements, and they are: 
one, the small businessman has a very limited number of 
advisers upon which he will rely.
Two, the primary service, which we as Clifton, 
Gunderson are selling, is not auditing but is general 
advice.
Three, for us to remain competitive, we have 
to be in both sections of the AICPA.
I would like to get into this a little bit 
further. My best partners are the ones who have an 
advisory relationship with their clients. They are not 
the ones who are the best auditors. It's the ones whom 
the clients will listen to, the ones whom the clients 
come to for advice, basically a confidant relationship.
Our advice as partners to these clients covers 
a multitude of areas and that will include employee 
recruiting, plant layout and in some cases a bit of 
marketing advice.
Normally, they do this, I would say, on a 
fairly informal basis, but it still comes under the 
category of providing MAS services.
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For an example, we are currently looking for 
three second-line managers for what to us is a fairly 
large retailer client. The owner has a very unique 
personality which is typical for many of our clients. 
We are in a position to know this client, and also to know 
how he is able to get along with people. I think we can 
provide a very valuable service in finding some one or 
two or three which we can propose to him that we feel have 
a chance or surviving, and I mean that literally.
We also spend a great deal of our time working 
with our clients on conflicts within their management 
or within the owners, between the owners.
Currently, we have a client which is 50-50 owned 
by two individuals. One fellow currently feels he is 
doing all the work, and the other guy has benefited from 
it, so again, we are providing advisory service for a client 
for which we are doing an audit. Again some people might 
say this would taint our independence.
Another example is we are working on two 
engagements where we are helping a client improve his 
productivity and his manufacturing process, and this will 
be through revising plant layouts to a certain extent. 
Again it is rather general and not an in-depth study, 
but I think it does fit under the plant layout category.
In the marketing area, we provide ideas to 
clients where we feel something needs to be done. One 
of the main items here is trying to help the client 
improve his visibility.
We have many clients where it is amazing how they 
expect business to come to them when they really make 
no effort to show the public that they are open and 
available for business.
And finally, we assist many of our clients in 
negotiations of buying and selling, labor negotiations 
and that sort of thing.
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So the question is: Why do we, Clifton, 
Gunderson, need to provide the service? Why not someone 
else?
I think we have gained the respect of these 
clients. They respect us as advisers, plus, and very 
important, we understand the financial implications of 
the activities and of the advice we provide.
The question comes up, does this hurt our 
independence? I don’t think so because none of our 
clients are large enough that we want to stake our 
reputation with banks which are the primary reader of 
our financial statements. We don't want to stake our 
reputation with banks which are the primary reader of 
our financial statements. We don't want to risk our 
reputation with banks and to a certain extent bonding 
companies.
Finally, our audits are better because of this 
knowledge we have of the client. We know things about 
the client including his personal marital problems 
that I am sure does not occur with much larger firms.
So in concluding, I would like to say that if 
we don't provide this broad business advice, our services 
become much less marketable. If all we are doing is 
providing an audit, then I think it should be basically 
the low bid gets the job, but by providing these 
additional services we understand the client much better 
and do a better, job at the audit.
Secondly, if we don't provide broad business 
advice, our clients will be losing a very valuable 
service and I say it is very valuable because they seem 
to be eager to pay our fee. It is not a problem that they 
don't think they are getting their money's worth, and 
finally, it would seem to me, a personal opinion that 
regulation is getting somewhat out of hand, that we seem 
to be going around trying to find someone to protect, and 
this is creating a lot of time being spent and a lot of 
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dollars being spent when basically, I guess, we are assuming 
that the public is not too intelligent.
Believe me, as far as our clients and the people 
that read our reports, I have found them to be quite 
intelligent.
Thank you.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you. How large do you say 
the profession staff is of your firm?
MR. VARLEY: We have approximately 250 personnel, 
yes.
MR. GARRETT: And you have a separate MAS 
department?
MR. VARLEY: Yes, there are five of us in it.
MR. GARRETT: Five. Is most of the advice
that you are talking about from MAS?
MR. VARLEY: Absolutely not.
Or day-to-day consultingMR. GARRETT:
that we were talking about this morning?
MR. VARLEY: It is day-to-day consulting, yes,
sir.
MR. GARRETT: And you sometimes help the
partner that gets the call, I suppose.
MR. VARLEY: That is right.
MR. GARRETT: Do you also have separate engagements.
ME. VARLEY: Yes, sir.
MR. GARRETT: That are from your department?
MR. VARLEY: Definitely.
MR. McCLOY: Your recruiting has been in
the lower range of the accounting-financial areas?
MR. VARLEY: Not necessarily.
MR. McCLOY: Have you recruited CEOs?
MR. VARLEY: No, it is the owner that is
hiring us , so he is not looking for his replacement.
MR. WOOD: Do you recruit a chief financial
officer?
MR. VARLEY: In many cases that will be a
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bookkeeper, but yes, we will recruit a controller.
MR. WOOD: How many states or cities do you 
operate?
MR. VARLEY: We have 20 offices between 
Colorado and Ohio.
MR. GARRETT: But your typical client, if 
not every one of your clients, needs an audit only for 
bank purposes or—
MR. VARLEY: Yes.
MR. GARRETT: —there may be some members of 
the family that are not active in management who want it 
and that sort of thing.
MR. VARLEY: Right, a group of doctors 
feel better if they have had an audit.
MR. GARRETT: But they are not investors in 
the ordinary sense?
MR. VARLEY: No.
MR. GARRETT: If the Executive Committee 
proposals were to become the rule, would it force you to 
curtail a significant amount of the services that you 
render, do you believe?
MR. VARLEY: Not as I understand they are 
stated because we have, I think, one SEC client, and 
that was the result of a recent merger.
MR. GARRETT: But even there, do you think 
you go beyond what they would condone or say was 
all right?
MR. VARLEY: I think if you took it literally, 
I have partners and myself giving advice to clients 
which would violate.
MR. GARRETT: Would they be management 
decisions or not auditing-skill related?
MR. VARLEY: Not auditing-skill related.
MR. GARRETT: I see. I don’t suppose you 
can be sure unless you fall within one of their express 
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examples because one of our problems is that we are 
not sure either just where the audit-skill related 
stops.
MR. VARLEY: Right.
MR. WOOD: Are your five MAS people also 
accountants?
MR. VARLEY: Three of us are, but one is also 
a Ph.D. with civil engineering, so it is kind of 
a shared profession in this case. Two are not.
MR. GARRETT: So it would be, I suppose, as 
a practical matter, satisfactory for your firm if a 
distinction were made between the SEC Practice Section— 
no, it wouldn’t since your members of the Section, I 
presume, or you wouldn’t be here.
MR. VARLEY: Yes, and we feel we must remain 
that way to be competitive.
MR. GARRETT: But there could be a distinction 
with respect to services provided to non-SEC clients.
MR. VARLEY: If it would hold, right, but 
I assume that eventually it would filter down and become 
for non-SEC also, the restrictions.
MR. GARRETT: If it is theoretically based 
on independence, I suppose it would have to, wouldn't it?
MR. VARLEY: Yes.
MR. GARRETT: Since you can’t make that 
distinction.
MR. MANZONI: Which services do you provide 
now that you think may not satisfy the skill-related 
criterion?
MR. VARLEY: The recruiting, plant layout, 
marketing.
MR. MANZONI: It is hard to tell when they 
do and don’t, but those are the ones you think of.
MR. VARLEY: Yes, those are the ones that I 
would be concerned. The others I don’t feel that we will 
ever get involved with, with our clientele.
337
MR. GARRETT: This plant layout is for production 
purposes, and not for paper flow and information flow 
purposes?
MR. VARLEY: Right.
MR. McCLOY: It is for production purposes?
MR. VARLEY: Yes, sir. Not initial layout, 
but many of our clients kind of start out in a garage, and 
start throwing in pieces of equipment, and then eventually 
as they grow, it gets pretty obvious that something has 
to be done, so we may, in fact, say: "Why don’t you 
shift things around a bit?"




VARLEY: When you say that, what do you
mean?
MR. GARRETT: Is the larger part of the firm's
revenues from nonauditing services, or can you tell, so
much of this is on a day-to-day consulting basis?
MR. VARLEY: I don't think we can really tell 
in all honesty. So much of our fees are billed accounting 
services, and yet it is the partner advising the client on 
some decisions the client has to make.
PROFESSOR CARY: You don't bill separately for 
an audit?
MR. VARLEY: Not necessarily. In some cases, 
yes, but not always.
PROFESSOR CARY: A period basis, I see.
MR. WOOD: Are the pension plans of your 
clients governed by ERISA?
MR. VARLEY: Yes.
MR. WOOD: And do they use outside actuaries?
MR. VARLEY: Yes.
MR. WOOD: Do you audit the unfunded 
pension liability? How far do you go to take a look 
at their findings?
MR. VARLEY: Now you are getting out of my 
area of the practice definitely, but to the extent of
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my knowledge, we have on occasion asked the client, and 
most of these are insurance company plans, to have an 
independent actuary look at it also because we weren't 
quite sure if the insurance company's information 
was correct.
MR. WOOD: And you would accept the findings 
of the retained actuary then in that case?
MR. VARLEY: Yes, if they agreed with the 
insurance company. If we have the two, then definitely. 
If there is a conflict, then we may have to go further.
MR. GARRETT: You used an interesting 
argument as to why there is no impairment of independence. 
You have so many little clients. I am not saying this in any 
scornful way. I can understand it very well, I am sure, 
the lack of any client on which you are beholden or 
that is terribly important to your total revenues is a 
corrupting possibility.
MR. VARLEY: True, and I think I have seen 
examples where I have felt some firms had a major 
client that it had to be a consideration for them at 
least, but in our case, it has not happened.
MR. GARRETT: I think that is all.
MR. McCLOY: I don't have any. 
PROFESSOR CARY: No questions. 
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much, Mr. Varley. 
Now Mr. Frechtman. Please proceed.
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MR. A. BERNARD FRECHTMAN: Thank you very much. 
Among all of the professional accountants, I feel a 
little like a fish out of water. I may be the only 
lawyer about.
I am A. Bernard Frechtman, general counsel to 
Robert Half Personnel Agencies. Its President, Robert 
Half, wanted to be present here today, but because of 
a previous out-of-town commitment he is unavailable. 
He does, however, feel that the work of this committee 
is very important and designated me to convey his views 
to you. On his behalf, I want to express my appreciation 
for your permitting me to attend and as well your 
accommodating to my own legal commitments.
The responsibility of certified public 
accounting firms for avoiding conflict of interest 
problems was well set forth in a report issued by the 
Accountant’s International Study Group entitled 
"Independence of Auditors" in which it was stated:
"The concept of the auditor’s independence 
cannot be precisely defined because it is 
considered a state of mind and character. 
Independence is viewed from two perspectives-- 
independence in fact and independence in 
appearance. Independence in fact refers 
to the quality of not being influenced by 
regard to personal advantage. Independence 
in appearance refers to the absence of 
certain ascertainable circumstances that 
give rise to a potential loss of 
independence or conflict of interest, 
which may lead third parties to conclude 
that the specified relationship poses an 
unacceptable threat to the auditor’s 
independence."
Personnel selection is the most important of 
all management functions and the manner in which it is 
carried out largely determines whether there is 
independence in fact as well as independence in 
appearance.
It is the function furthest removed from the 
auditing responsibility and is the clearest case of
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present and potential conflict of interest.
As long as certified public accounting firms 
participate, even slightly, in the selection of 
personnel, either by direct recruiting or by staff 
transfers, they do in fact become part of the management 
of the clients they audit or eventually may come to 
audit.
It is simple to understand the conflict as 
it comes from the situation that exists when a certified 
public accounting firm acts as an employment agency 
in recruiting personnel either on behalf of a client or 
on behalf of a company that in the future may potentially 
become its client. In both instances a subtle 
relationship of allegiance arises between the newly 
placed employee and the certified public accounting 
firm acting as an employment agency which found that 
employee the job and the employee's expectation that 
future jobs are similarly available. A thread now 
exists between the employee and the certified public 
accounting firm acting as an employment agency, that 
if undisturbed by future action can be strengthened 
to provide for the growth of the employee's own 
professional future.
But an even more insidious practice, which 
is not so easily discernible is that of certified 
public accounting firms, whether or not acting as 
employment agencies, in making transfers of their own 
staff to the staff of a client where they often assume 
a key position. If that staff member owes the job 
to the certified public accounting firm, it is clearly 
impossible to maintain either an actual independence 
or the appearance of independence as the Accountant's 
International Study Group said. In fact, this 
establishment of an alumni placement bureau is a form 
of patronage that gives an employee a total feeling 
of security that the employee is highly unlikely to
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disturb.
But the faith of the employee in making his 
future progress in this way is falsely placed. In fact, 
were the certified public accounting firms prohibited 
from acting as employment agencies, employees would have 
an expanded opportunity for upgrading their positions 
and employers would likewise be able to find competent 
personnel more easily. As things now stand, a certified 
public accounting firm will rarely recommend that a 
client hire staff personnel from another certified 
public accounting firm. Its prime motive in transferring 
staff is to assure that the client company is populated 
with as many people as possible who own strong allegiance 
to the former certified public accounting employer 
while simultaneously providing itself with an easy 
egress for its unpromotable employees thus making 
room for recruiting young fledglings. Since all large 
accounting firms share this philosophy, it places 
severe restrictions on the staff person who relies on 
the accounting firm to secure an accounting position 
outside the public accounting profession. Each 
placement made by a certified public accounting firm 
helps perpetuate the cozy relationship that exists 
between the auditor and the client. The net result 
is a drastic reduction in objectivity.
If you intend to eliminate questions 
concerning the credibility and integrity of the 
independence of a certified public accounting firm’s 
audit, whether those questions deal with reality or 
appearance, you must mandate a complete elimination 
of the involvement of certified public accounting 
firms in the employment process. Only in that way 
can we be sure that the certified public accounting 
firm and its clients, and vice versa, are completely 
free of influence. Without this complete separation 
there will always be a subtle question of the
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integrity and independence of the audit.
If certified public accountants continue to 
be permitted to recruit key employees for non-clients, 
they will end up with strong loyalties as those 
employees may likely go out of their way to bring 
the account to that certified public accounting firm. 
Then we are back to the conflict of interest. Now 
that the professions are permitted to advertise, 
aggressive certified public accounting firms will 
promote their recruiting service by direct mail and 
newspapers and magazines since they can afford 
massive advertising campaigns. They will in this 
way obtain non-audit clients for this recruiting 
service frequently ending up with them as audit 
clients and thus causing a further concentration 
of large client audits. In other words, non-auditing 
services advertised by big money will ultimately 
force the small and medium-sized firms to lose 
clients.
Mr. Chairman, somewhere out there is a 
fraud "incubating" as a result of some quasi­
relationship established between a certified public 
accounting firm and the placement of an employee 
at a client which is the subject of an audit by 
that very same firm. Attorneys now armed with 
facts relating to these kinds of personnel activities 
could be involved in some sort of litigation resulting 
from an outgrowth of that relationship. Of course, 
there is no proof that anything adverse has happened 
as a result of the conflict of interest I have just 
described. In the cases of proven fraud, there is 
no necessity of showing this conflict of interest. 
The fraudulent act is generally sufficient. On the 
other hand, the appearance of the conflict of interest 
may give rise to a further basis for predicating 
appropriate litigation given the proper circumstances.
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I urge you to stop it now before there will 
be an embarrassment to the entire accounting profession 
as a result of the charge that in fact there exists 
outright collusion between an accounting firm and 
employees of its clients. I urge you as well to 
consider that the only way you can regulate the "state 
of mind and character" of an auditor’s independence 
to assure that the opportunity to put a blemish on it 
is to prohibit the possibility of its occurrence by 
barring both recruiting and staff transfer.
MR. GARRETT: Have we any questions? 
PROFESSOR CARY: May I ask, your firm has 
no accountants and it is primarily a personnel firm, or 
am I clear?
MR. FRECHTMAN: My firm is a law firm. 
PROFESSOR CARY: The firm which you are 
representing.
MR. FRECHTMAN: The firm which I represent is 
only in the personnel business.
PROFESSOR CARY: No CPAs?
MR. FRECHTMAN: The only CPA in the firm is 
Bob Half who is a CPA, who is not engaged in the practice 
of accounting by your own rules that prohibit him from 
doing so.
There are, however, among the franchisees 
who operate Robert Half Personnel Agencies throughout 
the country, Canada and Europe, some people who are 
CPAs, but likewise, they do not practice.
PROFESSOR CARY: They specialize primarily 
in persons having a financial and accounting background?
MR. FRECHTMAN: Exactly. That is their 
entire expertise. They have been doing it for about 30 
years now.
MR. WOOD: So a generalist would not be 
recruited by the Half Agencies?
MR. FRECHTMAN: By generalist you mean?
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MR. WOOD: Marketing.
MR. FRECHTMAN: Yes, marketing, sales people 
such as that. They would only deal with accountants, 
controllers, financial people, EDP, financial vice 
presidents, bookkeepers, and so forth.
PROFESSOR CARY: I just wanted to ask, you 
made the point that accounting firms will seldom 
recommend staff from their competitors, and yet I 
suppose they might seldom recommend a staff member 
from their own firm if they think the person  
is particularly good and perhaps of partnership 
caliber. Isn't that right?
MR. FRECHTMAN: If they are partnership 
caliber, it is not likely they are going to recommend 
them. If they are not partnership caliber, and there 
is no place for them to go within the firm, and while 
they may be otherwise competent and capable, it is 
very likely that they would recommend them as a 
staff transfer. It happens in law firms as well, 
except law firms are not engaged in any kind of 
executive recruiting activity, and they don't audit 
their clients.
PROFESSOR CARY: I understand the parallel.
MR. WOOD: Would you see the same possibility 
of compromised relationships if the CPA firm recruited 
an assistant controller for its clients, its audit 
client, from another auditing firm?
MR. FRECHTMAN: Yes, I think that the subtle 
relationship that exists is the one that says that 
that employee in some way being recruited by the CPA 
firm, the CPA firm has exercised an influence in 
judgment in the selection process and subtly could 
likewise influence the future of promotability of that 
particular employee.
MR. WOOD: It seems to me that you are 
assuming that the management of the employer is 
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deferring its judgment in his capacity to its CPA firm. 
You are downgrading the competence of the personnel 
department and the officer to whom the assistant 
controller reports.
MR. FRECHTMAN: I don't think so. I think 
that they probably run parallel tracks. I don't think 
there are some subtle judgments that are made and there 
are very subtle relationships that exist. Whether 
or not they are real in all instances, they are certainly 
real in their appearance of being in conflict.
If the personnel department in the company, 
and we are dealing with both large and small companies, 
so personnel departments as a fact may be one person 
or may be one of the managers of the company, the 
personnel department makes a judgment about an employee, 
a potential employee, and then says: "But I want my 
CPA firm to interview them." then the final judgment 
may very well be made right there rather than in the 
company. They may just want your concurrence, but 
the applicant doesn't know that, totally.
MR. WOOD: Would you object to the CPA firm 
helping management to define the type of person that 
is needed, the scope of the job, what to look for, and 
then turning over the recruiting to the chief 
executive or to his personnel firm?
MR. FRECHTMAN: My impression is that there 
should be no objection to that. I may not be as 
qualified as Bob Half is to answer that question, but 
I couldn't see any objection to it personally.
MR. GARRETT: The objection that you see 
in the practice, is that based primarily on the fact 
that, in fact, perhaps if not in form, the auditing 
firm makes the hiring decision or is to some sort of 
lingering feeling of gratitude and closeness and 
dependence?
MR. FRECHTMAN: In which instance are you 
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referring to, because there are a couple. One is where 
they are making the referral, where they do the 
recruitment and make the referral and make the suggestion 
or recommendation, and the other instance is where it 
comes the other way, and they are asked to confirm 
the judgment of the company, and the third instance 
is there they make the suggestion of one of the firm’s 
own employees.
In all instances I would suggest that the 
choice, the referral and the judgment is clouded by 
either the real or apparent conflict that is not clear, 
that there is this thread that is maintained between 
the CPA firm and that particular employee.
MR. GARRETT: Who is that bad for?
MR. FRECHTMAN: The public. In the ultimate 
it is bad for the public.
MR. GARRETT: Because?
MR. FRECHTMAN: Because we are dealing with 
conflict of interest both in fact and appearance. I 
mean, we both have to deal with problems in terms of 
ethics, and when I say "both," I mean as accountants 
and as lawyers.
We have to stay very clearly away from both, 
in fact conflicts of interests as well as appearance 
of conflicts of interest.
Many times we make judgments in our firm, 
small that it may be, not to engage in a particular 
matter and not to represent a particular client or not 
to do a particular thing because although we know that 
it is not a conflict of interest, we also know that it 
might seem to be one.
If we are now judging the integrity of what 
you are concerned with and what you are focusing on, 
which is the audit process, which the public has to 
rely upon, which is what your concern is, then it 
would seem to me that you would want to maintain
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as much of a sacred circumstance surrounding all of the 
internal procedures that go on in doing the audit as 
well as all of those who are participating in doing 
the audit, and the relationships between those who 
are doing the actual work of recruiting and those 
who are doing the audit. So in the ultimate, it seem 
to me, it is the public.
MR. GARRETT: So in your view the problem 
wouldn’t be cured if this were a casual activity on 
the part of the CPA firm rather than a well organized, 
active, personnel placement bureau, so to speak?
MR. FRECHTMAN: Not at all. I think that 
you ought to be totally prohibited from engaging in 
the practice.
MR. GARRETT: Any involvement at all.
MR. FRECHTMAN: Directly or indirectly.
If you are going to do the audit, then you ought to 
be prohibited from being engaged in the recruiting 
activity.
I am not suggesting there is anything totally 
illegal in what is is that is going on. I am talking 
about the fact that there is an appearance of the 
possibility of compromise as it relates between the 
individual who has been placed by the firm that is 
doing the audit or there is also the possibility, as 
I suggested, that could incubate as a result of it. 
Somebody passes over something more casually because 
of the relationship.
MR. GARRETT: I think I understand your point. 
MR. McCLOY: Wouldn’t it be very unnatural, 
though, to proscribe any contact between the client 
and the accountant? Suppose he called up and said: 
”I have got an open spot. Have you got any ideas for 
an assistant controller," or "Can you give us some 
help." or "What do you hear in the trade about X?" 
He doesn’t charge any fee for it. Does he just say,
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"I am sorry. I can’t talk to you about that."
MR. FRECHTMAN: A lot of times we tell our 
clients that we are very sorry, but we are prohibited 
by the Canons of Ethics from dealing with a particular 
matter, and if you are prohibited, then there are other 
sources to which the client can go in order to verify 
the information.
MR. McCLOY: It seems rather unnatural, though, 
to say that he can’t express an opinion in regard to 
a matter.
MR. WOOD: Taking Mr. McCloy’s question one 
step further, suppose that Robert Half Associates had 
recruited a controller, and Mr. McCloy as chief 
financial officer of this company calls up his CPA 
and says, "I would like to have you interview this 
fine young man that Robert Half has brought to me. 
Check him out. Ask him a lot of questions. Give me 
your judgment on his qualifications, his record." Would 
you object to that?
MR. FRECHTMAN: Are you talking about now 
making a judgment predicated upon his qualification?
MR. WOOD: You bet.
MR. FRECHTMAN: If the company is otherwise 
unable to do so.
MR. WOOD: Wouldn't it be logical if Mr. 
McCloy’s XYZ Company is hiring an assistant controller, 
and you recommended three candidates, and after he and 
his personnel man have interviewed them, to ask Arthur 
Andersen or whoever it is that audits his company to 
conduct their own interview and analysis of his 
background?
MR. FRECHTMAN: I would think that if Mr.
McCloy was going to make a judgment as to the qualifications 
of the individual, that that could be done with a degree 
of independence, but when he makes reference to, just 
to use your observation before, when you are dealing 
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with a thing that is being unnatural, in that you have 
a problem in turning down a client with respect to making 
certain kinds of judgments, that is casual, I think 
that that creates a problem. But if you are going 
to test the qualifications of an individual and you 
are not otherwise engaged in this kind of an activity, 
I don’t really see that as a problem.
It is a very fine line we draw. It is when 
you start going over the line that I think you create a 
problem.
MR. MANZONI: Are there other personnel 
agencies besides yourself that specialize in these types 
of placements, financial and control people?
MR. FRECHTMAN: Yes, there are.
MR. MANZONI: Are there a large number of 
non-accounting firms who are doing it?
MR. FRECHTMAN: On, yes, there are a lot of 
independent companies throughout the United States.
MR. MANZONI: But with this kind of expertise?
MR. FRECHTMAN: I think that Bob Half would 
like to suggest that he has the most expertise. His 
people probably do, and they are probably the largest 
organization of its kind, probably in the world, in 
terms of financial placements and temporary personnel 
in the same area. But there are executive level agencies, 
personnel agencies throughout the country, from locality 
to locality that can among other things provide expert 
guidance and recruitment in this area.
You would not be without sources of finding 
personnel if you eliminated yourselves from the business 
of being in the recruitment of this kind of personnel.
MR. MATUSIAK: You are suggesting then that 
if the CPA firm decides to discontinue the services of 
employment to employees, that they just merely hand 
him his pink slip and say, "Sorry, you are on your own?" 
MR. FRECHTMAN: That sounds very brutal,
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doesn’t it? But the fact of the matter is that there 
are all kinds of out-placement activities that take 
place in large and small corporations and law firms 
and can likewise take place in accounting firms as 
well.
MR. MATUSIAK: Then if I understand your 
recommendation, that the CPA firm would be prohibited 
from rendering any kind of assistance to an employee 
that was discharged.
MR. FRECHTMAN: I don’t think that we are 
talking about the employee that is being discharged. 
The employee that the CPA firm discharges isn’t 
necessarily sent to a client. It is the employee that 
they transfer to the client who is an employee who 
doesn’t make partner in the firm.
MR. MATUSIAK: You make that sound as though 
it is solely the decision of the CPA firm and not the 
prospective client.
MR. FRECHTMAN: No, it is never solely the 
decision of the CPA firm. What I am suggesting is that 
the participation of the CPA firm in making a decision 
creates what I consider to be a conflict of interest. 
At least, if not in fact, in appearance.
MR. MATUSIAK: But you would suggest that 
a CPA firm be not allowed to render any assistance to 
a departing employee in finding a new job?
MR. FRECHTMAN: No, I never said that. They 
could send him to a personnel agency.
MR. MATUSIAK: Preferably to a Robert Half 
Personnel Agency?
MR. FRECHTMAN: Not preferably, but if they 
wanted to get to the best, I suppose that is the place 
to go.
MR. MATUSIAK: That is not giving him any 
assistance.
MR. FRECHTMAN: Oh, it is. What does the 
company do when they discharge an employee? They 
351
engage in a lot of other activities. You are transposing 
something. I am suggesting to you not to focus on the 
undesirable employee in the CPA firm because that 
person is somebody you probably would not want to have 
transferred to a company client. We are not talking 
about that individual. We are talking about the 
individual who achieves a particular level within the 
CPA firm and then can go no further. The CPA firm 
wants to make room for its own growth. They suggest 
therefore some kind of lateral transfer to a client 
where the individual would be competent and capable 
of doing whatever it was that they would have him do.
MR. McCLOY: Might not the accounting firm 
be better equipped to supply a vacancy than your firm 
would just be reason of the fact that they have had 
this contact with the company? They know something 
about the company. They know more about the company 
than de novo calling on you who have had no relationship 
with the company before that. We have heard a great 
deal about the benefits, this morning, to the audit 
function that was involved, but there are some benefits 
it may be argued also to the company as a result of 
the accountant’s wide knowledge due to the accountancy 
relationship. You discount that?
MR. FRECHTMAN: No, I don't discount it. 
I think I am suggesting you have to forego it.
MR. McCLOY: Because of the potential conflict 
of interest.
MR. FRECHTMAN: Exactly. I think you have 
to make a very firm decision that says essentially what 
is and what isn't a conflict of interest. If you do 
make a judgment that it constitutes a conflict of 
interest, they you must make a judgment that you forego 
that kind of activity in business.
When you really cut it down, what you are 
really talking about is a balance between maintaining 
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a professional standard and accommodating a 
professional standard to an economic interest of a 
firm engaging in another business.
There is no question but that the personnel 
recruiter, the executive recruiter or the personnel 
agency, all those firms that are out there engaged in 
this on a highly specialized basis can become just as 
proficient and just as familiar perhaps with some more 
objectivity with the activities of a company so as to 
make judgments in the personnel area. After all, 
if the CPA firm is engaging in this practice they must, 
of necessity, establish people who are no longer engaged 
in the audit or accounting process, but engaged solely 
in personnel functions, so what you really boil it 
down to is: Who operates the employment agency? If you 
want to operate the employment agency, then you operate 
the employment agency, and then you run the risk of 
what I am suggesting to you may very well be a severe 
conflict of interest, and it leads to some question 
of the integrity of that independent audit and the 
relationship. Why else hold on to the stake?
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much.
MR. FRECHTMAN: Thank you very much for 
inviting me. You were very gracious.
MR. GARRETT: Howard I. Bernstein.
Mr. Bernstein is from Chicago. Have you any 
idea where to reach him, Lou.
MR. WOOD: Try the telephone.
MR. McCLOY: While we are waiting for the 
telephone, does anybody from the audience have suggestions 
or additions they want to make to the testimony they 
have made or comment on anybody else's testimony?
MR. WOOD: It is a rare opportunity, 
gentlemen.
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MR. RAYMOND J. LEISNER: My name is Raymond 
J. Leisner. I am a CPA, a self-practitioner, and I 
limit my practice to management advisory services. 
I have spent all, or most all of my professional 
career in MAS, previously as a partner in one of the 
large firms.
I would like to address myself to two 
observations. I have sat through these hearings 
yesterday and today. One is the so-called fall-out 
issue of the prohibition of major firms in MAS or 
restriction of their practice which would cause a 
diminution in their total effort.
We have heard about the impact on their 
practice. The impact on the profession as a whole, 
could be substantial in that most of the technical 
resources of training, continued professional education 
committee work, papers, et cetera which Mr. Mitchell 
and his group administer and coordinate, it has been 
my observation emanate from these larger firms out 
of sheer size, and accordingly, I would think that 
the smaller practitioners who are seeking to upgrade 
their skills in an ever-expanding way would be 
adversely affected.
I happen to work with small practitioners 
and serve them in their consulting practice and with 
my years of experience, I have no personal need for 
such training, but part of my job is the helping 
in the development of their staff, many of whom 
are accountants, CPAs to be or in some cases partners 
in these firms who are skilled in auditing and who 
seek through these professional courses to expand 
those skills. I have seen nowhere in the literature 
or the comments on this issue this question of what 
would it do to our total professional capacity of 
the AICPA and our state societies to meet the 
continued professional education requirements of
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our profession if we had this kind of diminution, and 
I would suggest that that be incorporated somewhere 
in the analysis you are going to make.
My second point would run to the question of 
perceived problems of independence versus real. We 
have seen repeatedly this reference to the Cohen 
Commission Report, that we really couldn’t find any 
problems, but there must be one because somebody said 
there was.
I can remember when this issue first came 
up in the mid-’50s, and we have been at it for twenty 
years, and I would like to underscore that I believe 
the profession should take a stand on the real issues 
and not be precipitated into something because, after 
all, we have some perceived government regulation 
which is based on this.
As others have said before, this is the 
time to look at the issues and say: This is for real, 
and let’s close it out one way or the other through 
some action which you gentlemen would recommend 
hopefully.
That is really all I have to say, and I 
couldn’t resist the opportunity for these ad lib remarks. 
They were not as well prepared as the others that have 
been here.
MR. GARRETT: You came across very well. 
Thank you.
MR. LEISNER: Thank you.
MR. WOOD: I gather, Mr. Leisner, that you don't 
in 20 years of practice see any real compromise of 
independence from the MAS practice.
MR. LEISNER: No, Mr. Wood, as a matter of 
fact, I believe that the degree of independence that 
a consultant must have every day in dealing with the 
politics of internal management is a much higher degree 
of independence, or at least, as great in reality as 
355
what his audit brethren must practice, so independence 
is a very important criterion of the consulting 
practice.
MR. WOOD: However, doesn't a consulting 
practice compromise the independence of the audit partner 
of the same firm?
MR. LEISNER: I have never seen any evidence 
of that. In fact, we bend over backwards generally to 
be sure that we are as some one said like Caesar’s 
wife in this regard.
MR. WOOD: And it is your hope that out of 
these hearings and our recommendations to the Section 
that there will be a pretty decisive answer rendered on 
what you can and cannot do in the MAS area?
MR. LEISNER: Yes, sir, I do. I believe that 
every accused has a right to a due process, as was 
mentioned, which means a definitive opinion, and I 
believe that an examination of the facts should be 
able to put this in perspective.
MR. WOOD: Thank you.
MR. McCLOY: To your knowledge, has there 
been any sort of hearing such as this in the last 20 
years on this subject, or has it just been discussed 
in the periodicals?
MR. LEISNER: I remember addressing comments 
in the 1950s on what I called the independence of ignorance 
which it was alleged because you knew so much about a 
client, it would impede your independence, whereas, it 
goes the other way. At that time it was mostly in 
the academic journals, but I can think of going back 
to the mid-’50s.
MR. WOOD: Has anyone seriously recommended 
that clients be required to change their auditing firm 
at regular intervals? Do any of you know whether this 
has ever been advanced by anybody in government?
MR. GARRETT: The Metcalf Report recommended
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that.
MR. WOOD: That is what I thought.
MR. MITCHELL: I think Ralph Nader has, too.
MR. WOOD: That doesn’t surprise me.
MR. McCLOY: Mr. Gilbert has, too, and Wilma 
Sauss. And Evelyn.
MR. GARRETT: The Metcalf Report did more 
things than that.
I think we will break for ten minutes.
(A short recess was taken.)
MR. GARRETT: Gentlemen, may we come to 
order. Mr. Bernstein, will you proceed, please.
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MR. HOWARD I. BERNSTEIN: Yes, I represent 
several firms. I am not speaking on my own. I would like 
to tell you the firms that I am representing.
Each of the following firms has consented to the association 
of its name with these comments:
Bansley & Kiener 
300 West Washington Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60606
Bernstein and Bank, Ltd. 
6200 North Hiawatha Avenue 
Chicago, Illinois 60646
Blackman, Kallick & Company 
180 North LaSalle Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60601
Checkers, Simon & Rosner 
33 North LaSalle Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Clifton, Gunderson & Co. 
900 Commercial National Bank 
Peoria, Illinois 61602
Doty, Jarrow & Company 
20 North Wacker Drive 
Chicago, Illinois
Friedman, Eisenstein, Raemer &
Schwartz
233 North Michigan Avenue 
Chicago, Illinois
Gale, Takahashi & Channon 
120 South LaSalle 
Chicago, Illinois
Goldberg, Geiser & Company, Ltd. 
20 North Wacker Drive 
Chicago, Illinois
Thomas W. Havey & Company 
105 West Adams Street 
Chicago, Illinois
B. L. Rosenberg & Company
Suite 2300 
180 North LaSalle 
Chicago, Illinois... 60601
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This statement represents the collective 
opinions of eleven local Illinois CPA firms employing over 
607 partners and staff and billing about $21,250,000 per 
year. Based on a meeting of eight of the firms, and 
subsequent telephone calls and reviews of the draft of this 
statement, a consensus of all of the undersigned firms was 
achieved.
The firms in this group may be further described as 
follows:
1. Not affiliated with each other in any way.
2. Directly compete with each other.
3. Clients are mainly owner-managed commercial 
enterprizes.
4. The SEC clients of each firm number zero to 
a few.
5. Directly and frequently compete with Big 8 CPA 
firms.
One might logically guess that these firms would 
favor the proscription of MAS work for SEC companies by CPA 
firms, so that this MAS work might move from Big 8 CPA firms 
to local CPA firms. On the contrary, however, our group 
unanimously and strongly opposes any limitations whatsoever 
on the performance of MAS services by CPA firms for their 
audit clients, whether SEC companies or not.
It is our opinion that restriction would be:
1. Expensive and hurtful to clients.
2. Extremely damaging for local CPA firms.
3. Of no benefit at all to the general public.
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THE FORGOTTEN MAN - THE CLIENT
Several recent scandals have involved SEC companies 
that went bankrupt, bribed foreign officials or maintained 
political slush funds. Nets cast out to restrain possible 
future sharks will probably bring in the usual catch of 
minnows and assorted unexpected creatures. There is much 
concern for creditors and public stockholders. In the pro­
cess, the client is forgotten and is caught in the net.
Typical clients of CPA firms in our group may be 
described as follows:
1. Owned and managed by a small (1-3 persons) 
group.
2. Annual sales of $100,000 to $50,000,000.
3. Lack of management depth.
4. Owner-managers each skilled in only one aspect 
of business management such as sales, production 
or engineering.
5. Owner-managers lack financial management 
skills.
6. Most have no financial officer (controller or 
treasurer). Indeed, many are fortunate to have 
a decent bookkeeper.
Our local CPA firms are likely to serve a client 
over many years. We become intimately familiar with the 
financial and business affairs of the client. This familiarity, 
gained in the audit and other work, allows us to perform 
efficiently and effectively when the client asks for help in 
tax planning, business planning, assistance in securing financing, 
installation of a cost accounting system, computer selection 
and installation, etc.
Our wide exposure to the financial and business 
affairs of dozens of clients further enables us to provide 
meaningful service at reasonable prices.
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Very few clients of local CPA firms are capable of 
hiring a controller, treasurer, or even a bookkeeper without 
substantial assistance from the CPA firm. The CPA may: 
a) recognize the need to hire, b) define the position, 
c) describe the desired employee, d) interview candidates, 
e) make suggestions as to the best candidates, and f) help 
train the new person. Many of our clients may not know 
a debit from a credit and would be helpless without the 
assistance of the regularly-employed CPA when hiring accounting 
or financial staff.
The experience and objectivity of the CPA firm are 
extremely beneficial to client firms interested in employee 
benefit plans. The CPA has no significant financial interest 
in whether a plan is adopted or in the nature of a plan. If 
a client is interested in a pension plan, for example, we might 
talk him out of it if the financial obligations would be 
burdensome. If such a plan is to be installed, it is 
likely that we would recommend employment of an outside 
consultant. In that event, our advice is usually required to 
aid and comfort the client.
Firms of our size are not likely to design and lay 
out a plant, but we surely help the clients to analyze and 
understand the financial effects on the business of plant 
expansion or rebuilding.
We would not be likely to design new products, but we do 
help the client to determine costs and sales prices and to 
project effects on the business.
We are not likely to perform insurance actuarial
services, but every one of our clients needs our advice when
considering proposals for life insurance policies.
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Clients are already heavily burdened by complex 
reporting requirements that arose from a few SEC company 
scandals. Substantial additional burdens will result if 
the CPA’s knowledge of the client cannot be reused in MAS 
work.
LOCAL CPA FIRMS ALSO TO SUFFER
We would be less than candid if we did not 
acknowledge our self-interest in this issue. It is our belief 
that the proscription of MAS work for SEC firms will:
1. Make non-SEC auditors appear to be second-class 
auditors,
2. Eventually result in restriction of MAS 
services to non-SEC clients, thus elimination 
part of our business (the part many of us 
find most satisfying), with the further result 
that:
a. It could be easier for clients to fool us 
because of our reduced contact with and 
and understanding of the clients.
b. We will no longer be able to compete 
effectively against Big 8 firms. 
Most of our clients engage us because of the 
personal MAS service we are able to provide. 
Straight audit engagements usually go to 
the lowest bidder, and Big 8 firms almost 
invariably are significantly lower than we 
are.
The people who seem to object most to MAS services 
by CPAs are those with the least comprehension of this 
situation (see notice of this public hearing - page 6). 
We believe that it would be unfair to allow any group of 
professionals to be dictated to by those least qualified 
to make the required judgments. Must everything and every­
body in this country be reduced to the least-common
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denominator? Government seems to pursue this cause, but it 
is the duty of the private sector to resist.
NO BENEFIT TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC
It seems clear to us that the general public’s best 
protection is the professionalism, ethics and unlimited 
personal liability of the CPA. It is our understanding that 
there is no known instance of a lack of audit independence 
resulting from MAS work.
Accuracy and completeness in audit work require 
that the auditor achieve a thorough understanding of the 
affairs of the clients. The performance of MAS work can only 
increase this understanding, thus increasing the reliability of 
published reports.
Banks constitute, by far, the largest group, outside 
of the owner-managers of clients, relying on financial statements 
of our clients. Many of these clients are recommended to 
us by these banks; to our knowledge, none of these banks have 
expressed concern as to our independence or the possible 
effect of MAS work on our independence. In many cases, 
banker recommendations arise because of essential MAS 
services that the banker and the client believe are necessary.
******
Of the approximately 71,000 AICPA members in public 
practice, about 44,000, or about 62%, are with local firms. 
Statistics covering over 334, 000 U.S. manufacturing firms 
show that 90% employ under 100 people. Out of more than 
1,7 million U.S. retail establishments, only 66,000, or 3.9% 
have net worth over $200,000. Out of over 463,000 U.S. 
wholesale companies, only 29,000, or 6%, have net worth 
over $200,000. Out of over 898,000 U.S. service establishments, 
only 13,000, or 1.4%, have net worth over $200,000.
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We respectfully ask the Public Oversight Board to 
very carefully consider the effects that its actions will 
have on the small companies that constitute the large 
majority of companies in the U.S.
If you wish to ask me any questions, I will try to 
answer on behalf of the firms I represent.
We very much appreciate the opportunity to present 
our views, and we thank you for your time and attention.
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MR. McCLOY: If you can approximate your 
answer, what are the chief MAS services that this group of 
accountants perform? Have you got any concept of the first 
three important services that they render?
MR. BERNSTEIN: I would say financial counseling 
of one type or another would be very important. Many of 
the business people really don’t understand financing. They 
may not have a good picture of the effects of some of their 
actions on the future of the business or its ability to 
survive.
Almost any major action that a client wants to 
take is something that we are liable to become involved in, 
whether it is plant expansion, buying machinery, buying life 
insurance or taking on product lines. The financial impacts 
of these items.
This seems naturally to lead into actual counseling 
in business matters. I have never claimed that being a CPA 
automatically makes one a superbusinessman, but then, neither 
does anything else that I know of.
Our clients typically are in a relatively confined 
environment. They don’t have a lot of contact with peers. 
They are concentrating on their day-to-day problems.
The advantage we bring them is contact with 
dozens and dozens of other business situations over years 
of experience and through the observation and collection of 
knowledge we are sort of brokering to them, the experience 
and knowledge that we have achieved with other clients.
MR. McCLOY: What is your professional staff? 
How much is it?
MR. BERNSTEIN: Our own firm?
MR. McCLOY: Yes.
MR. BERNSTEIN: Our firm, as a professional 
corporation, employs a total of 57 people.
PROFESSOR CARY: Professional?
MR. BERNSTEIN: No, there are seven clerical and 
the rest would be professionals or some might be called 
para-professionals.
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MR. McCLOY: Do you do any industrial engineering. 
Do you do plant layouts?
MR. BERNSTEIN: No, I don't think that any of 
the firms in this group would actually lay out a plant 
or do industrial engineering. And with respect to such a 
plant, we would very likely be involved in projecting the 
financial effects and possibly even in assisting in the 
financing, but not in the physical layouts.
MR. McCLOY: You do the tax work?
MR. BERNSTEIN: Income tax work, yes, sir.
MR. McCLOY: Do you do executive recruiting?
MR. BERNSTEIN: Of financial people. I think 
it would be most uncommon for any of us to recruit a chief 
executive officer.
MR. McCLOY: Most of your chief executive officers 
are owners?
MR. BERNSTEIN: That is correct, sir.
MR. McCLOY: I don't know that I have any 
other questions.
MR. WOOD: Would your considerable involvement in 
financial problems and other general business advice to your 
clients mean that you would spend a number of days in consultation 
with your clients, greater than in a normal situation?
Are you always available by phone to come out and sit 
down with them?
MR. BERNSTEIN: On reasonable notice or sometimes 
unreasonable notice. Yes, they call frequently. Either for 
telephone consultation or for meetings, and I think most of 
the firms in this group tend to see their clients on a regular 
basis. It is not just an annual service which is the 
certified audit.
MR. WOOD: That is what I was getting at.
MR. BERNSTEIN: It might be monthly, quarterly or 
semi-annually and/or other times as required.
MR. WOOD: I take it it is your feeling that 
although some of your associated firms who are associated 
with your statement do not have any SEC clients, and
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accordingly, are not seeking membership in the SEC 
Section, that if MAS is proscribed for SEC audit firms, that 
it will trickle down in a short term to those of you who 
are not in the Section.
MR. BERNSTEIN: Yes, sir, that is exactly what 
we fear. I think there is a little bit more to it 
than that.
We really had two things that motivated us 
because in discussing it, the subject did come up: 
Well, hey, this might be a terrific thing. Now, if we 
can stop all those big guys from doing this, and 
some of the stuff that they can’t do is going to fall in 
our laps, but we felt that it would trickle down to us, and 
we also generally felt that we prefer freedom and free 
enterprise as unfettered as possible, and that any sort 
of restrictions on economic activity even if it would 
benefit us financially was not something that it was in 
our hearts to favor.
MR. WOOD: We all agree with that.
MR. MATUSIAK: Mr. Bernstein, in your statement 
you said the Big Eight firms are invariably significantly 
lower than you are in "bidding" on auditing engagements.
It is widely believed that the charged time 
or hourly rates of the national firms are higher than the 
hourly rates for the smaller firms. How do you account 
for the fact that their audit fees are generally lower 
than yours?
MR. BERNSTEIN: Let me say first of all that 
there would have been at least one other firm that would 
have agreed and had their name on this but for that one 
point. They disagreed with our statement in that regard. 
However, we do not favor any kind of profusion or assistance 
in competing with Big Eight firms. We favor unfettered 
competition and free enterprise. We will just have to 
continue to take our chances in the market place.
My real opinion of that is that typically we 
would bump heads with them on an initial engagement.
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Initial for somebody, and I think that they come in with a 
low price. I think they may actually reduce it below 
what otherwise it might have been, but that is not 
exclusive to them. It might be that somebody else 
might do that as well.
I also have the feeling that they go more 
for the over-all materiality, and I don’t know whether 
any big eight firms are here, and if they disagree with me, 
I am sorry. I am not speaking from actual experience, for I 
have never worked at a big eight firm, but my impression 
is that they really do go for the overall material representations 
in the statements which, of course, we do, too, but we 
tend to get a little more nitty-gritty.
If the withheld tax payable account does not 
exactly equal the amount that they owe, if it will not be 
zeroed out by the next payment, then we would tend to 
try to get that straightened out.
We are much more involved in the day-to-day 
operations. It is keeping things straight for the clients' 
day-to-day work, and that may tend to raise our cost a 
bit. It is just my opinion.
PROFESSOR CARY: About what percentage of your 
work is in the MAS field vis-a-vis the auditing field?
MR. BERNSTEIN: I have found a surprising 
consistency among firms' percentages that I am familiar 
with. They seem to be very similar to ours.
At our firm certified audit work represents 
about 35% of our billable time, and we figure that what 
we call controllership, which is a mixture, it could be 
anywhere from write-up or bookkeeping work to counseling 
that is as esoteric as we get, is in the neighborhood of 
50 to 60%.
PROFESSOR CARY: Thank you.
MR. WOOD: MAS is included in the controllership 
in the broad base?
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MR. BERNSTEIN: It would be included in that. 
It is hard to distinguish in many cases. Since we have 
regular contact, we might be seeing the client every 
month and we might prepare his financial statement in the 
morning and sometime in the afternoon sit down and meet 
with the client for some period of time, and somewhere in 
there I think you ought to call it MAS work.
MR. MATUSIAK: How much of this 50 to 60% 
is from nonaudit clients?
MR. BERNSTEIN: Most. At least, speaking in our 
case, the number of audit clients is much less than 
the number of nonaudit clients. Most of our engagements are 
unaudited engagements, but the MAS services spread out over 
both unaudited and audited, so it would be roughly in 
proportion to the number of clients, or probably 2 or 3 or 
4 times the amount of MAS work being done for nonaudit 
clients than for audit clients.
MR. WOOD: Do you seek to gain such confidence 
of your clients that they will make you the auditors 
as well as the supplier of services?
MR. BERNSTEIN: Yes, sir.
MR. GARRETT: When you say nonaudit clients, 
do you mean mostly clients that don’t have audits by anybody?
MR. BERNSTEIN: That is correct.
MR. GARRETT: It isn't that someone else is doing 
the auditing? Or they don't need an audit.
MR. BERNSTEIN: Offhand, I cannot think of any 
clients of ours that also employ another CPA firm.
MR. WOOD: That is what I wanted to know.
MR. McCLOY: Your readers particularly are 
the banks, generally?
MR. BERNSTEIN: Yes, sir. Outside of the 
clients themselves, the great majority are the banks.
I did a study on that which I don't have with 
me, but if you are interested, I could get it for you. I
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studied over 140 financial statements that we had issued 
as to where they went, and once you get beyond the client 
and the banks, there is only quite a small percentage 
left of other people that might see the statements.
They are generally either sophisticated readers or insiders.
MR. GARRETT: Just as a matter of curiosity, is 
most of this that would be MAS work sort of day-to-day 
consulting, or a week-to-week, call up, or is some of it 
formal engagements for special studies of an MAS nature?
MR. BERNSTEIN: Most would be regular day-to-day 
or month-to-month, but there are a certain number of special 
engagements that we have, where we are asked to install a cost 
system, hire a controller, analyze possible plant expansion.
MR. GARRETT: That would be set up as 
a separate engagement?
MR. BERNSTEIN: It might be in many cases, or 
it might just tend to just flow along with the rest of 
the work.
MR. GARRETT: Do you have an MAS staff, 
division, group or something?
MR. BERNSTEIN: We have a small MAS staff. 
We have one person who devotes almost all his time to 
it, and is in charge of that and he draws on others in 
the firm as the engagement requires.
MR. GARRETT: What is the professional skill? 
He is a CPA?
MR. BERNSTEIN: He is not a CPA. He is a man 
that has actually been with us longer than any other staff 
person that we have, and we have found him to have 
extremely excellent business sense, street sense, even, 
if you will, and that his insights into business seem to 
be extremely good and a large number of our clients recognize 
that and value his counsel.
MR. GARRETT: I gather that these 11 firms 
that you speak of are not an association?
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MR. BERNSTEIN: That is correct.
MR. GARRETT: They assembled for this purpose.
MR. BERNSTEIN: No, they got assembled by one 
of the gentlemen deciding that this would be a good 
idea for one of us to be here, and he called a bunch 
of his competitors. We had never met before. Some 
of the gentlemen I had never met before at all, and we 
had a luncheon. Apparently I opened my mouth more than 
the others, and here I am.
MR. WOOD: You got the job.
MR. BERNSTEIN: I think that was actually 
about two weeks ago, and it has been put together within 
the two-week period.
MR. GARRETT: Have you some idea of the extent 
to which the Executive Committee's proposals, that are the 
formal subject of this hearing, would affect your 
current practice if put into effect and applied to you.? 
Have you tried to determine what we are doing as it would fit 
under the accounting-and-auditing skill-related test and 
the participation of management test?
MR. BERNSTEIN: I think it would have two 
effects. Number one, it would reduce our practice 
somewhat. I don't think that the financial impact in 
our particular case would be catastrophic for us, 
although it would eliminate a good segment of our 
practice and a segment that is profitable.
MR. GARRETT: Is this the segment that is 
not accounting or auditing-skill related, or are 
you making a management decision?
MR. GARRETT: We have spent two days wondering 
where the line is whenever the subject comes up, so don't 
be surprised if you are not exactly certain.
MR. BERNSTEIN: If you find out, I hope you 
will tell me.
We get into things like trying to arbitrate 
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or help settle arguments between family members in 
family businesses.
MR. GARRETT: That is lawyers’ work; 
you don’t do that. (Laughter)
MR. BERNSTEIN: There is a fine line there, 
too. We have got two terrible wars going on now. We 
are just naturally drawn in because you know the people, 
and you know the numbers. Perhaps they trust you to 
get drawn in, but I think for me, at least, one of the 
worst aspects of not being able to do this kind of 
work, is that I like to do it. It is fun. That is 
why I am in this business, and if I get forced into a 
position where all I do is check and tick and do audits, then 
I am just not going to like my work any more.
MR. GARRETT: There are very few, if any, at 
least that have spoken these last two days, that 
would favor abolishing all MAS by all members. The 
questions have been whether there should be some tests 
of what they ought to be. A lot of agreement that 
independence is an important thing, but many saying that 
it is the only important thing.
One of the practical questions with respect 
to these proposals is how they would hit who, what they 
would do. It is not easy to determine if you 
can’t figure out exactly how they work in particular 
circumstances, but I get the impression that any restrictions 
on MAS, you would oppose, and your group would oppose.
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MR. BERNSTEIN: That is correct.
MR. GARRETT: But you wouldn’t oppose the 
independence standard where you are engaging in the 
attest function?
MR. BERNSTEIN: No, I agree with independence 
100%. I just don’t agree that these activities impair 
it as long as we don’t own a piece of the client 
and maybe some other criteria, but I think our 
unlimited personal liability is really where they have 
got us. No matter what we do for the client, we 
consider that, and the thing that has got to hurt 
your independence more than anything else has got 
to be the fees. I can't imagine anything that we 
could possibly do for a client that could compare 
in any way to it. Maybe the lack of independence 
that might come from wanting to retain the fees.
You can’t get away from fees, I hope.
MR. MANZONI: Do you think that getting 
involved in management decision would impair your 
independence?
MR. BERNSTEIN: Advising management when 
they have to make the decision. We don't make that.
MR. MANZONI: I understand. When you get 
closer away from advice toward actual involvement 
in the decision-making process, is that something 
that clearly impairs independence?
MR. BERNSTEIN: I don't think so. We 
consider ourselves extremely independent. We fight 
with the clients. We stand ready to lose them if 
they don't like what we are going to do, and it is 
always covering our assets and our unlimited 
liability that matters. What is the difference? 
How can you compare bending to a client, to getting 
sued, losing vast amounts of money and reputation 
to what you had built up over a career of work? 
That is where independence comes from, and we just 
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can’t escape getting drawn into these family situations, 
these management decisions, and I have clients I 
have personally worked on for 25 years. I know their 
families. I know their business affairs from top 
to bottom, and when something comes up that they have 
to make a decision, it is hard for me to imagine 
that they are going to look in the phone book under 
management consultants.
MR. MANZONI: Are these kinds of clients 
the ones you typically might audit?
MR. BERNSTEIN: It could go either way. It 
depends. The length of the engagement has nothing to 
do with whether they are audit clients or not.
MR. MANZONI: What about the relationship? 
Does the relationship have anything to do with whether 
they are audit clients? The closeness of these families 
for a long time.
MR. BERNSTEIN: When I said closeness to 
families, I didn’t really mean on a social or family 
basis. I meant that if I had worked for someone for 
25 years, that I am aware that he has a father in 
a certain business or state of health and that he has 
children.
At least, in my case, I am not a very social 
person, I guess, and I am really not sociable with a 
lot of the clients, but I know their affairs extremely 
well, and I don’t think that knowing their affairs 
well impairs our ability to be independent. Witness 
to that, I only point out, at least in our case, our 
firm has been in existence for over 50 years. It was 
started by my father. I have been in the firm for over 
25 years. We have never been sued by anybody for 
anything any time.
MR. McCLOY: Somebody similarly situated to 
you testified that he was apt to know what all the 
marital relations were.
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MR. BERNSTEIN: That would happen. When you 
go through somebody’s checkbook, you never know what 
you are going to find out. (Laughter)
MR. McCLOY: Do you do a lot of advising on 
acquisitions, mergers, or doesn’t that come up, or 
sales, I guess?
MR. BERNSTEIN: I couldn’t say a lot because 
our clients do not often buy or sell, but when they do, 
I would say in the 100% of the cases that we will be 
involved with them in making the acquisition or making 
the sale. Absolutely.
MR. GARRETT: I think I understood you clearly, 
but let me be sure. A rule that, of the type being 
proposed, that left you out altogether or left out the 
largest part of your practice, you would still oppose?
MR. BERNSTEIN: Yes, sir.
MR. GARRETT: Because you don’t want to tie 
your standards to the SEC firms for your type of firm. 
On the other hand, you don’t think it would survive 
anyway.
MR. BERNSTEIN: We think it will spread to 
us, and we don’t think that that is essential or desirable 
to maintain independence.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much. Are there 
any further questions?
That has been very helpful.
MR. BERNSTEIN: Thank you very much, gentlemen.
I have another set of our statement which is 
identical to the one that I sent to Mr. Matusiak except 
that it does have the list of firms that approved of 
this and it had some blanks filled in on the first page.
Thank you very much.
MR. GARRETT: If there is nothing further, 
would you like to declare the adjournment, Mr. Chairman?
MR. McCLOY: So declared.
MR. GARRETT: We are adjourned.
(The hearing adjourned at 3:30 o’clock.)
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